The prestige of his victories had bridled the opposition; when the end

of his command drew near, all the hostilities were awakened; they waited

the time when, returning to every-day life, he would be no longer

protected by the prerogatives attached to the _imperium_. “Marcus Cato,”

says Suetonius, “swore that he would denounce Cæsar to the magistrates

as soon as he had disbanded his army; and it was a matter of common talk

that, if Cæsar returned as a private individual, he would be obliged,

like Milo, to defend himself before judges, surrounded with armed men.

Asinius Pollio makes this account very probable; he relates that, at the

battle of Pharsalia, Cæsar, casting his eyes on his adversaries

vanquished or fugitives, exclaimed: ‘They have willed it! After having

accomplished so many great things, I, Caius Cæsar, was condemned, if I

had not demanded succour of my army.’”[802] Hence Cœlius, writing to

Cæsar, put the question in its true light when he said, “Cæsar is

persuaded that his only hope lies in keeping his army;”[803] and, on

another side, as Dio Cassius informs us, Pompey did not dare to submit

the difference to the people, knowing well that, if the people were

taken for judge, Cæsar would gain the day.[804]

[Sidenote: The Question of Right between the Senate and Cæsar.]

V. It is here the place to examine at what period the power of Cæsar

expired, and what was the pretext of the conflict which rose between him

and the Senate.

Learned historians have long had this subject under consideration; they

have devoted themselves to the most profound researches, and to the most

ingenious suppositions, still without arriving at a completely

satisfactory result,[805] which ought not to surprise us, inasmuch as

Cicero himself found the question obscure.[806]

In virtue of a law of C. Sempronius Gracchus, named _lex Sempronia_, it

had been decided that the Senate should designate, before the election

of the consuls, the provinces they were to administer after quitting

office. When Cæsar and Bibulus were elected, instead of provinces, the

inspection of the public ways was given to them; but Cæsar, unwilling to

suffer this affront, obtained, by a _plebiscitum_, on the motion of

Vatinius, the government of Cisalpine Gaul for five years; the Senate

added to it Transalpine Gaul, which then formed a separate province

independent of the other.[807] In 699, the law Trebonia prolonged, for

five more years, Cæsar’s command in Gaul. This command was therefore to

last ten years; and, since Cæsar only entered upon his proconsular

functions at the beginning of the year 696, it seems natural to infer

that these ten years should reach to the 1st of January, 706. We,

nevertheless, see that, at the end of 704, the Senate regarded Cæsar’s

power as at an end. We then ask, on what ground that assembly supported

the pretence that the ten years devolved to the proconsul were completed

at that date. We consider the following to be the explanation:--

It was in the month of March that, according to custom, the retiring

consuls took possession of the government of provinces.[808] It is,

consequently, very probable that the law of Vatinius, published, as we

have seen, in 695, was voted towards the latter days of the month of

February in that same year, and that the proconsulship given to Cæsar

was to begin from the day of the promulgation of that law. Nothing would

have prevented him, indeed, from shortening the time of his magistracy,

and seizing, before the termination of his curule functions, the

military command or _imperium_, as Crassus did in 699, who started for

Syria without waiting for the end of his consulship. Supposing, then,

which is not impossible, that the whole year of Cæsar’s consulship was

included in his proconsulship,[809] the five first years of his command

would date from 695, and end on the 1st of January, 700. The oration on

the Consular Provinces proves that it was so understood. The time when

it was pronounced (July or August, 698) was that of the assignment of

the provinces destined for the consuls who were to quit office eighteen

months after--that is, in 700--and when the question of superseding

Cæsar was agitated. The first _quinquennium_ of his command terminated,

therefore, in December, 699, and, consequently, the second in December,

704. Such was the system of the Senate, naturally much inclined to

shorten the duration of the proconsulship of Gaul.[810] Accordingly,

Hirtius informs us that, in 703, the Gauls knew that Cæsar had but one

summer, that of 704, to pass in Gaul.[811] Dio Cassius says similarly

that Cæsar’s power was to end with the year 704.[812] According to

Appian, the Consul Claudius Marcellus proposed, at the beginning of 704,

to name a successor to Cæsar, whose powers were on the eve of

expiring.[813] On the other hand, Cicero relates in one of his letters

that Pompey seemed to be of the same opinion as the Senate, to require

the return of the proconsul on the Ides of the November of 704. At the

end of that same year, the great orator expresses, in the following

terms, his own opinion on the subject of the claim raised by Cæsar to

dispensation from coming to Rome to solicit the consulship: “What, then?

must we have regard for a man who will keep his army after the day fixed

by the law?”[814] Some time afterwards, apostrophising Cæsar in a

letter to Atticus,[815] he exclaims: “You have kept, during ten years, a

province of which you have procured the continuance, not by the

sovereign will of the Senate, but by your intrigues and your acts of

violence. You have overpassed the term fixed, by your ambition, and not

by the law.... You retain your army longer than the people has ordained

and than it is the people’s will.” On another hand, a passage of

Suetonius says, in a very formal manner, that Cæsar intended to offer

himself as candidate in 705, to exercise the consulship in 706, when he

would have completed the time of his proconsulship.[816] Lastly the

Senate so evidently regards the beginning of the year 705 as the

obligatory termination of Cæsar’s command, that, in the month of

January, it declares him the enemy of the Republic, because he is still

at the head of his soldiers, and decrees extreme measures against

him.[817]

But the dispute between the Senate and Cæsar did not turn upon the term

of his command. Cæsar offered himself to the consular comitia of the

year 705. A law, submitted to the people by the ten tribunes, and

supported by Pompey and Cicero, had permitted him to solicit this

charge, although absent.[818] This law would have been without object

unless it had implied the authorisation for Cæsar to keep his army

until the time of the consular elections. Certain authors even think

that this right must have been formally reserved in the law. The

“Epitome” of Titus Livius says, in fact, that, according to the law, he

was to keep his command until the time of his second consulship.[819] On

the other hand, Cicero writes to Atticus that the best argument for

refusing Cæsar, in his absence, the power of soliciting the second

consulship, is that, by granting it to him, they acknowledge in him, by

the same act, the right of keeping his province and his army.[820] This

advantage Cæsar calls _beneficium populi_;[821] and when he complained

that they were depriving him of six months of his command, he reckoned

the time which had to pass between the 1st of January, 705, and the

month of July, the period of the consular comitia.[822]

Nevertheless, Cæsar had a great interest in keeping his army until he

was elected to the first magistracy of the Republic, for he would then

keep the _imperium_ as long as Pompey, whose powers, prolonged in 702,

would end on the 1st of January, 707.[823] It was evident that he was

unwilling to disarm before his rival; now if, according to the

combination established by law, he remained consul till the 1st of

January, 707, his command ended at the same time as that of Pompey, and

after that he had nothing more to fear from the plots of his enemies.

In fact, everything was now merging into an open struggle between Cæsar

and Pompey. In vain will the former seek all means of conciliation, in

vain will the latter strive to escape from the exactions of his party;

the force of circumstances will infallibly push them one against the

other. And just as we see, in the liquid traversed by an electric

current, all the elements it contains moving towards the two opposite

poles, so in Roman society in a state of dissolution, air the passions,

all the interests, the memories of the past, the hopes of the future,

are going to separate violently and divide themselves between the two

men who personify the antagonism of two opposite causes.

[Sidenote: Intrigues to deprive Cæsar of his Command.]

VI. Let us return to the relation of events. Pompey, all-powerful,

though a simple proconsul, had, as we have said before, retired to

Tarentum; he seemed to wish to remain foreign to the intrigues which

were at work in Rome; it appears even that he had the intention of going

into Spain to govern his province.[824] At the outset of revolutions,

the majority of the people, and even that of the assemblies, incline

always towards moderation; but soon, overruled by an excitable and

enterprising minority, they are drawn by it into extreme courses. It is

what happened at this time. Marcellus and his party strove first to

carry Pompey, and, when he had once taken his decision, they carried the

Senate. At the moment when, in the month of June, Pompey prepared to

return to the troops stationed at Ariminum, he was called back to Rome;

and when, on the 11th of the Calends of August, the senators assembled

in the temple of Apollo to regulate the pay of the troops, he was asked

why he had lent a legion to Cæsar. Obliged to give an explanation, he

promised to recall it, but not immediately, as he was unwilling to have

the appearance of yielding to threats. He was then pressed to give his

opinion on the recall of Cæsar; upon which, by one of those evasive

phrases which were habitual with him, and which revealed his hesitation,

he replied that “everybody ought equally to obey the Senate.”[825]

Nothing was enacted in regard to the consular powers.

The question of the government of Gaul was to be resumed on the Ides of

August; then again, in the month of September; but the Senate never

found itself in sufficient numbers to deliberate, so much did it fear to

come to a decision. They did not determine on entering upon the question

frankly until they were convinced of Pompey’s consent to the recall of

Cæsar.[826] beforehand the consuls nominated for the following year,

and imposed upon them a rule of conduct: their hostility to Cæsar had

determined their election. On the 11th of the Calends of October, M.

Marcellus, who made himself the organ of the passions of the moment,

exacted such numerous and unusual guarantees, that we may judge to what

point his party had at heart to carry the day. Thus, the consuls

recently elected were required to enter into the engagement to put the

question on the orders of the day for the Calends of March; until it was

settled, the Senate was bound to assemble to deliberate upon it every

day, even on those which were called _comitiales_, when any meeting of

that body was forbidden, and, to this effect, the senators who should

fill the offices of judges were to be sent for into the curia. The

Senate was also to declare beforehand that those who had the power of

interceding should abstain from exercising it, and that, if they

interceded or demanded an adjournment, they should be considered as

enemies of the Republic; a report of their conduct should be made, at

the same time, to the Senate and to the people.[827] This motion was

adopted and inscribed in the minutes as a _decision_ or an _opinion_ of

the Senate (_senatus auctoritas_). Four tribunes of the people

interceded: C. Cœlius, L. Vinucius, P. Cornelius, and C. Vibius

Pansa.

It was not enough to prepare attacks against Cæsar’s command; the

discontent of the army was also to be feared; and, in order to avert or

weaken its effect, M. Marcellus caused to be further inscribed in the

minutes of the Senate the following decision: “The Senate will take

into consideration the situation of those soldiers of the army of Gaul

whose time of service is expired, or who shall produce sufficient

reasons for being restored to civil life.” C. Cœlius and C. Vibius

Pansa renewed their opposition.[828]

Some senators, more impatient, demanded that they should not wait for

the time fixed by M. Marcellus to decree upon this subject. Pompey

interfered again as moderator, and said that they could not, without

injustice, take a decision on the subject of Cæsar’s province before the

Calends of March, 704, an epoch at which he should find no further

inconvenience in it. “What will be done,” asked one of the senators, “if

the decision of the Senate be opposed?”--“It matters little,” replied

Pompey, “whether Cæsar refuses to obey this decision, or suborns people

to intercede.”--“But,” said another, “if he seeks to be consul, and keep

his army?”--Pompey only replied with great coolness, “If my son would

beat me with a staff?...” He always, as we see, affected obscurity in

his replies. The natural conclusion from this language was to raise the

suspicion of secret negotiations with Cæsar, and it was believed that

the latter would accept one of these two conditions, either to keep his

province without soliciting the consulship, or to quit his army and

return to Rome when, though absent, he should be elected consul.

The Senate declared also that, for the province of Cilicia and the eight

other prætorian provinces, the governors should be chosen by lot among

the prætors who had not yet had a government. Cœlius and Pansa made

opposition to this decree, which left to that assembly the power of

giving the provinces at its will.[829] These different measures revealed

sufficiently the thoughts of the Senate, and the prudent politicians saw

with uneasiness that it was seeking to precipitate events.

Discord in the interior generally paralyses all national policy on the

exterior. Absorbed by the intrigues at home, the aristocratic party was

sacrificing the great interests of the Republic. Cicero wrote in vain

that his forces were insufficient to resist the Parthians, an invasion

by whom appeared imminent: the consuls refused to occupy the Senate with

his claims, because they were unwilling either to go themselves to

undertake so distant a campaign, or to permit others to go in their

place.[830] They were much more anxious to humble Cæsar than to avenge

Crassus; and yet the public opinion, moved by the dangers with which

Syria was threatened, called for an extraordinary command in the East,

either for Pompey or for Cæsar.[831] Fortunately, the Parthians did not

attack; Bibulus and Cicero had only to combat bands of plunderers. The

latter, on the 3rd of the Ides of October, defeated a party of Cilician

mountaineers near Mount Amanus. He carried their camp, besieged their

fortress of Pindenissus, which he took, and his soldiers saluted him as

_imperator_.[832] From that time he took this title in the subscription

of his letters.[833]

CHAPTER IX.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 704.

[Sidenote: C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Æmilius Paulus, Consuls.]

I. The year 703 had been employed in intrigues with the object of

overthrowing Cæsar, and the aristocratic party believed that, for the

success of this sort of plot, it could reckon upon the support of the

chief magistrates who were entering upon office in January, 704. Of the

two consuls, C. Claudius Marcellus, nephew of the preceding consul of

the same name, and L. Æmilius Paulus, the first was kinsman, but at the

same time enemy, of Cæsar; the second had not yet shown his party,

though report gave him the same opinions as his colleague. It was

expected that, in concert with C. Scribonius Curio, whose advancement to

the tribuneship was due to Pompey,[834] he would distribute the lands of

Campania which had not yet been given out, the consequence of which

would be that Cæsar, on his return, could no longer dispose of this

property in favour of his veterans.[835] This hope was vain; for already

Paulus and Curio had joined the party of the proconsul of Gaul. Well

informed of the intrigues of his enemies, Cæsar had long taken care to

have always at Rome a consul or tribunes devoted to his interest; in 703

he could reckon on the Consul Sulpicius and the tribunes Pansa and

Cœlius; in 704, Paulus and Curio were devoted to him. If,

subsequently, in 705, the two consuls were opposed to him, he had, at

least on his side, that year, the tribunes Mark Antony and Q. Cassius.

Curio is called by Velleius Paterculus the wittiest of rogues;[836] but

as long as this tribune remained faithful to the cause of the Senate,

Cicero honoured him with his esteem, and paid the greatest compliments

to his character and his high qualities.[837] Curio had acquired

authority by his eloquence, and by the numbers of his clients. His

father had been the declared enemy of Cæsar, against whom he had written

a book,[838] and uttered many jokes, cutting or coarse, which were

repeated in Rome.[839] Inheriting these feelings, Curio had long pursued

the conqueror of Gaul with his sarcasms; but nobody forgot insults so

easily as Cæsar, and, as he appreciated the political importance of this

dangerous adversary, he spared nothing to gain him to his interests.

From his earliest youth, Curio had been bound by close intimacy to Mark

Antony. Both ruined by debts, they had led together the most dissolute

lives; their friendship had never changed.[840] The relationship of Mark

Antony with the Julia family,[841] his connection with Gabinius, and,

above all, his military conduct in Egypt, had gained for him the respect

of Cæsar to whom he withdrew when Gabinius was put on his trial.[842]

Cæsar employed him first as lieutenant, and afterwards, in 701, chose

him as quæstor. His kindness for Mark Antony probably contributed to

soften Curio’s temper; his liberality did the rest. He had given him, if

we can believe Appian, more than 1,500 talents.[843] It is true that, at

the same time, he bought equally dear the Consul L. Æmilius Paulus,

without requiring more than his neutrality.[844] We can hardly

understand how Cæsar, while he was paying his army, could support such

sacrifices, and meet, at the same time, so many other expenses. To

increase by his largesses the number of his partisans in Rome;[845] to

cause to be built in the Narbonnese theatres and monuments; near Aricia,

in Italy, a magnificent villa;[846] to send rich presents to distant

towns--such were his burthens. How, to meet them, could he draw money

enough from a province exhausted by eight years’ war? The immensity of

his resources is explained by the circumstance that, independently of

the tributes paid by the vanquished, which amounted, for Gaul, to

40,000,000 sestertii a year (more than 7,500,000 francs) [£300,000], the

sale of prisoners to Roman traders produced enormous sums. Cicero

informs us that he gained 12,000,000 sestertii from the captives sold

after the unimportant siege of Pindenissus. If we suppose that their

number amounted to 12,000, this sum would represent 1,000 sestertii a

head. Now, in spite of Cæsar’s generosity in often restoring the

captives to the conquered peoples, or in making gifts of them to his

soldiers, as was the case after the siege of Alesia, we may admit that

500,000 Gauls, Germans, or Britons were sold as slaves during the eight

years of the war in Gaul, which must have produced a sum of about

500,000,000 sestertii, or about 95,000,000 francs [£3,800,000]. It was

thus Roman money, given by the slave-dealers, which formed the greatest

part of the booty, in the same manner as in modern times, when, in

distant expeditions, the European nations take possession of the foreign

custom-houses to pay the costs of the war, it is still European money

which forms the advance for the costs.

The reconciliation of Curio with Cæsar was at first kept secret; but,

whether in order to contrive a pretext for changing his party, the new

tribune had moved laws which had no chance of being adopted, or because

he felt offended at the rejection of his propositions, towards the

beginning of the year 704 he declared for Cæsar, or, which was the same

thing, as Cœlius said, he ranged himself on the side of the people.

Whatever might be the motive of his conduct, the following are the

circumstances in the sequel of which his attitude became modified. He

had proposed the intercalation of a month in the current year, in order,

probably, to retard the period for the decision of the question which

agitated the Senate and the town.[847] His character of pontiff

rendered his motion perfectly legal: in spite of its incontestable

utility,[848] it was ill received. He expected this, but he appeared to

take the matter to heart, and to look upon the Senate’s refusal as an

offence. From that moment he began a systematic opposition.[849] Towards

the same time he presented two laws, one concerning the alimentation of

the people, with which he proposed to charge the ædiles;[850] the other,

on the repair of the roads, of which he asked for the direction during

five years.[851] He seems to have intended to make the travellers pay

according to the number and nature of their means of transport; or, in a

word, to establish a tax upon the rich, and thus increase his

popularity.[852] These last two projects were as ill received as the

first, and this double check completed his reconciliation with those

against whom he had hitherto contended.

The nomination of the censors, which took place at this period, brought

new complications. One, L. Calpurnius Piso, Cæsar’s father-in-law,

accepted the office only with regret, and showed an extreme indulgence;

the other, Appius Claudius Pulcher, who had been consul in 700, a fiery

partisan of the nobles, thought he served their cause by displaying

excessive severity. He expelled from the Senate all the freedmen, and

several of the most illustrious nobles, among others the historian

Sallust, a man of mind and talent, who immediately repaired to the

Cisalpine, where Cæsar received him with eagerness.[853]

Appius had no moderation in his harshness. Cicero says of him that, to

efface a mere stain, he cut open veins and entrails.[854] Instead of

remedying the evil, he only envenomed it; he threw into the ranks of the

opposite party all whom he excluded, without giving greater

consideration to those whom he kept. There are times when severity is a

bad adviser, and is not calculated to restore to a government the moral

force it has lost.

[Sidenote: Cæsar repairs to the Cisalpine.]

II. Cæsar passed the whole of the winter, 704, at Nemetocenna (_Arras_).

“At the beginning of the following year, he started in haste for Italy,

in order,” says Hirtius, “to recommend to the municipal towns and

colonies his quæstor, Mark Antony, who solicited the priesthood.

Supporting him with his credit, he not only sought to serve a faithful

friend whom he had himself persuaded to seek that office, but to strive

against a faction which wished to defeat him, in order to shake Cæsar’s

power at the moment when his government was on the eve of expiring. On

his way, before he reached Italy, he received intelligence of the

election of Antony to the office of augur; he considered it none the

less his duty to visit the municipal towns and colonies, to thank them

for their favourable feeling towards Antony. He sought also to secure

their support next year (705), for his enemies insolently boasted that

they had, on one hand, named to the consulship L. Lentulus and C.

Marcellus, who would strip Cæsar of his offices and dignities; and, on

the other, that they had deprived Servius Galba of the consulship, in

spite of his credit and the number of his votes, for the sole reason

that he was Cæsar’s friend and lieutenant.

“Cæsar was received by the municipal towns and colonies with incredible

marks of respect and affection; it was the first time he appeared among

them since the general insurrection of Gaul. They omitted nothing that

could be imagined in adorning the gates, roads, and places on his

passage; women and children all rushed in crowds to the public places

and into the temples; everywhere they immolated victims and spread

tables. The rich displayed their magnificence, the poor rivalled each

other in zeal.” Cæsar tasted beforehand the pleasures of a triumph

earnestly desired.[855]

After having thus visited Citerior Gaul, he quickly rejoined the army at

Nemetocenna. In the prospect of his approaching departure, he wished to

strike the minds of the Germans and Gauls by a grand agglomeration of

forces, and show himself once more to his assembled troops. The legions,

who had withdrawn to their quarters, were sent into the country of the

Treviri; Cæsar went there also, and passed the army in review. This

solemnity was necessarily grand. He saw before him his old cohorts, with

whom he had fought so many battles, and of which the youngest soldiers

reckoned eight campaigns. No doubt he reminded them that, general or

consul, he owed everything to the people and to the army, and that the

glory they had acquired formed between them indissoluble ties. Until the

end of the summer he remained in the north of Gaul, “only moving the

troops as much as was necessary to preserve the soldiers’ health. T.

Labienus received afterwards the command of Citerior Gaul, in the aim of

securing more votes for Cæsar’s approaching candidateship for the office

of consul. Although the latter was not ignorant of the manœvres of

his enemies to detach Labienus from him, and of their intrigues to cause

the Senate to deprive him of a part of his army, he could not be

prevailed upon either to doubt Labienus, or to attempt anything against

the authority of the Senate. He knew that, if the votes were free, the

conscript fathers would do him justice.”[856] In fact, whenever the

Senate was not under the dominion of a factious minority, the majority

pronounced in favour of Cæsar.

It had been decided, in the preceding month of October, that the

question of the consular provinces should be brought under consideration

on the 1st of March, 704, the period at which Pompey had declared that

he would throw no obstacle in the way of the discussion. It was opened

then, as appears from a letter of Cicero, and the Senate showed an

inclination to recall Cæsar for the Ides of November, 704. Nevertheless,

there was no decisive result. People were afraid yet to engage in a

struggle for life: Curio, singly, made the Senate tremble by his

opposition.[857]

When, in the bosom of that assembly, C. Marcellus was declaiming against

Cæsar, Curio began to speak, praised the consul’s prudence, approved

much of the proposal that the conqueror of Gaul should be summoned to

disband his army; but he insinuated that it would not be less desirable

to see Pompey disband his. “Those great generals,” said he, “were

objects of suspicion to him, and there would be no tranquillity for the

Republic until both of them should become private men.”[858] This speech

pleased the people, who, moreover, began to lose much of their esteem

for Pompey since the time that, by his law on bribery, a great number of

citizens were condemned to exile. On all sides they praised Curio; they

admired his courage in braving two such powerful men, and on several

occasions an immense crowd escorted him to his house, throwing flowers

over him “like an athlete,” says Appian, “who had just sustained a

severe and dangerous combat.”[859]

The clever manœuvres of Cicero had such success that, when Marcellus

proposed to concert with the tribunes of the people on the means of

opposing the candidature of Cæsar, the majority of the Senate gave their

opinion to the contrary. On this subject, M. Cœlius wrote to Cæsar:

“The opinions have changed so much that now they are ready to reckon as

a candidate for the consulship a man who will give up neither his army

nor his province.”[860] Pompey gave no sign of life, and let the Senate

have its way.

He always seemed to disdain what he desired most. Thus, at this time, he

affected an entire carelessness, and retrenched himself in his legality,

taking care to avoid all appearance of personal hostility towards Cæsar.

At the same time, either in order to avoid being pressed too soon, or to

appear indifferent to the question which agitated the Republic, he left

his gardens near Rome to visit Campania. Thence he sent a letter to the

Senate, in which, while he praised Cæsar and himself, he reminded them

that he never had solicited a third consulship, nor yet the command of

the armies; that he had received it in spite of himself, in order to

save the Republic, and that he was ready to renounce it without waiting

the term fixed by the law.[861] This letter, studied and artful, was

intended to bring out the contrast between his disinterested conduct and

that of Cæsar, who refused to surrender his government; but Curio

baffled this manœuvre. “If Pompey were sincere,” he said, “he ought

not to promise to give his resignation, but to give it at once; so long

as he should not have retired into private life, the command could not

be taken from Cæsar. Besides, the interest of the State required the

presence of two rivals constantly opposed to each other; and, in his

eyes, it was Pompey who openly aspired to absolute power.”[862] This

accusation was not without ground; for during the last nineteen

years--that is to say, since 684, the time of his first

consulship--Pompey had nearly always been in possession of the

_imperium_, either as consul, or as general in the wars against the

pirates and against Mithridates, or, finally, as charged with the

victualling of Italy. “To take Cæsar’s army from him,” says Plutarch,

“and to leave his army to Pompey, was, by accusing the one of aspiring

to the tyranny, to give the other the means of obtaining it.”[863]

[Sidenote: Pompey receives Ovations, and asks Cæsar to return his Two

Legions.]

III. About this time Pompey fell dangerously ill, and on his recovery

the Neapolitans and the peoples of all Italy showed such joy, that

“every town, great or small,” says Plutarch, “celebrated festivals for

several days. When he returned to Rome, there was no place spacious

enough to contain the crowd which came to meet him; the roads, the

villages, and the ports were full of people offering sacrifices and

making banquets, in order to show their joy at his recovery. A great

number of citizens, crowned with leaves, went to receive him with

torches, and threw flowers on him as they accompanied him; the

procession which followed him in his progress offered the most

agreeable and most magnificent spectacle.”[864] Although these ovations

had given Pompey an exaggerated opinion of his influence, on his return

to Rome he observed in public the same reserve, though in secret he

supported the measures calculated to diminish Cæsar’s power. Thus,

taking for pretext the demands for re-enforcements renewed incessantly

by Bibulus and Cicero, proconsuls of Syria and Cilicia, who sought to

place their provinces in safety against an invasion of the Parthians, he

represented that the levies ordered by the Senate were insufficient, and

that it was necessary to send experienced troops to the East. It was

thereupon decided that Pompey and Cæsar, who were at the head of

considerable armies, should each of them detach one legion for the

defence of the threatened provinces. A senatus-consultus at once

summoned Cæsar to send his legion, and ordered him, besides, to return

the legion which Pompey had lent him shortly after the conference of

Lucca. Perhaps they hoped for resistance on his part, for this last

legion had been raised, like all those of his army, in Cisalpine Gaul;

but he obeyed without hesitation, so that he alone had to furnish the

re-enforcements required for the East. Before parting with his soldiers,

who had so long fought under his orders, he caused 250 drachmas (225

francs) to be distributed to each legionary.[865]

Appius Claudius, nephew of the censor of the same name, who had left

Rome with the mission of bringing those troops from the Cisalpine into

Italy, reported on his return that the soldiers of Cæsar, weary of their

long campaigns, sighed for repose, and that it would be impossible to

draw them into a civil war; he pretended even that the legions in winter

quarters in Transalpine Gaul would no sooner have passed the Alps than

they would rally to Pompey’s flag.[866] Events in the sequel proved the

falsity of this information, for not only, as will appear hereafter, did

the troops which had remained under Cæsar’s command continue faithful to

him, but those which had been withdrawn from him preserved the

remembrance of their ancient general. In fact, Pompey himself had not

the least confidence in the two legions he had received, and his letter

to Domitius, proconsul at the commencement of the civil war, explains

his inaction by the danger of bringing them into the presence of the

army of Cæsar, so much he fears to see them pass over to the opposite

camp.[867] At Rome, nevertheless, they believed in the reports which

flattered the pretensions of Pompey, although they were contradicted by

other more certain information, which showed Italy, the Cisalpine

provinces, and Gaul itself, equally devoted to Cæsar. Pompey, deaf to

these last warnings, affected the greatest contempt for the forces of

which his adversary could dispose. According to him, Cæsar was ruining

himself, and had no other chance of safety but in a prompt and complete

submission. When he was asked with what troops he would resist the

conqueror of Gaul, in case he were to march upon Rome, he replied, with

an air of confidence, that he had only to strike the soil of Italy with

his foot to make legions start up out of it.[868]

It was natural that his vanity should make him interpret favourably all

that was passing under his eyes. At Rome, the greatest personages were

devoted to him. Italy had shuddered at the news of his illness, and

celebrated his recovery as if it had been a triumph. The army of Gaul,

it was said, was ready to answer to his call.

With less blindness, Pompey might have discerned the true reason of the

enthusiasm of which he had been the object. He would have understood

that this enthusiasm was much less addressed to his person than to the

depositary of an authority which alone then seemed capable of saving the

Republic: he would have understood that, the day another general should

appear under the same conditions of fame and power as himself, the

people, with its admirable discernment, would at once side with him who

should best identify himself with their interests.

To understand the public opinion correctly, he ought not, though this

might have been a difficult thing to the chief of the aristocratic

cause, to have confined himself solely to the judgment of the official

world, but he should have interrogated the sentiments of those whose

position brought them nearest to the people. Instead of believing the

reports of Appius Claudius, and reckoning on the discontent of certain

of Cæsar’s lieutenants, who, like Labienus, already showed hostile

tendencies, Pompey ought to have meditated upon that exclamation of a

centurion, who, placed at the door of the Senate, when that assembly

rejected the just reclamations of the conqueror of Gaul, exclaimed,

putting his hand to his sword, “This will give him what he asks.”[869]

The fact is that, in civil commotions, each class of society divines, as

by instinct, the cause which responds to its aspirations, and feels

itself attracted to it by a secret affinity. Men born in the superior

classes, or brought to their level by honours and riches, are always

drawn towards the aristocracy, whilst men kept by fortune in the

inferior ranks remain the firm supports of the popular cause. Thus, at

the return from the isle of Elba, most of the generals of the Emperor

Napoleon, loaded with wealth like the lieutenants of Cæsar,[870] marched

openly against him; but in the army all up to the rank of colonel said,

after the example of the Roman centurion, pointing to their weapons,

“This will place him on the throne again!”

[Sidenote: The Senate votes impartially.]

IV. An attentive examination of the correspondence between M. Cœlius

and Cicero, as well as the relations of the various authors, leads to

the conviction that at that period it required great efforts on the part

of the turbulent fraction of the aristocratic party to drag the Senate

into hostility towards Cæsar. The censor Appius, reviewing the list of

that body, _noted_ Curio, that is, wished to strike him from the list;

but at the instances of his colleague and of the Consul Paulus, he

confined himself to expressing a formal reproof, and his regret that he

could not do justice. On hearing him, Curio tore his toga, and protested

with the utmost passion against a disloyal attack. The Consul Marcellus,

who suspected the good understanding between Curio and Cæsar, and who

reckoned on the feelings of the Senate, which were very unfavourable to

both, brought the conduct of the tribune under discussion. While he

protested against this illegal proceeding, Curio accepted the debate,

and declared that, strong in his conscience, and certain of having

always acted in the interests of the Republic, he placed with confidence

his honour and his life in the hands of the Senate. This scene could

have no other result but an honourable vote for Curio;[871] but this

incident was soon left, and the discussion passed to the political

situation. Marcellus proposed at first this question: _Ought Cæsar to be

superseded in his province?_ He urged the Senate to a vote. The senators

having formed themselves into two groups in the curia, an immense

majority declared for the affirmative. The same majority pronounced for

the negative on a second question of Marcellus: _Ought Pompey to be

superseded?_ But Curio, resuming the arguments which he had used so many

times on the danger of favouring Pompey at the expense of Cæsar,

demanded a vote upon a third question: _Ought Pompey and Cæsar both to

disarm?_ To the surprise of the consul, this unexpected motion passed by

a majority of 370 against 22. Then Marcellus dismissed the Senate,

saying with bitterness, “You carry the day! you will have Cæsar for

master.”[872] He did not imagine that he foretold the future so well.

Thus the almost unanimity of the assembly had, by its vote, justified

Curio, who, in this instance, was only the representative of Cæsar; and

if Pompey and his party had submitted to this decision, there would no

longer have been a pretext for the struggle which honest men feared:

Cæsar and Pompey would have resumed their place in ordinary life, each

with his partisans and his renown, but without army, and consequently

without the means of disturbing the Republic.

[Sidenote: Violent Measures adopted against Cæsar.]

V. This was not what these restless men wanted, who masked their petty

passions under the great words of public safety and liberty. In order to

destroy the effect of this vote of the Senate, the rumour was spread in

Rome that Cæsar had entered Italy; Marcellus demanded that troops should

be raised, and that the two legions destined for the war in the East

should be brought from Capua, where they were in garrison. Curio

protested against the falsehood of this news, and interceded, in his

quality of tribune, to oppose all extraordinary arming. Then Marcellus

exclaimed, “Since I can do nothing here with the consent of all, I alone

take charge of the public welfare on my own responsibility!” He then

hurried to the suburb where Pompey had his quarters, and, presenting him

with a sword, addressed him in these words: “I summon you to take the

command of the troops which are at Capua, to raise others, and to take

the measures necessary for the safety of the Republic.” Pompey accepted

this mission, but with reserves: he said that he would obey the orders

of the consuls, “if, at least, there was nothing better to do.” This

prudent reflection, at a moment so critical, pictures the character of

the man.[873] M. Marcellus understood all the irregularity of his

conduct, and brought with him the consuls nominated for the following

year (705); even before they entered upon office,[874] which was to take

place in a few days, they had the right to render edicts which indicated

the principles upon which they intended to act during the time of their

magistracy. They were L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus and C. Claudius

Marcellus, the last a kinsman of the preceding consul of the same name,

both enemies to Cæsar. They entered into an engagement with Pompey to

support with all their efforts the measure which their predecessor had

taken at his own risk and peril. We see, they are the consuls and Pompey

who revolt against the decisions of the Senate.

Curio could not oppose these measures regularly, the tribunes not having

the right of exercising their powers outside Rome; but he attacked

before the people what had just been done, and recommended them not to

obey the levy of troops which had been ordered by Pompey, in contempt of

the law.[875]

[Sidenote: State of Public Opinion.]

VI. The following letter from M. Cœlius to Cicero shows what was the

judgment of impartial Romans upon the public situation in September,

704:--

“The nearer we approach the inevitable struggle, the more we are struck

with the greatness of the danger. This is the ground on which the two

men of power of the day are going to encounter each other. Cn. Pompey is

decided not to suffer Cæsar to be consul until he has resigned his army

and his provinces, and Cæsar is convinced that there is no safety for

him unless he keep his army; he consents, nevertheless, if the condition

of giving up the commandment be reciprocal. Thus those effusions of

tenderness and this so dreaded alliance will end, not in hidden

animosity, but in open war. As far as I am concerned, I do not know

which side to take in this conjuncture, and I doubt not but this

perplexity is common to us. In one of the parties, I have obligations of

gratitude and friendship; in the other, it is the cause, not the men, I

hate. My principles, which no doubt you share, are these: in domestic

dissensions, so long as things pass between unarmed citizens, to prefer

the most honest party; but when war breaks out, and two camps are in

presence, to side with the strongest, and seek reason where there is

safety. Now, what do I see here? On one side, Pompey, with the Senate

and the magistracy; on the other, Cæsar, with all who have anything to

fear or to covet. No comparison possible, as far as the armies are

concerned. May it please the gods to give us time to weigh the

respective forces, and to make our choice.”[876] Cœlius was not long

in making his; he embraced the party of Cæsar.[877]

This appreciation of a contemporary was certainly shared by a great

number of persons, who, without well-defined convictions, were ready to

side with the strongest. Cicero, who was returning to Italy,[878] had

the same tendency, yet he felt an extreme embarrassment. Not only was he

on friendly terms with the two adversaries, but Cæsar had lent him a

considerable sum, and this debt weighed upon him like a remorse.[879]

After having ardently desired to leave his command for fear of the war

against the Parthians, he fell into the midst of preparations for a

civil war which presented a much greater danger. Hence, when on his

arrival in Greece he believed, on false reports, that Cæsar had sent

four legions into Piacenza, his first thought was to shut himself up in

the citadel of Athens.[880] When at last he had returned to Italy, he

congratulated himself on being in a condition to obtain the honours of a

triumph, because then the obligation of remaining outside Rome dispensed

him from declaring for either of the two rivals.

He wished above all for the triumph, and in his letters he pressed the

influential personages to prevail upon the Senate to consent to it; but

Cato considered, like many others, that the exploits of the proconsul in

Cilicia did not deserve so much honour, and he refused to give him his

support, whilst, at the same time, he greatly praised his character.

Cæsar, less rigid on principles, forgetting nothing which could flatter

the self-love of important men, had written to Cicero to promise him his

assistance, and blame Cato’s severity.[881]

Meanwhile, the celebrated orator did not deceive himself as to the

resources of the two parties. When he talked with Pompey, the assurance

of that warrior tranquillised him; but when abandoned to his own

meditations, he saw well that all the chances were on the side of Cæsar.

“To-day,” he wrote, “Cæsar is at the head of eleven legions (he forgot

the two legions given to Pompey), without counting the cavalry, of which

he can have as many as he likes; he has in his favour the Transpadan

towns, the populace of Rome, the entire order of the knights, nearly all

the tribunes, all the disorderly youth, the ascendant of his glorious

name, and his extreme boldness. This is the man they have to

combat.[882] This party only wants a good cause; the rest they have in

abundance. Consequently, there is nothing which they must not do rather

than come to war; the result of which is always uncertain, and how much

the more is it not to be feared for us!”[883]

As for his own party, he defined it in the following manner: “What do

you mean by these men of the good side? I know none that I could name. I

know some, if we mean to speak of the whole class of honest men; for

individually, in the true sense of the word, they are rare; but in civil

strife you must seek the cause of honourable men where it is. Is it the

Senate which is that good party; the Senate, which leaves provinces

without governors? Curio would never have resisted if they had made up

their minds to oppose him; but the Senate has done nothing of the kind,

and they have not been able to give Cæsar a successor. Is it the knights

who have never shown a very firm patriotism, and who now are entirely

devoted to Cæsar? Are they the merchants or the country people who only

ask to live in repose? Shall we believe that they fear much to see one

single man in power, they who are content with any government, so long

as they are quiet?”[884]

The more the situation became serious, the more wise men inclined

towards the party of peace. Pompey had again absented himself from Rome

for a few days; he showed great irritation at the arrogance of the

tribune Mark Antony, who, in a speech before the people, had attacked

him with violence. He seemed also much hurt at the want of regard of

Hirtius, that friend of Cæsar, who had come to Rome without paying him a

visit.[885] The absence of Pompey in such critical moments had been

generally blamed,[886] but he soon returned; his resolution was taken.

“I have seen Pompey,” wrote Cicero to his friend, on the 6th of the

Calends of December. “We went together to Formiæ, and we conversed alone

from two o’clock till evening. You ask me if there is any hope of

agreement. As far as I have been able to judge from what he told me in

a lengthy conversation full of details, there is even no desire for it.

He pretends that, if Cæsar obtains the consulship, even after having

dismissed his army, there will be a revolution in the state. He is,

moreover, convinced that, when Cæsar knows that they take measures

against him, he will abandon the consulship for this year, and that he

will prefer keeping his army and his province; he added that his anger

would not frighten him, and that Rome and he would know how to defend

themselves. What shall I say? Although the great phrase, _Mars has equal

chances for everybody_, recurred often to my mind, I felt reassured, in

hearing a valiant man, so able and so powerful, reasoning like a

politician upon the dangers of a false peace. We read together the

speech of Antony, of the 10th of the Calends of January, which is, from

beginning to end, an accusation against Pompey, whom he takes up from

his infantile toga. He reproaches him with condemnations by thousands;

he threatens us with war. Upon which Pompey said to me, ‘What will Cæsar

not do, once master of the Republic, if his quæstor, a man without

wealth, without support, dare to speak in this manner?’ In short, far

from desiring such a peace, he appeared to me to fear it, perhaps

because then he would be obliged to go to Spain. What annoys me most is,

that I shall be obliged to reimburse Cæsar, and to apply to that use all

the money which I intended for my triumph, for it would be disgraceful

to remain the debtor of a political adversary.”[887] By this declaration

Cicero proves in the most positive manner that Pompey desired war, and

rejected all reconciliation; he repeats it elsewhere with still more

precision.

Pompey, led by the inevitable march of events to oppose Cæsar’s just

demands, which he had favoured at first, was reduced to desire civil

war.

He and his party had not arrived at this extremity without in most cases

overruling the will of the Senate, without wounding the public feeling,

and without overstepping the bonds of legality. In the beginning of 703,

when Marcellus had proposed to recall Cæsar before the legal period, the

Senate, assembled in great number, had passed to the order of the

day,[888] and during the rest of the year they had shown a determination

not to undertake anything against the proconsul of Gaul. They had

rejected a second time the motion of Marcellus, renewed on the 1st of

March, 704, and afterwards the Senate had shown dispositions favourable

to Cæsar. However, the law which permitted him to keep his command until

the consular comitia of 705 is soon treated with contempt; after many

hesitations the Senate decides that Cæsar and Pompey shall disband their

armies at the same time, but the decree is not executed; passions become

inflamed, the most arbitrary measures are proposed, the tribunes

intercede: their veto is considered as not existing. Then, without

obtaining a senatus-consultus, without appealing to the people, the

consuls charge Pompey to raise troops, and to watch over the welfare of

the Republic. It is the aristocratic party which places itself above the

law, and places right on the side of Cæsar.

CHAPTER X.

EVENTS OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR 705.

[Sidenote: C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Cornelius Lentulus, Consuls.]

I. In the course of the summer, it will be remembered, Cæsar had

returned to Arras, to the middle of his army, which was encamped in the

north of Gaul. He was informed of the plots going on at Rome; he knew

that his enemies would agree to no arrangement, but he still hoped that

the Senate would maintain the equal balance between him and his rival,

for that assembly had already shown its pacific tendencies, and did not

even seem inclined to interfere in the quarrel.[889] In the winter

between 704 and 705 he returned to Cisalpine Gaul; presided there,

according to his custom, over the provincial assemblies, and stopped at

Ravenna, the last town in his command.[890] He had only the 13th legion

at his disposal, which was 5,000 men strong, with 300 cavalry;[891]

nearly his whole army, to the number of eight legions, had remained in

winter quarters in Belgium and Burgundy.[892]

It was at Ravenna that Curio, the year of whose tribuneship expired in

December, 704,[893] hastened to him. Cæsar received him with open arms,

thanked him for his devotedness, and conferred with him upon the

measures to be taken. Curio proposed that he should call the other

legions which he had beyond the Alps, and march upon Rome; but Cæsar did

not approve of this counsel, still persuaded that things would yet come

to an understanding. He engaged his friends[894] at Rome to propose a

plan of accommodation which had been approved, it was said, by Cicero,

and which Plutarch expressly ascribes to him: Cæsar was to have given up

Transalpine Gaul, and kept Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria with two legions,

until he had obtained the consulship. It was even said that he would be

satisfied with Illyria alone and one legion.[895] “He made the greatest

efforts,” says Velleius Paterculus,[896] “to maintain peace: the friends

of Pompey refused all conciliatory proposals.” “The appearance of

justice,” says Plutarch, “was on the side of Cæsar.” When the

negotiation had failed, he charged Curio to carry to the Senate a letter

full of impudence, according to Pompey; full of threats, according to

Cicero;[897] well adapted, on the contrary, according to Plutarch, to

draw the multitude to Cæsar’s side.[898]

Curio, after travelling 1,300 stadia (210 kilomètres) in three days,

re-appeared in that assembly on the very day of the installation of the

new consuls, the Calends of January, 705. He did not deliver to them,

according to custom, the letter of which he was the bearer, for fear

that they should not communicate it; and, indeed, at first they opposed

the reading of it; but two tribunes of the people devoted to Cæsar, Mark

Antony, formerly his quæstor, and Q. Cassius, insisted with so much

energy, that the new consuls were unable to refuse.[899]

Cæsar, after reminding them of what he had done for the Republic,

justified himself against the imputations spread against him by his

enemies. While he protested his respect for the Senate, he declared that

he was ready to resign his proconsular functions, and to disband his

army, or deliver it to his successor, provided Pompey did the same. It

could not be required of him to deliver himself up unarmed to his

enemies while they remained armed, and alone to set the example of

submission. He spoke not on this occasion of his pretensions to the

consulship; the great question, to know whether he and Pompey should

keep their armies, overruled all the others. The conclusion of the

letter displayed a strong feeling of resentment. Cæsar declared in it

that, if justice were not rendered to him, he should know how, by

revenging himself, to revenge his country also. This last expression,

which strongly resembled a threat, excited the loudest reclamations in

the Senate. “It is war he declares,” they exclaimed, and the irritation

rose to the greatest height.[900] No deliberation could be obtained on

any of his propositions.

[Sidenote: Lentulus carries the Senate against Cæsar.]

II. The Consul L. Lentulus, in a violent oration, engaged the Senate to

show more courage and firmness: he promised to support it, and defend

the Republic: “If, on the contrary, the assembly, in this critical

moment, was wanting in energy--if, as in the past, it meant to spare

Cæsar and to conciliate his good graces, there would be an end of its

authority: as far as he was concerned, he should hasten to withdraw from

it, and should in future consult only himself. After all, he also might

gain the friendship and favour of Cæsar.” Scipio spoke in the same

spirit: “Pompey,” said he, “will not fail the Republic, if he is

followed by the Senate; but if they hesitate, if they act with weakness,

the Senate will henceforth invoke his aid in vain.” This language of

Scipio seemed to be the expression of the thoughts of Pompey, who was at

the gates of the town with his army. More moderate opinions were also

offered. M. Marcellus demanded that, before coming to any decision, the

Senate should assemble troops from the different parts of Italy in order

to ensure the independence of their deliberations; M. Calidius proposed

that Pompey should retire to his province, in order to avoid all motive

for a war; for Cæsar might justly fear to see used against him the two

legions taken away from his command, and retained under the walls of

Rome. M. Rufus gave his opinion nearly in the same terms. Lentulus

immediately burst out into violent reproaches against the latter

speakers; he upbraided them with their defection, and refused to put the

proposal of Calidius to a vote. Marcellus, terrified, withdrew his

motion. Then there happened one of those strange and sudden changes, so

common in revolutionary assemblies: the violent apostrophes of

Lentulus, the threats uttered by the partisans of Pompey, the terror

inspired by the presence of an army under the walls of Rome, exerted an

irresistible pressure upon the minds of the senators, who, in spite of

themselves, adopted the motion of Scipio, and decreed that “if Cæsar did

not disband his army on the day prescribed, he should be declared an

enemy of the Republic.”[901]

Mark Antony and Q. Cassius, tribunes of the people, oppose this

decree.[902] A report is immediately made of their opposition, invoking

the decision taken by the Senate the year before; grave measures are

proposed: the more violent they are, the more the enemies of Cæsar

applaud. In the evening, after the sitting, Pompey convokes the senators

in his gardens: he distributes praise and blame amongst them, encourages

some, intimidates others. At the same time, he recalls from all parts a

great number of his veterans, promising them rewards and promotion. He

addressed himself even to the soldiers of the two legions who had formed

part of Cæsar’s army.[903]

The town is in a state of extreme agitation. The tribune Curio claims

the right of the comitia which had been set aside. The friends of the

consuls, the adherents of Pompey, all who nourished old rancours against

Cæsar, hurry towards the Senate, which is again assembled. Their

clamours and threats deprive that assembly of all liberty of decision.

The most varied proposals follow each other. The censor L. Piso and the

prætor Roscius offer to go to Cæsar, to inform him of what is going on;

they only ask a delay of six days. Others desire that deputies be

charged to go to make him acquainted with the will of the Senate.

All these motions are rejected. Cato, Lentulus, and Scipio redouble in

violence. Cato is animated by old enmities and the mortification of his

recent check in the consular elections. Lentulus, overwhelmed with

debts, hopes for honours and riches; he boasts among his party that he

will become a second Sylla, and be master of the empire.[904] Scipio

flatters himself with an ambition equally chimerical. Lastly, Pompey,

who will have no equal, desires war, the only way to get over the folly

of his conduct,[905] and this prop of the Republic assumes the title,

like Agamemnon, of king of kings.[906]

The consuls propose to the Senate to assume public mourning, in order to

strike the imagination of the people, and to show them that the country

is in danger. Mark Antony and his colleague Cassius intercede; but no

attention is paid to their opposition. The Senate assembles in mourning

attire, decided beforehand on rigorous measures. The tribunes, on the

other hand, announce that they intend to make use of their right of

veto. In the midst of this general excitement, their obstinacy is no

longer considered as a right of their office, but as a proof of their

complicity; and, first of all, measures are brought under deliberation

to be taken against their opposition. Mark Antony is the most

audacious; the Consul Lentulus interrupts him with anger, and orders him

to leave the curia, “where,” he says, “his sacred character will not

preserve him any longer from the punishment merited by his spirit of

hostility towards the Republic.” Mark Antony thereupon, rising

impetuously, takes the gods to witness that the privileges of the

tribune’s power are violated in his person. “We are insulted,” exclaims

he; “we are treated like murderers. You want proscriptions, massacres,

conflagrations. May all those evils which you have drawn down fall upon

your own heads!” Then, pronouncing the forms of execration, which had

always the power of impressing superstitious minds, he leaves the curia,

followed by Q. Cassius, Curio, and M. Cœlius.[907] It was time: the

curia was on the point of being surrounded by a detachment of troops,

which were already approaching.[908] All four left Rome in the night

between the 6th and 7th of January, in the disguise of slaves, in an

ordinary chariot, and reached Cæsar’s quarters.[909]

The following days the Senate meets outside the town. Pompey repeats

there what he had employed Scipio to say. He applauds the courage and

firmness of the assembly; he enumerates his forces, boasts of having ten

legions--six in Spain, and four in Italy.[910] According to his

conviction, the army is not devoted to Cæsar, and will not follow him in

his rash undertakings. Besides, would he dare, with one single legion,

to face the forces of the Senate? Before he will have had time to summon

his troops, which are on the other side of the Alps, Pompey will have

assembled a formidable army.[911] Then the Senate declares the country

in danger (it was the 18th of the Ides of January), an extreme measure

reserved for great public calamities; and the care to watch that the

Republic receive no harm is confided to the consuls, the proconsuls, the

prætors, and the tribunes of the people. Immediately, all his party,

whose violence has driven Pompey and the Senate into civil war, fell

upon the dignities, the honours, the governments of provinces, as so

many objects of prey. Italy is divided into great commands,[912] which

the principal chiefs divide amongst themselves. Cicero, always prudent,

chooses Campania as being more distant from the scene of war. Scribonius

Libo is sent to Etruria,[913] P. Lentulus Spinther to the coast of

Picenum,[914] P. Attius Varus to Auximum and Cingulum,[915] and Q.

Minucius Thermus to Umbria.[916] By a false interpretation of the law

which allows proconsuls to be chosen among the magistrates who have

resigned their functions within five years, the consular and prætorian

provinces are shared arbitrarily: Syria is given to Metellus Scipio,

Transalpine Gaul to L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cisalpine Gaul to Considius

Nonianus, Sicily to Cato, Sardinia to M. Aurelius Cotta, Africa to L.

Ælius Tuberno, and Cilicia to P. Sextius.[917] The obligation of a

curiate law to legitimate their power is regarded as useless. Their

names are not drawn by lot; they do not wait, according to the

established practice, till the people has ratified their election, and

till they have put on the dress of war, after having pronounced the

usual vows. The consuls, contrary to custom, leave the town; men, till

then strangers to all high office, cause lictors to go before them in

Rome and in the Capitol. It is proposed to declare King Juba friend and

ally of the Roman people. What matters whether he be devoted or not to

the Roman domination, provided he become a useful auxiliary for the

civil war? A levy of 130,000 men in Italy is decreed. All the resources

of the public treasure are placed at the disposal of Pompey; the money

preserved in the temples is taken; and if that be not sufficient, the

property of private persons themselves shall be employed for the pay of

the troops. In the midst of this sudden commotion, rights divine and

human are equally trampled under foot.[918] And yet a few days had

scarcely passed “when the Senate,” says Appian, “regretted not having

accepted the conditions of Cæsar, the justice of which they felt at a

moment when fear brought them back from the excitement of party spirit

to the counsels of wisdom.”[919]

[Sidenote: Cæsar harangues his Troops.]

III. Whilst at Rome all was confusion, and Pompey, nominal chief of his

party, underwent its various exigencies and impulses, Cæsar, master of

himself and free in his resolutions, waited quietly at Ravenna until the

thoughtless impetuosity of his enemies should break itself against his

firmness and the justice of his cause. The tribunes of the people, Mark

Antony and Q. Cassius, accompanied by Curio and M. Cœlius, hasten to

him.[920] At the news of the events in Rome, he sends couriers to the

other side of the Alps, in order to unite his army; but, without waiting

for it, he assembles the 13th legion, the only one which had crossed the

Alps; he reminds his soldiers in a few words of the ancient insults and

the recent injustices of which he is the victim.

“The people had authorised him, although absent, to solicit a new

consulship, and, as soon as he thought that he ought to avail himself of

this favour, it was opposed. He has been asked, for the interest of his

country, to deprive himself of two legions, and, after he has made the

sacrifice, it is against him they are employed. The decrees of the

Senate and the people, legally rendered, have been disregarded, and

other decrees have been sanctioned; notwithstanding the opposition of

the tribunes. The right of intercession, which Sylla himself had

respected, has been set at naught, and it is under the garb of slaves

that the representatives of the Roman people come to seek a refuge in

his camp. All his proposals of conciliation have been rejected. What has

been refused to him has been granted to Pompey, who, prompted by envious

malignity, has broken the ties of an old friendship. Lastly, what

pretext is there for declaring the country in danger, and calling the

Roman people to arms? Are they in presence of a popular revolt, or a

violence of the tribunes, as in the time of the Gracchi, or an invasion

of the barbarians, as in the time of Marius? Besides, no law has been

promulgated, no motion has been submitted for the sanction of the

people; _all which has been done without the sanction of the people is

unlawful_.[921] Let the soldiers, then, defend the general under whom,

for nine years, they have served the Republic with so much success,

gained so many battles, subdued the whole of Gaul, overcome the Germans

and the Britons; for his enemies are theirs, and his elevation, as well

as his glory, is their work.”

Unanimous acclamations respond to this speech of Cæsar. The soldiers of

the 13th legion declare that they are ready to make the greatest

sacrifices; they will revenge their general and the tribunes of the

people for all these outrages; as a proof of his devotion, each

centurion offers to entertain a horseman at his expense; each soldier,

to serve gratuitously, the richer ones providing for the poorer ones;

and during the whole civil war, Suetonius affirms, not one of them

failed in this engagement.[922] Such was the devotedness of the army;

Labienus alone, whom Cæsar loved especially, whom he had loaded with

favours, deserted the cause of the conqueror of Gaul, and passed over to

Pompey.[923] Cicero and his party thought that this deserter would bring

a great addition to their strength. But Labienus,[924] though an able

general under Cæsar, was only an indifferent one in the opposite camp.

Desertions have never made any man great.

[Sidenote: Cæsar is driven to Civil War.]

IV. The moment for action had arrived. Cæsar was reduced to the

alternative of maintaining himself at the head of his army, in spite of

the Senate, or surrendering himself to his enemies, who would have

reserved for him the fate of the accomplices of Catiline, who had been

condemned to death, if he were not, like the Gracchi, Saturninus, and so

many others, killed in a popular tumult. Here the question naturally

offers itself: Ought not Cæsar, who had so often faced death on the

battle-fields, have gone to Rome to face it under another form, and to

have renounced his command, rather than engage in a struggle which must

throw the Republic into all the horrors of a civil war? Yes, if by his

abnegation he could save Rome from anarchy, corruption, and tyranny. No,

if this abnegation would endanger what he had most at heart, the

regeneration of the Republic. Cæsar, like men of his temper, cared

little for life, and still less for power for the sake of power; but,

as chief of the popular party, he felt a great cause rise behind him; it

urged him forward, and obliged him to conquer in despite of legality,

the imprecations of his adversaries, and the uncertain judgment of

posterity. Roman society, in a state of dissolution, asked for a master;

oppressed Italy, for a representative of its rights; the world, bowed

under the yoke, for a saviour. Ought he, by deserting his mission,

disappoint so many legitimate hopes, so many noble aspirations? What!

Cæsar, who owed all his dignities to the people, and confining himself

within his right, should he have retired before Pompey, who, having

become the docile tool of a factious minority of the Senate, was

trampling right and justice under foot; before Pompey, who, according to

the admission of Cicero himself, would have been, after victory, a cruel

and vindictive despot, and would have allowed the world to be plundered

for the benefit of a few families, incapable, moreover, of arresting the

decay of the Republic, and founding an order of things sufficiently firm

to retard the invasion of barbarians for many centuries! He would have

retreated before a party which reckoned it a crime to repair the evils

caused by the violence of Sylla, and the severity of Pompey, by

recalling the exiles;[925] to give rights to the peoples of Italy; to

distribute lands among the poor and the veterans; and, by an equitable

administration, to ensure the prosperity of the provinces! It would have

been madness. The question had not the mean proportions of a quarrel

between two generals who contended for power: it was the decisive

conflict between two hostile causes, between the privileged classes and

the people; it was the continuation of the formidable struggle between

Marius and Sylla![926]

There are imperious circumstances which condemn public men either to

abnegation or to perseverance. To cling to power when one is no longer

able to do good, and when, as a representative of the past, one has, as

it were, no partisans but among those who live upon abuses, is a

deplorable obstinacy; to abandon it when one is the representative of a

new era, and the hope of a better future, is a cowardly act and a crime.

[Sidenote: Cæsar crosses the Rubicon.]

V. Cæsar has taken his resolution. He began the conquest of Gaul with

four legions; he is going to commence that of the world with one only.

He must first of all, by a surprise, take possession of Ariminum

(_Rimini_), the first important fortress of Italy on the side of

Cisalpine Gaul. For this purpose, he sends before him a detachment

composed of trusty soldiers and centurions, commanded by Q. Hortensius;

he places a part of his cavalry in _échelon_ on the road.[927] When

evening arrives, pretending an indisposition, he leaves his officers,

who were at table, enters a chariot with a few friends, and joins his

vanguard. When he arrives at the Rubicon, a stream which formed the

limit of his government, and which the laws forbad him to cross, he

halts for a moment as though struck with terror; he communicates his

apprehensions to Asinius Pollio and those who surround him. A comet has

appeared in the sky;[928] he foresees the misfortunes which are on the

point of befalling Italy, and recollects the dream which the night

before had oppressed his mind: he had dreamt that he violated his

mother. Was not his country, in fact, his mother; and, notwithstanding

the justness of his cause and the greatness of his designs, was not his

enterprise an outrage upon her? But the augurs, those flattering

interpreters of the future, affirm that this dream promises him the

empire of the world; this woman whom he has seen extended on the ground

is no other than the earth, the common mother of all mortals.[929] Then

suddenly an apparition, it is said, strikes the eyes of Cæsar: it is a

man of tall stature, blowing martial airs on a trumpet, and calling him

to the other bank. All hesitation ceases; he hurries onward and crosses

the Rubicon, exclaiming, “The die is cast! Let us go where I am called

by the prodigies of the gods and the iniquity of my enemies.”[930] Soon

he arrived at Ariminum, of which he takes possession without striking a

blow. The civil war has commenced!

“The true author of war,” says Montesquieu, “is not he who declares it,

but he who renders it necessary.” It is not granted to man,

notwithstanding his genius and power, to raise at will the popular

waves; yet, when, elected by the public voice, he appears in the midst

of the storm which endangers the vessel of the state, then he alone can

direct its course and bring it to the harbour. Cæsar was not, therefore,

the instigator of this profound perturbation of Roman society: he had

become the indispensable pilot. Had it been otherwise, when he

disappeared all would have returned to order; on the contrary, his death

gave up the whole universe to all the horrors of war. Europe, Asia,

Africa, were the theatre of sanguinary struggles between the past and

the future, and the Roman world did not find peace until the heir of his

name had made his cause triumph. But it was no longer possible for

Augustus to renew the work of Cæsar; fourteen years of civil war had

exhausted the strength of the nation and used up the characters; the men

imbued with the great principles of the past were dead; the survivors

had alternately served all parties; to succeed, Augustus himself had

made peace with the murderers of his adoptive father; the convictions

were extinct, and the world, longing for rest, no longer contained the

elements which would have permitted Cæsar, as was his intention, to

re-establish the Republic in its ancient splendour and its ancient

forms, but on new principles.

NAPOLEON.

_The Tuileries, March 20, 1866._

APPENDIX A.

CONCORDANCE OF DATES OF THE ANCIENT ROMAN CALENDAR WITH THE JULIAN

STYLE, FOR THE YEARS OF ROME 691-709.

_Bases on which the Tables of Concordance are Founded._

Before the Julian reform, the Roman year comprised 355 days, divided

into twelve months, namely: Januarius, 29 days; Februarius, 28; Martius,

31; Aprilis, 29; Maius, 31; Junius, 29; Quintilis, 31; Sextilis, 29;

September, 29; October, 31; November, 29; December, 29.

Every other year, an intercalation of 22 or 23 days alternately was to

be added after the 23rd day of February.

The mean year being thus too long by one day, 24 days were to be

subtracted in the last eight years of a period of 24 years. We shall not

here have to take this correction into consideration.

The intercalation appears to have been regularly followed from A.U.C.

691 (that of Cicero’s consulship) until 702, when it was of 23 days. In

the middle of the troubles, the intercalation was omitted in the years

704, 706, and 708.

Towards the end of the year 708, Cæsar remedied the disorder by placing

extraordinarily between November and December 67 days, and by

introducing a new mode of intercalation.

The year 708 is the last of the _confusion_.

The year 709 is the first of the Julian style.

_Historical Data which the Concordance must Satisfy._

Cicero relates that at the beginning of his consulship the planet

Jupiter lighted the whole sky. (_De Divin._, I. 11.) Cicero entered on

office on the Calends of January in the year of Rome 691; that is, on

the 14th of December, 64 B.C. Jupiter had reached opposition eleven days

before, on the 3rd of December.[931]

In the year 691, on the 5th of the Ides of November, Cicero, in his

_Second Oration against Catiline_, 10, asks how the effeminate

companions of Catiline will support the frosts of the Appenine,

especially in these nights _already_ long (_his præsertim jam

noctibus_).[932] We are, in fact, on the 15th of October, 63 B.C. Later,

in his _Oration for Sextius_, speaking of the defeat of Catiline at the

beginning of January, 692 (the middle of December, 63 B.C.), Cicero

asserts that the result is due to Sextius, without whose activity the

winter would have been allowed to intervene (_datus illo in bello esset

hiemi locus_).

In the year 696 of Rome (58 B.C.), the Helvetii appoint their rendezvous

at Geneva for a day fixed: “is dies erat a.d.v. Kal-Aprilis.” (Cæsar,

_De Bello Gallico_, I. 6.) This date corresponds with the Julian 24th of

March, the day on which the spring equinox fell. The Helvetii had taken

this natural period; Cæsar has referred it to the Roman calendar.[933]

In the year 700 of Rome (54 B.C.), Cæsar, after his second campaign in

Britain, re-embarks his troops “quod æquinoctium suberat.” (_De Bello

Gallico_, V. 23.) He informs Cicero of it on the 6th of the Calends of

October, the Julian 21st of September. (Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, IV.

17.) The equinox fell on the 26th of September.[934]

In the year 702, on the 13th of the Calends of February (that is, on the

30th of December, 53 B.C.), Clodius is slain by Milo. (Cicero, _Orat.

pro Milone_, 10.) Pompey is created consul for the third time on the 5th

of the Calends of March, _in the intercalary month_. (Asconius.)

In the year 703, Cicero writes to Atticus (V. 13): “I have arrived at

Ephesus on the 11th of the Calends of Sextilis (12th of July, 51 B.C.),

560 days after the battle of Bovillæ;” an exact computation, if we count

the day of the murder of Clodius, and reckon 23 days for the

intercalation of 702.[935]

In the year 704 the intercalation is omitted. Cæsar’s partisans demanded

it in vain. (Dio Cassius, XL. 61, 62.)

In 705, Cicero, who hesitates in joining Pompey, writes to Atticus:

“a.d. xvii Kal. Junii: Nunc quidem æquinoctium nos moratur, quod valde

perturbatum erat.” It was the 16th of April; the equinox was passed 21

days before, and the atmospheric disturbances might still last. Or was

it anything else than an excuse on the part of Cicero?

Cæsar embarks at Brundusium on the eve of the Nones of January, 706.

(_De Bello Civili_, III. 6.) It is the 28th of November, 49 B.C. “Gravis

autumnus in Apulio circumque Brundusium ... omnem exercitum valetudine

tentaverat.” (_De Bello Civili_, III. 2, 6.)--“Bibulus gravissima hieme

in navibus excubabat.” (_De Bello Civili_, III. 8.)--“Jamque hiems

appropinquabat.” (_De Bello Civili_, III. 9.)

After his arrival at Rome towards the end of the year 707, Cæsar started

again for the African war. It was only on his return towards the middle

of the year 708, that he could devote himself to the re-organisation of

the Republic and the reform of the calendar. According to Dio Cassius

(XLIII. 26), “as the days of the year did not concord well together,

Cæsar introduced the present manner of reckoning, by intercalating 67

days necessary to restore the concordance. Some authors have pretended

that he intercalated more; but this is the truth.”[936]

What concordance was it that required to be established thus? The 67

days _necessary_ were exactly what required to be added that, in the

secular year of Rome 700, the Julian month of March should coincide with

the ancient Roman month of March. The month of March of the year 700 of

Rome is the true starting-point of the Julian style.

--+--------------------------------------------------------

D |

a |

y | JULIAN YEAR 64 BEFORE CHRIST.

s |

|--------------------------------------------------------

o | | | |

f | | | |

| | | |

t | | | |

h | SEPTEMBER. | OCTOBER. | NOVEMBER. | DECEMBER.

e | | | |

| | | |

J | | | |

u | | | |

l | YEAR OF ROME.

i | | | |

a | | | |

n | | | |

| | | |

M | | | |

o | | | |

n | | | |

t | 690 | 690 | 690 | 690-691

h | | | |

s | | | |

. | | | |

--+------------+--------------+-------------+-------------

1|XVI Kal.Oct.|XVII Kal. Nov.|XV Kal. Dec. |XIV Kal. Jan.

2|XV |XVI |XIV |XIII

3|XIV |XV |XIII |XII

4|XIII |XIV |XII |XI

5|XII |XIII |XI |X

| | | |

6|XI |XII |X |IX

7|X |XI |IX |VIII

8|IX |X |VIII |VII

9|VIII |IX |VII |VI

10|VII |VIII |VI |V

| | | |

11|VI |VII |V |IV

12|V |VI |IV |III

13|IV |V |III |Pridie

14|III |IV |Pridie |-------------

| | |-------------| KAL. JAN.

15|Pridie |III | KAL. DEC. |IV Nonas

|------------| | |

16| KAL. OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III

| |--------------| |

17|VI Nonas | KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie

18|V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ

19|IV |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus

20|III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII

| | | |

21|Pridie |Nonæ |VII |VI

22|Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V

23|VIII Idus |VII |V |IV

24|VII |VI |IV |III

25|VI |V |III |Pridie

| | | |

26|V |IV |Pridie |Idus

27|IV |III | Idus |XVII Kal.Feb.

28|III |Pridie |XVII Kal.Jan.|XVI

29|Pridie | Idus |XVI |XV

30| Idus |XVII Kal. Dec.|XV |XIV

| | | |

31| |XVI | |XIII

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

D|

a|

y|

s| JULIAN YEAR 63 BEFORE CHRIST.

|

o|

f|

|

t|----------------------------------------------------------------------

h| | | | | |

e| | | | | |

| JANUARY. | FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.

J| | | | | |

u| | | | | |

l| | | | | |

i| | | | | |

a| | | | | |

n| YEAR OF ROME.

| | | | | |

M| | | | | |

o| | | | | |

n| | | | | |

t| | | | | |

h| | | | | |

s| 691 | 691 | 691 | 691 | 691 | 691

.| | | | | |

--+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+----------

1|XII K. Feb.|IX K. Mar. |XII K.Apr. |X Kal. Maii|XI Kal. Ju.|IX K.Quin.

2|XI |VIII |XI |IX |X |VIII

3|X |VII |X |VIII |IX |VII

4|IX |VI |IX |VII |VIII |VI

5|VIII |V |VIII |VI |VII |V

| | | | | |

6|VII |IV |VII |V |VI |IV

7|VI |III |VI |IV |V |III

8|V |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie

| |-----------| | | |-----------

9|IV |KAL. MAR. |IV |Pridie |III |KAL QUIN.

| | | |-----------| |

10|III |VI Nonas |III |KAL.MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas

| | | | |-----------|

11|Pridie |V |Pridie |VI Nonas | |V

|-----------| |-----------| |KAL. JUN. |

12|KAL. FEB. |IV |KAL. APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV

13|IV Nonas |III |IV Nonas |IV |III |III

14|III |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie

15|Pridie | Nonæ |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ

| | | | | |

16| Nonæ |VIII Idus | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VIII Idus

17|VIII Idus |VII |VIII Idus |VTII Idus |VII |VII

18|VII |VI |VII |VII |VI |VI

19|VI |V |VI |VI |V |V

20|V |IV |V |V |IV |IV

| | | | | |

21|IV |III |IV |IV |III |III

22|III |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie

23|Pridie | Idus |Pridie |Pridie | Idus | Idus

24| Idus |XVII K.AP. | Idus | Idus |XVII Kal. |XVII K.Sex.

25|XVI K. Mr. |XVI |XVII Kal. |XVII K.Jun.|XVI [Quin. |XVI

| | | [Maii | | |

26|XV |XV |XVI |XVI |XV |XV

27|XIV |XIV |XV |XV |XIV |XIV

28|XIII |XIII |XIV |XIV |XIII |XIII

29|XII | |XIII |XIII |XII |XII

30|XI | |XII |XII |XI |XI

| | | | | |

31|X | |XI | |X |

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

D|

a|

y|

s| JULIAN YEAR 63 BEFORE CHRIST.

|

o|

f|

|

t|-----------------------------------------------------------------------

h| | | | | |

e| | | | | |

| JANUARY. | FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.

J| | | | | |

u| | | | | |

l| | | | | |

i| | | | | |

a| | | | | |

n| YEAR OF ROME.

| | | | | |

M| | | | | |

o| | | | | |

n| | | | | |

t| | | | | |

h| | | | | |

s| 691 | 691 | 691 | 691 | 691 | 691

.| | | | | |

--+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------

1|XII K. Feb.|IX K. Mar. |XII K.Apr. |X Kal. Maii|XI Kal. Ju.|IX K.Quin.

2|XI |VIII |XI |IX |X |VIII

3|X |VII |X |VIII |IX |VII

4|IX |VI |IX |VII |VIII |VI

5|VIII |V |VIII |VI |VII |V

| | | | | |

6|VII |IV |VII |V |VI |IV

7|VI |III |VI |IV |V |III

8|V |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie

| |-----------| | | |-----------

9|IV |KAL. MAR. |IV |Pridie |III |KAL QUIN.

| | | |-----------| |

10|III |VI Nonas |III |KAL.MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas

| | | | |-----------|

11|Pridie |V |Pridie |VI Nonas | |V

|-----------| |-----------| |KAL. JUN. |

12|KAL. FEB. |IV |KAL. APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV

13|IV Nonas |III |IV Nonas |IV |III |III

14|III |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie

15|Pridie | Nonæ |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ

| | | | | |

16| Nonæ |VIII Idus | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VIII Idus

17|VIII Idus |VII |VIII Idus |VTII Idus |VII |VII

18|VII |VI |VII |VII |VI |VI

19|VI |V |VI |VI |V |V

20|V |IV |V |V |IV |IV

| | | | | |

21|IV |III |IV |IV |III |III

22|III |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie

23|Pridie | Idus |Pridie |Pridie | Idus | Idus

24| Idus |XVII K.AP. | Idus | Idus |XVII Kal. |XVII K.Sex.

25|XVI K. Mr. |XVI |XVII Kal. |XVII K.Jun.|XVI [Quin. |XVI

| | | [Maii | | |

26|XV |XV |XVI |XVI |XV |XV

27|XIV |XIV |XV |XV |XIV |XIV

28|XIII |XIII |XIV |XIV |XIII |XIII

29|XII | |XIII |XIII |XII |XII

30|XI | |XII |XII |XI |XI

| | | | | |

31|X | |XI | |X |

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

| JULIAN YEAR 63 BEFORE CHRIST.

|--------------------------------------------------------------------

| JULY. | AUGUST. | SEPTEMBER.| OCTOBER. | NOVEMBER.| DECEMBER.

Days | | | | | |

of the| YEAR OF ROME

Julian| | | | | |

months.| 691 | 691 | 691 | 691 | 691 | 691-692

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1|X Kal.Sex.|VIII K.Sep.|VI Kal.Oct.|VII K. Nov.|V Kal.Dec.|IV Kal.Jan.

2|IX |VII |V |VI |IV |III

3|VIII |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie

4|VII |V |III |IV |Pridie |KAL. JAN.

5|VI |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. DEC. |IV Nonas

6|V |III |KAL. OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III

7|IV |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie

8|III |KAL. SEP. |V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ

9|Pridie |IV Nonas |IV |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus

10|KAL. SEX. |III |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII

11|IV Nonas |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ |VII |VI

12|III | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V

13|Pridie |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |V |IV

14| Nonæ |VII |VII |VI |IV |III

15|VIII Idus |VI |VI |V |III |Pridie

16|VII |V |V |IV |Pridie | Idus

17|VI |IV |IV |III | Idus |XVII K.Fb.

18|V |III |III |Pridie |XVII K.Jn.|XVI

19|IV |Pridie |Pridie | Idus |XVI |XV

20|III | Idus | Idus |XVII K.Dc. |XV |XIV

21|Pridie |XVII K.Oct.|XVII K.Nv. |XVI |XIV |XIII

22| Idus |XVI |XVI |XV |XIII |XII

23|XVIIK.Sep.|XV |XV |XIV |XII |XI

24|XVI |XIV |XIV |XIII |XI |X

25|XV |XIII |XIII |XII |X |IX

26|XIV |XII |XII |XI |IX |VIII

27|XIII |XI |XI |X |VIII |VII

28|XII |X |X |IX |VII |VI

29|XI |IX |IX |VIII |VI |V

30|X |VIII |VIII |VII |V |IV

31|IX |VII | |VI | |III

-------|--------------------------------------------------------------------

| JULIAN YEAR 62 BEFORE CHRIST.

|--------------------------------------------------------------------

| JANUARY. | FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.

Days | | | | | |

of the | YEAR OF ROME.

Julian | | | | | |

months.| 692 | 692 | 692 | 692 | 692 | 692

-------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------

1 |Pr. K. Feb.|VI Id. int.|VII Id.Mar.| V Id. Apr.|VI Id.Maii.|IV Id.Jun.

2 |KAL. FEB. |V |VI |IV |V |III

3 |IV Nonas |IV |V |III |IV |Pridie

4 |III |III |IV |Pridie |III | Idus

5 |Pridie |Pridie |III | Idus |Pridie |XVII K.Qu.

6 | Nonæ | Idus |Pridie |XVII K. M. | Idus |XVI

7 |VIII Idus |XV K. Mar. | Idus |XVI |XVII K. Ju.|XV

8 |VII |XIV |XVII K.Ap. |XV |XVI |XIV

9 |VI |XIII |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII

10 |V |XII |XV |XIII |XIV |XII

11 |IV |XI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI

12 |III |X |XIII |XI |XII |X

13 |Pridie |IX |XII |X |XI |IX

14 | Idus |VIII |XI |IX |X |VIII

15 |XI Kal.int.|VII |X |VIII |IX |VII

16 |X |VI |IX |VII |VIII |VI

17 |IX |V |VIII |VI |VII |V

18 |VIII |IV |VII |V |VI |IV

19 |VII |III |VI |IV |V |III

20 |VI |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie

21 |V |KAL. MAR. |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. QUIN.

22 |IV |VI Nonas |III |KAL MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas

23 |III |V |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. JUN. |V

24 |Pridie |IV |KAL. APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV

25 |KAL. INT. |III |IV Nonas |IV |III |III

26 |IV Nonas |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie

27 |III | Nonæ |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ

28 |Pridie |VIII Idus | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus

29 | Nonæ | |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |VII

30 |VIII Idus | |VII |VII |VI |VI

31 |VII | |VI | |V |

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

D|

a|

y|

s| JULIAN YEAR 62 BEFORE CHRIST.

|

o|

f|-----------------------------------------------------------------------

| | | | | |

t| | | | | |

h| | | | | |

e| | | | | |

| JULY. | AUGUST. | SEPTEMBER.| OCTOBER. | NOVEMBER. | DECEMBER.

J| | | | | |

u| | | | | |

l| | | | | |

i| | | | | |

a| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |

n| | | | | |

| | | | | |

M| | | | | |

o| | | | | |

n| | | | | |

t| | | | | |

h| | | | | |

s| 692 | 692 | 692 | 692 | 692 | 692-693

.| | | | | |

--|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------

1|V Id. Quin.|III Id.Sex.|Idus Sept. |Pr.Id. Oct.|XVII K.Dec.|XVI K. Jan.

2|IV |Pridie |XVII K.Oct.| Idus |XVI |XV

3|III | Idus |XVI |XVII K. Nv.|XV |XIV

4|Pridie |XVII K.Sep.|XV |XVI |XIV |XIII

5| Idus |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII |XII

| | | | | |

6|XVII K.Sex.|XV |XIII |XIV |XII |XI

7|XVI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI |X

8|XV |XIII |XI |XII |X |IX

9|XIV |XII |X |XI |IX |VIII

10|XIII |XI |IX |X |VIII |VII

| | | | | |

11|XII |X |VIII |IX |VII |VI

12|XI |IX |VII |VIII |VI |V

13|X |VIII |VI |VII |V |IV

14|IX |VII |V |VI |IV |III

15|VIII |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie.

| | | | | |-----------

16|VII |V |III |IV |Pridie |KAL. JAN.

17|VI |IV |Pridie |III |KAL DEC. |IV Nonas

| | |-----------| | |

18|V |III | KAL. OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III

| | | |-----------| |

19|IV |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie

| |-----------| | | |

20|III | KAL. SEP. |V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ

| | | | | |

21|Pridie |IV Nonas |IV |III |Nonæ |VIII Idus

|-----------| | | | |

22|KAL. SEX. |III |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII

23|IV Nonas |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ |VII |VI

24|III | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V

25|Pridie |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |V |IV

| | | | | |

26|Nonæ |VII |VII |VI |IV |III

27|VIII Idus |VI |VI |V |III |Pridie

28|VII |V |V |IV |Pridie | Idus

29|VI |IV |IV |III | Idus |XVII K. Fb.

30|V |III |III |Pridie |XVII K.Jan.|XVI

| | | | | |

31|IV |Pridie | | Idus | |XV

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

D|

a|

y|

s| JULIAN YEAR 61 BEFORE CHRIST.

| (BISSEXTILE.)

o|

f|-----------------------------------------------------------------------

| | | | | |

t| JANUARY. | FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.

h| | | | | |

e| | | | | |

| | | | | |

J| | | | | |

u| | | | | |

l| | | | | |

i| | | | | |

a| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |

n| | | | | |

| | | | | |

M| | | | | |

o| | | | | |

n| | | | | |

t| | | | | |

h| | | | | |

s| 693 | 693 | 693 | 693 | 693 | 693

.| | | | | |

----------------------------------------------------------------------

1|XIV K.Feb. |XI K.Mar. |XIII K.Ap. |XI K.Maii |XII K.Jun. |X Kal.Qu.

2|XIII |X |XII |X |XI |IX

3|XII |IX |XI |IX |X |VIII

4|XI |VIII |X |VIII |IX |VII

5|X |VII |IX |VII |VIII |VI

| | | | | |

6|IX |VI |VIII |VI |VII |V

7|VIII |V |VII |V |VI |IV

8|VII |IV |VI |IV |V |III

9|VI |III |V |III |IV |Pridie

10|V |Pridie |IV |Pridie |III |---------

| | | | | |KAL.QUIN.

| |-----------| |-----------| |

11|IV |KAL. MAR. |III |KAL. MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas

| | | | |-----------|

12|III |VI Nonas |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. JUN. |V

| | |-----------| | |

13|Pridie |V |KAL. APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV

|-----------| | | | |

14|KAL.FEB. |IV |IV Nonas |IV |III |III

15|IV Nonas |III |III |III |Pridie |Pridie

| | | | | |

16|III |Pridie |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ

17|Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus

18| Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |VII

19|VIII Idus |VII |VII |VII |VI |VI

20|VII |VI |VI |VI |V |V

| | | | | |

21|VI |V |V |V |IV |IV

22|V |IV |IV |Iv |III |III

23|IV |III |III |III |Pridie |Pridie

24|III |Pridie |Pridie |Pridie |Idus |Idus

25|Pridie | Idus | Idus | Idus |XVII K.Qu. |XVII K.Sex.

| | | | | |

26| Idus |XVII K.Ap. |XVII K.M. |XVII K.Jn. |XVI |XVI

27|XVIK.Mr. |XVI |XVI |XVI |XV |XV

28|XV |XV |XV |XV |XIV |XIV

29|XIV |XIV |XIV |XIV |XIII |XIII

30|XIII | |XIII |XIII |XII |XII

| | | | | |

31|XII | |XII | |XI |

-----+----------------------------------------------------------------

D t M| JULIAN YEAR 61 BEFORE CHRIST.

a h o|

y e n| JULY | AUGUST |SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER

s t| | | | | |

J h| | | | | |

o u s| YEAR OF ROME.

f l | | | | | |

i | 693 | 693 | 693 | 693 | 693 | 693-694

a | | | | | |

n | | | | | |

-----+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+-----------

1 |XI K.Sex |IX K.Sep. |VII K.Oct.|VIII K.Nv.|VI K.Dec. |V Kal. Jan

2 |X |VIII |VI |VII |V |IV

3 |IX |VII |V |VI |IV |III

4 |VIII |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie

5 |VII |V |III |IV |Pridie |KAL. JAN.

| | | | | |

6 |VI |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. DEC. |IV Nonas

7 |V |III |KAL. OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III

8 |IV |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie

9 |III |KAL. SEP. |V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ

10 |Pridie |IV Nonas |IV |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus

| | | | | |

11 |KAL. SEX. |III |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII

12 |IV Nonas |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ |VII |VI

13 |III | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V

14 |Pridie |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |V |IV

15 | Nonæ |VII |VII |VI |IV |III

| | | | | |

16 |VIII Idus |VI |VI |V |III |Pridie

17 |VII |V |V |IV |Pridie | Idus

18 |VI |IV |IV |III | Idus |XVII K.Fb.

19 |V |III |III |Pridie |XVII K.Jan|XVI

20 |IV |Pridie |Pridie | Idus |XVI |XV

| | | | | |

21 |III | Idus | Idus |XVII K.Dec|XV |XIV

22 |Pridie |XVII K.Oct|XVII K.Nv.|XVI |XIV |XIII

23 | Idus |XVI |XVI |XV |XIII |XII

24 |XVII K.Sep|XV |XV |XIV |XII |XI

25 |XVI |XIV |XIV |XIII |XI |X

| | | | | |

26 |XV |XIII |XIII |XII |X |IX

27 |XIV |XII |XII |XI |IX |VIII

28 |XIII |XI |XI |X |VIII |VII

29 |XII |X |X |IX |VII |VI

30 |XI |IX |IX |VIII |VI |V

| | | | | |

31 |X |XIII | |VII | |IV

-----+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------

-----+-----------------------------------------------------------------------

D t M| JULIAN YEAR 60 BEFORE CHRIST.

a h o|-----------------------------------------------------------------------

y e n| JANUARY. | FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.

s t| | | | | |

J h|

o u s| YEAR OF ROME.

f l .|

i | 694 | 694 | 694 | 694 | 694 | 694

a | | | | | |

n | | | | | |

-----+------------+------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+----------

1 |III K. Feb. |VII Id. int.|Nonæ Mart. |VIII d. Ap.|VIII Id. Ma.|VI Id. Jun.

2 |Pridie |VI |VIII Idus |VI |VII |V

|------------| | | | |

3 |KAL. FEB. |V |VII |V |VI |IV

4 |IV Nonas |IV |VI |IV |V |III

5 |III |III |V |III |IV |Pridie

| | | | | |

6 |Pridie |Pridie |IV |Pridie |III | Idus

7 | Nonæ | Idus |III | Idus |Pridie |XVII K. Qu.

8 |VIII Idus |XVI K. Mar. |Pridie |XVII K.M. | Idus |XVI

9 |VII |XV | Idus |XVI |XVII K. Ju. |XV

10 |VI |XIV |XVII K. Ap.|XV |XVI |XIV

| | | | | |

11 |V |XIII |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII

12 |IV |XII |XV |XIII |XIV |XII

13 |III |XI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI

14 |Pridie |X |XIII |XI |XII |X

15 | Idus |IX |XII |X |XI |IX

| | | | | |

16 |XI Kal. int.|VIII |XI |IX |X |VIII

17 |X |VII |X |VIII |IX |VII

18 |IX |VI |IX |VII |VIII |VI

19 |VIII |V |VIII |VI |VII |V

20 |VII |IV |VII |V |VI |IV

| | | | | |

21 |VI |III |VI |IV |V |III

22 |V |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie

| |------------| | | |----------

23 |IV |KAL. MAR. |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. QUIN.

| | | |-----------| |

24 |III |VI Nonas |III |KAL. MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas

| | | | |------------|

25 |Pridie |V |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. JUN. |V

| | | | | |

|------------| |-----------| | |

26 |KAL. INT. |IV |KAL. APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV

27 |IV Nonas |III |IV Nonas |IV |III |III

28 |III |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie

29 |Pridie | |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ

30 | Nonæ | | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus

| | | | | |

31 |VIII Idus | |VIII Idus | |VII |

-----+------------+------------+-----------+-----------+------------+----------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| JULIAN YEAR 60 BEFORE CHRIST.

|------------------------------------------------------------------------

Days | JULY. | AUGUST. | SEPTEMBER. | OCTOBER. | NOVEMBER. | DECEMBER.

of the| | | | | |

Julian| YEAR OF ROME.

Months| | | | | |

| 694 | 694 | 694 | 694 | 694 | 694--695

------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------

1|VII Id. Qu.|V Id. Sext.|III Id. Sep.|IV Id. Oct. |Pr. Id. Nov.|Idus Dec.

2|VI |IV |Pridie |III |Idus |XVII K. Jn.

3|V |III | Idus |Pridie |XVII K.Dc. |XVI

4|IV |Pridie |XVII K. Oct | Idus |XVI |XV

5|III | Idus |XVI |XVII K.Nv. |XV |XIV

6|Pridie |XVII K.Sep.|XV |XVI |XIV |XIII

7| Idus |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII |XII

8|XVII K.Sex.|XV |XIII |XIV |XII |XI

9|XVI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI |X

10|XV |XIII |XI |XII |X |IX

11|XIV |XII |X |XI |IX |VIII

12|XIII |XI |IX |X |VIII |VII

13|XII |X |VIII |IX |VII |VI

14|XI |IX |VII |VIII |VI |V

15|X |VIII |VI |VII |V |IV

16|IX |VII |V |VI |IV |III

17|VIII |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie

| | | | | |-----------

18|VII |V |III |IV |Pridie |KAL. JAN.

| | | | |------------|

19|VI |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. DEC. |IV Nonas

| | |------------| | |

20|V |III |KAL. OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III

| | | |------------| |

21|IV |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie

| |-----------| | | |

22|III |KAL SEP. |V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ

23|Pridie |IV Nonas |IV |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus

|-----------| | | | |

24|KAL. SEX. |III |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII

25|IV Nonas |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ |VII |VI

26|III | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V

27|Pridie |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |V |IV

28| Nonae |VII |VII |VI |IV |III

29|VIII Idus |VI |VI |V |III |Pridie

30|VII |V |V |IV |Pridie | Idus

31|VI |IV | |III | |XVII K.Fb.

------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

| JULIAN YEAR 59 BEFORE CHRIST.

|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------

Days | JANUARY. | FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.

of the| | | | | |

Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |

Months| | | | | |

| 695 | 695 | 695 | 695 | 695 | 695

------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------

1|XVI K. Feb.|XIII K. Mr.|XVI K. Ap. |XIV K. Maii|XV K. Jun. |XIII K. Qn.

2|XV |XII |XV |XIII |XIV |XII

3|XIV |XI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI

4|XIII |X |XIII |XI |XII |X

5|XII |IX |XII |X |XI |IX

| | | | | |

6|XI |VIII |XI |IX |X |VIII

7|X |VII |X |VIII |IX |VII

8|IX |VI |IX |VII |VIII |VI

9|VIII |V |VIII |VI |VII |V

10|VII |IV |VII |V |VI |IV

| | | | | |

11|VI |III |VI |IV |V |III

12|V |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie

| |-----------| | | |-----------

13|IV | KAL. MAR. |IV |Pridie |III | KAL QUIN.

| | | |-----------| |

14|III |VI Nonas |III | KAL. MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas

| | | | |-----------|

15|Pridie |V |Pridie |VI Nonas | KAL.JUN. |V

|-----------| |-----------| | |

16| KAL. FEB. |IV | KAL APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV

17|IV Nonas |III |IV Nonas |IV |III |III

18|III |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie

19|Pridie | Nonæ |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ |Nonæ

20| Nonæ |VIII Idus | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus

| | | | | |

21|VIII Idus |VII |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |VII

22|VII |VI |VII |VII |VI |VI

23|VI |V |VI |VI |V |V

24|V |IV |V |V |IV |IV

25|IV |III |IV |IV |III |III

| | | | | |

26|III |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie

27|Pridie | Idus |Pridie |Pridie | Idus | Idus

28| Idus |XVII K. Ap.| Idus | Idus |XVII K. Qu.|XVII K.SEX.

29|XVI K. Mr. | |XVII K.M. |XVII K. Ju.|XVI |XVI

30|XV | |XVI |XVI |XV |XV

| | | | | |

31|XIV | |XV | |XIV |

------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------

APPENDIX A.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

| JULIAN YEAR 59 BEFORE CHRIST.

|----------------------------------------------------------------------

Days | JULY. | AUGUST. | SEPTEMBER.| OCTOBER. | NOVEMBER. | DECEMBER.

of the| | | | | |

Julian| YEAR OF ROME.

Months| | | | | |

| 695 | 695 | 695 | 695 | 695 | 695--696

------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------

1|XIV K. Sex.|XII K. Sep.|X Kal. Oct.|XI K. Nov. |IX K. Dec. |VIIl K.Jan.

2|XIII |XI |IX |X |VIII |VII

3|XII |X |VIII |IX |VII |VI

4|XI |IX |VII |VIII |VI |V

5|X |VIII |VI |VII |V |IV

| | | | | |

6|IX |VII |V |VI |IV |III

7|VIII |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie

| | | | | |-----------

8|VII |V |III |IV |Pridie | KAL. JAN.

| | | | |-----------|

9|VI |IV |Pridie |III | KAL.DEC. |IV Nonas

10|V |III | KAL OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III

| | | |-----------| |

11|IV |Pridie |VI Nonas | KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie

| |-----------| | | |

12|III | KAL. SEP. |V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ

13|Pridie |IV Nonas |IV |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus

|-----------| | | | |

14| KAL. SEX. |III |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII

15|IV Nonas |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ |VII |VI

| | | | | |

16|III | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V

17|Pridie |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |V |IV

18| Nonæ |VII |VII |VI |IV |III

19|VIII Idus |VI |VI |V |III |Pridie

20|VII |V |V |IV |Pridie | Idus

| | | | | |

21|VI |IV |IV |III | Idus |XVII K. Fb.

22|V |III |III |Pridie |XVII K.Jan.|XVI

23|IV |Pridie |Pridie | Idus |XVI |XV

24|III | Idus | Idus |XVII K.Dec.|XV |XIV

25|Pridie |XVII K.Oct.|XVII K. Nv.|XVI |XIV |XIII

| | | | | |

26| Idas |XVI |XVI |XV |XIII |XII

27|XVII K.Sep.|XV |XV |XIV |XII |XI

28|XVI |XIV |XIV |XIII |XI |X

29|XV |XIII |XIII |XII |X |IX

30|XIV |XII |XII |XI |IX |VIII

| | | | | |

31|XIII |XI | |X | |VII

------+----------------------------------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

| JULIAN YEAR 58 BEFORE CHRIST.

|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------

Days | JANUARY. | FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.

of the| | | | | |

Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |

Months| | | | | |

| 696 | 696 | 696 | 696 | 696 | 696

| | | | | |

------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------

1|VI K. Feb. |Pr.Non.int.|III Non.Mr.| Nonæ Ap. |Pr.Non.Ma. |VIII Id Ju.

2|V | Nonæ |Pridie |VIII Idus |Nonæ |VII

3|IV |VIII Idus | Nonæ |VII |VIII Idus |VI

4|III |VII |VIII Idus |VI |VII |V

5|Pridie |VI |VII |V |VI |IV

|-----------| | | | |

6|KAL. FEB. |V |VI |IV |V |III

7|IV Nonas |IV |V |III |IV |Pridie

8|III |III |IV |Pridie |III | Idus

9|Pridie |Pridie |III | Idus |Pridie |XVII K.Qu.

10| Nonæ | Idus |Pridie |XVII K.M. | Idus |XVI

| | | | | |

11|VIII Idus |XV K. Man | Idus |XVI |XVII K.Ju. |XV

12|VII |XIV |XVII K.Ap. |XV |XVI |XIV

13|VI |XIII |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII

14|V |XII |XV |XIII |XIV |XII

15|IV |XI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI

| | | | | |

16|III |X |XIII |XI |XII |X

17|Pridie |IX |XII |X |XI |IX

18| Idus |VIII |XI |IX |X |VIII

19|XI Kal.int.|VII |X |VIII |IX |VII

20|X |VI |IX |VII |VIII |VI

| | | | | |

21|IX |V |VIII |VI |VII |V

22|VIII |IV |VII |V |VI |IV

23|VII |III |VI |IV |V |III

24|VI |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie

| |-----------| | | |-----------

25|V |KAL. MAR. |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. QUIN.

| | | |-----------| |

26|IV |VI Nonas |III |KAL. MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas

| | | | |-----------|

27|III |V |Pridie |VI Nonas | KAL. JUN. |V

| | |-----------| | |

28|Pridie |IV | KAL.APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV

|-----------| | | | |

29| KAL. INT. | |IV Nonas |IV |III |III

30|IV Nonas | |III |III |Pridie |Pridie

| | | | | |

31|III | |Pridie | | Nonæ |

------+-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------

History of Julius Cæsar, Vol. 2 of 2 · 第 13 / 17 章