Our position at Corpus Christi--Instructions to Taylor as to the boundary
of the Rio Grande--Taylor's views--Review and history of the boundary
question--Letter from Mr. Adams--Santa Anna's agreements with Texas,
&c.--March to the Rio Grande ordered--Justification in a military
point of view of the occupation of the disputed territory--Anecdote
of Frederick the Great--War in Silesia and Austria--Madison's conduct
to Spain in 1810--Right of declaration of war--Justifiable causes of
war--Opinion of Sir J. Mackintosh--War and diplomacy contrasted.
One of the most inclement winters in the Gulf of Mexico had passed in
the comfortless manner described in the last chapter. Our attempts to
negotiate with Mexico were repulsed, and although our minister had not
yet returned to the United States--having delayed at Jalapa with the
hope of finding Paredes more accessible than Herrera--every thing
indicated an ultimate defeat of diplomacy.
Meanwhile our forces at Corpus Christi were gradually augmenting, under
the command of Generals Taylor and Worth. In October, 1845, the troops
amounted to near four thousand, and General Taylor made every
preparation, by reconnoissances between the Nueces and the Rio Grande
for the ultimate defence of soil which had been claimed by our
government as part of Texas.[81]
As a military man it was not his duty to affix the boundaries that were
to be the subject of negotiation or war; but simply to ascertain
precisely the extent of defence required along a disputed territory, and
to dispose his troops accordingly.[82]
In October, 1845, therefore, General Taylor reviewed the instructions
from the war department, and, seeing that he had been ordered to select
and occupy near the Rio Grande such a site as would consist with the
health of the troops, and was best adapted to repel invasion, he
ventured to suggest an advance of his army. This however, was done by
him whilst he felt great diffidence in touching topics that might become
matter of delicate diplomacy. Nevertheless, taking a soldier's view of
the topographical and not the diplomatic question, he informed our
government, that if it made the Rio Grande an _ultimatum_ in adjusting a
boundary, he doubted not that the settlement would be facilitated by
taking possession, at once, of one or two suitable points on, or quite
near, that river. At these spots, our strength would be displayed in a
manner not to be mistaken, while the position of our troops at the
remote camp of Corpus Christi, with arid wastes between them and the
outposts of Mexico, altogether failed to impress that government with
our readiness to vindicate by force of arms our title to the country as
far as the Rio Grande.[83] Moreover, General Taylor felt encumbered by
the orders from our war department of the 8th July, in which he was told
that Mexico held military establishments on the east side of the Rio
Grande, whose forces he should not disturb until our peaceful relations
were finally destroyed.[84]
Accordingly, on the 13th of January, 1846, our commander-in-chief was
directed to advance with his troops to the Rio Grande.[85] This movement
was made in consequence of the anticipated failure of our negotiations,
clearly indicated by the conduct of the Mexican government immediately
upon the arrival of Mr. Slidell in the capital. But before these orders
were despatched to General Taylor, he had already in August, 1845, been
apprised of his duties in the event of hostile demonstrations on the
part of the enemy. In case of an invasion of Texas by the Mexicans, he
was directed to drive them back beyond the Rio Grande; and, although it
was desirable that he should confine himself as much as possible to
defensive measures, yet, in the event of such a repulse, he was
authorized to seize and hold possession of Matamoros and other places on
the soil of Mexico.
This resolution of our government was made the subject of grave
complaint by persons who opposed the war. The order to advance from
Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande was alleged to be an act of invasion,
and consequently, that _hostilities_ were commenced by us and not by
Mexico.
It may be pardoned if we pause awhile to consider a subject of such
vital importance. The solution of the question was placed by one party
upon the determination whether the Rio Grande was the boundary between
Texas and Mexico before the battle of San Jacinto; and, if not, whether
it has been made so since by competent authority. Up to that period it
was asserted to be a recognized fact that the Nueces was the western
boundary of Texas. Mr. John Quincy Adams, in his controversy with Don
Luis De Onis, upon the Spanish boundary question, in March, 1818;[86]
and Messieurs Pinckney and Monroe, in their argument with Cevallos at
Madrid in April, 1805,[87] claimed the Rio Grande as the true limit
between the United States and Mexico, by virtue of the ancient rights of
France and the treaties between that sovereignty and the Spanish
king.[88] It was asserted, therefore, that by the cession of Louisiana
all the rights of France over Texas, as an integral part of her
territory, accrued to us; and consequently that when the State of Texas
was united to this country it was only _re_-annexed with what were
_claimed_ to be its ancient limits. But this was not a true statement
of the controversy, for after our treaty with Spain the aspect of the
affair changed. The question then was no longer what had been the
boundary under the laws between France and Spain, or between Spain and
the United States,--but what were the limits either under the colonial
government of the Mexican viceroyalty, or under the laws of Mexico, when
she became an independent republic. It was asserted that no map or
geography existed since the establishment of the republic that did not
lay down the boundary north of the Rio Grande. The map of Texas,
compiled by Stephen H. Austin, the parent of Texan colonization,
published at Philadelphia in 1835, and setting forth all the Mexican
grants in Texas, represents the Rio Nueces as the western boundary.
General Almonte in 1834, as I have previously stated, alleged, upon the
authority of the State government of Coahuila and Texas that the
boundary between them was even east of the Nueces. This was probably in
accordance with the ancient Spanish division; for, in 1805 Cevallos
declared to our ministers at Madrid that the province of Texas, "where
the Spaniards have had settlements from the 17th century, was bounded on
the east by Louisiana, and contains the extensive country which lies
between the river Medina _where the government of Coahuila ends_, and
the post now abandoned." Authorities to this effect might be
extensively multiplied.[90] Brazos de Santiago was a Mexican port of
entry, which continued to be held up to the period of hostilities, and
Laredo was a small Mexican town, occupied by a Mexican garrison. If such
was the geographical division between Texas and Mexico on the lower Rio
Grande, near its mouth in the gulf, it was asserted that there could be
infinitely less right to claim it as a limit nearer its source, since
Santa Fe, the capital of New Mexico, had never been within the
jurisdiction of Texas, and since the boundaries of Chihuahua commenced
near the head waters of the Nueces.
These were some of the arguments used by individuals who deemed the
march to Point Isabel an invasion of Mexican territory. It is just that
a few reasons should also be presented on behalf of those who believed
it to be lawful or expedient.
When Santa Anna was captured after the battle of San Jacinto in 1836,
the leading men in Texas had great difficulty in rescuing him from
popular vengeance for the massacres he had committed. The victory over
the central chief--the despot and dictator of Mexico--was generally
believed to be a crowning measure of success, for the bitter persecutor
soon dwindled into the humble supplicant, and pledged his name and his
oath to secure the independence of the rebellious State. Accordingly,
with every appearance and promise of good faith and honor, he executed
contracts with the Texan authorities which deserve consideration in
discussing this question. On the 14th of May, 1836, at Velasco, two of
these documents were signed by Santa Anna, Burnet, Collingsworth,
Hardiman and Grayson,--the first being a public, and the second a secret
convention between the parties. The third article of the first paper
stipulates that the Mexican troops shall evacuate the _territory_ of
Texas, _passing to the other side of the Rio Grande_, while the fourth
article of the secret agreement declares that a treaty of amity,
commerce and limits shall be made between Mexico and Texas, _the
territory of the latter power not to extend beyond the Rio Bravo del
Norte, or Rio Grande_. In conformity with these contracts, Texas set
free the prisoner, whose "prompt release and departure for Vera Cruz,"
according to their tenor, "were necessary for the fulfilment of his
_solemn oath_," to obtain a recognition of the independence of Texas,
and to dispose the Mexican cabinet for the reception of
commissioners.[91]
Santa Anna returned to his country in disgrace after his disastrous
campaign, and lurked in retirement at his farm until the French attacked
Vera Cruz, when he threw himself again at the head of the departmental
forces. In the action he fortunately lost a limb, and by the skilful
display of his mutilation in defence of Mexico, he renewed his claims
to national gratitude. Instead, however, of using his influence to
obtain the treaty, promised as the boon for his life, he became at once
the bitterest foe of Texas, and pledged himself to fight "forever for
its reconquest." Texas, meanwhile, acting in good faith, and presuming
to adopt the spirit and letter of the convention with Santa Anna, whom
she naturally regarded as the dictator of Mexico, passed the act of
December 19, 1836, establishing the Rio Grande as her boundary from the
gulf to its source. Besides this, her congress created senatorial and
representative districts west of the Nueces; organized and defined
limits of counties extending to the Rio Grande; created courts of
justice; spread her judicial system over the country wherever her people
roamed, and performed other acts of sovereignty which we are compelled
not to disregard. It cannot be contended that these acts and agreements
were alone sufficient, under the laws of nations, to confer upon Texas
unquestionable rights over the soil between the Nueces and the Rio
Grande, for a contract with the captive president and general was not
legally binding; but it is equally clear that all these arguments of the
old authorities as to the original boundary, and all the new claims set
up by Texas, under her statutes, as well as stipulations with Santa
Anna, made that territory a disputed ground whose real ownership could
only be equitably settled by negotiation. The strong language of both
the contracts, just recited, seems to _concede_ the fact that the
president of Mexico regarded, at least the lower Rio Grande, as already
the real boundary between Mexico and Texas, notwithstanding the opinion
of Almonte in 1834; and consequently that it was neither the subject of
treaty or agreement at that moment, nor could it become so afterwards
when commissioners were appointed.
When Texas was annexed to the United States she was received with these
asserted limits, though she did not join the Union with any specific
boundaries.[92] It was thought best by both parties to leave the
question of confines open between Mexico and our country, so as not to
complicate the national entanglements. After the congress of the United
States and convention in Texas had acted upon the joint resolution it
was impossible for us to recede. The course of our presidents,
therefore, was at once pacific and soothing towards Mexico. For although
they believed that republic had no right to be consulted as to the
annexation of Texas, a free and independent State, they nevertheless
admitted all her natural and just privileges in regard to boundary. Mr.
Tyler and Mr. Polk therefore despatched envoys to Mexico with the offer
of liberal negotiations as soon as a favorable opportunity presented
itself. But the charge and minister of Mr. Tyler were scornfully
rejected, while Mr. Slidell, as has been already related, was refused an
audience upon frivolous pretences at a moment when the Mexican secretary
was secretly craving to receive him.[93]
In such a juncture what was the duty of the United States? It is an easy
matter for speculative philosophers or political critics to find fault
with the conduct of statesmen and to become prophets of woe _after_ the
occurrence of events they deprecate. But such men are timid actors on
the world's stage, and especially in such a theatre of folly as the
Mexican republic. Governments have but two ways of settling
international disputes,--either by negotiation or war,--and, even the
latter must be concluded by diplomacy, for nations rarely fight until
one of them is completely annihilated. Negotiation, or the attempt to
negotiate, had been completely exhausted by us. Meanwhile Mexico
continued to excite our curiosity by spasmodic struggles in nerving her
people for the war, as well as by gasconading despatches which breathed
relentless animosity to our country for the annexation of Texas.
Nevertheless, this sensitive and vaunting nation would neither make
peace, establish boundaries, negotiate, nor declare war. Was it
reasonable that such a frantic state of things should be permitted to
continue? Could this perverse aversion to fighting or friendship be
tolerated? Were our countries to conclude an eternal compact of mutual
hatred and non intercourse? Was such childish obstinacy and weakness to
be connived at in our country? Was it due to common sense, justice, or
the preservation of a good neighborhood that we should remain supine
under insane threats and dishonorable treatment? We asserted that, upon
the Texas question, we had rightly no dispute with Mexico, except as to
the boundary involved in the territory our forces were then occupying or
about to cross. We did not design discussing our right to annex Texas.
That was an act accomplished and unalterable. It was, doubtless,
exceedingly convenient for Mexico to maintain this pacific state of
_quasi-war_ and to reject, alike, our amity and hostilities, as long as
she owed us many millions of dollars and refused either to pay principal
or interest, or to conclude a treaty for the settlement of unadjusted
claims. Whilst her government was able to enforce non-intercourse, it
was free from importunity and payment. But this adroit scheme of
insolvency was unjust to our citizens, and only served to augment the
liabilities of Mexico. What then remained to be done? The reply may be
found in a significant anecdote related by Mr. Adams in a speech in
congress on the Oregon question, on the 2d of January, 1846.
"After negotiating"--said he--"for twenty years about this matter we may
take possession of the subject matter of negotiation. Indeed, we may
negotiate after we take possession, and this is the military way of
doing business. When Frederick the Great came to the throne of Prussia
he found that his father had equipped for him an army of a hundred
thousand men. Meeting soon after the Austrian minister, the latter said
to him: "Your father has given you a great army, but ours has seen the
wolf, whilst your majesty's has not." "Well--well!" exclaimed Frederick,
"I will soon give it an opportunity to see the wolf!" Frederick then
added, in his memoirs:--"I had some excellent old _pretensions_ to an
Austrian province, which some of my ancestors owned one or two centuries
before; accordingly I sent an ambassador to the court of Austria stating
my claim, and presenting a full exposition of my right to the province.
The same day my ambassador was received in Vienna, I entered Silesia
with my army!"[94]
Such would be a prompt and impulsive answer to the manifold
prevarications of seditious Mexico. But the army we advanced and the
country we occupied, were neither the army of Frederick nor the pleasant
vales of rich and populous Silesia. A nearly desolate waste, stretched
from the Nueces to the Rio Grande, barren alike in soil and inhabitants,
and tempting none to its dreary wilderness but nomadic _rancheros_ or
outlaws who found even Mexico no place of refuge for their wickedness.
It was, surely, not a land worthy of bloodshed, and yet, in consequence
of its sterility, it became of vast importance on a frontier across
whose wide extent enemies might pass unobserved and unmolested. With the
entire command of the Rio Grande from its source to its mouth in the
hands of our enemy, and the whole of this arid region flanking the
stream and interposing itself between Mexico and our troops, it is
evident that our adversaries would possess unusual advantages over us
either for offensive or defensive war. The mere control of the
embouchure of the river was no trivial superiority, for, on a stormy and
inhospitable coast, it was almost impossible to support an effectual
blockade and thus prevent the enemy from being succored along his whole
frontier with arms and provisions from abroad. By seizing, however, the
usual points of transit and entrance on the lower Rio Grande many of
these evils might be avoided; and, if Mexico ultimately resolved on
hostilities, we should be enabled to throw our forces promptly across
the river, and by rapid marches obtain the command of all the military
positions of vantage along her north-eastern boundary.
The foresight of Frederick the Great disclosed to him the military value
of Silesia in the event of a war with Austria, and it was probably that
circumstance, quite as much as his alleged political rights, that
induced him to enter it with an army on the day when he commenced
negotiations. He began the war with Austria by surprising Saxony, and,
during all his difficulties, clung tenaciously to the possession of
Silesia. Saxony was important as a military barrier covering Prussia on
the side of Austria, while Silesia indented deeply the line of the
Austrian frontier and flanked a large part of Bohemia.[95] Thus Saxony
and Silesia formed a natural fortification for Prussia, just as the
deserts of the disputed land, when in our rear, covered the undefended
confines of Texas at the same time that they gave us the keys to the
enemy's country at Point Isabel and Matamoros.
* * * * *
It may be asserted that, when vacant or nearly vacant territory is in
controversy between two nations, and forms the only subject of real
dispute between them, it would be better for both to refrain from an
attempt to occupy it, provided they are willing to arbitrate the
quarrel, or settle it by diplomacy. But, when both parties assert
claims, both have equal rights to enter it, when negotiation fails. The
decision is then to be made only by intimidation or war. There is no
alternative by which collision can be escaped, and it is the duty of the
wiser of the disputants to place his national forces in such an
advantageous position as either to defend his acknowledged territory or
force himself to be driven from the soil he claims. "I do not consider
the march to the Rio Grande to have been the cause of the war"--said a
distinguished statesman, "anymore than I consider the British march on
Concord or Lexington to have been the cause of the American revolution,
or the crossing of the Rubicon to have been the cause of the civil war
in Rome. The march to the Rio Grande brought on the _collision of arms_,
but, so far from being the cause of the war, it was itself the effect of
those causes."
* * * * *
The power of declaring war is expressly reserved by the constitution to
congress, and, though the president is commander in chief of the army
when called into actual service, he should be extremely cautious in
issuing orders or doing acts which may lead to hostilities resulting in
war. Our congress was in session in January, 1846, when Mr. Slidell was
rejected by Mexico, when our international relations were complicated as
I have described, and when the secretary of war, by the president's
direction, gave the order for Taylor's advance to the Rio Grande. This
was an act that brought the armies of Mexico and the United States in
front of each other; and although there can be no doubt that congress
would have authorised the movement of our troops under the military
advice of General Taylor,--provided the Rio Grande was to be made an
ultimatum in the ratification of a treaty by our senate,--it is,
nevertheless, to be profoundly regretted that the question was not
previously submitted to our national representatives. At that moment the
public mind was distracted between Mexico and England; but the Oregon
question nearly absorbed the apparently minor difficulties with our
restive neighbor. Congress contemplated the solemn probability of war
with one of the mightiest nations of our age, and even some of our
experienced statesmen,--as we have seen in the example of Mr.
Adams,--recommended the most stringent measures of armed occupation. At
such a crisis, and with a confidential knowledge of all our foreign
relations, it was the duty of the president to represent these matters
frankly to congress and to ask the opinion of his constitutional
advisers, as he subsequently did in the settlement of the dispute with
Great Britain. This prudent act would have saved the executive from
needless responsibility, whilst it indicated a sensitive devotion to the
behests of our constitution. Congress met whilst our troops were
encamped at Corpus Christi, as an army of observation, whose hostile,
though protective character, was unquestionable; yet our representatives
neither ordered its return nor refused it supplies. This denoted a
willingness to sanction measures which might either pacify Mexico, or
impose upon that republic the immediate alternative of war. It is not
improbable that congress would have adopted such a course, because,
according to the pretensions of Mexico, our troops had already invaded
her domains. This is an important view of the question which should not
be passed by silently. Mexico, it must be remembered, never relinquished
her right to reconquer Texas, but always claimed the _whole_ province as
her own, asserting a determination to regard its union with our
confederacy as justifiable cause of war. The joint-resolution, alone,
was therefore a belligerent act of the congress of the United States,
sufficient, according to the doctrine of Mexico, to compel hostile
retaliation. But, moreover, as the entire soil of Texas, from the Sabine
to the Nueces or Rio Grande was still claimed by Mexico as her
unsurrendered country, the landing of a single American soldier anywhere
south of our ancient boundary with Spain, was quite as hostile an
invasion of Mexican territory as the passage of our army from Corpus
Christi to Point Isabel.
Occasions upon which the eminent right of self protection has been
adopted as a principle of action in the United States, are not wanting
in our political history. The circumstances in all, are of course not
precisely the same, but the policy is identical. The conduct of our
government in regard to General Jackson's invasion of Florida for the
suppression of Indian cruelties may be referred to. But congress might
have found a still more analogous case, in the dispute between Spain and
the United States as to the eastern limits of Louisiana. Spain alleged
that Florida extended to the Mississippi, embracing what was then a
wilderness, but, now, forms the populous States of Alabama and
Mississippi; while our government asserted that all the territory
eastward of the Mississippi and extending to the Rio Perdido belonged of
right to us by virtue of the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of
April, 1803. By acts of congress in 1803 and 1804 the president was
authorized to take possession of the territory ceded by France, to
establish a provisional government, to lay duties on goods imported into
it; and, moreover, _whenever he deemed it expedient_, to erect the bay
and river Mobile into a separate district, in which he might establish a
port of entry and delivery.
In 1810, President Madison believing that the United States had too long
acquiesced in the temporary continuance of this territory under Spanish
domain, and that nothing was to be gained from Spain by candid
discussion and amicable negotiation for several years, solved the
difficulty by taking possession of Mobile and Baton Rouge and extending
our jurisdiction to the Perdido. This possession, he took means to
ensure, if needful, by military force. Mr. Madison's conduct was
assailed in congress by the federalists who regarded it as an
unjustifiable and offensive demonstration against Spain, but it was
defended with equal warmth by the opposition,--especially by Mr.
Clay,--and the Rio Perdido has ever since continued to form the western
limit of Florida.[96]
* * * * *
When nations are about to undertake the dread responsibility of war, and
to spread the sorrow and ruin which always mark the pathway of
victorious or defeated armies, they should pause to contemplate the
enormity of their enterprise as well as the principles that can alone
justify them in the sight of God and man. Human life cannot be lawfully
destroyed, assailed or endangered for any other object than that of just
defence of person or principle, yet it is not a legal consequence that
defensive wars are always just.[97]
"It is the right of a State," said that profound moralist and statesman,
Sir James Mackintosh, "to take all measures necessary for her safety if
it be attacked or threatened from without: provided always that
reparation cannot otherwise be obtained; that there is a reasonable
prospect of obtaining it by arms; and that the evils of the contest are
not probably greater than the mischiefs of acquiescence in the wrong;
including, on both sides of the deliberation, the ordinary consequences
of the example as well as the immediate effects of the act. If
reparation can otherwise be obtained, a nation has no necessary, and
therefore no just cause of war; if there be no probability of obtaining
it by arms, a government cannot, with justice to their own nation,
embark it in war; and, if the evils of resistance should appear on the
whole greater than those of submission, wise rulers will consider an
abstinence from a pernicious exercise of right as a sacred duty to their
own subjects, and a debt which every people owes to the great
commonwealth of mankind, of which they and their enemies are alike
members. A war is just against the wrongdoer when reparation for wrong
cannot otherwise be obtained; but is then only conformable to all the
principles of morality when it is not likely to expose the nation by
whom it is levied to greater evils than it professes to avert, and when
it does not inflict on the nation which has done the wrong, sufferings
altogether disproportioned to the extent of the injury. When the rulers
of a nation are required to determine a question of peace or war, the
bare justice of their case against the wrongdoer never can be the sole,
and is not always the chief matter on which they are morally bound to
exercise a conscientious deliberation. Prudence in conducting the
affairs of their subjects is in them a part of justice."
These are the true principles by which Mexico should have judged the
controversy between us, before she rejected all our efforts to
negotiate, and forced our government to prepare for hostilities.
* * * * *
The idea of war, for mere conquest, seems now to be obsolete among
civilized nations. To political dominion, as exhibited in the various
governments of the old world, and in most of the new, geographical
limits are definitely assigned. This fact must, hereafter, greatly
modify the objects of war, by narrowing them to _principles_ instead of
_territory_. Principles, however, are always the fair subjects of
controversy for the diplomatic art. Yet such is the perversity of human
nature, that, although we are convinced of the propriety and possibility
of adjusting our disputes by reason, we nevertheless go to war for
these very principles, and, after having done each other an incalculable
amount of injury, at last sit down like cripples, to negotiate the very
matters which ought to have been treated and terminated diplomatically
at first. It is, perhaps, the folly of mankind to believe that there is
more wisdom in negotiators and diplomacy when nations are lame and
weakened by war than when they are full of the vigorous energy and
intelligence of peace!
NOTE.--It may be useful to record the following proclamation
of General Woll, before annexation, in order to show, that
the agreements between Santa Anna and the Texans in 1836, are
not the only Mexican documents in existence which seemed to
open the boundary question between Texas and Tamaulipas.
"_Headquarters of the Army of the North, Mier, June 20, 1844._
"I, Adrian Woll, general of brigade, &c., make known:
"1. The armistice agreed on with the department of Texas
having expired, and the war being, in consequence,
recommenced against the inhabitants of that department, all
communication with it ceases.
"2. Every individual, of whatever condition, who may
contravene provisions of the preceding article, shall be
regarded as a traitor, and shall receive the punishment
prescribed in article 45, title 10, treatise 8, of the
articles of war.
"3. _Every individual who may be found at the distance of
one league from the left bank of the Rio Bravo, will be
regarded as a favorer and accomplice of the usurpers of that
part of the national territory, and as a traitor to his
country; and, after a summary military trial, shall receive
the said punishment._
"4. Every individual who may be comprehended within the
provisions of the preceding article, and may be rash enough
to fly at the sight of any force belonging to the supreme
government, shall be pursued until taken, or put to death.
"5. In consideration of the situation of the towns of La
Reda and Santa Rita de Ampudia, as well as of all the _farm
houses beyond the Rio Bravo_, I have this day received, from
the supreme government, orders to determine the manner by
which those interested are to be protected; but, until the
determination of the supreme government be received, I warn
all those who are beyond the limits here prescribed, to
bring them within the line, or to abandon them; as those who
disobey this order, will infallibly suffer the punishment
here established.
ADRIAN WOLL.
FOOTNOTES:
[81] On the 15th of June, 1845, Mr. Bancroft, as acting secretary of
state, wrote to General Taylor as follows:
"The point of your ultimate destination is the western frontier of
Texas, where you will select and occupy, on or near the Rio Grande del
Norte, such a site as will consist with the health of the troops, and
will be best adapted to repel invasion, and to protect what, in the
event of annexation, will be our western border."
On the 30th of July, 1845, the secretary of war, Mr. Marcy, declared to
him that "the Rio Grande is claimed to be the boundary between the two
countries, and up to this boundary you are to extend your protection,
only excepting any posts on the eastern side thereof which are in the
actual occupancy of Mexican forces, or Mexican settlements over which
the republic of Texas did not exercise jurisdiction at the period of
annexation, or shortly before that event. It is expected that, in
selecting the establishment for your troops, you will approach as near
the boundary line--the Rio Grande--as prudence will dictate. With this
view, the President desires that your position, for a part of your
forces, at least, should be west of the river Nueces."
This, and even more forcible language, was repeated in letters from the
same source on the 23d and 30th of August, and on the 16th of October,
1845. In the last letter the secretary of war states distinctly that the
western boundary of Texas is the Rio Grande. See Senate doc. No. 337,
29th cong. 1st sess. pp. 75, 77, 80, 81, 82.
[82] That this was General Taylor's view of the question is proved by a
remark in his letter to General Ampudia on the 12th of April, 1846, on
being warned by that officer to break up his camp and to retire to the
other bank of the Nueces. General Taylor says: I need hardly advise you
that charged as I am, _in only a military capacity, with the performance
of specific duties, I cannot enter into a discussion of the
international question involved in the advance of the American
army_.--id. p. 124.
[83] See Senate Doc. No. 337, 29th cong. 1st sess. p. 99.
[84] Id. p. 75.
[85] Id. p. 82.
[86] American State papers, vol. 4, p. 468.
[87] Id. vol. 2, p. 662.
[88] As it may be important that the reader should understand the title
to Louisiana under which the boundary of the Rio Grande was claimed, the
following is a summary of its history. Louisiana originally belonged to
France, but by a secret compact between that country and Spain in 1762,
and by treaties, in the following year, between France, Spain, and
England, the French dominion was extinguished on all the continent of
America. In consequence of the treaty between this country and England
in 1783, the Mississippi became the western boundary of the United
States from its source to the 31 deg. of north latitude, and thence, on the
same parallel to the St. Mary's. France, it will be remembered, always
had _claimed_ dominion in Louisiana to the Rio Bravo or Rio Grande, by
virtue
1st. Of the discovery of the Mississippi from near its source to the
ocean.
2d. _Of the possession taken, and establishment made by La Salle, at the
bay of St. Bernard, west of the rivers Trinity and Colorado, by
authority of Louis XIV, in 1685_; notwithstanding the subsequent
destruction of the colony.
3d. Of the charter of Louis XIV, to Crozat in 1712.
4th. The historical authority of Du Pratz, Champigny, and the Count de
Vergennes.
5th. Of the authority of De Lisle's map, and of the map published in
1762 by Don Thomas Lopez, _geographer to the king of Spain_, as well as
of various other maps, atlases, and geographical and historical
authorities.
By an article of the secret treaty of San Ildefonso, in October, 1800,
Spain retroceded Louisiana to France; yet this treaty was not
promulgated till the beginning of 1802. The paragraph of cession is as
follows: "His Catholic majesty engages to retrocede to the French
republic, six months after the full and entire execution of the
conditions and stipulations above recited relative to his Royal
Highness, the Duke of Parma, the colony and province of Louisiana, with
the same extent that it already has in the hands of Spain, _and that it
had when France possessed it_, and such as it should be, after the
treaties passed subsequently between Spain and other powers." In 1803,
Bonaparte, the first consul of the French republic, ceded Louisiana to
the United States, as fully and in the same manner as it had been
retroceded to France by Spain in the treaty of San Ildefonso; and, by
virtue of this grant, Messieurs Madison, Monroe, Adams, Clay, Van Buren,
and Jackson contended that the original limits of the state had been the
Rio Grande. However, by the 3rd article of our treaty with Spain in
1819, all our pretensions to extend the territory of Louisiana towards
Mexico or the Rio Grande, were resigned and abandoned by adopting the
River Sabine as our southern confine in that quarter. See Lyman's
diplomacy of the United States. Vol. 1, p. 368, and vol. 2, p. 136.
The following extract from a valuable letter with which the author was
favored by Ex-President Adams, who, as secretary of state, conducted the
negotiations with Spain, will explain his opinions and acts upon a
subject of so much importance.
QUINCY, 7th July, 1847.
* * * * *
"Whoever sets out with an inquiry respecting the right of
territories in the American hemisphere claimed by Europeans,
must begin by settling certain conventional principles of
right and wrong before he can enter upon the discussion.
"For example what right had Columbus to Cat Island,
otherwise called Guanahani? Who has the right to it now and
how came they by it? The flag of St. George and the Dragon
now waves over it; but who had the right to take possession
of it because Christopher Columbus found it,--the paltriest
island in the midst of the ocean. European statesmen,
warriors, and writers on what are called the laws of
nations, have laid down a system of laws upon which they
found this right. Have the Carribee Indians, in whose
possession that Island was discovered by Columbus, ever
assented to that system of right and wrong?
"You remember that Hume, in commencing his history of
England by the Roman conquest says--"that without seeking
any more justifiable reasons of hostility than were employed
by the later Europeans in subjecting the Africans and the
Americans, they sent over an army under the command of
Plautius, an able general, who gained some victories, and
made a considerable progress in subduing the inhabitants."
Then, no European has ever had any better right to take
possession of America, than Julius Caesar and the Romans had
to take possession of the island of Britain.
"What then was the right either of France or Spain to the
possession of the province of Texas? To come to any question
of right between the parties upon the subject you must agree
upon certain conventional principles: where and when your
question of right must become applicable to the facts; and,
as between them, it was a disputed question, and had been so
from the discovery of the mouth of the Mississippi river by
La Salle, and from his second expedition to find the mouth
of the Mississippi coming from the ocean, in which he
perished.
"Spain had prior claims to the country, but the claim of
France was founded upon the last voyage of La Salle, and by
extending a supposed derivative right, from the spot where
La Salle landed half way to the nearest Spanish settlement.
"Mr. Monroe and Mr. Charles Pinckney, in their
correspondence with Cevallos, assumed this as a settled
principle between European nations, in the discussion of
right to American territory. It was not contested, but was
not assented to on the part of Spain; and, having found it
laid down by Messieurs Monroe and Pinckney, I argued upon
it, and it was never directly answered by Don Luis De Onis,
who could not controvert it without going to the Pope's
Bull.[89]
"As between France and Spain therefore, I maintained that
the question of right, had always been disputed and never
was settled, from which opinion I have not since varied.
That we had a shadow of right beyond the Sabine I never
believed since the conclusion of the Florida treaty, and, it
is from the date of that treaty, that Great Britain had not
a shadow of right upon the Oregon territory until we have
been pleased to confer it upon her."
* * * * *
"I am, dear sir, with great respect, your very obedient
servant,
J. Q. ADAMS."
To BRANTZ MAYER, ESQ., Baltimore."
[89] Alexander VIth's Bull of Donation.
[90] See "Matthew Carey's general map of the world,"--29th
map--published 1814.--Kennedy's Texas, p. 4.--Mrs. Holley's
Texas.--History of Texas, by D. B. Edwards, preceptor of Gonzales
Seminary, Texas, 1836, p. 14. He says:--"Texas is bounded on the north
by Red river, which divides it from Arkansas, Ozark District, and New
Mexico; on the south by the Gulf of Mexico and the Rio de las Nueces,
_which divides it from the States of Coahuila and Tamaulipas_; on the
east by the eastern branch of the river Sabine and the State of
Louisiana; on the west by the State of Coahuila and the territory of New
Mexico."
Accompanying the work is a map of Texas with boundaries, as laid down
above. In a note on one corner of the map, speaking of the Rio Grande,
he says: "_If_ this river should ever become the western boundary of
Texas (as desired by the inhabitants) it will add a hundred miles to its
sea-coast and fifty thousand square miles to its superficies; the
southern section of the surface is sandy, barren prairie, almost
destitute of water; and its northern rocky, sterile mountains, nearly as
destitute of timber."
[91] Primera Campana de Tejas: by Ramon Martinez Caro, secretary of
Santa Anna, pp. 122, 125.
[92] Mr. Donelson wrote to Mr. Buchanan on the 2d July, 1845, from
Washington, Texas, as follows: "_My position is_ that we can hold Corpus
Christi and all other points up the Nueces. If attacked, the right of
defence will authorise us to expel the Mexicans to the Rio Grande. It is
better for us to await the attack than incur the risk of embarrassing
the question of annexation with the consequences of immediate possession
of the territory on the Rio Grande. * * * The government left for treaty
arrangement the boundary question in the propositions for a definitive
treaty of peace. H. of R. doc. No. 2, 29th cong. 1st sess. pp. 78, 79.
[93] I am informed by Mr. Parrott, the secretary of legation who
accompanied Mr. Slidell, that no form of letters of credence--or
evidence of powers as "_commissioner to settle the Texan dispute_,"
would have secured a hearing for our envoy. The mob, the army, and
Paredes were determined that no missionary of peace should be received
from the United States.
[94] The _claim_ of Frederick the IInd to Silesia was considered
_plausible_. As Bohemia renounced not only the possession, but all its
rights to Silesia by the treaties of Breslau and Berlin and other
subsequent treaties, the kings of Prussia pretended, that by virtue of
the renunciation, they became sovereign dukes of the country and not
subject to the emperor in their new character. To this claim it was
replied that Bohemia being an imperial State, could not, of its own
authority, destroy the feudal tenure by which Silesia was attached to
it, and through it to the empire. The question was rendered more
intricate, for one party considered Bohemia feudal only as to the
electoral dignity, but as a kingdom free and independent of Germany. The
Germans argued that Silesia was part of the empire, the Prussians
considered it a separate and independent State. Frederick took advantage
of these "state right" doctrines to sustain his claim, as Texas took
advantage of her state right sovereignty when the central despotism of
Santa Anna overthrew the federal constitution of 1824.
[95] Arnold's fourth lecture on Modern History.
[96] Waite's State papers, 1809-11, p. 261; and Clay's speech on the
line of the Perdido.
[97] Pufendorf, Lib. VIII, c. 6.--Note by Barbeyrac.