Before beginning the story of the Lahore Division’s share in this
fighting, it is well to state that the Indian Corps had received
meantime two notable additions to its strength. The 4th Suffolks was the
first of the Territorial battalions to join us. I saw them on parade and
told them how glad I was to have them with us. I explained how it was
proposed to employ them, and particularly noticed their physique and
workmanlike appearance. I had but little acquaintance with the Force,
and had never soldiered with any but regular British troops in my life,
and hence I was able to take an impartial view.
The next to join us was the 4th Seaforths, another of that wonderful
Army which leapt from the dim shadow of neglect into the fulness of the
shining light of war, and gave England immediate proof of the truth that
though we are the least military we are the most warlike race on earth.
This battalion was intended to learn its trench work from the sister
regular battalion of Highlanders, forming part of the Indian Corps.
Immediately after their arrival I saw them at Vieille Chapelle, December
20. Even whilst I was going round and talking to the officers and
N.C.O.’s, the angry and increasing roar of guns was growing louder, and
just as I had finished explaining how they would at first be employed by
platoons in the trenches, an orderly arrived with a note to say the
German attacks were in full swing and my presence was required at my
Headquarters. These days of telephone warfare have destroyed the
glamour, such as is left of it, for Generals. It is difficult to get
away and see something of the fray oneself, but it amused me to think
after all my explanations and injunctions that this corps was in fact to
learn its lesson in the thick of the fighting without any preliminary
practice at all. Thus the 4th Seaforths, under their fine commander,
MacFarlane, marched away from the ground and their next halt was in the
second-line trenches running south from La Couture. The officers and men
all looked like fighters, and, as will be related later, they did not
belie their looks and rendered grand service throughout.
In accordance with the general plans for the local offensives,
Lieut.-General Watkis, in command of the Lahore Division, had also
directed an attack, on December 19, against a front of 300 yards of
German trenches N.E. of Givenchy, as already stated. The attacking
companies were drawn from the Highland Light Infantry and the 4th
Gurkhas, the latter being on the right, and this formed the left of the
combined Divisional attack, and was commanded by Colonel Ronaldson,
H.L.I., a good soldier. The Ferozepore Brigade was on the right of the
Sirhinds, and the 129th Baluchis were to have furnished the companies to
complete the attack which was being delivered from the point of junction
of the two Brigades, but this battalion, after its hard fighting on the
16th instant, was not fit for another thrust and was replaced by the
59th Rifles of the Jalandar Brigade.
The Sirhind attack was delivered at 5.34 A.M. after a very brief
Artillery preparation from field guns and howitzers. I have seen this
criticised in Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s most interesting book, _The
British Campaign in France and Flanders_, 1914, but it is necessary to
remember that our ammunition supply was very limited in those days and
commanders occasionally preferred a very short bombardment and a bigger
reserve to meet the counter-attacks, and to enable our men to hold on
and consolidate, or cover their retirement should such become necessary.
In any case the assault was completely successful, two lines of trenches
being taken. Though the distance was considerably over 150 yards, our
casualties in this first rush were few and over seventy prisoners fell
into our hands. The attack was made in four lines, the first being under
the command of Major B. U. Nicolay, 4th Gurkhas. He was wounded next
day, but commanded here with skill and behaved under trying
circumstances with the utmost coolness. He reported that the conduct of
the H.L.I. and 4th Gurkha detachment was admirable and described the
conditions, which, shortly explained, were these: The captured trenches
were about 200 yards long, straight and without traverses, and they were
found after some time to be under enfilade fire from the higher ground
on the right rear near Givenchy village. The trenches became overcrowded
and the saps between our own trenches and these were not finished.
Colonel Ronaldson reported that had it been possible to join these up
the gains would assuredly have been retained. Nicolay and his command
held on throughout a long and very trying day, and then, seeing the
hopelessness of the position, retired, with all the wounded, towards
dusk. The captures of the day were lost and we were once more back in
our own trenches.
Captain Cramer-Roberts, 4th Gurkhas, behaved with splendid gallantry in
carrying back a message over the open; he was thrice wounded but
nevertheless persevered, and just managed to reach the trench and give
his information to Colonel Ronaldson. He received a D.S.O. The name of
Major Gardiner, R.E., was prominently brought to notice for good work.
Our bombs had run out early in the day and the only others available
were a few found in the captured German trench, which Nicolay used with
good effect on their former owners. An incident occurred in front of the
H.L.I. advanced platoon which was already in those early days opening
our eyes to Hun methods. A German officer advanced with a white flag,
and his men, who had put on some of our Balaclava caps, under this
protection hoped to deceive us. They gained but a temporary advantage
and were soon found out, many being hit, and had thus added one more
deed to their scroll of shame.
After dark over thirty machine-guns concentrated their fire on the
H.L.I. trenches, foreshadowing the preparations which were in the making
for the attack next day.
In the H.L.I. Captain Pringle and Lieut. Anderson were missing and
Lieut. Kerr was killed. Sergeant Whitton, H.L.I., was strongly commended
by Major Nicolay, who also brought to notice the names of Subadar Durga
Gurung, Havildar Hara Sing Thapa, Naik Dharmraj Gurung, and Rifleman
Jangia Thapa, Cramer-Roberts’ orderly. Correspondence found in the
enemy’s trenches showed that we had been opposed chiefly by portions of
the 3rd, 13th, and 56th regiments, XIV. Division of Prussians.
Captain Inglis, Adjutant of the 4th Gurkhas, had guided the troops to
their rendezvous, and had then insisted as a reward on accompanying them
in the assault, and was killed. A good specimen of those splendid
British officers of which the Indian Army can boast so many.
Lieut. C. H. Anderson, H.L.I., one of those glorious spirits who are
well described in the Book of Job: “He saith unto the trumpets, Ha! Ha!
and he smelleth the battle afar off, the thunder of the Captains and the
shouting,” rushed on to the German Reserve trench, which he and his
Highlanders took in their stride, and shouting, “We are going to capture
Chapelle St. Roch,” those brave men went into the darkness, through the
pelting rain and storm, and were no more seen.
From scenes like these old Scotia’s grandeur springs.
The 59th Rifles, who attacked on the right, were only able to reach the
main German trench with a few men. Their task was a difficult one as
they had only just reached the front to relieve the 129th Baluchis, and
it was a wild stormy night with heavy rain and the ground was unknown to
them. It would have been better to have told off another corps for the
purpose, but the G.O.C. Division found it was the only way to carry out
his orders.
One company joined with the H.L.I. on their left; a platoon of another
company lost direction and went away to its right. The result was that a
number of men eventually got into the two saps on the right and left of
those attacked and held on. These two saps ran almost the whole way
between the German lines and ours. A bit which was incomplete in the
right sap was eventually, after many hours, joined up by the Sappers and
Miners, thus enabling a party of the 129th Baluchis who were holding the
main trenches to relieve the 59th. In this affair Jemadar Mangal Singh
of the 59th behaved with great gallantry and received the I.D.S.M.
After the first advance the fighting was of a very confused nature owing
to the darkness, rain, etc., and the reports that can be pieced together
are not sufficiently clear to enable me to form a connected story. This,
however, is certain, that considering the general mix up in the dark,
many deeds of bravery were performed, and although the attack did not
succeed in capturing any length of German trench, and thereby exposed
the right of the trench which had been captured to a flank attack by the
enemy, the 59th Rifles, well directed by their officers, made every
endeavour to accomplish their task.
Captain B. Anderson of this battalion, whom I had once seen lead a
charge against a band of Ghazis across the Indian border, was here again
leading his men, but on this occasion, unlike the Ghazis, who died
fighting to a man, the Germans turned and ran. Lieut. J. G. Atkinson was
killed. Lieut. W. A. McCrae-Bruce by his personal disregard of danger
set a splendid example which kept his men together in the turmoil.[8]
Havildar Dost Mahomed and Havildar Abdul Wahab were awarded the I.O.M.,
and a small party of men whose names cannot be recorded, for they all
perished, behaved splendidly, refusing to retire because the body of
their officer, Lieut. Bruce, had not been recovered.
Captain H. N. Lee and R. C. Gilchrist were killed during the attack on
and capture of the left sap, whilst Captain Scale was wounded and the
battalion had over 100 other casualties. Lieut. Scobie received the
Military Cross for his share in holding on to the left sap. Lieut.
Kisch, R.E., did excellent work under a heavy fire.
An attack on a German sap-head by two platoons of the 1st Gurkhas had
been ordered to be carried out at 5.30 A.M. this same day, and the
officers to accompany it were Captain T. Burke and Lieut. L. B. Rundall.
The latter was the younger of two sons of Colonel Rundall, an old friend
and comrade of mine who had served on my Staff. I knew both boys, and
all three of these fighting soldiers belonged to Gurkha regiments. The
elder brother was a Captain in the 4th Gurkhas and both were killed on
this and the following day, behaving as British officers do when stern
work is in hand, and leaving a name which will be cherished in the
Gurkha Brigade.
This attack could not be launched in time, owing to various causes, and
orders were issued cancelling it, but for some unknown reason the
assault was carried out at about 10 o’clock. As usual, the two brave
fellows rushed forward at the head of their men and were met by a hail
of fire and the leaden scythe mowed them down. About fifty took part in
the assault, of whom half were killed or wounded, both British officers
being among the former.
This brings the story of the Lahore Division’s attempts on December 19
to engage the enemy and help our other Army Corps and our French Allies
who were operating on our right to an end. As I said before, in
themselves, though described at length, they were only local offensives,
but they were unfortunate in as far as they had severely tried our
already tired troops on the very eve of the prepared German attack. In
war the man who can truly forecast events is of more value than many
legions of soldiers. All one can do is to endeavour by every means in
one’s power to carry out the Commander-in-Chief’s plans. Both Divisions
had done their duty.
The Meerut Division after the fighting on the 19th December was disposed
as under: Garhwal Brigade back in its own trenches; to their right the
6th Jats, the left battalion of the Dehra Dun Brigade, held their line
with the right thrown back so as to connect with, and conform to, the
retired line of the 2nd Gurkhas behind the “Orchard”; the Seaforth
Highlanders formed the right of the Brigade to near the “Picquet” house,
from which point the Sirhind Brigade of the Lahore Division continued
farther still to the right.
About 9 A.M., December 20, the attack on the Meerut Division was
started. The 2nd Gurkhas and the Seaforths—old and trusted comrades—were
singled out, and a heavy bombardment and Infantry advance told the
Division that a day which was to be an important one for the Indian
Corps had begun. Half an hour later word reached General Anderson that
the Seaforths’ right was in the air owing to the retirement of the left
of the Sirhind Brigade and that they were being heavily attacked from
this flank and at the same time bombed on their left owing to retirement
of part of the 2nd Gurkhas, which exposed them to the enemy’s bombers.
The Seaforths never lose an inch of ground without making the attackers
pay a heavy toll, but they were now fighting against great odds,
hand-grenades, machine-guns, and trench mortars, with both their flanks
in the air. One company was driven from its trench, but not until fifty
per cent of the enemy lay dead in it. Captain the Hon. St. Clair was
killed just as he had skilfully withdrawn into and was holding a
communication trench.
The 2nd Gurkhas were again put to a severe test this day; bombed and
overmatched, they were driven from their newly-occupied trenches;
followed up with hand-grenades and harried they retired, but always took
their toll in the retreat and finally drew up in a retired position
under Major Boileau, a soldier with an extraordinary personality. I
cannot better describe him than in the words of one of his own Gurkha
officers, “Asal Jangi Sahib” (a truly brave gentleman). With him was
Major Watt, another staunch fighter. During this fighting the Gurkhas
were pushed back a long way and were glad indeed to meet the 9th Gurkhas
coming up to their assistance. To do what is set you is of course the
best proof that you are competent to do it, but I have found in life
that sometimes though you may fail in the eyes of your judges, you may
nevertheless have done everything that was possible. Those gallant
Gurkhas deserved success, and I would as soon have them by me in a tight
place as any battalion I know.
It is instructive to note that at this moment N Battery, R.H.A., from
the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade, came into action and helped materially
by its fire across the front. This was the only calibre of gun
(18-pounders) for which we were not limited to a certain number of
rounds of ammunition, and the confidence this inspired, with the
excellence of the fire itself, was equal to many heavier batteries.
Think of it, the warriors of later times! An Army Corps was rejoiced at
the advent of six guns, manned by the pick of the Army, and instead of
wondering how it was going to be done, considered themselves fortunate
and bound to win. Unlimited ammunition! although only for six guns it is
true: but the surprise caused by the advance of the first six tanks in
later days was as nothing compared to that of the General who found
himself with six real guns and plenty of rounds for each. “Tempora
mutantur, nos et mutamur in illis.”
To fill the gap between the Seaforths and the retired line of the
Gurkhas, the 58th Rifles were ordered up; half the 41st Dogras was also
placed at the disposal of the G.O.C. Dehra Dun Brigade, and half the
Black Watch to form a link between Seaforths and the retired left of
Sirhind Brigade.
It was now 1 o’clock, December 20, and in order to retain the thread of
the story and make the movements of both Divisions coincide, I will
leave the Meerut Division and relate the occurrences which had taken
place in the Lahore Command.
Simultaneously with the attacks already described on the Meerut
Division, the Germans started their operations against the Lahore
Division, and from the early morning of the 20th December the trenches
were subjected to a fierce fire from guns and mortars, and then followed
a series of mine explosions under the trenches occupied by the Sirhind
Brigade. Soaked with rain which had lasted through the night; wearied by
the previous day’s trials; standing in bog knee-deep with the mud
slipping in as fast as it could be shovelled out of the trenches, and
with numbers totally inadequate to the front held, the British and
Indian troops began the resistance which lasted for twenty-four hours
without any extraneous help, and continued it for another twenty-four
hours until in part relieved by fresh troops of the First Army Corps;
when first the Lahore and later the Meerut Divisions were withdrawn,
with difficulty lasting out the ordeal. The wonder is not that they were
literally done up but that they were able to hold out as they did.
And the men who came to their relief, what of them? They were some of
the finest troops in our Army, the famous First Corps of Mons and Ypres
fame: with double our reduced numbers, fresh from a rest in reserve,
full of fight. Guards, Highlanders, Irish and English: neither Germans
nor anybody else could have withstood such a gathering; and as they
looked at our tired-out men, amongst them a few British battalions of
their own countrymen, as fine soldiers as themselves, battle-stained and
mud-grimed, I do not believe there was one amongst the brave new
arrivals who did not own that the Indian Corps had indeed had a hard
task and done its duty well.
The fight that followed showed them that it was a determined foe they
had to deal with, and 2400 casualties in their own ranks before the line
was more or less restored was evidence of the hard fighting which had
taken toll of over 4000 British and Indian soldiers.
However, to my story. The right of the Sirhind Brigade was the first to
bear the brunt, and here a half company of the H.L.I. and a double
company[9] of the 4th Gurkhas suffered very heavy losses, being buried
or blown up by the well-engineered explosions. The day had not then
arrived when we were able to detect and counter this underground
warfare; it was new to the Indian Corps at any rate, nor had we the
appliances to put it into use.
Amongst the survivors of these first explosions was Colour-Sergeant
Brisbane, H.L.I., who had served with me in Ashanti fourteen years
previously. I had met him later in India, and on this day we were once
more separated, for after holding on to the last, he with his officer,
Lieut. D. Barry, and some others were captured by the enemy. May we meet
again!
Another double company of the 4th Gurkhas made a stout resistance
against heavy odds, but were driven from their trenches, and at about 1
P.M. these were occupied by the Germans, who were coming on in massed
formation.
During this fighting, which ended in many hand-to-hand encounters,
Captain A. M. Rundall of the 4th Gurkhas, brother of the Lieutenant
whose death I described in the previous day’s fighting, led a bombing
party in a counter-attack, himself killed two Germans, and died fighting
at the head of his few men.
A glorious tale indeed to tell,
’Neath thousand blows one hero fell.
The machine-gun detachment of the 125th (Napier’s) Rifles at this stage
rendered gallant service, and with that of the 4th Gurkhas was
practically destroyed.
Captain R. C. Yates of the 4th Gurkhas with the greater part of his
company was also overwhelmed. It was reported to me after this action
that, whereas the Germans used hundreds of bombs which almost invariably
exploded and caused great damage, our own home-made articles constantly
failed to light or dropped harmless, being wet and unprotected from the
slush and rain.
Farther to the left of the Sirhind Brigade was a double company of the
1st Gurkhas commanded by Major C. Bliss, and a company of the H.L.I.
under Major T. F. Murray, and they had between them four Maxims.
Following heavy mine explosions this section was also attacked by great
numbers of the enemy, who notwithstanding heavy losses, caused
especially by our machine-guns, rushed in and made themselves masters of
the trenches.
Murray and Captain W. Cameron with their men made a fine stand and were
reported killed. Lieut. R. Guthrie-Smith, also of the H.L.I., was killed
and Lieut. C. Pitts-Tucker, whilst crossing the open with sorely needed
reinforcements, was wounded, and most of his party shared his fate or
were killed. Tucker was being carried in by two gallant comrades,
Corporal A. Barr and Private J. Carmichael, when he was again hit and
killed. Both men received the D.C.M.
About 11 o’clock General Watkis ordered up his reserve, and two French
Territorial battalions which were at his disposal, to the neighbourhood
of Givenchy; the 47th Sikhs to move up in reserve of the Sirhind
Brigade, and General Carnegy, commanding the Jalandar Brigade, to make a
flank attack from Givenchy to retake the lost trenches of the Sirhind
Brigade. During the defence of the left section by H.L.I. and 1st
Gurkhas, just described, Lieut. W. Stewart, H.L.I., with seventy men and
two Maxims, held on in the support trench. His party was very much in
the air, but showed splendid grit, tired and overworked as they had been
for two days; but with the help of forty men who reached him at dusk he
held on for nearly twenty-four hours until relieved by troops from the
First British Division. He was awarded the D.S.O.
The assistance rendered by our Artillery at this stage, and indeed
throughout these operations, was the theme of high praise from all ranks
of the Infantry, and well was it deserved, for without it the H.L.I. and
Gurkhas would have been destroyed by the advancing mass of troops.
The 1st Gurkhas, like the H.L.I., were being severely handled and the
enemy had driven a wedge into their line. Major Bliss was mortally
wounded while leading a bayonet charge which succeeded in affording our
sorely-tried men a short respite; Captain H. Momey was killed; but
numbers prevailed, and the Germans having gained a footing on flanks and
centre, and using large numbers of grenades, forced the Gurkhas back
into their support trenches, and quickly following up established
themselves in all our advanced lines. Festubert was reached before the
retiring line could be thoroughly joined up, and some of the troops had
by this time become much disorganised.
Seeing that General Watkis had his hands more than full, and being
apprehensive of further retirement, I had placed the Secunderabad
Cavalry Brigade and Jodhpore Lancers, acting as Infantry, and the 8th
Gurkhas from the Meerut Division, at his disposal, and to these was
added the 47th Sikhs; the whole under General Macbean.
This brings the narrative up to an hour after mid-day of the 20th
December, at which time news was received that the left of the
Ferozepore Brigade had been driven back and that Givenchy was being
heavily attacked.
The Artillery was working with a precision that spoke volumes for them,
and I felt assured that, come what might, the gunners, most of whom I
had known well in India, would answer to any call, and prove as ever
that their motto is well called “Ubique.”
Of the Indian battalions of the newly-arrived Sirhind Brigade two were
Gurkhas and the third was the 125th Rifles. The 1st Gurkhas (King
George’s Own) was raised in 1815 from soldiers who took service with the
British after the fall of Malaun. It went through many changes of name
and shared in many campaigns from Bhurtpore and Aliwal to Tirah. In 1910
it received its present title. A second battalion had been added in
1886.
The 4th Gurkhas was raised in 1857 as the “Extra Gurkha Regiment.” Its
battle honours date from “Ali Musjid and Kabul, 1879,” to “China, 1900.”
A second battalion was added in 1886.
The 125th (Napier’s) Rifles was raised in 1820, largely from men who had
served in the Peishwa’s Army. The battalion received several titles
connecting it with the old Bombay Army from time to time, until in 1903
its present designation was conferred upon it. It had served under
Napier at Meanee and last seen service in Burmah 1885–87.
My story of the action of the Meerut Division stopped at about this same
hour, and it is convenient to take a retrospect and see how the Army
Corps stood exactly at this time in order to better follow the battle.
Beginning with our right, the Ferozepore Brigade was next to and on the
left of the French XXIst Corps d’Armée, the Commander of which had
placed two Territorial battalions at the disposal of the Lahore
Division. The right battalion of the Ferozepore Brigade, the Connaught
Rangers, held the trenches south of the La Bassée Canal. On their left,
covering the east of Givenchy, were the greater part of the 57th Rifles
and part of the 9th Bhopals; these troops had not so far been attacked.
The 129th Baluchis was the left battalion of this Brigade and, as I
said, had just then been reported as retiring. Continuing to the left
stood the Sirhind Brigade, lately arrived from Egypt, and hence fresher
for work than others. The 4th and 1st Gurkhas and H.L.I. held the front;
companies of the Highlanders being interspersed in the Gurkha ranks. The
machine-guns of the 125th Rifles of this Brigade were also up in the
trenches. This ended the line held by the Lahore Division, and the
movements of the Divisional reserves have already been explained. As
will have been seen from the description of the fighting, this whole
Brigade had been driven back and held a now considerably retired line.
Carrying on our line to the north, _i.e._ farther to the left, the
Meerut Division had on its right the Dehra Dun Brigade, of which the
Seaforths occupied their old position, near the Picquet House, and
though being severely attacked were holding on in the most gallant
manner. On their right rear was half of the Black Watch which had been
sent up to establish connection between the Seaforths and the now
retired Sirhind Brigade. To the left of the Seaforths were the 2nd
Gurkhas, considerably drawn back by their retirement; and as a
connecting link to fill the gap the 58th Rifles had been ordered up by
General Anderson. Still farther to the left were the 6th Jats, forming
the left battalion of the Brigade, with their right skilfully thrown
back so as to keep connection with the retired Gurkha line. Finally, the
Garhwal Brigade completed the Meerut Division and was holding its
original line.
[Illustration: From a rough sketch made at the time.]
To continue the story of the Meerut Division from 1 P.M. on the 20th,
where I left them. At this hour the 2nd Gurkhas were holding a line a
quarter of a mile south of La Quinque Rue, and the Seaforths had
recaptured a lost trench on their left, and were bombing the Huns out of
their right, greatly hampered by a heavy fire from the Picquet House,
from which the left of the Sirhind Brigade had been driven. The Germans
were in occupation of the old 2nd Gurkha trenches; the 41st Dogras were
in Brigade reserve, and the 107th Pioneers, half of the Black Watch, and
4th Indian Cavalry were in Divisional reserve at Le Touret. The Garhwal
Brigade was being heavily attacked by shell-fire and trench mortars, but
was holding its own well. All available machine-guns were sent up to
assist this Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel Roche, 6th Jats, as senior officer on the spot, was in
command of his own Corps and all neighbouring reinforcements, and took
prompt measures to consolidate his position, and held it throughout this
and the next day.
The fighting Major Wauchope with half his Black Watch had succeeded by
11 P.M. in re-establishing touch with the Sirhind Brigade on his right
and the Seaforths on his left, and by this manœuvre completed the line
of the Meerut Division. The Germans had pushed in deep in front of the
2nd Gurkhas, but their triumph was only to be a temporary one.
As the attacks all along our front had assumed big proportions by the
afternoon of the 20th December, and I was only too well aware that the
Corps was, after its long tour of trench work since the end of October,
quite unfit for a prolonged struggle, I had asked G.H.Q. for two
Brigades from the Indian Cavalry Corps, which on foot might furnish the
strength of two battalions, and also for a Brigade from the First Army
Corps then in Army reserve, and these were at once given me, and two
additional Brigades from this Corps also arrived and were all employed
the next day, thus making an extra Division. I informed the G.O.C.
Meerut Division that one of these Brigades would reach him next day.
By 3 A.M. on the 21st, the Dehra Dun Brigade reported the enemy massing
on its front, and at 7.45 A.M. the G.O.C. Division learnt that a
counter-attack by the left Brigade of the Lahore Division had been
unsuccessful. At this stage General Keary, commanding the Garhwal
Brigade, suggested a counter-attack by the Dehra Dun Brigade, which he
would support from his side with his reserve battalion, the Leicesters;
this attack did not mature as the Dehra Dun Brigade was too exhausted to
carry it out. By this time the Seaforths on the right were being very
hard pressed, and half of the 107th Pioneers were sent to their
assistance, whilst the remainder of this battalion and the 4th Indian
Cavalry were called up and placed in a second line of trenches.
This remained more or less the position until the arrival that evening
of General Westmacott’s Brigade from the First Army Corps. Owing to
unavoidable delays in bringing this Brigade up, its attack was not
commenced until late in the evening. One battalion of the Royal Sussex
regiment was to relieve the Seaforths whilst the Loyal North Lancashires
and Northamptons attacked the lost “Orchard” positions.
By 10.30 P.M. on the 21st a report was received that this attack had
taken the supporting trenches west of the “Orchard” and was progressing
favourably, but the trenches about it were untenable and the attackers
eventually took position just west of it.
The Dehra Dun Brigade and the other Corps assisting in this part of the
line had now been fighting without a break for seventy-two hours in rain
and mud, and were much reduced in numbers. They had lost the “Orchard,”
but by the action of the troops in that neighbourhood, especially of the
Seaforths, the pivot at the Picquet House was still retained and acted
as a hinge the flexibility of which meant that the Meerut Division’s
line, though deeply indented, was still intact. By 7 o’clock on the
morning of the 22nd December the bulk of the Dehra Dun Brigade, as also
the 58th Rifles and Black Watch, had been withdrawn for a well-earned
rest, and the newly-arrived British Brigade had occupied their places in
the trenches.
At 10 A.M., 22nd December, after General Anderson had arranged for the
handing over of the right of his command to the First Army Corps, an
Artillery observing-officer reported that there was something wrong in
front of the “Orchard,” now held by the British troops, and that a
retirement was taking place there. If fresh Britishers found it
necessary to temporarily give way, it only shows the pressure that our
men had been faced with for two long days.
Tired out as they were, orders were at once given for the still fit
Indian Corps battalions to move up again and the others to stand fast.
The _contretemps_ was put right by the G.O.C. 2nd British Brigade before
10.30 o’clock; and at this hour on the 22nd December, the second
shortest day of the year, but, like the 21st, the longest in a fighting
sense, the worn-out troops at last found some rest, although still
retained ready in case of need. The Divisional Commander in reporting
his positions wound up with the words: “The worn-out Seaforth
Highlanders and 58th Rifles are now in reserve.”
At this point, 1 P.M., 22nd December, I will leave the Meerut Command
and describe the heavy fighting which was all this time going on in the
Lahore Division in and near that place of ill omen yclept Festubert.
Before doing so I will turn from the general story and record a few of
the names of those heroic soldiers who throughout these days had
maintained the traditions of the British and Indian Armies. I often
feel, and I say it in truth, that the rewards of Senior Generals are
seldom their own, but rather the work of subordinates of all ranks; and
if I had the power I would issue gazettes notifying them somewhat as
follows, taking as a sample an Army Corps:
In recognition of the fine fighting qualities displayed by the —— Army
Corps during the battle of ——, the G.O.C. in Command is awarded, etc.
I have received many honours from three Sovereigns. I should have
received none had it not been for the officers and men who had to carry
out orders at the risk of their lives, whilst I only issued them. It was
comparatively easy in this trench warfare to say “Promite vires,” when
you yourself were safe. He who has to make decisions under stress of
danger is the hero, and not the man FAR behind the guns.
In writing this story I have relied chiefly on orders and reports I was
able to get copied in France, and on my own diary very carefully kept
from day to day, together with letters and information from friends
since, but I have not had access to all the War diaries of Brigades and
battalions, etc. I cannot therefore pretend to describe in any detail
the doings of all those whose work I saw daily, and can only record such
matters as I have some knowledge of. If, therefore, omissions occur I
can only regret it.
Lieut.-Colonel Widdicombe, who commanded the 9th Gurkhas, did excellent
work; he arrived at a most opportune moment, reinforcing both the 2nd
Gurkhas and 6th Jats during the early fighting on 20th December. Captain
Laing of the Seaforths, leading a bombing party with great gallantry,
rushed and recaptured several traverses in a trench evacuated by the 2nd
Gurkhas, and in which the Huns left over twenty dead. Lieut. I. M.
Macandrew of the same regiment rallied some of the men of the British
Brigade as they retired from the “Orchard” on 22nd, led them in a
bombing attack, and after killing several of the enemy this gallant
young officer and ten of his men were themselves killed. Colonel
Ritchie, ever staunch and brave, Captain Wicks, a very fine soldier, and
Captain Laing, all of the Seaforths, received distinctions. In this
fighting the Seaforths suffered 175 casualties out of 700 engaged.
Major A. Young of the 1st Gurkhas, Brigade Major of the Garhwal Brigade,
had died of wounds on the 14th—a great loss to the Service. Major
Wauchope, Black Watch, was again wounded, and the regiment had to record
severe casualties.
In the 58th Rifles, Captain M. A. R. Bell, 54th Sikhs (attached), whom I
had known for many years, was killed, a very earnest soldier. Jemadar
Mardan Ali and twenty-five others were also killed and thirty-two were
wounded. The losses in killed, wounded, and missing throughout the
Divisions bore witness to the nature of the struggle in which they had
been engaged.