The fighting east of Festubert had been full of incidents which
furnished us with useful material for future operations. The German
strength directly opposite the Corps at this time may be taken at about
20,000 Infantry in addition to Pioneers, and an unknown number of guns
of all calibres. Ours should have been near that same number, but was,
owing to heavy casualties without replacements on any but a nominal
scale, very much less. What was found was that the enemy had already
achieved great skill in sapping up to our lines, and in this respect was
infinitely superior. Having completed his saps, and aided by grenades
and trench mortars, there was nothing to prevent his capturing our first
lines of trenches, nor for long after this time were we able to employ
his methods. The time came when the tables were turned; but you cannot
reach the skies while your feet are still on the earth, and ours were
deep in the Flanders mud. We also found that it makes for efficiency to
have British troops interspersed with the Indians. In this case only on
the extreme right was there half a Highland battalion, and on the
extreme left one company of an Irish regiment.
But whatever we may have learned, the Huns discovered that the Indian
Corps could give back all and more than it got, and we braced ourselves
up in the certain belief that although England had been sadly behind in
providing us with the means of paying back the enemy in his own coin,
she would assuredly make up way, and then would come our turn.
I often said all this to the Indian officers and men, and it cheered
them; they knew our real strength; they began to realise that we had
been caught tripping; and from surprise at first that this should ever
have been possible, they gradually became sarcastic at the expense of
the Huns. One Jawan (young fellow) even declared that if the Germans
would exchange weapons the war would be over in a week. “Not if we kept
them as clean as you do,” remarked a comrade, and all laughed. I
discovered our recruit had been reprimanded that morning for having a
dirty rifle on parade.
On the 24th November I attended my first conference at General
Headquarters. All the Corps Commanders were present, and although I knew
some of them and had casually met others at manœuvres which I had
attended when on leave from India (and I may here add that every time I
came home on leave I never missed attending manœuvres, British or
foreign, as opportunity offered), I felt for the first time in France
that I was a stranger. I heard as I came into the hall, “Who is that?”
“He commands the Indians.” It was as if some foreign general had
suddenly dropped into the sacred haunts of Whitehall in pre-war days.
However, I was prepared for it. I knew that most of them would hold out
the hand of welcome to our Indian soldiers, and it was satisfactory that
at our first meeting I was able to tell the Commander-in-Chief the
results of our fighting that very morning. Sir John French and Sir
Horace Smith-Dorrien congratulated me on the conduct of all ranks, and I
was rather pleased than otherwise that I was not one of those present
who might be referred to as Tom, Dick, or Harry.
On the 26th November I wrote to G.H.Q. giving a statement of the
strength of the Indian Corps which, including the Secunderabad Cavalry
Brigade, then numbered only 14,000 rifles or little over that of a
British Division, and was reducing at the rate of about eighty a day and
stating that I could receive no further reinforcements from India before
the 5th December, when the Sirhind Brigade should rejoin from Egypt. In
addition I pointed out that the British battalions averaged only 700 men
each, a pitifully low one for work in this Corps. I laid stress on the
fact that there were indications we might be again attacked, and that
one Brigade would, before the arrival of reinforcements, have done
forty-five days, and all the others thirty-five days actually in, or in
support of, the trenches, with only scraps of such rest as could be
arranged. I requested that under these conditions the Corps might be
given a complete rest of a few days when the reinforcements arrived;
gave full reasons why I considered it absolutely necessary, and
suggested remedies for our shortage in numbers and for increasing them.
One of these was the addition of Territorial battalions, and I may add
that, although G.H.Q. did not at first appear to approve of this, I did
get first two, and later a total of six, of these fine battalions, and
of them I shall have much to say as I progress. I said plainly that
unless my request was agreed to, the Corps would soon only be equivalent
to a single Division.
The reply to my letter stated that the condition of the Indian Corps was
well known, and I was to exercise caution in its employment, and that
the Commander-in-Chief would give such assistance as was possible, and
this was outlined; but I was given no hope of a rest for the Corps as a
whole, except such as I could eke out after the reinforcements arrived.
I realised the immense difficulties of the Commander-in-Chief; but I am
now writing for those who, knowing nothing of our own difficulties,
passed hasty judgement and unfairly criticised men who were in truth
doing right good work.
As a matter of fact no rest was given, but the Indian Corps held on to
its line for twenty-four days longer, reducing daily and being
eventually altogether too weak for its task. As if, however, to strain
the rope to the last strand, after the reinforcements arrived, instead
of deriving any benefit I was ordered to farther extend my front to
include Givenchy and up to the La Bassée-Bethune road. I knew how fatal
was such an order, but there was nothing to do but obey. The French
Brigadier whom we relieved was surprised at the smallness of the numbers
of the relieving troops, and told us his own outgoing strength, which
was very considerably higher. Shortly after that a heavy German attack
was launched at us, straining the tired-out troops to the limit of
endurance and entailing, after three days’ hard fighting, the assistance
of the First Army Corps from reserve to restore the position. All that
will be described in due course; but why I have gone into detail
regarding this matter is that, notwithstanding my having so strongly
urged a rest, and written as plainly as a Corps Commander could well do
in the field, yet in the despatch describing the operations of the 18th
and 19th December I am alluded to as having made an attack on the
Germans, because I deemed it to be “a favourable opportunity.” Nothing
could be farther from the facts. I considered it in truth a most
unfavourable opportunity; but my instructions as they read to me, and
which I will quote fully, were sufficiently clear to lay on me the
definite duty of using every endeavour to make one or more local pushes
to the front if I considered this reasonably feasible, and under those
conditions I chose what appeared to me to be the most favourable
opportunity that presented itself.
I had once drawn attention to the long term of unrelieved duty in the
trenches, and again when my front was extended beyond the power of the
tired Corps to hold on, and I could do no more.
On 28th November I had the honour of entertaining General de Maud’huy,
Commanding Xth French Army, at lunch. He and his Staff stayed till late
in the afternoon, and as usual I never enjoyed anything in France better
than visits to or from our Allied officers.
During the rest of the month the usual trench warfare continued, but
there was one incident worth recording. On the night of the 27th
November a party of the Manchesters, commanded by 2nd Lieut. S. D.
Connell, accompanied by Lieut. F. E. Buller, R.E., advanced and entered
two German saps sixty yards away. The saps were filled in, but in the
subsequent retirement Connell was killed and there were eleven other
casualties. Buller was awarded the Military Cross for his gallantry in
returning to bring in a wounded man, during which attempt he himself was
wounded. The O.C. Manchesters after careful inquiry estimated the German
casualties as not under forty, including an officer who was bayoneted as
he emerged from his dug-out.
On the 1st December His Majesty the King visited the Indian Corps, and
the honour was greatly appreciated by all ranks. There is nothing the
Indian soldier holds in comparison to a word from his Sovereign, and as
the King made frequent inquiries regarding individuals, these of course
were henceforth marked men. As soon as I knew that His Majesty meant to
start his tour from Corps Headquarters at Hinges, I telephoned to
General Maistre in command of the XXIst Corps d’Armée on my right and
asked him to attend. The French General had that morning an important
local duty in his trenches, but nevertheless he came. I had not been
able to tell him on the telephone the reason, as it was essential the
news of the King’s visit should be kept secret till the last moment; and
when he arrived and I explained it to him, he said, “No duty would have
kept me from paying my respects to your King. I am very pleased you let
me know.” His Majesty conversed with him for some time.
The King had all the British and Indian officers introduced to him at
each place where they were collected along the route from Hinges to
Locon: through slush and mud he tramped, adding joy and strength to his
soldiers, and after seeing all the assembled troops who were not on duty
in the trenches, and the Divisional Commanders and Indian Princes and
Chiefs, I had the honour of motoring His Majesty to a battery in action,
where he examined the guns, the men and their dug-outs, and I believe I
must have been one of the first officers to have this honour. He has
since been among many Corps and batteries, but this was his first visit
to the Army in France.
On 4th December I visited General Maistre, and with him went a long tour
of the trenches of the XXIst Corps d’Armée. What struck me most was the
extraordinarily well constructed communication trenches leading up to
the village of Fosse-Calonne. The country was chalky and rolling and as
different as a place could be from our own boggy front. I was also
struck by the perfection to which the French had brought their village
defences. The dug-outs were far more substantial and comfortable than
our own ever were at any time: electric power was available, and hence
many shelters were lighted with electricity, and every man appeared to
be hard at work improving the defences. The whole organisation was
excellent, and the nature of the soil and advantage of having a village
in the centre of the defensive line greatly assisted all their
protective measures. The men were full of humour and gave proof of this
in one room which was loopholed and only thirty yards away from another
held by the Germans. The roof had been damaged by a shell, and through
an opening one of the poilus proceeded to display a tricolour flag on
the end of a pole, his daily amusement. On this occasion, however,
Brother Boche was not to be drawn. On the table was a gramophone, and
another man at once turning it towards the loophole started the
“Marseillaise.” “If this will not fetch them,” he said, “I will try ‘God
save the King.’” But the Hun must have been in his mid-day sleep, as
nothing would move him, and all was quiet till we got outside, when they
started a lively fusillade at a chimney behind us, with what object I
could not surmise.
After spending three very interesting hours we returned by another
trench, and at an opening near a mound I emerged to find a Guard of
Honour drawn up with a band. To my surprise I learnt this was in my
honour, and after being saluted, those fine soldiers marched past me.
Needless to say I was more than gratified by this compliment paid to me
by an Allied brother Corps Commander. It is actions like this that bind
peoples together, and it is only one of a hundred proofs that our
friendship is not on the surface, but deep. Personally, I shall always
look on France as a land where I saw more human nature in its truest
form than I have ever seen elsewhere, and like Alexander and Diogenes
shall feel that if I were not an Englishman I would be a Frenchman.
On the return journey we went over the ruined village of Vermelle
recently taken by the French. I went through the German trenches and was
much surprised to find the comfortable dug-outs of the officers were
furnished with every kind of table, chair, and other luxuries. The walls
had pictures hung, and there were even good lamps and clocks in niches.
It all seemed so different from our own and gave me the impression that
the Huns looked after their comforts far too much. Shooting was going on
and numbers of shells lay unexploded, some of them being English. By
permission of the French Colonel I brought away two kinds of steel
loopholes out of German trenches, and eventually these were sent to
G.H.Q.; but I kept a periscope. These I had not till then seen in our
own Corps. The entire village was a mass of ruins, but a statuette of
the Virgin near a chapel still stood on its pedestal among the debris.
The Sirhind Brigade, under command of Major-General Brunker, arrived
from Egypt on the 7th December, and thus at last the Lahore Division was
completed. With the arrival of this Brigade and considerable drafts from
India, I prepared a scheme for giving my troops as much rest as was
possible; but it was short-lived, for on the 9th December the Chief of
the Staff called and told me the Corps was to extend its front and take
over the village of Givenchy and about a mile to the south of it from
the French. I have already told what this meant to us; but there was no
option, and on the 11th December we took over the trenches at Givenchy,
and as far as the La Bassée-Bethune road.
On the 8th December Sir John French had telegraphed thanking the Corps
for a message we had sent him, and said, “I owe them a deep debt of
gratitude for the splendid services they have rendered and which have
proved of great value in the conduct of the campaign.” Sir John never
failed to say a word at the right time.
On 12th December I attended a conference at G.H.Q., and was then
informed of the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief to commence an
offensive on the 14th December with the Second and Third Corps in
conjunction with the French on the left, with the object of reaching the
line Le Touquet-Warneton-Hollebeke. The Fourth and Indian Corps, though
taking no direct part in this action, were ordered to “carry out active
local operations with a view to containing the enemy now in their
front.” At this time the French on our right, _i.e._ next to the Indian
Corps, also undertook offensive operations.
This was the first of many orders received between this date and 20th
December, and, as I shall show, beginning with small injunctions they
increased in their scope; and the loyal endeavour on my part and that of
my Generals to comply with their spirit only ended when the enemy
launched a heavy attack against several parts of the Indian Corps.
Loyalty should claim no conditions, but it does not always meet with its
reward. As a matter of fact the offensives undertaken received the
commendation of the Commander-in-Chief at the time, as contained in his
own operation orders, and would under ordinary conditions have remained
at that, and no more would have been heard of them. It was the
long-premeditated attack delivered on the 20th December by the enemy
which alone brought us into prominence; and that it was carried out on
that date, just after our local efforts, was a mere coincidence, as the
German prisoners themselves stated the 20th was the day fixed for it.
On the 16th December it was decided to capture two German saps opposite
to the trenches of the 15th Sikhs in the neighbourhood of Givenchy, and
then to extend the operation by securing a portion of the German main
trenches. The troops selected for this operation were taken from the
Ferozepore Brigade.
The 129th Baluchis and 57th Rifles were ready to attack by 8.30 A.M.;
whilst the Connaught Rangers were detailed in support, and a Territorial
battalion (the 142nd), lent by the French General on our right, was held
in reserve. Major Potter with his company of the 129th was quickly
across the thirty yards which separated him from the left sap, and the
other company under Lieut. C. S. Browning also reached its objective;
the casualties in this first rush were not heavy, and both attacks
pushing up the sap were soon close to the enemy main trench.
But (there was always a “but” in the trench operations of those days)
the difficulty now presented itself as to how to reinforce them, as it
was impossible to cross the open space swept by a hail of bullets which
soon destroyed the wounded who had fallen in the first rush. The
attackers were gradually bombed back towards the captured sap-heads.
Browning and all his Indian officers were wounded, and the men in the
right sap got jammed in on the sap-head but held on till dusk under a
heavy fire of grenades, whilst Potter and his men in the left sap also
held their position with splendid determination.
A party of the 15th Sikhs who had accompanied each attack were meantime
working heart and soul to dig a trench back from the sap-head to our
main trench, and the 21st Company Sappers and Miners and working parties
of the 34th Pioneers were engaged in the same process to join up with
them from our own side. The right sap was the more difficult of the two,
and before connection could be established the remnants of our men in
the sap-head, fearing that relief would be late, made an attempt to
cross the open over the fifteen yards which still separated them from
their comrades: the distance was short but the devastating fire which
the enemy rained across it killed or wounded every man as he ran, and
the Hun had his revenge in the recapture of his lost ground.
Potter in the left sap was more fortunate, the new communication trench
being completed by dark, when he and his men withdrew into our own line.
His cool bearing and gallantry were never more conspicuous than on this
day, and though he was missing a few days later during an attack, his
name will live in the history of his Corps.
The casualties were heavy. In the Baluchis Captain Ussher, Subadar Adam
Khan, and fifty men were killed; Lieut. Browning, Captain Money, two
Indian officers, and seventy rank and file were wounded.
Writing of the 129th Baluchis brings to mind one or two good stories of
that battalion. Early in November, for purposes of identifying enemy
corps on our front, C.O.’s were asked to secure a few prisoners. One
afternoon Sepoy Abdulla Jan, a Mahsud, asked permission of his section
commander to cross “No Man’s Land” and enter a German sap. This was
refused, but shortly after, no N.C.O. being near, Abdulla slipped over
the parapet, ran across to the sap and jumped in. There was a Hun in it
all right but, possessing no rifle, he promptly bolted. The section
commander, having meantime returned along our trench, looked over the
parapet and saw our gallant friend; he shouted to him to return, which
the man did very quietly, and on arrival, being asked what he was at,
replied that he was trying to get hold of a German rifle and did not
think it worth while bringing in a mere man without it. His native
instinct had got the better of his discretion, as a Mahsud in his own
hills will risk his life to steal or otherwise procure a good firearm.
On being told a rifle was as nothing in value compared to a man, he at
once volunteered to go out again and capture one, and was much disgusted
when his request was refused.
These Mahsuds were on their first trial in our regular Corps, and in
some respects showed aptitude for trench warfare. As soon as our
roughly-made hand-grenades began to be issued they asked to be allowed
to use them, and the gallant Robson, R.E., of whom I told in the attack
by the 39th Garhwalis on November 23, gave them several lessons in their
use. The men were quite delighted, and parties often went out and bombed
German saps and entirely stopped the Huns working on that particular bit
of front. I have one more story of the 129th Baluchis.
The C.O., being in need of a change in his menu, one morning sent his
Afridi orderly and a signaller to find a chicken; no special method of
procuring it was prescribed, except that the men were to leave by the
communication trench. Some hours later the signaller returned with the
chicken and reported that the orderly had been arrested by the
Provost-Marshal for looting an empty shop (mark the words). This was
followed by another report from the Staff Captain. Next morning, to the
C.O.’s surprise, the orderly turned up as usual. Asked by what means he
had returned he quietly said, “I told the officer that I was taking the
things for you”; and later a large bundle arrived from Brigade
Headquarters addressed to the C.O. and on it a label, “Herewith your
property.” The contents comprised a bedspread, two blankets, a box of
china basins, knives, forks, a lady’s parasol, and a pair of stays. When
asked what the stays were for he replied, “They make very good hockey
pads.” Such were some of the lighter sides of trench warfare.
However, stern events were now ahead of us, and the Corps was about to
bear the brunt of a heavy German blow. On the 17th December, the
operation orders from Chief of Staff, G.H.Q., stated that it was the
intention of the Commander-in-Chief to “attack vigorously all along the
front” on the 18th, with the Second, Third, Fourth, and Indian Corps,
and a further paragraph directed that these Corps “will demonstrate and
seize any favourable opportunity which may offer to capture any enemy
trenches in their front.”
It is hard to reconcile the two operations contained in the self-same
order. To “attack vigorously” is clear enough; to “demonstrate” is to
make only a show of doing so. How can you do both at the same time?
This order was issued from G.H.Q. at 9 P.M. on the 17th December. My
orders based on it were timed 2.45 A.M. on the 18th, and the operations
planned were ordered to commence at 10 A.M. on the same day. At 10.15
A.M. G.H.Q. issued instructions that the efforts of the Second, Fourth,
and Indian Corps should be concentrated only on such objectives as were
reasonably feasible. At the risk of going into technical details for a
moment, I must give the orders in their sequence so that military
readers may realise the difficult conditions under which I had to carry
on operations until the German attack came on us. On this same date
(December 18) another order from G.H.Q. issued at 4.15 P.M. said the
Second, Third, Fourth, and Indian Corps would continue to demonstrate on
the 19th December along the whole front and seize every favourable
opportunity which may offer to capture any of the enemy’s trenches.
Now in order to capture enemy trenches it is necessary to make elaborate
and detailed arrangements. You cannot issue orders the same as you might
do in open warfare, and indeed it is the carefully-thought-out and
elaborate plans adopted since those early days that have turned this
trench warfare into an exact science, and why two years later even less
highly trained troops, assisted, it is true, by an overwhelming
Artillery fire, grenades, howitzers, etc., were able to carry out their
programme with something approaching mathematical exactitude. But all
this was different in 1914; we had then to do our best without these
aids and to take the consequences.
I have often thought how different might have been the results of some
of the many attacks carried out by Indian troops had we arrived “After”
instead of “Before” unlimited ammunition and all the other helps to
victory had come to be looked on as part of the absolute necessaries for
any advance.
A distinguished General said to me in 1917: “When _you_ were in France
it was a crime to say it was necessary to success to have a large gun
support; now any one volunteering to carry out an enterprise except with
an unlimited amount of shells would be looked on as a fool and take his
_congé_ at once.” What a pleasant change!
On the 18th and 19th, operations were carried out by the Indian Corps as
will shortly be narrated, and G.H.Q. was of course kept fully informed.
On this latter date the Commander-in-Chief’s orders were as follows:
Issued at 6 P.M. The operations conducted yesterday were attended in
several cases with marked success. Although the ground gained has not
in all cases been maintained the balance of advantage rests with us
and promises well for further progress. It is the intention of the
Commander-in-Chief that the Second, Third, Fourth, and Indian Corps
should continue until further orders to prosecute similar enterprises
under Corps arrangements, taking every possible measure to consolidate
and “extend” [my inverted commas] all successes achieved.
Such were the orders received by me from the 12th to 19th December
inclusive, and it was in accordance with them that the operations of the
Corps, now about to be told, were carried out. As will be seen, we
succeeded in occupying a portion of enemy trenches and sap-heads, and
captured two machine-guns and some prisoners, and, as I said before, but
for the German attack on us the following day, our job would probably
have been considered as very successful.
Details were, of course, left to Divisional Commanders, but the
responsibility was mine, for I could have altered or refused to sanction
them. In the case of the Meerut Division matters were allowed to stand
as proposed. In the case of the Lahore Division for their attack on
19th, General Watkis proposed an attack on a front of 1000 yards. I
reduced this to 300 yards, leaving the choice of the part to be attacked
to him. We had neither the men nor the guns for the larger attack, and
our orders limited us to distinctly minor operations.
The Commander-in-Chief’s despatch on this battle stated that the losses
in the Meerut Division after the first attack on the 19th December and
subsequent return to its own trenches were “considerable,” but the total
casualties amounted to eighty-two, including officers. The Lahore
Division fought for several successive days before the German attack was
launched, and during this time lost very heavily, especially in
officers; but in both Divisions not a single regimental officer in the
Indian Army was “mentioned” in the body of the despatch, and only two in
the British Service.
At this time our distribution was as under. The French on our right had
their extreme left on the Bethune-La Bassée road. From this road to the
canal was held by the Connaught Rangers of the Ferozepore Brigade, and
the remainder of this Brigade held the trenches as far as east of
Givenchy. The Sirhind Brigade was on their left and extended the line
keeping parallel to the Festubert road, up to within half a mile of the
cross-roads at La Quinque Rue. This completed the front of the Lahore
Division; and the Meerut Division, with the Seaforth Highlanders of the
Dehra Dun Brigade on their extreme right, was distributed as follows:
Remainder of this Brigade in position as far as the cross-roads on the
Rue du Bois, the line passing through what was commonly then known as
“The Orchard,” though this name later caused some confusion, owing to
the fact that several other orchards existed. The Garhwal Brigade was on
the left of the Corps, and held trenches as far as the cross-roads south
of Neuve Chapelle.
Both the Lahore and Meerut Divisional Commanders had arranged local
offensive operations to give effect to the orders of the
Commander-in-Chief, and these were put into execution on the morning of
the 19th. The portion of German trench to be attacked by the Lahore
Division was just opposite the junction of the Ferozepore and Sirhind
Brigades, and the attacking troops consisted of one battalion from each
Brigade.
The Meerut Division had selected as its objective the German trenches
near the “Orchard,” and opposite the 6th Jats on the left of the Dehra
Dun Brigade. The attacking troops consisted of one and a half battalions
of the Garhwal Brigade.
Both attacks were accompanied by a complement of Sappers and Pioneers. A
biting cold wind blew over the trenches, making it impossible to get any
warmth into the body, as the Meerut Division party, which advanced
first, left its trenches.
Half an hour after midnight the Leicesters moved to the salient whence
would start the attack, and by 3.30 A.M. deployed and began the advance.
The battalion was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Blackader, and he had
under him a splendid body of officers and men. The remainder of his
troops consisted of half of the 2/3rd Gurkhas, a company of the 107th
Pioneers, and a party of Sappers.
Immediately the advance began machine-guns swept the area, but, although
held up by barbed wire and a hedge, Captain Romilly, who was with his
company on the left, stopped at nothing until they had entered the Hun
trench and captured two machine-guns. The enemy, not caring to face this
class of men, had bolted as we neared the objective, but the Leicesters
once started are hard to stop, and into the hail of another gun which
had opened on them went the men from the Midland County. Again the bird
had flown, but a second trench was ours and was only abandoned when it
was seen that it was too far in advance and under our own Artillery
fire. The captors took up their position in the first trench and at once
put it into a proper state of defence.
The right company of the Leicesters with equal determination had soon
made themselves masters over 100 yards of trench, but in bombing along
this found it led into the main trench, and when within only a few yards
of this, seven of the eight bombers were put out of action. A barricade
was erected and, being reinforced by their own men and some of the 3rd
Gurkhas, they held on. This, however, left a gap between the right and
left attacking companies, which Major Dundas and his Gurkhas, with
splendid élan, endeavoured to bridge. The enemy, however, held this
portion of the trench strongly, and although driven back with grenades
and bayonets, still remained in possession of a considerable part of it.
The Gurkhas suffered from a close enfilade fire, but consolidated their
gains.
In the result the trenches captured by the Leicesters on the right were
lost, as the enemy employed machine-guns to cut away the barricades and
followed up with unlimited bombing. New barricades were constructed but
shared the same fate, and, as Dundas on the left found it impossible to
advance farther, and all ranks were under heavy minenwerfer fire, a
withdrawal of the right attack was carried out deliberately and in good
order. The left company held on all day to the captured trenches but was
withdrawn by 8.30 P.M., having done its duty well.
Meantime General Anderson, commanding the Meerut Division, had with his
usual energy been doing all that was possible to enable the Leicesters
to hold on; an attack by portions of the Dehra Dun Brigade had been
arranged, but the Germans, now thoroughly roused and angry, and having
made their preparations for the attack they had planned for the next
day, the 20th, began a very heavy bombardment of our trenches, specially
selecting the “Orchard” portion of them, on which shell-fire was
concentrated, damaging everything in the vicinity, blowing men to bits,
and rendering any hold on them quite impossible. At the same time it was
reported by aviators that numbers of the enemy were concentrating on
this and other fronts, and everything pointed to a counter-attack.
During the fighting I had placed troops as necessitated from the Corps
Reserve at the disposal of the G.O.C. Meerut Division.
It has always been a wonder to me how in these winter days of 1914 the
Indian troops did their work so well. If any man trusted them to fight,
I did: but I knew their limits. What surprises me as I look back on it
all is that they stood the strain as they did. It was in truth a
prolonged feat of arms.
The result of this destructive fire was to render the “Orchard”
untenable, and a new line fifty yards farther to the west was taken up
and put into the best state of defence possible, but this was only done
late in the evening and after the Brigadier had reported the
impossibility of holding on any longer; a few Scouts still remained in
the destroyed trenches. Orders were got ready for a combined
counter-attack the next morning, but before this could be carried out
the prepared and due Hun attack was launched and a new phase in the
operations begun.
The following are amongst those who were brought to special notice
during these operations: Colonel Blackader, who led his battalion and
withdrew it skilfully; Major Knatchbull, Captain Romilly, and Lieut.
Tooley, all of the Leicesters; No. 6275 Private Buckingham, for great
gallantry (and it is pleasant to record that this brave soldier later in
the war won the V.C.); Sergeant Sutherland, Lance-Corporal Brakes, and
Private Crisp; and if all the names of other brave Leicester officers
and men were recorded here and whenever the battalion was engaged they
would fill many pages. Captain Lodwick, 3rd Gurkhas, who with his
machine-gun team rendered good service; Rifleman Thaman Gharti and Major
Dundas of the same battalion came in for high praise; and Captain C. D.
Bamberger, R.E., who was killed, would have assuredly been rewarded had
he survived.
We had on the left made our demonstration—or give it any other name. We
had certainly succeeded on this flank in holding the enemy to his ground
and prevented him sending away troops to other parts of his front. We
had captured a few prisoners and machine-guns, and now we were doing our
best to hold his attacks.