CHAPTER I.

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[Illustration: Ant. Lopez de S^ta Anna]

[Illustration: BATTLE

of

PALO ALTO

8^th. May 1846.

Lith. by E. Weber & Co. Balto.]

[Illustration: BATTLE

of

RESACA DE LA PALMA

9^th May 1846.

Lith. by E. Weber & Co. Balto.]

HISTORY OF THE WAR

BETWEEN

MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES,

WITH A PRELIMINARY VIEW OF ITS ORIGIN;

BY

BRANTZ MAYER,

FORMERLY SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES LEGATION IN MEXICO,

AND AUTHOR OF "MEXICO AS IT WAS AND AS IT IS."

Ne dites a la posterite que ce qui est digne de la posterite.--VOLTAIRE.

VOLUME I.

NEW YORK & LONDON.

WILEY AND PUTNAM.

MDCCCXLVIII.

Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1847, by

BRANTZ MAYER,

in the Clerk's office of the District Court for the District of Maryland.

BOOK FIRST:

PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE ORIGIN

OF THE WAR.

HISTORY OF THE WAR

BETWEEN

MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

Introductory views of Mexico--The people and government.

The war which broke out between the United States of North America and

the Mexican Republic, in the spring of 1846, is an event of great

importance in the history of the world. Profound peace had reigned among

Christian nations, since the downfall of Napoleon; and, with the

exception of internal discords in France, Belgium, Poland and Greece,

the civilized world had cause to believe that mankind would henceforth

resort to the cabinet rather than the field for the settlement of

international disputes. The recent conflicts between the French and the

Arabs in Algeria, and between the British and Indian races, have been

characterized by ferocity and endurance. But, it will be recollected

these encounters took place between nations unequal alike in religion,

morals, law, and civilization. The temper or character of Mahomedans was

not to be measured by that of Christians nor had we just reason to hope

for a pacific or temporizing spirit in people whose savage habits have

ever rendered them prompt to return invasion by a blow, and make war the

precursor of negotiation. It was, thus, reserved for the Mexicans, whose

blood is mixed with that of an Arab ancestry, to exhibit the spectacle

of continual domestic broils, and, latterly of a positive warfare

against a nation whose friendly hand was the first to summon them into

the pale of national independence.

The disorganized condition of our neighbor for nearly thirty years, may,

partly account for and palliate this fault. With administrations

shifting like the scenes of a drama, and with a stage, at times dyed

with blood, and at others imitating the mimic passions and transports of

the real theatre, it may be confessed that much should be pardoned by a

forbearing nation whose aggregate intelligence and force are not to be

compared with the fragmentary and impulsive usurpations in Mexico. To

judge faithfully of the justice or injustice of this war, and to

comprehend this history in truth and fairness, we must not only narrate

in chronological order the simple events that occurred between the two

nations; but the student of this epoch must go back a step in order to

master the scope and motives of the war. He must study the preceding

Mexican history and character; and, it will speedily be discovered that

when he attempts to judge the Spanish republics by the ordinary

standards applied to free and enlightened governments, he will signally

fail in arriving at truth. He must neither imagine that when the name of

Republic was engrafted on the Mexican system, that it accommodated

itself at once to our ideal standard of political power, nor that the

dominant faction was willing to adopt the simple machinery which

operates so perfectly in the United States. There are many reasons why

this should not be the case. The Spanish race, although it has achieved

the most wonderful results in discovery, conquest, colonial settlement,

diplomacy, feats of arms, and success of domestic power, has proved

itself, within the present century, to be one of the few opponents of

the progressive principles of our age. A Castilian pride of remembered

greatness, and a superstitious reluctance to cast off the bondage of the

past, have made the Spaniards content to cling devotedly to their

ancient edifice without bestowing on it those repairs or improvements

without which governments, must evidently crumble and decay. Spain

believed that what had produced national power and greatness in one age

must ever continue to effect the same results, and, thus, she was

content to bear the evils of the present time rather than disjoint a

fragment of her ancient temple, lest the whole should fall in

indiscriminate ruin. The blindness of national vanity was made more

profound by the universal glare of progressive civilization that

surrounded this doomed country, whilst superstitious influences clogged

every avenue to progress which might have saved and regenerated both the

parent and her colonies.

It may be urged by the apologists for Spain, that, being nearly as deep

in moral, political and social degradation as France was at the period

of the revolution, she naturally contemplated such an event with horror,

especially when she remembered the sensitive and excitable race that

peopled her vallies and sierras, and the likelihood that the bloody

dramas of Paris would be frightfully exaggerated in Madrid. But I still

believe that the true cause will be found more deeply seated, in the

nature of the people; and that Spain,--made up as she is of many

nations, incompetent for self-government, uneducated and bigoted,--will

ever be content to find her ideal future in her traditionary past.

Spain and the Spaniards have few more zealous admirers than the author

of this history. The nation contains individuals who in patriotism, love

of liberty, and devotion to science, literature, and art, are

unsurpassed by any people of the world. As Americans we owe a debt of

gratitude to the noble discoverers and conquerors of this continent. In

deeds of bravery, in chivalrous enterprise, and in intellectual power,

with what people may they not be matched in their perfect period. But

their golden age has passed, and manifold corruptions in church and

state have preyed upon the country with paralyzing influence.

For a long time we received from England with the submissive credulity

of children, all her traditionary ignorance and abuse of Spain, much of

which was owing to political animosity, as well as to the rivalry that

grew up between that country and the rest of Europe during the reign of

Philip the second. But the study of her language, history and

literature, has unveiled the legendary falsehoods with which we were

cheated. Whilst a large portion of her past history should be admired

and lauded, her present downfall should be regarded with compassionate

censure and sympathy. We should endeavor, in writing history, to make

ourselves men of the times and nations we describe, and it is in this

manner alone, that we can establish the spiritual sympathy between

ourselves and foreign countries, which will enable us to enter into

their feelings and motives, and thus become not only merciful but true

and discreet judges.

* * * * *

The two great impressions made on this continent by the Spaniards were

in Mexico and Peru. Avarice and ambition induced the conquest of the

latter, while that of Mexico may also be attributed to the same motives,

although the hero who added the Aztec empire to the Spanish dominions,

modified his victories by personal qualities which were infinitely

superior to those of the conqueror of Peru.[1] Yet, in neither of these

great adventures do we find any of the fruits of peaceful acquisition,

or of those well regulated advances in civilization which always mark a

people whose conquest is undertaken under the immediate direction and

legal restraints of government. The conquests in America were, in truth,

chiefly individual enterprises, and, of course, could not be conducted

in a spirit of temperance and justice. The exploits of Cortez and

Pizarro, especially those of the latter, are characterized by ferocity

and barbarism which would place them in the category with freebooters

and buccaneers, were they not saved from it by the splendor of their

successful results. The Indians of the countries they subjected to

Spain, were utterly vanquished; yet, unlike the hardy and warlike

aborigines of the north, they remained on their native soil, content to

serve or mingle with their conquerors.--Wherever the white man came at

the north, the Indian retreated to his congenial wilderness;--he could

not inhabit the same country or breathe the same air with the

intruder;--but, as the Spaniard advanced at the south, the

semi-civilization of the enervated native, induced him to linger near

the homes of his ancestors, and, with a tame heart, to obey his

conqueror rather than to resist him or enjoy the fierce independence of

the forest.

The territory thus seized by violence was held by fear.--Loyalty can

never be the tenure of conquerors, and, especially, of the conquerors of

an inferior race. The Spaniard and Indian lived together in a spirit of

lordly dominion on the one hand, and of crushed dependence on the other,

whilst the Castilian derived from the native nothing but his habits of

savage life, and the Indian, in turn, learned nothing from the Castilian

but his vices.

A conquest thus achieved, an empire founded in blood and terror, would

naturally seem to have a doubtful destiny. It is unquestionably true

that Spain made humane laws, and that Charles the Fifth passed a decree

by which his American possessions were declared to be integral parts of

the Spanish kingdom. It is true, moreover, that he sought to abolish the

special grants to discoverers and conquerors by which they were invested

with almost absolute authority; and, by mitigating the system

_repartimientos_[2] or of vassalage among the Indians, to raise them to

the dignity of Spanish subjects. But, at the same time, these humane

laws were badly administered in a country so difficult of access as

America was at that period from Spain; and viceroys and governors acted

as they pleased, with but little regard to the people or the country,

except for their individual interests. Whilst this system of

maladministration made the royal and beneficent laws nugatory, Spain

seems to have been engaged in creating a colonial system which was

calculated to paralyze the energies of Mexico and Peru. She taught them

to look exclusively to mining for wealth, and to their Indians for

labor. All the laws relative to the natural development of a new

country were disregarded, and civilized existence in America began on

artificial principles. The example of the last fifty years has proved

that America is capable of producing all the necessaries, and most of

the luxuries of life quite as abundantly as Europe. Yet, Spain denied

her colonies the privilege of an effort. For instance,--she resolved at

the outset not to allow them to be independent in agriculture, commerce

or manufactures. She would not permit them to cultivate the soil save

for the merest daily necessaries. Wine and oil were to be made in the

old world. Cotton and wool were not to be woven into the beautiful

fabrics for which the ancient Peruvians were so celebrated. The church

aided the strong arm of government by the weight of her exactions and

the power of superstitious control. The Inquisition put its veto on the

spread of knowledge by restraining the sale and publication of books.

Foreigners were not allowed to navigate Spanish seas or enter American

harbors. And these distant shores were only visited at stated seasons by

national vessels, carrying such produce at exorbitant prices, as Spain

might think proper to despatch from Seville or Cadiz.[3]

* * * * *

I have thought it proper to state in my introductory chapter, thus much

of the laws and system under which Mexico began her national

existence;--for laws modify the character whenever they are not

self-imposed. Let us now, for a moment consider the population which was

subjected to the bad administration of such laws; and we shall then

understand better the character of the belligerents.

The blood of the Spaniards, even at home, is a mixed blood. But when we

remember the various races that have overrun, resided in, ruled, and

incorporated themselves with Spain, we cannot be surprised at detecting

so many and diverse characteristics in Mexico. The Celti-gallic,

Celt-Iberian, Carthagenian, Roman, Vandalic, Visigothic, and Moorish

blood have mingled again in Mexico and Peru with the Indian, and in some

cases have been dashed even with the Negro.[4] Mexicans are thus, as I

have observed elsewhere, grafts rather of the wild Arab on the American

Indian, than of the Spanish Don on the noble Aztec.[5]

When Mexico was completely conquered and emigration began to fill up the

land, the soil was divided, in large estates, among the adventurers and

the Indians, by a system of _repartimientos_, were apportioned to the

land holders.[6] This created an absolute vassalage, and bound the

Indian, virtually and forever, to the spot where he was born. As it

became wearisome to the planters to dwell in the seclusion of these vast

and lonely estates, they left them and their Indians to the care of an

_administrador_, and retreated to the chief cities of the provinces or

to the capital. Thus all the intelligence and cultivation of Mexico

became compacted in the towns, whilst the original ignorance and

semi-civilization remained diffused over the country. It is, therefore,

not at all surprising to find that out of a population of seven

millions, four millions are Indians and only one million purely white,

while more than two millions, of the rest, are zambos, mestizos and

mulattos. Nor is it singular that of this whole population of seven

millions, not more than six hundred thousand whites and eighty thousand

of other castes, can read and write.[7]

Indeed it may be said with truth,--as agriculture has received but

little attention beyond the ordinary wants of life, and as the great

proprietors of estates have chiefly devoted their attention to the

_raising of cattle_,--that the ancient nomadic habits of the Indian and

half-breed, have remained unchanged, and, consequently, that the great

body of this semi-civilized people is quite as much at home on horseback

with sword and lance as in the _corral_ or _hacienda_.[8]

The RANCHERO, who has played so conspicuous a part in this war,

is the natural offspring of such a state of society. This class of men

is composed of individuals, half Spanish half Indian, who resemble the

_gauchos_ of the South American Pampas. Gaunt, shrivelled and bronzed by

exposure, though hardy and muscular from athletic exercise, they are,

indeed, the Arabs of our continent. Living half the time in their

saddles, for they are matchless horsemen, they traverse the plains and

mountains, with lasso[9] in hand, either searching for, or tending their

herds. The slaughter of beasts and preparation and sale of hides is

their chief means of livelihood, varied occasionally by the cultivation

of a small patch of ground, or by taking part in the civil wars that are

always waging. Their costume generally consists of a pair of tough

leggings of skin and leathern trousers, over which is a _serape_ or

blanket, with a hole in the centre large enough for the head to pass

through, whence it falls in graceful folds over the chest and shoulders,

leaving room for the play of hands and arms. Add to this a broad

_sombrero_, and the _lasso_, hanging ready for use at his saddle bow,

and the reader will have a picture of the _ranchero_ as he appears in

peace or in the ordinary pursuit of his occupation. Join to this garb a

long sabre, a horse as savage and untamed as himself, and a belt

plentifully studded with pistols and _machetes_, and the _ranchero_

presents himself ready either to join a troop of banditti, or to serve

in a body of cavalry.

Cowardly as they generally are in the open field when encountering

regular troops, yet, in ambuscade, a sudden fight, or, as _guerillas_,

they are both a formidable and cruel foe. Their power of endurance is

inexhaustible. Fatigue is almost unknown to them, and a scanty meal,

each day, of jerked beef and corn or plantain, is sufficient to sustain

them on the longest marches.

Such are the _rancheros_, who, by discipline, might be rendered the best

light troops in the world. These are the men who form the material of

the Mexican cavalry; and they bear the same relation to the armies of

that republic that the Cossacks do to the Russians;--ever on the

alert,--easily lodged,--capable of supporting fatigue or hunger,--and

untiring in pursuit of an enemy, when even the most trifling plunder is

to be obtained.[10]

* * * * *

Another large and formidable body in Mexico is that of the _Indians_,

amounting, as we have seen, to four millions; whose knowledge of their

governors' language is generally confined to such phrases as will enable

them to buy and sell, or perform the ordinary functions of life.

Formerly they lived, and usually still live, in narrow huts built of

mud, thatched with straw or palm leaves, and which have scarcely the

merit of being picturesque. In these miserable lairs, they nestle with

their families, their domestic animals, and a table or altar on which

they erect a cross or place the figure of a patron saint. Their food is

mostly maize, and their dress corresponds with this grovelling

wretchedness. Five out of every hundred may perhaps possess two suits of

clothes, but their general vesture consists of a large cotton shirt, a

pair of leathern trousers, and a blanket. Even the Indian women, who

elsewhere, like their sex in civilized countries, are always fond of

personal adornment, exhibit no desire to appear decent or to rival each

other in tasteful ornaments when they go abroad. They are as foul and

ill-clad on their festivals at church, as in their hovels at home, so

that few things are more disgusting to a foreigner than to mingle in an

Indian crowd.[11] It is impossible to imagine such a population capable

of becoming landed proprietors; and, consequently, we find them

contented with the annual product of their small fields, amounting,

perhaps, to thirty or fifty _fanegas_ of corn. When they live on the

large estates of Mexican proprietors, they are, in reality, vassals,

although free from the nominal stain of slavery.[12] On these

plantations they are beaten when they commit faults, and, if then found

incorrigible, are driven beyond their limits,--a punishment deemed by

them the severest that can be inflicted, and which they bear with as

much difficulty as our Indians do their banishment from the "hunting

grounds" of their forefathers. When they have gained a little money by

labor, they hasten to squander it by making a festival in honor of their

favorite saint, and thus consume their miserable earnings in gluttony,

gambling, masses, fire works, and drunkenness. When it is not absolutely

necessary to toil for the necessaries of life,--especially in the

_tierras calientes_, or warmer portions of Mexico,--they pass their time

in utter idleness or sleep. Zavala declares that in many portions of

the country, the _curates_ maintain such entire dominion over the

Indians, that they order them to be publicly whipped whenever they fail

to pay their _ovenciones_, or tributes, at the regular time, or commit

some act of personal disobedience. But the degradation of this class

does not stop even here, for the same author alleges that he has

frequently seen many Indians and their wives flogged at the village

church door, because they had failed to come to mass upon some Sunday or

festival, whilst, after the punishment, these wretches were obliged to

kiss the hand of the executioner![13]

It will be seen from this sketch and description that the vicious

colonial system of Spain formed only two great classes in America,--the

proprietor and the vassal,--and that, in the nature of things, it was

utterly impossible for the latter to amalgamate with the former except

by creating an inferior race, whose sympathies were with the Indian

rather than the Spaniard, and whose type is the nomadic _ranchero_. This

fact was proved in the revolution which broke out in Spanish America.

The war cry was against the Spaniard[14] and his pure descendants. The

_creole_[15] rose against the _gachupin_,[16] and the ferocity with

which the soldiers of old Spain carried on the war against the natives

confirmed their hereditary animosity.

* * * * *

The struggle for domestic power commenced as soon as the independence of

Mexico was achieved, and the people began to establish a system of

government upon a republican basis after the downfall of the Emperor

Iturbide. The Spaniards had taught a lesson of privileged classes which

was never forgotten; so that, when the revolution took place, THE

PEOPLE were only used to effect national emancipation rather than

to establish general political liberty.

The nobles or great proprietors, and the clergy, had, in the olden time,

formed the influential class of society which ruled the land. The theory

of republicanism was marvellously captivating so long as there was an

European foe to subdue. But, when the last remnant of Spanish power

disappeared, the men who had governed during the revolution were loath

to surrender power and subside into the insignificance of mere

citizenship. In such a country as Mexico, and in such a war as had just

occurred, this controlling influence in public affairs was, of course,

to be chiefly found in the army; so that when the nation looked around

for men to direct her at a period when Spain had not yet recognized her

independence and might again assail her, she naturally turned to the

military chieftains whose valor sustained her cause so bravely. Thus it

was that in her first moments of peace, the army obtained an important

ascendancy, which it has ever since contrived to retain during all

administrations.

It is not just to the Spanish colonies to blame them for such a

procedure, especially when we remember that even our republic is

beginning to manifest a marked partiality for military men. The great

deed rather than the great thought,--the brilliant act rather than

beneficent legislation,--arrests and captivates the multitude. In

republics, where an eager strife for wealth, distinction or power, is

constantly going on, the notice and position that each man obtains must

be won either by intrigue or by the irresistible power of talents and

achievements. Ambitious parties sometimes even compromise for the

weakest, rather than yield the palm to superior merit of which they are

meanly jealous. The great mass of the country has no time to pause in

the midst of its earnest labor to meditate wisely on the political

abilities and moral claims of individuals. They cannot weigh them in the

golden scales of justice;--but, by a more rapid and easy process, they

yield their suffrages promptly to those whose manifestations of genius

or power are so resistless as to compel admiration. Thus is it that the

brave soldier, performing his noble exploit on the field of battle,

speaks palpably to the eye and ear of the greedy multitude. His is,

indeed, the language of action, and each new deed makes national glory

more distinct, and national vanity more confident. But the more quiet

and unobtrusive statesman, with a field infinitely less glaring or

attractive, exacts from his judges a suspension of party feeling, an

investigation of motive and merit, a calm and forbearing justice, which

the impatient masses have seldom the time or talent to bestow. It is,

therefore, by no means surprising to find in history, that the sword has

commonly been mightier than the pen, and that military chieftains become

the natural heads of republics which are created by long and bitter

revolutions.

It must be remembered that the army in Mexico is not what armies are

generally understood to be in other countries. In Europe they are

designed to restrain the aggressive ambition of rival powers, to act as

military police, and, by their imposing skill, discipline and numbers,

to preserve the balance of national power. But in Mexico, whilst the

members of an immensely rich hierarchy constitute a distinct _order_ in

society, the army forms another.--The policy of the existing military

chieftains was to sustain, foster and increase their individual power

and patronage. The mere domestic police of the country could surely

never require, in time of peace, so large a numerical force under arms

as that which has always been supported in it; yet the military

presidents, at once, sought to establish an _army of officers_, and by

the enlistment of a body of commanders, entirely disproportionate to the

number of rank and file, they immediately created a _military order_

upon whose support they could rely so long as they possessed the means

of patronage. The officers thus became armed and paid politicians,

whilst the common soldiers formed a military police;--the one an

element of all political revolutions, the other a tool by which those

revolutions were effected. The great practical idea of government, it

will be perceived, was derived from _compulsory force_. The church

wielded the spiritual power, whilst the army held the physical; and,

between the two, _the people_,--composed of merchants, professional men,

farmers, proprietors, and artisans,--were refused all participation in

authority, or progress in civil order which might have placed Mexico

among the foremost nations of the world. In this manner a central despot

has always found means and instruments to suppress federalism;--for

whilst near _thirty_ revolutions have occurred in Mexico since her

independence, every one of her presidents has been a military

chieftain.[17]

Macaulay, in his essay on the life of Lord Bacon describes the condition

of England when she was governed by warriors whose rude courage was

neither guided by science nor softened by humanity, and by priests whose

learning and abilities were habitually devoted to the defence of power.

The description of that age in England is by no means inapplicable to

Mexico in the nineteenth century. "On the one side," says he, "the

Hotspurs, the Nevilles, the Cliffords, rough illiterate and

unreflecting, brought to the council-board the fierce and impetuous

despotism which they had acquired amid the tumult of predatory war or in

the gloomy repose of the garrisoned and moated castle. On the other side

was the calm and placid prelate, versed in all that was considered as

learning; trained in the schools to manage words, and, in the

Confessional, to manage hearts;--seldom superstitious, but skilful in

practising on the superstitions of others; false as it was natural for a

man to be whose profession imposed on all who were not saints the

necessity of being hypocrites;--selfish as it was natural that a man

should be who could form no domestic ties and cherish no hope of

legitimate posterity;--more attached to his order than to his country,

and guiding the politics of England with a constant side glance to

Rome."[18]

And so it was in Mexico. The sojourner in her capital is continually

warned of this double dominion over the soul and body of the people. The

drum and the bell resound in his ears from morning to night fall.

Priests and soldiers throng the streets; and, whilst the former enjoy

the comfortable revenues which are derived from the one hundred millions

of property owned by the church, the latter live upon the labor of the

people, whom they are paid to control and transfer from one military

despot to another.

The Mexican revolution,--like the revolutions of England, but unlike

that of France,--was political rather than social. The great foundations

of society were therefore undisturbed, and the priest and soldier took

the ranks of the ancient privileged classes, whilst the mixed people and

the native Indians remained what they had ever been--the subjects of

government.

Of all the officers who have commanded the army and enjoyed the

presidency, Santa Anna has occupied the most distinguished position

since the death of Iturbide, and it is with him and the nation thus

described, that we shall deal in the following pages.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] See Prescott's Conquest of Peru, 2nd vol. pages 199: 245.

[2] The word _repartimiento_ means, division, partition, distribution,

or apportionment. In the old Spanish historians and English books, such

as Zarate, Garcilasso de la Vega, Fernandez, Robertson, it is uniformly

used to denote the well known allotment of lands and vassal Indians

(_genuine adscripti glebae_) granted to the first conquerors in reward of

their services. In some later writers, this word is applied to the

_monopoly of sales to the Indians_ exercised by the _corregedores_,

under pretext of protecting the Indians from imposition, by the official

distribution of goods. N. A. Review, vol. xx. p. 287.

"Indeed the Spanish court made no scruple of regarding the Indians in

the same light as the beasts and the soil, disposing of them as the

rightful property of the crown; for it was not till 1537, nearly fifty

years after the discovery, that the Pope issued a mandate declaring them

to be really and truly men,--"_ipsos veros homines_,"--and capable of

receiving the Christian faith." N. A. Review, vol. xix. p. 198.

[3] The American trade was confined to Seville until 1720, when it was

removed to Cadiz, as a more convenient port. On the subject of these

oppressions and misgovernment, see Zavala's "Revoluciones de Mexico,"

Introduction;--and North American Review. vol. xx. p. 158.

[4] The subjoined list shows the varieties of parentage and blood

forming the castes throughout Spanish America:

PARENTS.

1. ORIGINAL RACES.

WHITE. European _whites_ are called _gachupines_ or chapetones.

_Whites_, born in the colonies, are called creoles.

NEGRO.

INDIAN.

PARENTS. CHILDREN.

2. CASTES OF WHITE RACE.

White father and Negro mother Mulatto.

White father and Indian mother Mestizo.

White father and Mulatta mother Quarteron.

White father and Meztiza mother Creole, (only distinguishable

from the white by a

pale brown complexion.)

White father and China mother Chino-blanco.

White father and Quarterona mother Quintero.

White father and Quintera mother White.

3. CASTES OF NEGRO RACE.

Negro father and Mulatta mother Zambo-negro.

Negro father and Meztiza mother Mulatto-oscuro.

Negro father and China mother Zambo-chino.

Negro father and Zamba mother Zambo & Negro (perfectly

black.)

Negro father and Quarterona mother dark Mulatto.

Negro father and Quintera mother dark Mulatto.

4. CASTES OF INDIAN RACE.

Indian father and Negro mother Chino.

Indian father and Mulatta mother Chino-oscuro.

Indian father and Mestiza mother Mestizo-claro (often very

beautiful.)

Indian father and China mother Chino-cholo.

Indian father and Zamba mother Zambo-claro.

Indian father and China-chola mother Indian (with short, frizzly

hair.)

Indian father and Quarterona mother brown Meztizo.

Indian father and Quintera mother brown Meztizo.

5. MULATTO CORRUPTIONS.

Mulatto father and Zamba mother Zambo (a miserable race.)

Mulatto father and Zamba mother Chino (rather clear race.)

Mulatto father and China mother Chino (rather dark.)

Besides these specified castes there are many others not distinguished

by particular names. The best criterion for judging is the hair of the

women which is infinitely less deceiving than the complexion. The short

woolly hair, or the coarse Indian locks may always be detected on the

head or back of the neck. This tabular statement exhibits at a glance

the mongrel corruptions of the human race in Spanish America, and forms

an interesting subject for students of physiology. See Tschudi's Peru,

p. 80, Am. Ed.

[5] Preface to 3d Ed. of Mexico as it was and as it is, p. 12.

[6] Zavala's "Revoluciones de Mexico," vol. 1. p. 15, gives an account

of the manner in which estates are divided in Mexico.

[7] See Mexico as it was and as it is, p. 301.

[8] _Corral_ signifies cattle yard; _hacienda_, plantation; _rancho_,

small farm.

[9] _The lasso_ is a long rope, with a running noose at the end of it.

The Mexicans learn to fling this with great accuracy so as to catch a

bull, a horse, or a man with equal facility. All classes have some skill

in the use of this weapon, and I have seen children, with cords,

attempting to _lasso_ chickens and even butterflies!

[10] See Head's Rough Notes of a Journey over the Pampas. The Mexican

ranchero is somewhat superior to the _gaucho_ of the Pampas.

[11] Mexico as it was and is, p. 144.

[12] Id. p. 201; and see Stephens' Travels in Yucatan,--where, he says,

the maxim is that "los Indios no oyen sino por las nalgas,"--the Indians

only hear through their backs.

[13] Zavala Revoluciones de Mejico, vol. i, pp. 15, 16. "Este escandalo

estaba autorizado por la costumbre de mi provincia." Zavala was one of

the wisest and most illustrious patriots of Mexico. His History was

published in Paris in 1831.

[14] It will be recollected that the outburst of the Mexican revolution

was not in favor of republicanism; but only against misgovernment. It

was not against the _form_ of rule, but against the _men_ who ruled.

Even the plan of Iguala offered the crown of Mexico to Ferdinand, as a

separate kingdom. See Robinson's Memoirs of the Mexican Revolution.

"It is related that Hidalgo, the celebrated priestly leader of the

revolutionary movement, was accustomed to travel from village to village

preaching a crusade against the Spaniards, exciting the _creoles_ and

Indians; and one of his most effective tricks is said to have been the

following. Although he had thrown off the cassock for the military coat,

he wore a figure of the Virgin Mary suspended by a chain around his

neck. After haranguing the mob on such occasions, he would suddenly

break off, and looking down at his breast, address himself to the holy

image, after the following fashion: 'Mary! Mother of God! Holy Virgin!

Patron of Mexico! behold our country,--behold our wrongs,--behold our

sufferings! Dost thou not wish they should be changed? that we should be

delivered from our tyrants? that we should be free? that we should slay

the gachupines! that we should kill the Spaniards?'

"The image had a moveable head fastened to a spring, which he jerked by

a cord concealed beneath his coat, and, of course the Virgin responded

with a nod! The effect was surprising--and the air was filled with

Indian shouts of obedience to the present miracle."--Mexico as it was

and as it is, p. 230.

[15] The term _creole_ is a corruption of the Spanish word _criollo_,

which is derived from _criar_, to create or foster. The Spaniards apply

the term criollo not merely to the human race, but to animals born in

the colonies, if they are of _pure European blood_.

[16] See Robinson's Memoirs Mexican Revolution, page 15. The term

_gachupin_ has been always used by the creoles and Indians as a word of

contempt towards the Spaniards. Its origin and exact signification are

unknown; but it is believed to be an Indian, and perhaps Aztec, term of

scorn and opprobrium.

[17] A _federal_ government, similar to our own, was established in

Mexico in 1824, and overthrown in 1835, to yield to a _central_

constitution. In the meanwhile, the centralists were almost always at

war, openly or secretly, against the _federalists_.

[18] Macaulay's Essays, vol. 2d, p. 356, Bost. Ed.

CHAPTER II.

Origin of the war considered--True objects of contemporaneous history

--Motives for war--No single act caused it--Difference between war

and hostilities--Mexican revolution--Federalism and Centralism--

Operation of the Constitution of 1824--History of our commercial and

diplomatic relations--Bad conduct of Mexico in regard to our claims,

compared with that of other nations--Commission--Award of umpire--

Subsequent course of Mexico--History of the seizure and surrender of

Monterey, on the Pacific, by Commodore Jones in 1842--Secretary

Upshur's censure of his conduct--Ill feeling in Mexico towards the

United States in consequence of this seizure.

An artist in portraying a face or delineating a landscape, does not

imprint upon his canvass, each line and wrinkle, each blade of grass or

mossy stone, yet a spectator recognizes in the complete painting, those

broad characteristics of truth which establish a limner's fidelity. So

it is with the historian. Whilst seeking for accuracy in all his

details, he aims, chiefly, at exactness in his ruling principles and

general effect, but he leaves the minute inelegances and tasteless

incidents to those whose critical fervor delights in detecting them.

It is not alone in the detail of facts that the historian is liable to

incur censure, especially when he writes a contemporaneous narrative. It

is almost impossible to suppose that he will divest himself so

completely of party feeling, as to compose an unprejudiced work. Some

critics have even declared that a historian should possess neither

religion nor country, and would thus force us to believe it utterly

impossible to be impartial unless an author were an infidel or a

cosmopolite.

The age is so characterized by political rancor and so little by true

statesmanship, that it is not surprising to hear such opinions even from

experienced and patient scholars. Yet I have always thought that a

writer who undertakes the task of delineating national annals in no

sectarian spirit but with broad and Christian tolerance,--honestly

seeking to do justice in politics and religion to all,--may so far

separate himself from the strifes of the day as to pronounce opinions as

honest, though perhaps not as learned, as those that issue from the

bench.

There is, too, a great advantage which should not escape our notice in

recording contemporaneous history and fixing permanently the facts of

the time as they occur. He who describes events or periods long since

past, is forced to throw himself back, if possible, into the scenes of

which he writes, whilst he remains free from sympathy with their

factions and parties. But if a writer of the present day will place

himself on the impartial ground of religious and political freedom, and

make himself what Madame de Stael has so felicitously styled

"contemporaneous posterity," I think he will be better able than those

who come after us to narrate with vivid freshness the story of this

sanguinary war.

The impression of public feeling both in Mexico and the United States is

still distinct in our recollection; the political motives influencing or

controlling both the great parties in our country, have not yet ceased

to operate; and the errors that may innocently creep into a narrative

may be corrected by intelligent men who took part in the war as soldiers

or civilians. A history thus dispassionately written, must, it seems to

me, have the truth and value of a portrait taken from life, rather than

of a sketch made from memory whose coloring lacks all the freshness of

vitality.

* * * * *

The very threshold of this history is embarrassed by the party

controversies to which I have alluded. The origin of the war was

attributed by the president and his adherents to the wrong doings of

Mexico, whilst the opponents of the executive did not hesitate to charge

its unnecessary inception and all its errors directly on the cabinet.

Documents, messages, speeches, essays, and reviews, were published to

sustain both sides of the question, and the whole subject was argued

with so much ability and bitterness, so much zeal and apparent

sincerity, that an impartial mind experiences extraordinary difficulty

in detecting the actual offender. That grievances existed in the conduct

of Mexico against us during a long series of years cannot be denied;

but, it is equally true, that, between governments well administered and

entirely reasonable on both sides, none of those provocations justified

war. Yet, when offended power on one side, and passion on the other,

become engaged in discussion, it requires but little to fan the smallest

spark into a flame, and thus to kindle a conflagration, which the

stoutest arms may fail to suppress. It frequently occurs in the affairs

of ordinary life, that neighbors are the bitterest enemies. Men often

dislike each other at their first interview, especially if they belong

to families in which mutual prejudices have existed. They find it

impossible to assign reasons for their aversion; nevertheless it exists

in all its marvellous virulence. A slight disagreement as to limits

between neighboring landholders, a paltry quarrel among servants, the

malicious representation of innocent remarks, a thousand vain and

trifling incidents, may effectually create a degree of ill feeling and

cause them never to meet without scornful looks and quickened pulses.

At length, this offensive temper is manifested in personal annoyance or

insulting language, and blows are struck in the first encounter without

pausing to debate the justice of an assault. It is with nations as it is

with persons. The boasted discretion of statesmen, and the provident

temper of politicians have, in all ages, failed to control the animosity

of mankind; and we thus find as much littleness in the conduct of

governments as in the petulance of men.

I have therefore, in studying this subject carefully, been led to the

opinion that no single act or cause can be truly said to have originated

the war between the United States and Mexico; but that it occurred as

the result of a series of events, and as the necessary consequence of

the acts, position, temper, passions, ambition and history of both

parties since our international relations commenced.

The reader will observe that I draw a distinction between the _war_ and

_hostilities_. I shall discuss the latter question in the portion of

this volume which relates to events on the Rio Grande.[19]

* * * * *

In the preceding chapter I have glanced at the character of the people

of Mexico, and I trust that the sketch I gave will be continually

remembered as illustrating the people with whom we are dealing. When our

first envoy, Mr. Poinsett, was despatched, he found Mexico pausing to

recover breath after her revolution. The bad government of Spain had

been followed by the turmoil and bloodshed of the rebellion, and that,

in turn, was succeeded by the anarchy of a distracted republic.

Revolution has followed revolution so rapidly since then, that the

historian, at a loss to discover their causes, can scarcely detect

their pretexts. For twenty years past we have been so accustomed to hear

of a new military outbreak in Mexico that the familiarized act seems to

be only the legitimate order of constitutional change. Passion,

ambition, turbulence, avarice, and superstition, have so devoured the

country, that during the whole of this period, Mexico, whilst presenting

to foreign nations, the external appearance of nationality, has, in

fact, at home, scarcely ever enjoyed the benefit of a real or stable

government that could make an impression upon the character of the

people or their rulers. It is true that, at first, she sought to adopt

our federal system; but the original difference between the colonial

condition of things in the two countries, made the operation of it

almost impossible. The British provinces of North America, with their

ancient and separate governments, very naturally united in a federation

for national purposes, whilst they retained their freedom and laws as

independent States. But the viceroyalty of Mexico, when it

revolutionized its government, was forced to reverse our system,--to

destroy the original central power, and, subsequently to divide the

territory into departments, or states. Until the year 1824, nothing of

this kind existed in Mexico. The whole country from the Sabine to its

utmost southern limit, was under the central rule of a viceroy, with the

same laws, religion, priests, judges, and civil as well as military

authorities. The constitution of 1824, for the first time broke up the

consolidated nation into nineteen states, and then, by the same

legislative act, recomposed them in a federative union. The

constitutions of these nineteen states, consequently, were creative of

differences that never existed before, and the unity of power, will, and

action, which previously existed was destroyed forever. This was,

naturally the origin of jealousies, parties, and sectional feeling; and

the result was, that the revenues of the country became wasted whilst

their collection was impeded, and that a people unused to freedom and

chiefly composed of illiterate _creoles_, were confounded by a scheme of

government whose machinery was too intricate.[20]

The state and municipal governments of Mexico were, consequently, always

quite as incompetent for self-rule as the central authority. In addition

to this, they were cordially jealous of the national powers. This arose

from the state fears of consolidation; and, as it was with these

municipal authorities, as well as with the corrupt government officers,

that our citizens were chiefly brought in contact in the ports, it is

not at all wonderful to find them soon complaining of oppression and

burthening the records of our legation with their grievances. When our

ministers sought to obtain redress, the Mexican government was reluctant

to undertake the investigation of the subject; and, when it did so,

continually encountered delay and equivocation on the part of the local

authorities. The distant peculator was anxious to escape the penalty of

his fault by procrastination, and the Mexican secretary of state, ever

willing to uphold his national pride by concealing or not confessing the

villainy of his subordinate, was ready to sustain him by an interminable

correspondence.

The history of the diplomatic and commercial relations between the

United States and Mexico, as exhibited by congress in all the published

volumes of national documents, presents a series of wrongs, which the

reader will find ably recapitulated in a report[21] made by Mr. Cushing

in the year 1842. Our claims, arising from injuries inflicted by Mexico,

were no ordinary demands founded on mere querulousness, or contrived

with a view to obtain money fraudulently from that republic. They were

brought to the notice of the ministry of foreign affairs by all our

envoys, and their justice urged with ample proof; until, at length, upon

the return of Mr. Powhatan Ellis to the United States, in the year 1837,

after demanding his passports, they became the subject of a message from

President Jackson in which he alleges that all his efforts of pacific

negotiation had been fruitless and that he found it both just and

prudent to recommend reprisals against Mexico. This serious aspect of

our difficulties immediately commended the subject to the notice of

committees in both houses of congress, and whilst they sustained the

president's opinion of the character of our wrongs, they recommended

that a forbearing spirit should still characterize our conduct, so that,

"after a further demand, should prompt justice be refused by the Mexican

government, we might appeal to all nations not only for the equity and

moderation with which we had acted towards a sister republic but for the

necessity which will then compel us to seek redress for our wrongs

either by actual war or reprisals."[22]

"Shortly after these proceedings"--says President Polk--"a special

messenger was despatched to Mexico, to make a final demand for redress;

and on the 20th of July, 1837, the demand was made. The reply of the

Mexican government bears date on the 29th of the same month, and

contains assurances of the anxious wish of the Mexican government 'not

to delay the moment of that final and equitable adjustment which is to

terminate the existing difficulties between the two governments;' that

nothing 'should be left undone which may contribute to the speediest and

most equitable termination of the subjects which have so seriously

engaged the attention of the United States,' that the 'Mexican

government would adopt, as the only guides for its conduct, the plainest

principles of public right, the sacred obligations imposed by

international law, and the religious faith of treaties,' and that

'whatever reason and justice may dictate respecting each case will be

done.' The assurance was further given that the decision of the Mexican

government upon each cause of complaint, for which redress had been

demanded, should be communicated to the government of the United States

by the Mexican minister at Washington.

"These solemn assurances, in answer to our demand for redress, were

disregarded. By making them, however, Mexico obtained further delay.

President Van Buren, in his annual message to congress of the 5th of

December, 1837, states that 'although the larger number' of our demands

for redress, and 'many of them aggravated cases of personal wrongs, have

been now for years before the Mexican government, and although the

causes of national complaint, and those of the most offensive character,

admitted of immediate, simple, and satisfactory replies, it is only

within a few days past that any specific communication in answer to our

last demand, made five months ago, has been received from the Mexican

minister;' and that 'for not one of our public complaints has

satisfaction been given or offered; that but one of the cases of

personal wrong has been favorably considered, and but four cases of both

descriptions, out of all those formally presented, and earnestly

pressed, have as yet been decided upon by the Mexican government.'

President Van Buren, believing that it would be vain to make any further

attempt to obtain redress by the ordinary means within the power of the

executive, communicated this opinion to congress, in the message

referred to, in which he said that 'on a careful and deliberate

examination of the contents,' of the correspondence with the Mexican

government, 'and considering the spirit manifested by the Mexican

government, it became his painful duty to return the subject, as it now

stands, to congress, to whom it belongs, to decide upon the time, the

mode, and the measure of redress.'

"Instead of taking redress into our own hands, a new negotiation was

entered upon with fair promises on the part of Mexico. This negotiation,

after more than a year's delay, resulted in the convention of the 11th

of April, 1839, 'for the adjustment of claims of citizens of the United

States of America upon the government of the Mexican republic.' The

joint board of commissioners created by this convention to examine and

decide upon these claims was not organized until the month of August,

1840, and under the terms of the convention they were to terminate their

duties within eighteen months from that time. Four of the eighteen

months were consumed in preliminary discussions on frivolous and

dilatory points raised by the Mexican commissioners; nor was it until

the month of December, 1840, that they commenced the examination of the

claims of our citizens upon Mexico. Fourteen months only remained to

examine and decide upon these numerous and complicated cases. In the

month of February, 1842, the term of the commission expired, leaving

many claims undisposed of for want of time. The claims which were

allowed by the board and by the umpire, authorized by the convention to

decide in case of disagreement between the Mexican and American

commissioners, amounted to _two millions twenty-six thousand one hundred

and thirty-nine dollars and sixty-eight cents_. There were pending

before the umpire when the commission expired additional claims which

had been examined and awarded by the American commissioners, and had not

been allowed by the Mexican commissioners, amounting to _nine hundred

and twenty-eight thousand and twenty-seven dollars and eighty-eight

cents_, upon which he did not decide, alleging that his authority ceased

with the termination of the joint commission. Besides these claims,

there were others of American citizens amounting to _three millions

three hundred and thirty-six thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven

dollars and five cents_, which had been submitted to the board, and upon

which they had not time to decide before their final adjournment.

"The sum of two millions twenty-six thousand one hundred and thirty-nine

dollars and sixty-eight cents which had been awarded to the claimants,

was an ascertained debt by Mexico, about which there could be no

dispute, and which she was bound to pay according to the terms of the

convention. Soon after the final awards for this amount had been made,

the Mexican government asked for a postponement of the time of making

payment, alleging that it would be inconvenient to pay at the time

stipulated. In the spirit of forbearing kindness towards a sister

republic, which Mexico has so long abused, the United States promptly

complied with her request. A second convention was accordingly concluded

between the two governments on the thirtieth of January, 1843, which

upon its face declares, that, 'this new arrangement is entered into for

the accommodation of Mexico.' By the terms of this convention, all the

interest due on the awards which had been made in favor of the claimants

under the convention of the 11th of April, 1839, was to be paid to them

on the 30th of April, 1843, and "the principal of the said awards, and

the interest accruing thereon," was stipulated to "be paid in five

years, in equal instalments every three months." Notwithstanding this

new convention was entered into at the request of Mexico, and for the

purpose of relieving her from embarrassment, the claimants only received

the interest due on the 30th of April, 1843, and three of the twenty

instalments. Although the payments of the sum thus liquidated, and

confessedly due by Mexico to our citizens as indemnity for acknowledged

acts of outrage and wrong, was secured by treaty, the obligations of

which are ever held sacred by all just nations, yet Mexico violated this

solemn engagement by failing and refusing to make the payment. The two

instalments due in April and July, 1844, under the peculiar

circumstances connected with them, were assumed by the United States and

paid to the claimants. But this is not all of which we have just cause

of complaint. To provide a remedy for the claimants whose cases were not

decided by the joint commission under the convention of April the 11th,

1839, it was expressly stipulated by the sixth article of the convention

of the 30th of January, 1843, that 'a new convention shall be entered

into for the settlement of all claims of the government and citizens of

the United States against the republic of Mexico which were not finally

decided by the late commission which met in the city of Washington, and

all claims of the government and citizens of Mexico against the United

States.'

"In conformity with this stipulation, a third convention was concluded

and signed at the city of Mexico on the 20th of November, 1843, by the

plenipotentiaries of the two governments, by which provision was made

for ascertaining and paying these claims. In January, 1844, this

convention was ratified by the senate of the United States, with two

amendments, which were manifestly reasonable in their character.

"Upon a reference of the amendments proposed to the government of

Mexico, the same evasions, difficulties, and delays were interposed

which have so long marked the policy with that government towards the

United States. It has not even yet decided whether it would or would not

accede to them, although the subject has been repeatedly pressed upon

its consideration.

"Mexico thus violated a second time the faith of treaties, by failing or

refusing to carry into effect the sixth article of convention of

January, 1843."[23]

The allegations made in this message are unquestionable. They rest upon

the evidence of documents which are accessible to all in the published

papers of the government.[24] The outrages of Mexico consisted in

seizure of property, illegal imprisonment of citizens, deprivation of

just rights, interference with our lawful commerce, forced loans,

violations of contracts, and arbitrary expulsion from the territory

without trial. All these misdeeds formed the exasperating burthen of our

complaint, and their perpetration was in fact proved beyond the

possibility of cavil by the awards in favor of our claimants made by the

Baron von Roenne, who, as Prussian minister, was umpire between the

Mexican and American commissioners.

It must not be forgotten that we had claims also against Spain, France,

England, Denmark and Naples, which were adjusted by negotiation and

liquidated in strict accordance with treaties. These, demands, however,

originated during the wars in Europe which followed the French

revolution, so that it remained for Mexico to peculate on our commerce

and persecute our people during a period of entire international peace,

and without any excuse save the direct villainy of her government, or

the corrupt ignorance of her subordinate officers.

* * * * *

We must now retrace our steps, in order to narrate an event of interest

in the series of causes that originated this war.

It appears that the Mexican government, in anticipation of some attack

on its distant territories of California, had, in the summer of 1842,

sent a number of troops thither, under the command of Don Manuel

Micheltorena, who was appointed commandant general and inspector of both

the Californias. These troops arrived at San Diego, the southernmost

port on the Pacific side of California, in the middle of October, and

were on their way to Monterey, the capital, when the occurrences in

question took place.

Monterey, on the Pacific, is a small village founded by the Spaniards in

1771, at the southern extremity of a bay of the same name, near the 36th

degree of latitude, about a hundred miles south of the great bay of San

Francisco, and about three hundred and fifty miles north from the town

of Angeles, where the Commandant Micheltorena was resting with his

troops when the events in question occurred.

Whilst Commodore Jones was visiting the port of Callao, in September,

1842, he received from Mr. John Parrott, our consul at Mazatlan, a copy

of a Mexican newspaper of the 4th of June, containing three official

declarations against the United States, which he regarded as "highly

belligerent."[25] He also obtained a newspaper published in Boston,

quoting a paragraph from the New Orleans Advertiser of the 19th April,

1842, in which it was asserted,--upon what the editor deemed authentic

information,--that Mexico had ceded the Californias to England for seven

millions of dollars. These documents reached our sensitive commodore at

a moment when his suspicions were aroused by other circumstances. For,

on the 5th of September, Rear-Admiral Thomas, a British commander,

sailed from Callao in the Dublin having previously despatched two of his

fleet with sealed orders just received from England. The whole fleet, he

believed, was secretly on its way to Panama to embark reinforcements of

troops, from the West Indies, to take armed possession of the

Californias in conformity with the allegation of the Boston and New

Orleans editors.[26]

Commodore Jones immediately hastened from the port of Callao to Lima,

where, in a conversation with the American charge d'affaires, Mr.

Pickett, he formed the decided opinion that there would be war not only

with Mexico but with Great Britain also.[27] Accordingly, he lost no

time in preparing for sea, and on the 7th of September, sailed for the

coast of Mexico.

On the 19th of October, Jones arrived at Monterey, in the frigate United

States, accompanied by the Cyane, Captain Stribling. They did not

communicate with the shore or endeavor, in any authentic way, to

ascertain the state of our political relations; but at four o'clock in

the afternoon, Captain Armstrong, the flag captain of the United States,

landed, and delivered to the acting governor, Don Juan Alvarado, a

letter from Commodore Jones, requiring the immediate surrender of the

place, with its forts, castles, ammunitions and arms, to the United

States, in order to save it from the horrors of war, which would be the

immediate consequences of a refusal to submit. Alvarado, upon this

summons, consulted the military and civil authorities; and, finding that

the garrison consisted of only twenty-nine men, that the artillery was

composed of eleven pieces, entirely useless from the rottenness of their

carriages, and that the whole number of muskets and carbines, good and

bad, did not exceed a hundred and fifty, he surrendered the place, which

was taken possession of by the Americans early on the 20th of October.

The articles of capitulation signed on the occasion provide, that the

Mexican soldiers shall march out with colors flying, and shall remain as

prisoners of war until they can be sent to Mexico, and that the

inhabitants shall be protected in their persons and property, so long as

they conduct themselves properly, and do not infringe the laws of the

United States. Commodore Jones at the same time issued a proclamation to

the Californians, declaring that "he came in arms as the representative

of a powerful nation, against which the existing government of Mexico

had engaged in war, but not with the intention of spreading dismay among

the peaceful inhabitants," and inviting them to submit to the authority

of a government which would protect them forever in the enjoyment of

liberty.

The evening and night of the 20th passed quietly; but, on the next day,

the commodore seems to have reflected on the results of a bloodless

conquest which was even more easily won than the victories of Cortez and

Pizarro three hundred years before. Learning that there was late and

pacific news from Mexico, and, forthwith despatching his private

secretary and chaplain to seek for it, they discovered, in the office of

the Mexican commissary, several packages containing unopened files of

gazettes, as late as the 4th of August. "The general tone of the

articles,"--says the commodore,--"relating to the United States, in

these papers, was pacific, whilst the certainty that Mexico had not

commenced hostilities against us, up to the 22d of August, was

established by private commercial letters from Mazatlan." Thus, it

seemed to him, that the crisis had passed; that his victory was barren,

that the reported cession of the Californias to England was untrue and

could not have been prevented even by his valor. The war which had been

recklessly undertaken upon surmises or newspaper articles, and

stimulated by the sailing of an English fleet with sealed orders, came

to an end as it began--by Mexican journals.

Accordingly, on the 21st of the month, Commodore Jones addressed another

letter to the acting governor, Alvarado, announcing that information

received since the capture of the place, left him no reason to doubt

that the difficulties between Mexico and the United States had been

adjusted; and that, being anxious to avoid all cause of future

controversy, he was ready to restore the place, with its forts and

property, to the Mexicans, in the same condition in which they were

before the seizure. Monterey was therefore at once evacuated by the

Americans, and reoccupied by the Mexicans, whose flag, on being

rehoisted, was saluted by our ships.

If the commodore of our squadron had prudently despatched his secretary

and chaplain on a pacific mission of inquiry under a flag of truce,

immediately upon his arrival, it is extremely probable that they would

either have discovered on the 20th the newspapers they found on the

21st, or have received the commercial letter which terminated the

capture. This would have prevented an angry diplomatic correspondence;

it would have allayed the irritation of national sensibility, and,

whilst it saved us from the imputation of attempting to intimidate a

weak power, would not have subjected our forces to the mortification of

mistake upon such grievous subjects as peace and war. The Mexican

papers, of course, viewed the matter as a national insult; and the

government gazette, published in the capital, unequivocally asserted

that Commodore Jones attacked Monterey, agreeably to orders from his

government, with the view of conquering California, but that finding the

country in a state of defence, (for which thanks were due to President

Santa Anna and his efficient minister of war,) he was obliged to abandon

his plan and invent a story for his justification.[28]

It is scarcely possible for a citizen of the United States to take a

different view of the subject without a full knowledge of the facts; for

it could hardly be believed that the commander of a naval station,

during a period of profound peace, would venture to summon towns to

surrender, to land forces, take prisoners, and hoist our national flag

on friendly soil, without the authority or connivance of his

government.[29]

FOOTNOTES:

[19] This river is known by various names in different authors. By some

it is called Rio Bravo, by others, Rio del Norte, and by others, again,

Rio Grande. I shall adhere to the latter throughout this work.

[20] See the Natchez Daily Courier of 18th January, 1843, for an

excellent article on Mexico, signed EGO ET ALTER.

[21] Report No. 1096 to the H. of R., 27th congress, 2d session.

[22] See senate documents of that session.

[23] President Polk's annual message to congress, 8th Dec. 1846, p. 6.

[24] See Doc. No. 139, 24 cong. 2d sess. H. of R.--Senate Doc. No. 320,

2d sess. 27 cong.--Doc. No. 57, H. of R. 27 cong. 1st sess.--Senate Doc.

No. 411, 27 cong. 2d sess.--Doc. No. 1096, H. of R. 27 cong. 2d

sess.--Doc. No. 158, H. of R. 28 cong. 2d sess.--Doc. No. 144, H. of R.

28 cong. 2d sess.--Senate Doc. No. 85, 29 cong. 1st sess.--Senate Doc.

No. 151, 29 cong. 1 sess.

[25] This paper contained the circular of the Mexican minister of

foreign relations to the diplomatic corps, dated 31st May,

1842,--(answered by Mr. Thompson on the 1st of June,)--relative to

public meetings in the United States favorable to Texas; the aid

furnished Texas by _volunteers_ from the United States; and the trade in

arms and munitions of war with Texas. Doc. No. 266, H. of R., 27th

congress, 2d session.

[26] See doc., No. 166, H. of R., 27th congress, 3d session, page 85.

[27] Id. pages 15, 68, 73.

[28] Diario del Gobierno--Mexico, 1842.

[29] A correspondence relative to this seizure of Monterey took place at

Washington between Mr. Webster, secretary of state, and Gen. Almonte,

the Mexican minister; and, in Mexico, between Senor Bocanegra, minister

of foreign affairs, and Mr. Waddy Thompson, our diplomatic

representative. Mexico complained bitterly of our insulting descent on

her territory, and our ministers apologized gracefully for the

unauthorised act. The correspondence between the governments and with

Commodore Jones will be found in document No. 166, H. of R., 97th

congress, 3d session, 1843.

The recall of Commodore Jones by the secretary of the navy is the

following words:

"NAVY DEPARTMENT, January 24, 1843.

"SIR: Although no official intelligence of the recent occurrences at

Monterey has reached this department, yet the leading facts have been

communicated in a form sufficiently authentic to justify and render

necessary my immediate action. In the opinion of this government it is

due to the friendly relations subsisting between the United States and

Mexico, and to the respect which every nation owes to the rights of

other nations, that you should be recalled from the command of the

squadron in the Pacific.

"In adopting this course it is not designed to prejudge the case, _nor

even to indicate any opinion as to the propriety or impropriety of your

conduct in the matter alluded to_. That will of course be made the

subject of proper inquiry after you return to the United States, when

full justice will be done as between yourself and your own country. The

present order has reference only to the just claims of Mexico on this

government for such a disavowal of the attack on Monterey as will fully

recognize the rights of Mexico, and at the same time place the conduct

of this government in a proper light before the nations of the world.

Commodore Dallas will relieve you as soon as he can conveniently reach

the station and you will return to the United States in such mode as may

be most convenient and agreeable to yourself.

"I am respectfully yours,

"A. P. UPSHUR.

"Com. THOS. AP. C. JONES, commanding Pacific squadron."

I believe that the commodore was not tried by a court of inquiry or a

court martial after his return, but that the affair has slumbered since

the date of the above letter.

CHAPTER III.

The origin of the war--History of the pacification between Spain and

Holland in 1609--Spain and Mexico should have followed the

example--The Texas question--Origin of the Texas revolution--

True history of it--Resistance to the Central despotism of Santa

Anna--Mexican war against Texas--Independence of Texas--Santa

Anna's retraction in 1846 of his anti-federative opinions.

The student of Mexican history, at this period, will derive instruction

from a narrative of the connexion which once existed between Spain and

the Netherlands and its fatal rupture.

After the fall of the duke of Burgundy in 1477, his daughter Mary

brought the low countries to Austria by her marriage with the Emperor

Maximilian; and his grandson, Charles V, united these provinces with

Spain. During the reign of Charles, their ancient liberties were

carefully respected, and the country prospered whilst the Protestant

religion spread throughout it in spite of stern opposition. But when

his successor, Philip II, mounted the throne, all prudence in the

government of the Belgic and Batavian provinces seems to have been

abandoned, and unbridled persecution was let loose on the civil and

religious rights of the people. Granvella and the bloody duke of Alva

were the monarch's instruments in this sad misgovernment, which resulted

in a total renunciation of allegiance to the king of Spain. Long and

bitter was the rebellion,--continuing from the middle of the sixteenth

century to the year 1609,--when the Spanish claim to the sovereignty of

the new republic of Holland was virtually resigned under the form of a

truce for twelve years between the belligerents.[30]

The independence of the united provinces was thus, in fact achieved, and

it was recognized by all the great powers of Europe except Spain; still

Holland went through the thirty years war, before her nationality was

secured by the peace of Westphalia.

From this sketch it will be perceived that Spain, although willing to

forego the continuance of war, and to save the point of honor between

herself and the rebellious provinces when it was impossible to recover

her dominion over them, nevertheless, clung with stupid pride to her

abstract right of reconquest for a long period after she had

substantially acknowledged their freedom. The dismemberment of Spain

was, of course, an event which the monarch could not behold without

regret, for it was natural that he should seek to transmit his dominions

to posterity uncurtailed of their fair proportions. Yet, in the adoption

of a diplomatic _ruse_,--in the truce of twelve years,--there was a

degree of wisdom which it would have been well for Spain to recollect

when it became evident that the revolt of her American colonies was

about to terminate in their independence. The passions between the

belligerents would have had time to cool. The common ties of blood and

language might gradually have bound up the wounds made by war. The

intervention of friendly powers would have obtained concessions from the

discreet parent,--and thus Peru and Mexico might still have shone as the

brightest jewels in the Spanish crown. No quarrel ever terminated in

perfect re-establishment of amity without tolerance or retraction on the

part of one of the disputants. Superior force may overawe into silence

or crush by its ponderous blows, yet the non-resistance and taciturnity

which ensue are but the repose that precedes the hurricane, in which the

elements seem gathering strength to pour forth their wrath with

irresistible fury.

So was it with Spain and her American colonies. Instead of soothing and

pacific measures, tending to allay resentment and bring back the rebel

to allegiance, the utmost violence was at once adopted both in deeds and

language, and scenes of barbarity were enacted by Calleja and his

myrmidons from which the heart recoils with horror.[31]

Severe as was the lesson taught by the conduct of Spain to Mexico, that

republic, nevertheless, resolved not to profit by it when she, in turn,

saw one of her States discontented with her misrule and usurpations. If

Texas had been soothed; if justice had been speedily done; if the

executive had despatched discreet officers, and reconciled the

differences between the North American emigrants and the Spaniards, not

only in civil and municipal government, but in religion and

temper,--Texas might not have been lost to Mexico,--but, invigorated by

a hardy and industrious population, would have poured commercial wealth

into her coffers, and furnished her factories among the mountains with

an abundance of that staple which the native Indians are as unused as

they are unwilling to cultivate. Had Mexico been even as wise as Philip,

in 1609, and saved her punctilious honor by a twelve years truce, she

would only have postponed the settlement of her difficulties, until her

internal affairs became sufficiently pacific to enable a firm government

to act with discretion and justice.

* * * * *

Since the year 1843 the Texas question has been so much a matter of

party dispute in the United States that the true history of the revolt

seems to be almost forgotten. I shall not hesitate therefore to recount

some of the events connected with it, because they are relevant to the

issue between us and Mexico, as well as necessary to the elucidation of

the justice of her quarrel.

It is an error that the Texan rebellion was conceived in a spirit of

sheer fraud upon Mexico; and writers who seek to stigmatize it thus are

entirely ignorant of its origin.

The contest that arose between the central and federal parties in Mexico

immediately after the establishment of independence has been narrated in

a preceding chapter. The first _federal_ constitution is an almost

literal copy of our own; but its equitable and progressive principles

did not suit the military despots who, whilst they commanded the army,

held the physical power of Mexico in their hands. The consequence was

that during the administration of the first president, Victoria, there

were _pronunciamientos_ against federation and in favor of centralism,

by _Padre Arenas_, and at Tulancingo, under the "plan of Montayno."

Quarrels in the party lodges of the Yorkinos and Escossceses--the

liberalists and centralists--next arose;--and, finally, the revolution

under the "plan of Toluca," destroyed the cherished constitution of

1824, by striking a death blow at the federative principle. This plan

vested the power in a central government, abolished State legislatures,

and changed those States into departments under the control of military

governors, who were responsible to the chief authorities of the nation

alone. These principles were embodied in the new constitution of 1836,

and were, of course, distasteful to every friend of genuine liberty.[32]

Meanwhile, the beautiful province of Texas had not been an unconcerned

spectator of events. Bordering on the Gulf of Mexico, and stretching

along our Southern boundary, it contained an extensive territory, fine

rivers, wide prairies, and a soil capable of maintaining near ten

millions of people.--Such a country naturally attracted the attention of

the people of the United States, numbers of whom are always ready, with

the adventurous spirit that characterises our race, to seek new lands

and improve their fortunes by emigrating from the crowded places of

their birth. The project of colonizing Texas, had, therefore, struck an

intelligent citizen of our country; and, on the 17th of January, 1821,

Moses Austin obtained permission from the supreme government of the

eastern internal provinces of New Spain at Monterey, to settle a colony

of emigrants in Texas. Accordingly, in the following winter, his son,

Stephen F. Austin, who undertook the enterprize in obedience to a

testamentary request of his father, appeared on the Brazos with the

first Anglo-American settlers.

In January, 1823, a national colonization law, approved by the Emperor

Iturbide, was adopted by the Mexican congress, and, on the 18th of

February, a decree was issued authorizing Austin to proceed with the

founding of his colony. This decree, after Iturbide's abdication and the

downfall of the Imperial government, was confirmed by the first

executive council in accordance with a special order of the Mexican

congress.

In 1824, the federal constitution was adopted and proclaimed as the

established polity of the land;--and, at this period, the character of

Texas begins for the first time to assume an independent aspect, for, by

a decree of the 7th of May, it was united with Coahuila, and, under the

name of Coahuila and Texas, formed one of the constituent, sovereign

States of the Mexican confederacy. Up to this period, whilst all was

proceeding well in the capital, the scheme of emigration, seems to have

met with no discouragement. By an act passed in August, 1824, another

_general_ colonization law was established;--and, by a _State_

colonization law of Coahuila and Texas, foreigners were invited to

settle within the limits of that especial jurisdiction. Thus it was that

State sovereignty first accrued to Texas and Coahuila under the federal

system,--a system similar to the one under which the colonists had

formerly lived in our Union and under which, by the adoption of their

own State laws, they signified their willingness to become members of

the Mexican confederacy. This State sovereignty was never resigned, but,

on the contrary, was always distinctly asserted. The federation existed

precisely for the same purposes that the union of our States was formed;

and, as soon as the constitution was destroyed by intrigue and

revolutionary violence in 1835, the several States were remitted to

their inherent rights, independent of any military despot who succeeded

in seizing the central power. Meanwhile our people had flocked to Texas

under the belief that a constitution which was a transcript of our own,

would secure peace and prosperity to settlers. Accustomed to find laws

observed and the constitution indestructible, they expected to encounter

the same regularity and firmness in that virgin State. They were

industrious in their pursuits, and willing to abide the settlement of

all quarrels in the capital; nor was it until long after the federal and

centralist disputes commenced, that they began even to notice the

political convulsions which were so ominous of disaster. The quiet and

orderly conduct of our emigrants was, nevertheless, not regarded so

favorably by the Mexicans. The rapidly growing strength of the Texans

and their strict devotion to republicanism, attracted the jealousy of

the supreme government; and when a Mexican begins either to fear or to

doubt, the provocation is quite enough to convert him into an oppressor.

Accordingly, on the 6th of April, 1830, an arbitrary law was passed by

which the future immigration of American settlers to Texas was

prohibited. Military posts of _surveillance_ were established over the

State, and ignorant and insolent soldiers of another race, began to

domineer over a people whom they regarded as inferiors. At length the

civil authorities of Texas were entirely disregarded, and the emigrants

hitherto unused at home or abroad to an armed police, or to the sight of

a uniform except on parade days, suddenly found themselves subjected to

the capricious tyranny of military rule.[33]

On the 26th of June, 1832, the colonists took arms against this despotic

interference with their constitutional freedom and besieged and captured

the fort at Velasco. The garrison at Anahuac and that at Nacogdoches,

were next reduced; and, in December of that year, when hostilities were

suspended between Santa Anna and Bustamante, the colonists were again

restored to the enjoyment of their rights guarantied under the

constitution.

In May 1824, Texas had been promised a separate State constitution as

soon as she was prepared for it, but upon application to congress in

1833, after framing a suitable instrument in general convention at San

Felipe, her request was denied. In 1835 the crisis at length arrived.

The federal constitution fell. The resistance of several States to this

despotism was suppressed by force. The legislature of Coahuila and Texas

was dispersed at the point of the bayonet. Zacatecas, a brave stronghold

of federalism, was assaulted by the central chiefs and her people

butchered. And, finally, the whole republic, save Texas, yielded to

Santa Anna.

As this state at once resolved to maintain her sovereignty and

federative rights, corresponding committees of safety and vigilance were

promptly formed in all the municipalities. An immediate appeal to arms

proclaimed the people's resolution to adhere to the constitution; and at

Gonzales, Goliad, Bexar, Conception, Sepantillan, San Patricio, and San

Antonio, they were victorious over the centralists. In November, 1835,

the delegates of the Texan people assembled in "general consultation,"

and declared that "they had taken up arms in defence of the federal

constitution of 1824, and that they would continue faithful to the

Mexican confederacy as long as it should be governed by the laws that

were framed for the protection of their political rights; that they were

no longer morally or politically bound by the compact of union; yet,

stimulated by the generous sympathy of a free people, they offered their

assistance to such members of the confederacy as would take up arms

against military despotism. This patriotic manifesto declaring at once

the freedom of Texas and offering to other parts of Mexico a defensive

alliance in favor of constitutional liberty, found no response from the

overawed States, and thus Texas was abandoned to the mercy of a military

president, who signalized his campaign of 1836 by acts of brutality

which must forever consign his name to infamy."[34] Notwithstanding

Santa Anna's successes at San Antonio and his frightful massacres,

General Houston, the commander of the Texan forces, met and conquered

the Mexicans on the 21st of April, 1836, in the brilliant action at San

Jacinto, and thenceforth, in the emphatic language of an American

statesman "the war was at an end."[35]

"No hostile foot found rest" within her territory for six or seven years

ensuing this event, and Mexico, by confining her assaults to border

forays practically abstained from all efforts to re-establish her

dominion.[36] In this peaceful interval the country rapidly filled up

with emigrants; adopted a constitution; established a permanent

government, and obtained an acknowledgement of her independence by the

United States and other powers. It was then supposed that nearly one

hundred thousand people occupied the territory; and, in 1837, they

sought to place themselves under the protection of our confederacy. But

our government declined the proposition made through the Texan

plenipotentiary, upon the ground that the treaty of amity and peace

between the United States and Mexico should not be violated by an act

which necessarily involved the question of war with the adversary of

Texas.[37]

* * * * *

This brief history of the Texan revolt against centralism seems to place

the authorities of that country on a firm basis of natural and

constitutional right. In the constant conflicts that have taken place

throughout Mexico between the federalists and centralists, or rather

between democracy and despotism, Texas attempted no more than any of the

liberal States of Mexico would have done, had not the free voice of

educated patriots been elsewhere stifled by military power. The only

difference between them is, that in Texas there was an Anglo-American

population bold and strong enough to maintain republicanism, whilst in

Mexico, the mongrel race of Spaniards and Indians was too feeble to

resist effectually.

* * * * *

From 1836 to 1846 Santa Anna diligently persevered in the support of his

central usurpation. But in the latter year the principles of the Texan

revolution obtained a decided victory over military despotism, and even

Santa Anna himself, who had been the originator of all the revolutions

of his country, the disturber of its peace, and destroyer of its

political morality was forced to make a humiliating confession of his

errors.

It will be remembered that he was exiled from Mexico in the year 1845,

and resided in Havana until the summer of 1846, when a revolution

against the government of Paredes prepared the way for his return. On

the 8th of March, 1846, in writing to a friend a letter which has since

been published he declares that: "the love of provincial liberties being

firmly rooted in the minds of all, and the democratic principle

predominating every where, nothing can be established in a solid manner,

in the country, which does not conform with these tendencies; nor

without them can we attain either order, peace, prosperity, or

respectability among foreign nations. To draw every thing to the centre,

and thus to give unity of action to the republic, as I at one time

considered best, is no longer possible; nay more, I say it is dangerous;

it is contrary to the object which I proposed for myself in the

unitarian system, because we thereby expose ourselves to the separation

of the northern departments, which are the most clamorous for freedom of

internal administration."[38]

In this remarkable retraction of Santa Anna's despotic principles, Texas

finds a perfect vindication of her revolt. It would have been well for

Mexico had her military president been willing to make the same

concessions before the memorable battle of San Jacinto!

FOOTNOTES:

[30] Arnold's third lecture on modern history.

[31] Robinson's Memoirs of the Mexican Revolution, pages 20, 22, 24.

[32] Mexico as it was and as it is, pp. 336, 339. Foote's History of

Texas.

[33] Document No. 40, H. of R. 25th cong. 1st sess. p. 4.

[34] A full account of this campaign will be found in a work entitled

"Primera Campana de Tejas," published in Mexico in August 1837, by Don

Ramon Martinez Caro, who was Santa Anna's military secretary during the

campaign. He treats his former chief with unsparing severity, and very

clearly attributes to him all the ferocious acts of the war. In

Thompson's "Recollections of Mexico," a conversation of the ex-minister

with Santa Anna will be found, in which his exculpation is attempted,

pp. 68, _et seq._

[35] Mr. Webster's letter to Waddy Thompson, 8th July, 1842.

[36] Webster to Thompson _ut antea_.

[37] Letter of Mr. Forsyth to General Hunt, 25th Aug. 1847. Doc. No. 40,

H. of R., 25th congress, 1st session.

[38] Translation of a letter from General Santa Anna, in Mexico as it

was and as it is.--4th edition, page 414.

CHAPTER IV.

Origin of the war continued--Proposed annexation of Texas to the United

States by treaty--Efforts of several administrations to recover

Texas after the Florida treaty--President Tyler's objects--Mexican

opinions--British intrigue--British views relative to Texas--Defeat

of the treaty in the senate--French opinions.

There is no doubt that although the government of the United States was

anxious to preserve a strict neutrality between the belligerents in

1837, and, thus, to avoid assuming the war with Mexico by annexing an

insurgent State, it, nevertheless, refused the proffered union with

regret. From the earliest period, our statesmen contended that, by the

Louisiana treaty, we acquired a title to Texas extending to the Rio

Grande, and that we unwisely relinquished our title to Spain by the

treaty of 1819 which substituted the Sabine for the Rio Grande as our

western boundary.[39] But, divested as we were by solemn compact with

Spain, of what may have been our territory under the treaty with France,

it was idle to regard Texas as a proper subject for restoration to the

Union whilst active hostilities were waged by Mexico. Nevertheless, such

was the evident value of the province, and such the anxiety to regain

our ancient limits that before the outbreak of the revolution, Mr. Clay,

as secretary of state under the administration of Mr. Adams, in March of

the years 1825 and 1827, directed Mr. Poinsett, our envoy in Mexico, to

negotiate for the transfer of Texas. This direction was repeated by Mr.

Van Buren to our minister in August, 1829; and was followed by similar

instructions from Mr. Livingston on the 20th of March, 1833, and by Mr.

Forsyth on the 2d of July, 1835. President Jackson, however, was not

contented with negotiations for that province alone; but, looking

forward, with statesmanlike forecast, to the growth and value of our

commerce in the Pacific ocean as well as on the west coast of America,

he required the secretary of state, in August, 1835, to seek from Mexico

a cession of territory, whose boundary, beginning at the mouth of the

Rio Grande, would run along the eastern bank of that river to the

thirty-seventh degree of latitude, and continue thence, by that

parallel, to the Pacific. This demand, if granted by Mexico, not only

secured Texas, but would have included the largest and most valuable

portion of California together with the noble bay of San Francisco, in

which our navy and merchantmen might find a safe and commodious

refuge.[40]

Our anxiety to reannex Texas by peaceable negotiation was not met,

however, by a correspondent feeling upon the part of Mexico.

Mr. Poinsett, on his return from Mexico, informed Mr. Clay that he had

forborne even to make an overture for the repurchase of Texas, because

he knew that such a negotiation would be impracticable, and believed

that any hint of our desire would aggravate the irritations already

existing between the countries.[41] The events which subsequently

transpired in Texas, during the period when emigration increased from

the United States, to that of the actual outbreak of hostilities,

prevented the formation, in Mexico, of any party favorable to such an

enterprise; and, after the war began, all hope of negotiation between us

was dispelled.

"A leading member of the Mexican cabinet once remarked to me," says Mr.

Thompson, in his Recollections of Mexico,[42] "that he believed the

tendency of things was towards the annexation of Texas to the United

States, and that he greatly preferred such a result either to the

independence of Texas or any connection or dependence of Texas upon

England; that if it became an independent power, other departments of

Mexico would unite with it either voluntarily or by conquest, and that

if there was any connexion between Texas and England, English

merchandize would be smuggled into Mexico through Texas to the utter

ruin of Mexican manufactures and revenue.

"In one of my last interviews with Santa Anna," continues the American

minister, "I mentioned this conversation. He replied with great

vehemence that he would 'war forever for the reconquest of Texas, and

that if he died in his senses his last words should be an exhortation to

his countrymen never to abandon the effort to recover the province;'

and, added he: 'you know, sir, very well, that to sign a treaty for the

alienation of Texas would be the same thing as signing the death warrant

of Mexico, for, by the same process, the United States would take one

after another of the Mexican provinces, until they possessed them all.'"

Such were the feelings of Mexico in regard to annexation, and such the

anxieties in cabinets of all parties in the United States to restore

our ancient limits, when the presses of our country intimated, in the

year 1844, that President Tyler was negotiating a treaty of union with

Texas as an independent power. It was on the eve a presidential canvass;

and whilst the incumbent of the executive chair sought very naturally to

present himself to the people with the successful results of a popular

and beneficial negotiation, there were other candidates who opposed the

measure both on principle and policy, as well as on account of the mode

in which it was to be effected.

I might very properly in this historical sketch pass over the narrative

of annexation, and, deal with the union, ultimately effected between

Texas and the United States as the only important fact. Texas, bound to

the North American confederacy by a solemn act of congress,--the

indisputable constitutionality of which is implied in its passage,--is,

indeed, the only subject which the historian is compelled to regard.

Whatever results ensued, whether they were perceived and predicted by

the statesmen of the time, or, were entirely latent until developed

during the last two years, must be entirely attributed to the act of

congress which consummated annexation and reposed in the hands of a

president the executive power of solemnizing the union. Nevertheless, I

believe it due to impartial history that I should state concisely the

causes which seem to have provoked annexation, and, indeed, rendered it

almost necessary at the time when it occurred.

We have seen that active hostilities by Mexico against the insurgents

had either ceased for nearly seven years, or had been confined to such

border forays as resembled predatory incursions rather than civilized

hostilities. Statesmen, in all parties, regarded the war as ended; for

Mexico, impoverished by the thriftless administrations that ruled and

plundered her during the short intervals between her revolutions, was

in no condition to carry it on with reasonable prospects of success.

France, England, Belgium and the United States, had acknowledged Texan

independence and established diplomatic relations with the republic.

Emigrants settled the interior, and invited accessions. The constitution

and laws of the nation were fixed upon a firm basis, while the

government was conducted with ability. A lucrative commerce from foreign

countries began to pour into the territory. New towns sprang up every

where, and Texas exhibited to the world every evidence of an orderly,

well regulated government, with infinitely greater strength and

stability than the military republic from which she was divorced.

Mexico, nevertheless, refused to recognize her independence

notwithstanding her inability to make any effort for reconquest. The

leading men of Texas anxiously desired that their national independence

should continue, and the moral sense of the world, in contrasting the

superior progress of the Anglo-American race with the anarchy and

feebleness of Mexico, was naturally solicitous to behold the infant

colony successful rather than to see it fall a prey to the passions of a

people with whom it had no sympathy, and, in whose victory, they might

witness the outpouring of a pent up wrath which would never cease in its

vindictive persecutions until the province was entirely desolated.[43]

This was not alone the common feeling in the United States, but it

prevailed in Europe also. The British minister of foreign affairs, Lord

Aberdeen, and that zealous partizan of liberty, Lord Brougham, took

occasion in the house of peers in August, 1843, to express their

solicitude as to the prospects of Texas. Lord Brougham characterized it

as a country as large as France, possessing the greatest natural

capabilities, but, at the same time he perceived in it an embryo state,

(a large portion of whose soil was adapted to cultivation by white

labor,) which might become a boundary and barrier against the slavery of

the United States of America. If, by the good offices of England, Mexico

could be induced to acknowledge Texan independence upon the condition of

abolishing slavery, he suggested the hope that it would lead to the

extinction of slavery in the southern States of our Union.

Lord Aberdeen replied to Lord Brougham, that England had not only

acknowledged her independence, but had also negotiated with Texas a

treaty of commerce as well as one for the abolition of the slave trade.

He did not believe that there was any importation of slaves into Texas

by sea, but, he alleged, there was a large influx of slaves from the

United States to that country. As soon as negotiations were commenced

with Texas, the utmost endeavors of England had been used to end the war

which prevented the full recognition of the independence of Texas by

Mexico; but all their endeavors had been met by difficulties, although

he was happy to declare that an armistice had been established between

the two powers which he hoped would lead to the absolute acknowledgment

of her independence. In the existing state of negotiations between the

parties, however, he thought it would not contribute to an useful end to

express any opinion as to the state of those negotiations, nevertheless

he assured his noble friend that the matter would be pressed by every

means in the power of her majesty's ministers.

The answer of Lord Brougham to this conversational speech of the

minister of foreign affairs, was brief but ominous. Nothing, he

declared, could be more satisfactory to him, whilst the statement of his

lordship "would be hailed with joy by all who were favorable to the

object of anti-slavery societies."[44]

* * * * *

I do not design in this history to discuss either the slavery question

or the British project of propagating seditious opinions upon negro

servitude by means of diplomacy on this continent. But, when we remember

the guaranties of our constitution and the preponderance of the black

population in our southern States, it must be conceded that it requires

no great degree of sensibility to alarm the white inhabitants of that

section and to render them anxious to counteract the avowed machinations

of Great Britain. The abstract question of the right of slavery is

altogether distinct from slavery as it exists in this Union, and as the

foundation of property, population, labor, and, even, existence in the

south.

For many years past the fanaticism of freedom has been warring against

slavery, until it has created in our country a fanaticism of slavery

which was quite as relentless in its obstinacy. It was therefore,

natural that individuals who had refused our own congress the right to

interfere with slavery, by denying the privilege of petition for the

abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, should resist most

ardently the jesuitical propagandism of a foreign power.

This was a question of grave importance to the south. It was an avowal

of European policy that struck a death blow at American property; nor

was it therefore at all surprising to see Mr. Calhoun, our secretary of

state, who was a native and inhabitant of that part of the union, at

once seize upon the project of prompt annexation as the only means of

counteracting the evils of British diplomacy. If expressions, similar to

those used by Lords Aberdeen and Brougham in the English parliament, had

been casually uttered in the warm debates of our congress, perhaps but

little attention would have been paid them by reflecting men; yet the

most trifling observations of British statesmen always deserve notice,

because they are well pondered and deliberately made. The opinions of

Lord Brougham, assented to by the silence of Lord Aberdeen, had

consequently an emphatic significance; and although the British minister

of foreign affairs, as well as the envoy at Washington, subsequently

disclaimed any attempt to interfere with the internal system of the

United States, yet there can be no doubt that they wished to modify the

condition and laws of a southern neighbor so as to effect indirectly

what prudence taught them to avoid openly.[45] "Great Britain," said

Lord Aberdeen, in a despatch to the Hon. Mr. Pakenham, on the 26th

December, 1843, "does not desire to establish in Texas, whether

partially dependent on Mexico or entirely independent, any dominant

influence. She only wishes to share her influence equally with other

nations. Her objects are purely commercial, and she has no thought or

intention of seeking to act directly or indirectly, in a political

sense, on the United States through Texas."

It cannot be expected--for it is not the nature or policy of

governments--that statesmen should disclose to each other, with perfect

frankness, all their international ambitions, projects or hopes. A wise

diplomacy conceals these things whilst in progress. But all governments

take means to obtain secretly, as far as they are able, an insight into

the views of each other. The diplomacy of the United States, although

generally very frank, is nevertheless employed sometimes in this way,

and, I believe our records will show, that wherever it became necessary

for our departments to get information upon projects touching the

interests of our country, they have always found means to discover the

truth.

It is fortunate for the history of this annexation question that the

commercial designs alluded to by Lord Aberdeen have been revealed to us.

Some of the statements are made anonymously, yet, from the very nature

of such disclosures whilst negotiations were pending, it cannot be

expected that the names of informants would be revealed. Their value and

character must be vouched for alone by the officers who communicate them

to the world, and deem them sufficient to authorize the action of

government. The authorities, to which I allude, were communicated to

congress by President Tyler in May, 1844, and were submitted to him by

Mr. Calhoun, as secretary of state, on the 16th of that month.[46]

* * * * *

By a convention, concluded in London on the 14th of November, 1840,

between Her Majesty's government and the republic of Texas, it was

agreed that the queen should tender her good offices to Mexico as

mediator between the belligerents. Mexico, however, saw fit to reject

this offer. But Texas, still animated by a desire for peace, sought to

obtain a triple mediation of the three great powers,--the United States,

France and England,--with the hope that under their auspices a

settlement might speedily be made. To this arrangement, the governments

of France and the United States assented with alacrity; while the

government of Great Britain, though expressing an ardent desire to do

all in its power by private mediatorial efforts, inclined to the opinion

that it would be better, on all accounts, for each party to act alone,

though similarly in point of tone and argument, in urging the Mexican

government to recognize the independence of Texas.

This suggestion was communicated through Lord Cowley the British

ambassador in Paris, to the French government, by whom it was

approved.[47]

By this act of the British cabinet, it preserved its independence of all

others, and abstained from combined action which would, necessarily,

have disclosed its motives as well as its conduct. The objects of the

ministers in retaining their independence of all other cabinets will now

become more manifest.

If an abstract love of liberty is, indeed, the true cause why England

seeks to abolish slavery throughout the world and has set the example of

emancipation in her West India colonies, she may really deserve the high

commendation of philanthropists. But it cannot be denied that whilst she

diffuses a spirit of individual freedom, she does not regret to behold

national dependence on herself established by interest and necessity. We

find among the documents transmitted to congress by President Tyler, a

number of private letters, in which it is alleged that the primary

object of Great Britain's interference was to prevent absolute

annexation to the United States. Indeed, Lord Aberdeen, in May, 1844,

declared to Mr. Everett that he "shared with Lord Brougham the hope and

belief that the treaty for annexation would not be ratified by our

senate."[48]

If the independence of Texas could be secured on the only probable

ground upon which Mexico would acknowledge it,--a pledge that she would

not subsequently join the United States;--and if so desirable a

result,--which appealed directly to the ambition and vanity of the

leading men of Texas, could be effected by the secret negotiations of

her ministers, England foresaw that she would obtain a decided advantage

over us in future negotiations, without a positive treaty stipulation to

that effect. Texas, with every element of prosperity in her people and

territory, was war-worn, and suffering from pecuniary embarrassments in

which her revolution plunged her. For an agricultural and commercial

people, peace and stability, under almost any liberal government, are

all that is requisite to insure progress. England, a free, maritime and

manufacturing country, deeply interested in Mexico as a purchaser, and

in the United States as a rival, was precisely the nation to secure

these advantages for Texas, especially as that republic offered a _point

d'appui_ which she could not find elsewhere on this continent.

The "free trade" policy of Great Britain was consequently addressed to

the cupidity of Texas as a bewitching allurement; and this was, perhaps,

secretly coupled with pecuniary offers which would enable her to

struggle against adverse fortune during the first years of independence.

This liberal system, while it attracted to England the cotton of Texas

in British vessels, would necessarily raise the national duties of the

republic to the highest standard on American produce and provisions, at

the same time that it introduced the manufactures of England without

imposts. The schemers who had achieved emancipation in the British West

Indies[49] imagined that the same result might be produced in Texas by

sufficient inducements, and that white labor or _apprentices_ would

supply the place of slaves, thus striking an indirect blow at slavery

in the southern States of our Union. Besides this, England would find a

market for her manufactures which might temptingly address itself to the

cupidity of the United States and of Mexico as well as of Texas. For,

with such an extent of frontier on all sides, and with wastes between

us, inhabited by a sparse or reckless population, the greatest

inducements would be offered to convert Texas into a smuggling ground

not only for our Union but especially for Mexico, whence British fabrics

are almost excluded by exorbitant tariffs. The policy of England would

thus affect simultaneously our manufactures as well as our commerce.

Instead of sending her merchandize to New York, she would find in

Galveston a readier market to supply our southern States through the

medium of contraband.[50] Her goods would naturally have been carried in

British vessels, and thus the labor and commerce of the United States

would be directly injured by England until we could afford to navigate

and manufacture at cheaper rates.[51]

The impolicy of permitting our carrying trade and home market, in such a

country, to pass out of our hands into those of a commercial rival, and

the dangers of counteracting or creating a contraband system which would

almost immediately ensue, commended this annexation promptly to the

notice of President Tyler. He perceived in British supremacy in Texas a

multitude of evils. Collisions would arise which must endanger our

peace. The power and influence of England would be intruded,

geographically, on territory lying between us and Mexico. A large

increase of our military forces would be necessary, not only to protect

the United States from daily disputes with Texans, but to guard the

border inhabitants against hostile inroads from Indians. Texas, he was

authoritatively told, would seek the friendship of other nations if

denied the protection of ours; and, in a condition of almost hopeless

abandonment, would naturally fall an easy prey to any power that would

protect her, should we refuse our alliance.[52]

Such were some of the reasons that induced the president, in 1844, to

direct Mr. Upshur, who was the secretary of state, to negotiate a treaty

of annexation between the United States and Mexico, and thus, in his

emphatic language,--"to break up and scatter to the winds the web of

European intrigues."[53]

This treaty was transmitted to the senate on the 22nd of April, 1844,

and immediately became the topic of discussion throughout the country.

It was opposed and defended by some of the most distinguished men in the

country. General Jackson pleaded that the golden moment might not be

lost, and that we should not throw Texas into the arms of England.[54]

Mr. Clay, whose nomination as a presidential candidate was expected to

be shortly made, and Mr. Van Buren whose name was also speedily to come

before a democratic convention assembled to select a candidate for the

chief magistracy, both published long and argumentative letters against

the project. The debate on the treaty in the senate was eager, and able.

The northern abolitionists regarded it as a measure frought with danger

to their cause, and as the basis of perpetual slavery, whilst the

southern slave owners hailed annexation as a boon, which, at least for a

season, would stay the aggressive arm that was raised against their

rights and interests.

At length, the senate finally rejected the treaty; but President Tyler,

by a message to the house of representatives, dated the 10th of June,

transmitted the rejected document to the popular branch of the national

legislature, so that, without suggesting the mode of annexation, the

house of representatives might decide whether it should be accomplished

in any shape.

At that moment, however, new elements of political commotion were

introduced in the nomination of Mr. Clay and Mr. Polk by the respective

party conventions held in Baltimore, and the project passed from the

national legislature to the people for discussion during the

presidential canvass.

NOTE.--The opinions and arguments adduced by the

president in support of annexation have been singularly

fortified by disclosures subsequent to the union between

Texas and the United States. The British cabinet, mortified

by defeat, has been silent upon the subject, but singular

developments were made in debate in the French chambers. On

the 12th and 20th of January, 1846, a discussion took place

between Messieurs Guizot, Thiers, Berreyer and others, in

which the Texas question, and the position of France, in the

event of war between the United States and England, upon the

Oregon question, was warmly debated. The minister, Guizot,

alleged that in all the negotiations with Texas, France had

sought commercial relations in consequence of the advantages

offered of markets for French goods. He declared that it was

his policy to interpose _an independent State in the midst

of the United States_, and _that he believed it to be

advisable to multiply the number of secondary independent

States on our continent_, as the commercial and political

interests of France would suffer materially by the

foundation of a governmental unity in America. He watched

our progress with a jealous eye, and he considered the

policy of the United States in refusing to be the _ally_ of

any European power both right and wise in our view of the

question.

M. Thiers, the former minister, replied to M. Guizot; and,

after asserting that Texas had been annexed to our Union "to

the great displeasure of England, and, as far as could be

discovered, to the great displeasure of France," he declared

that it was the true interest of his government to place

Texas under the patronage of a powerful nation like ours

rather than to abandon it to the influence of England. "You

are aware," said he, "that _Texas is of great importance to

the United States_, and that its possession was anxiously

desired by that power: _I will add that never was an

annexation made in a more regular manner_. For more than ten

years Texas had been separated from Mexico, and all the

powers, including France, had recognised it." He regarded

the union of England and France in diplomacy between Mexico,

Texas, and the United States, as adopted only to redeem the

faults of the French cabinet during the last five years, and

as a truckling peace-offering for its conduct on the

question of the "right of search." But, of all the French

orators and statesmen, none denounced the conduct of the

cabinet with more zeal than the eloquent Berreyer. He proved

by facts and documents that it was at the instance of

England, and in subservience to her, that the French

government interposed, (as will be seen in the following

chapter,) to maintain the separate independence of

Texas:--"We have not limited ourselves"--exclaimed he--"to a

wish and a counsel that Texas should retain her freedom, but

we have been led to take a part in that which I regret I am

compelled to regard as nothing else than an _intrigue_,

which, unfortunately for our national dignity has borne all

the marks of an _intrigue_, and has met, at last, its

humiliation."--Niles' Register, vol. 70, pp. 25, 26, 27, 28,

and vol. 68, p. 290.

FOOTNOTES:

[39] See Mr. Clay's letter on the Texas question, Raleigh, N. C., April,

1844. I shall discuss the boundary elsewhere in this volume. When Texas

offered herself in 1837 to the United States it was only two years after

Mexico had overthrown the federal constitution, and not even one after

the battle of San Jacinto. A great change however took place in the

general aspect of affairs between that period and the final annexation.

[40] Executive document, No. 42, H. of R., 25th congress, 1st session,

contains the letters referred to.

[41] Mr. Clay's letter on annexation, _ut antea_.

[42] Recollections of Mexico, p. 238.

[43] It was evidently the intention of Mr. Webster, whilst secretary of

state, to adopt some prudent scheme for the settlement of the war

between Texas and Mexico. In January, 1843, he addressed a despatch to

Mr. Thompson, who was then our envoy in Mexico, in which he directs him

to use his good offices with the Mexican secretary to mitigate the

animosity of the government. "Mexico," says he, "has an undoubted right

to resubjugate Texas, if she can, so far as other states are concerned,

by the common and lawful means of war. _But other States are

interested,--especially the United States, a near neighbor of both

parties, are interested,--not only in the restoration of peace between

them, but also in the manner in which the war shall be conducted if it

shall continue._ These suggestions may suffice for what you are

requested to say amicably and kindly to the Mexican secretary, _at

present; but I may add, for your information, that it is in the

contemplation of this government to remonstrate, in a more formal

manner, with Mexico, at a period not far distant, unless she shall

consent to make peace with Texas, or shall show the disposition and

ability to prosecute the war with respectable forces_. Executive

document, No. 271, H. of R., 28th cong., 1st sess., p. 69.

For the opinions of French statesmen on this question see the debate

between Guizot, Thiers, Berreyer and others, reported in vol. 70, of

Niles' Register, p. 25, 26.

[44] Debates in the British house of lords, Friday 18th August, 1843,

reported in the London Morning Chronicle of the 19th; and see executive

document, No. 271, H. of R., 28th congress, 1st session.

[45] Ex. Doc. No. 271, H. of R., 28 cong., 1st sess. p. 48, _et

seq_:--In an interview between Lord Aberdeen and Mr. Everett, in

November, 1843, the secretary of foreign affairs told him that England

had long been pledged to encourage the abolition of the slave trade _and

of slavery_, as far as her influence extended and in every proper way,

but had no wish to interfere with the _internal_ concerns of

governments. In reference to Texas, he said that "the suggestion that

England had made or intended to make the abolition of slavery the

_condition_ of any treaty arrangement with her was wholly without

foundation."--id. page 38. The _direct_ interference of England in the

_internal_ affairs of other governments has often been very distinctly

manifested notwithstanding Lord Aberdeen's disavowal. There is scarcely

a country in Europe which has been unvisited by her arms or her

diplomacy, either when it became her interest to do so, or when she had

the necessary force to make success unquestionable. Her policy is,

perhaps, not so much one of ambition as of avarice or necessity. She

must feed her multitudes at home; and an extension of her wide spread

commerce, with co-extensive privileges in new countries, will open new

sources of wealth to her people. Nations are not to be blamed for

seeking such advantages; but the nearer neighbor should be equally

blameless for grasping, if possible, the benefit for herself, so as to

keep off a dangerous rival and secure the revenues which otherwise would

flow into that rival's coffers.

The excursive _philanthropy_ of England was admirably depicted by the

Frenchman, who, according to the London Times remarked that: "Your

Englishman knows all about Timbuctoo, or Hindoostan, or the frozen

regions about the North Pole; but ask him about Ireland, the country

lying next his own, and he is perfectly innocent of any information on

the subject. Africa he investigates--Ireland he neglects. He weeps for

the suffering of the negro, but allows his Irish fellow subject to live

in ignorance and filth, and often to die of starvation."

[46] Ex. Doc. No. 271, H. of R., 28th cong., 1st sess. p. 101, _et seq._

[47] Id.--p. 70. Letter of Mr. Van Zandt to Mr. Webster.

[48] Id.--p. 100. Washington, 24th January, 1843.

[49] See Lord Brougham's speech, _ut antea_.

[50] Any one who is familiar with the condition of our Canadian frontier

will understand the ease with which smuggling in British fabrics is

carried on between the countries. An extensive business has, doubtless,

always been sustained; and it is not unusual even for the ladies of

certain towns along the frontier, to _shop_ in Canada, with the

understanding that their purchases are to be _delivered at the risk of

the British vender, on the other side of the American line_!

[51] Executive document, 271, H. of R., 28th cong., 1st sess. Letter of

Mr. Allen to Hon. R. J. Walker, and other letters copied on pages 103

and 105 of the same document.

The government of the United States entertained such views of the

grasping policy of England for reasons which are clearly set forth in an

able despatch from Mr. Calhoun to Mr. King, our envoy at the court of

France. "The question," says the secretary of state, "is, by what means

can Great Britain regain and keep a superiority in tropical cultivation,

commerce and influence? Or shall that be abandoned and other nations,

suffered to acquire the supremacy even to the extent of supplying

British markets to the destruction of the capital already vested in

their production? These are the questions which now profoundly occupy

the attention of her statesmen and have the greatest influence over her

councils.

"In order to regain her superiority she not only seeks to revive and

increase her own capacity to produce tropical productions, but to

diminish and destroy the capacity of those who have so far outstripped

her in consequence of her error. In pursuit of the former, she has cast

her eyes to her East India possessions, to Central and Eastern Africa,

with the view of establishing colonies there, and even to restore,

substantially, the slave trade itself, under the specious name of

transporting free laborers from Africa to her West India possessions, in

order, if possible, to compete successfully with those who have refused

to follow her suicidal policy. Her main reliance, however, is on the

other alternative, to cripple or destroy the productions of her

successful rivals. There is but one way by which it can be done, and

that is by abolishing African slavery throughout this continent; and

that she avows to be the constant object of her policy and exertions."

Senate doc. No. 1, 28th cong. 1st sess. p. 44.

[52] President Tyler's message to the senate. 22nd April, 1844.

[53] Letter of President Tyler to the Richmond Enquirer in 1847.

[54] President Jackson's letter 17th March, 1844, written in consequence

of a private mission to him from President Houston of Texas.

CHAPTER V.

Change of public feeling as to annexation--Election of President Polk

--Mr. Clay defeated by the abolitionists--Almonte's threat--

President Tyler attempts to soothe Mexico--His failure to do so

--Mexican projects of reconquest--Want of confidence in Santa

Anna--Loans--Downfall and disgrace of Santa Anna--His expulsion to

Cuba--Herrera made provisional president--Congress of United States

reconsiders annexation--Joint resolution passed with an alternative

of negotiation--President Tyler adopts the first clause, and why--

European intrigues--France and England operating on Texas and Mexico

--Mexico offers independence provided Texas will not annex herself

to the United States--Defeat of the foreign scheme.

When Congress met in December, 1844, a remarkable change had come over

the political would in the United States. The extraordinary popularity

of Mr. Clay induced reflective men to believe, at the close of the last

session, that he would be elected president, and that the prospects of

immediate annexation would probably be blighted by that event. The great

body of his partizans opposed the project of President Tyler; but the

Democratic convention, assembled in Baltimore, in May, inscribed the

fortunes of Texas on its banner together with the name of that party's

candidate. The south immediately rallied around it, whilst the north

assumed strange grounds of objection to the course of Mr. Clay. The

Native American and Abolition parties in New York professed to vote with

the friends of that gentleman in consequence of his opposition to

annexation, and yet a sufficient number to defeat his election cast

their ballots in direct contradiction of their principles. This was but

another lesson of the danger of confiding in men or parties who have but

a single idea. The folly of fanaticism commonly leads to violent

inconsistencies, but perhaps a more palpable one was never exhibited

than in the result of the presidential election of 1844.

When the project of annexation was first discussed in 1843 in the

gazettes of the day, and before any decided action by the president or

secretary of state, General Almonte, who was then Mexican envoy at

Washington, protested earnestly against the act, and even threatened, by

express order of his government, that on sanction being given to the

incorporation of Texas into the United States, he would consider his

mission as ended, seeing that the Mexican government was resolved to

declare war as soon as it received information of such a deed.[55]

But Mr. Tyler, disregarding the irascible temper of the minister and his

government, despatched pacific and soothing instructions to our charge

at Mexico, intimating a desire to act justly towards that republic, and

to settle all questions growing out of the treaty as well as of boundary

on the most liberal terms.[56]

The Mexican government, however, would listen to no proposals of

accommodation. The Texan question, as we have seen, was always one of

great annoyance to the Mexican authorities; for although they

acknowledged, in effect, that their dominion was really lost over Texas,

yet their national pride and public feeling forced them to project, if

they did not attempt, its reconquest.[57] Besides this, darkness was

gathering around the fate of Santa Anna, who dared not undertake

negotiations upon a subject so unpopular.

When a new congress assembled in Mexico in January, 1844, it was

disposed to aid the executive in his scheme of reconquest. Four millions

of dollars were therefore granted him; but when he claimed ten millions

for the same purpose, whilst it was notorious that the first grant had

not yet been collected, the members of congress absolutely refused to

sustain Santa Anna's measures for the recovery of the lost territory.

This refusal was not grounded upon any aversion of the Mexicans from

reconquest, but solely because they believed the money would be extorted

from the people only to be plundered by the president and his myrmidons.

The politicians and country had alike, lost confidence in him; and Santa

Anna, observing the rising storm, obtained permission from congress to

retire to his estate of Manga de Clavo near the sea coast at Vera Cruz,

whilst his friend Don Valentin Canalizo took his place in the capital as

president _ad interim_.

Santa Anna hardly reached his estate when a fatal blow was struck

against his administration from the departmental junta of Jalisco. This

revolt was lead by General Paredes, and after a multitude of military

and diplomatic manoeuvres, resulted in Santa Anna's downfall on the

4th of January, 1845. The ex-president fled towards the sea-coast; but

was captured by a detachment of volunteers at the village of Jico,

whence he was transferred under a strong escort to the castle of Perote.

It is difficult even to imagine the bitter wrath with which the Mexican

people assailed the captured chief. He, who but a few months before

exercised despotic sway over the land, was now a prisoner and at the

mercy of the mob. His friends interposed in this emergency to save his

life both from popular fury and judicial action which might make it the

penalty of his misrule. The strife was long and anxious, but, at length,

an amnesty was declared, under which Santa Anna departed for Cuba on the

29th of May, 1845, accompanied by his wife and daughter.[58] The fury of

the people against the exile may be imagined from the fact that they

exhausted every means by which they could manifest their hatred of his

deeds and memory. They thronged the streets singing ribald songs, and

hawking ridiculous caricatures;--they tore his pictures from the walls,

and hurled his statues from their pedestals; and, with the fiendishness

of hyenas, they even snatched from the grave the leg he had lost in

battle with the French at Vera Cruz, and tossed it about the streets of

Mexico![59]

* * * * *

The result of Santa Anna's downfall was the establishment of a

provisional government under General Herrera, president of the council.

This person is represented to have been a discreet officer, whose

judgment naturally led him to see the wisdom of a pacific course towards

the United States, but whose destiny was finally controlled by the rash

and unprincipled conduct of insurrectionary demagogues.

Meanwhile the congress of the United States reconsidered the Texan

question, and after a long and ardent debate, finally passed a joint

resolution for annexation, with an alternative permission to the

executive to negotiate; provided he thought proper to adopt that course.

This was a solemn decision of the question by the representatives of the

people, and it was sustained by the president who did not permit himself

to be influenced by the threats of Mexico or the hostile preparations

made by that country. In fact, Mr. Tyler had been careful to guard

against military surprises, for, in consequence of the early menaces of

Mexico, he deemed it his duty, as a precautionary measure, to

concentrate in the gulf and its vicinity a large portion of the Home

squadron under the command of Commodore Conner, and, at the same time to

assemble at fort Jesup on the Texan border, as large a military force as

the demands of the service at other encampments would allow.

Thus, the joint resolution for annexing Texas to the United States, with

its alternative power to negotiate, came to President Tyler and was

approved by him on the 1st of March, 1845. On the fourth of the same

month, James K. Polk, who had been chosen president of the United

States, at the last election, was to assume the reins of government.

President Tyler believed that the necessity for annexation was immediate

and urgent in consequence of the reasons he had already presented to

congress in his several messages. The only doubt therefore, that he

experienced in making his selection, arose from a point of delicacy to

his successor. The first section of the joint resolution authorized the

erection of a new State of our Union out of the republic of Texas under

certain conditions contained in the second section; whilst the third

authorized the president to negotiate with that republic for admission

either by treaty to be submitted to the senate, or by articles of

agreement to be presented to our houses of congress, as the president

might direct.

Under these circumstances a cabinet council was summoned for the 2nd of

March, and the point was resolved by informing the president's

successor, Mr. Polk, of the proposed action, and, if he desired it,

submitting to his perusal the despatch to Texas. Mr. Calhoun, our

secretary of state, at the president's request, accordingly waited upon

Mr. Polk, explained to him Mr. Tyler's selection of the first and second

sections of the joint resolution, and expressed a readiness to exhibit

the despatch to Mr. A. J. Donelson, who had been appointed charge to

Texas.[60] Mr. Polk courteously declined expressing an opinion

concerning the executive action, accompanying his remark with some

complimentary declaration; and, on that evening, a bearer of despatches

with the requisite documents, was on his way to Mr. Donelson.[61]

This is a brief and accurate summary of the history of annexation so far

as the action of our government is involved, and as is necessary for

this narrative. The terms of annexation which were offered by the United

States were accepted by Texas, and the public faith of both nations was

solemnly pledged to a compact of union, which was finally consummated at

the following session of congress, when Texas became a member of our

confederacy.

There were other circumstances, however, which properly induced the

prompt course of President Tyler in sending the joint resolution for the

action of Texas; but, in order to understand these perfectly, it is

necessary for us to direct our attention to the French and English

negotiations between that republic and Mexico. In 1840, as we have seen,

England preferred separate action on behalf of Texas, but she was now

willing to unite with France against the aggrandizement of the United

States. Monsieur de Saligny and the Hon. Mr. Elliott were the

representatives of these European courts in Texas, and to the former of

them was entrusted the active part of the diplomacy. Whilst the

discussions were going on in the United States Mr. Elliott was never at

rest. He was heard of in Charleston, in New Orleans, in Havana, in

Mexico, and, again, in Texas. The restlessness of the agent denoted the

anxiety of his government and of France.

The rejection of the annexation treaty by congress, in 1844, had almost

deprived Texas of hope. She believed it impossible to expect a union

with the United States, and was prepared to receive the mediation of

France and England which would secure her independence. This was surely

gratifying to the emissaries of these powers and they eagerly undertook

the task of obtaining the coveted boon from Mexico. The Mexican

ministry, ever anxious to thwart the union with our confederacy, was

equally pleased to avert it by any diplomatic _ruse_ that would save the

point of honor, and place her erect before the world. Besides this, the

Mexicans relied on a hope that increasing difficulties between the

United States and England upon the Oregon boundary question, would make

us loath to undertake a war with a southern neighbor whilst our north

and our sea board were menaced by Great Britain. This hope of a

counter-menace from England inspirited the Mexican cabinet and made it

solicitous to resist us successfully. Herrera's ministry was composed of

discreet and patriotic men; but, in the first moments of their power,

they dared not oppose popular prejudices. The revolution which

overthrew Santa Anna was one of the few that sprang from the popular

branches of the nation, and originated neither in factions, the army, or

the church, but derived its success from the universal feeling that

existed against the oppressive misrule of the executive.[62]

Nevertheless popular feeling was against our country, and the cabinet

took its tone from its patrons.

There can be little doubt of the fact, that the notion of probable

difficulties between the United States and England on the boundary

question, was studiously fostered by emissaries who were hostile to us.

Herrera's cabinet therefore hailed with delight the propositions which

were brought to Mexico by Mr. Elliott, and were presented by the Hon.

Charles Bankhead and Baron Alleye de Cyprey, the British and French

ministers. These propositions, Senor Cuevas laid before the Mexican

congress on the 21st of April, 1845. The preliminary conditions offered

by Texas, under French and English mediation, and transmitted from that

republic by President Jones, on the 29th of March, were the following:

1st. That Mexico shall consent to acknowledge the independence of Texas.

2nd. That Texas shall engage and stipulate in the treaty _not to annex

herself to or become subject to any country whatever_.

3rd. The limits and other conditions shall be matter of arrangement by

final treaty.

4th. That Texas should be willing to remit disputed points _concerning

territory and other matters to the arbitration of umpires_.

These spiteful stipulations, evidently aimed against the United States,

and bearing the marks of their European parentage, suited the taste of

Mexico precisely. Her congress, therefore, at once deemed it advisable

to entertain the Texan proposals, and to proceed to the celebration of a

treaty. But when the Baron de Cyprey announced this assent to the

president of Texas, on the 20th of May, it was already too late for the

success of European diplomacy. Our congress had passed the

joint-resolution, our president had approved it, and our minister, Mr.

Donelson, was in Texas preparing the cabinet to act favorably upon our

propositions. Accordingly when Mr. Elliott returned in June to Texas in

a French corvette, the public mind was already manifesting its anxiety

to accede to our liberal offers, which were finally sanctioned by the

Texan convention on the 4th of July, 1845.

Had the resolution for annexation not been adopted at the preceding

session of congress, the pretensions of Mexico, instead of being

lowered, would have been raised still higher than they were on the

receipt of the propositions from President Jones. The mediatorial powers

of Mr. Elliott would, in all probability, have been employed in

negotiating truces and treaties until the foundation was laid for the

operation of those peaceful means by which Lord Aberdeen declared it his

intention to promote his philanthropic views. "Abandoned by the United

States, oppressed by debt, and wearied by the increasing burthens and

privations of war, Texas would have been at the mercy of Britain, and

her statesmen would have accepted almost any terms to secure

independence and peace."[63]

FOOTNOTES:

[55] Senate doc. No. 341, 28th cong. 1st sess. p. 95.

[56] Senate doc. No. 1, 28th cong. 2d sess. p. 53.

[57] General Almonte, the Mexican envoy, in a conversation in New York,

confessed to the writer, in the spring of 1843, that Texas was lost to

Mexico, but that all then desired by his countrymen was to save the

point of honor before they acknowledged its independence.

[58] Mexico as it was and as it is, 4th Ed. Letter XXV. p. 367.

[59] Id. page 382.

[60] House of Rep., doc. No. 2, 29th cong. 1st sess. p. 125.

[61] The election of the 1st and 2nd sections of the joint resolution

made by President Tyler was subsequently approved by President Polk, as

he declares both in his negotiations and in his message to congress of

the 2nd December, 1845. H. of R., Doc. No. 2, 29th cong. 1st session, p.

3.

[62] Mexico as it was and as it is--p. 390, 4th ed.

[63] Letter from Mr. Donelson to Mr. Buchanan, 2nd June, 1845, H. of R.,

doc. No. 2, 29th cong. 1st sess. p. 52. I do not discuss the question of

the _mode_ of annexation, whether by treaty, joint resolution, or

negotiation, as that would require almost a volume by itself to present

a true sketch of the debate that occurred upon it. It is my purpose

rather to narrate events than to discuss all the various subordinate

questions arising from them. "Annexation," is made one of the great

motives or causes for war by Mexico, no matter in what way it is

effected or attempted. "_Mexico would never agree to annexation_;"--said

Senor Cuevas, the Mexican secretary of foreign affairs, in April,

1845.--Mexico as it was and as it is. p. 391, 4th ed.

CHAPTER VI.

General Almonte demands passports and leaves--Shannon and Rejon and

Cuevas--Views of the Mexican cabinet and people--Animosity--Revolt

in Mexico--Political condition of Mexico--Her right of reconquering

Texas--Mr. Buchanan despatches Mr. Slidell as envoy--Rejection of

all accommodation between us--The reason why Mexico refused to

negotiate, after promising to receive a commissioner from the United

States--Subterfuges--Ill feeling in Mexico on the Texas question--

Herrera overthrown by Paredes--Paredes and the monarchical party--

Unpopularity of his scheme--Miserable state of Mexican affairs--

Review of the Texas question.

In March, 1845, as soon as congress passed the joint-resolution, Gen.

Almonte demanded his passports and departed. A correspondence which took

place in Mexico between Mr. Shannon, our envoy, and Senor Rejon, the

minister of foreign affairs, relative to the projected union resulted

fruitlessly; and, on the 2d of April, Senor Cuevas, who had succeeded

Rejon in office, announced to our legation that his government could

neither continue diplomatic intercourse with ours, nor maintain

friendship with a republic that violated her obligations and usurped a

portion of Mexican territory. He declared, moreover, that the relations

between the two countries could not be re-established before a complete

reparation of that injury should be made.[64]

This violent and denunciatory language, together with the hint to our

minister to depart, was of course not calculated to allay ill-feeling in

either country. The Mexican congress was not less bitter in its

animadversions, thereby spreading the animosity among the people. It

promptly seconded the wishes of the cabinet, and offered two projects,

both of which asserted the unalienated rights of Mexico over Texas, and

the national resolve to maintain them by force.

Meantime, however, domestic discontent was again brewing. A certain Gen.

Rangel attempted to revolutionize the government, and is said to have

been favored by the partizans of the late administration. The insurgents

seized the palace, capturing the president and three of his ministers of

state; but they were speedily overpowered and the insurrection

suppressed. In June and July of this year all the Mexican papers were

loud in their clamors for vengeance. The minister of war, Garcia Conde,

wrote despatch after despatch; and, with the usual spirit of national

gasconade, denounced our "perfidy," and continually alluded to "the war

which Mexico waged against the United States," in consequence of our

"treachery." On the 16th of the latter month, he despatched to the

minister of foreign relations and justice a note detailing a plan for

covering the national frontiers, and asserted that Mexico would maintain

her rights by force, or fall in the struggle. "She will not consent,"

says he, "to give up one half of her territory from the base fear of

losing the other!"

Patriotic and stirring as are these declarations, they cannot but be

regarded otherwise than as the most inflated bombast when we recollect

that they were made in defiance of the United States, and after a

failure for seven years to reconquer even Texas, feeble as she was. What

just hope could distracted Mexico reasonably entertain of ultimate

victory? Several years before this period, her discreet statesmen and

reflecting citizens privately acknowledged that Texas was lost forever.

Pecuniary embarrassments, political misrule, and repeated revolutions

had still more impaired her national strength, and yet, an obstinacy as

inveterate as it was silly, forced her to make declarations of intended

hostilities which only served to kindle and spread the excitement among

the masses.

It is just that we should concede to national pride and honor all they

reasonably demand of respect, yet I have greatly misunderstood this

spirit of our century, if it does not require nations to be as

reasonable in their quarrels as individuals. Empires, kingdoms, states,

republics, and men, are equally amenable to the great tribunal of the

world's common sense, and all are obliged, if they consult their

interests, to yield to the force of circumstances they cannot control.

What then becomes of the mere abstract and visionary "right of

reconquest" which Mexico asserted, even if she really possessed it after

the central usurpation, and destruction of the federal system in 1824?

What hope was there in a war with the United States, after a failure in

that with Texas? It is true that Mexico had the power to annoy us, and

procrastinate her fate; she might oppose and resist; she might develope

all the evil passions of her people and let them loose on our armies in

irregular warfare; but these, after all were nothing more than spiteful

manifestations of impotent malice, disgraceful to the nation that

encouraged them. The cause of genuine humanity, which, I believe, in our

age, truly seeks for peace, demanded the pacification of Texas. The

cruelty with which the war was waged, and the brutal treatment received

by some of the prisoners of the Santa Fe expedition in 1841 and 1842,

convince us that a strong power should have imposed peace on Mexico.

National propriety demanded it; for how long was the "right of

reconquest" to continue? England, the proudest nation on earth,

acknowledged the independence of the United States after a seven years

war. The great powers of Europe interfered to protect oppressed Greece.

England has several times interposed in the affairs of Spain and

Portugal; and our geographical as well as political affinity to Texas

clearly indicated that it was our national interest to establish a firm

and friendly government on our border.

* * * * *

There can be no doubt that when General Herrera was, almost unanimously,

elected president in August, 1845, he saw things in this light, and was

prudently disposed to bend to inevitable fate. Notwithstanding the

warlike despatches, speeches, and proclamations of the Mexicans in the

earlier part of the year, our secretary of state seems to have

sufficiently understood their gasconading habits, to disregard these

inflated productions. He therefore authorized Mr. Black, who remained in

Mexico as consul, upon Mr. Shannon's withdrawal, to propose that we

should send an envoy with full powers to adjust all the questions in

dispute between the two countries. Mexico, notwithstanding her open

bravado, secretly assented to our proposal, declaring that she would

receive "the commissioner of the United States who might come to the

capital with full powers to settle the present dispute in a peaceful,

reasonable and honorable manner."

Accordingly, Mr. Slidell was hastily despatched so as to be sure of

meeting the same persons in power with whom the arrangement had been

made; for in Mexico, the delay of even a day may sometimes change a

government, and create new or unwilling negotiators. Nevertheless when

our minister presented himself in the capital early in December, having

travelled rapidly but unostentatiously, so as to avoid exciting ill

feeling among the Mexicans as to the purposes of his mission, he found

the secretary unprepared to receive him. It was objected that Mr.

Slidell's commission had not been confirmed by the senate of the United

States and that the president had no constitutional right to send him;

that Mexico agreed to receive a commissioner to settle the Texas

dispute, and not a resident envoy; that the reception of such an envoy

would admit the minister on the footing of a friendly mission during a

period of concord between nations, which would not be diplomatically

proper so long as our amity was in the least interrupted;--and, finally,

that the government had not expected a commissioner until after the

session of congress began in January, 1846.

There may be some force in technical diplomacy, between the mission as

agreed on by Messieurs Black and Pena, and the one despatched by Mr.

Buchanan, for the letter of credence declares that Mr. Slidell is "_to

reside_ near the government of the Mexican republic in the quality of

envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, and that he is well

informed of the president's desire to _restore_, cultivate, and

strengthen friendship and good correspondence between us." A point of

extreme etiquette raised at such a moment, when both parties were

confessedly anxious for peace, naturally excites some inquiry as to its

probable origin. Accordingly we find that it was a mere subterfuge,

urged by a tottering administration to avert its ruin. The violence of

the cabinet against annexation had done its work among the people. When

Herrera and Pena accepted, in October, our proposal to treat, they hoped

the popular elections, as well as judicious overtures to the departments

and citizens, would so modify national opinion as to permit their

independent and liberal action. But such forbearance could scarcely be

expected from the watchfulness of Mexican intriguers. Herrera was a

federalist, but his failure to proclaim the federal system, and to throw

himself on that party as soon as he attained power, alienated a large

portion of it and made the rest but feeble supporters. The church and

the centralists soon coalesced in hostility to his government; and,

although his measures were moderate, and all his efforts designed to

correct abuses, yet every political symptom denoted his speedy fall. Of

all the popular clamors, probably none was louder in the mob and the

army, than that which arose in consequence of his effort to negotiate a

peace with our Union. General Paredes took advantage of this

unpopularity, and, at the head of five thousand of the soldiery,

pronounced against the government of the president.

It will be perceived from this sketch how completely this Texas question

and the war with our country have been made electioneering and

revolutionary elements in Mexico: not, however, with patriotic hopes, or

reasonable expectations of reconquest, but with the contemptible anxiety

of usurping a temporary power which, for a while, enabled the aspirant

to govern the country without the least prospect of settling the

difficulty with us or of regaining Texas.[65]

This revolution commenced with the army of reserve stationed at San Luis

Potosi, and was seconded by the military men generally. On the 15th of

December, 1845, Paredes issued a bombastic proclamation[66] from his

headquarters; and, in the latter part of the month the revolutionary

forces reached the capital, when a portion of the garrison pronounced in

favor of the insurgent chief. This induced an early accommodation

between the parties, and finished the outbreak without bloodshed. Yet

Paredes, having overthrown Herrera, partly in consequence of his

friendly disposition for peace with us, could not now attempt

negotiations successfully. Mr. Slidell renewed his offers to the

cabinet, but was repulsed and left the country. The lame reliance of

Mexico upon bombastic proclamations was again adopted. Yet the people

were discontented with Paredes who soon began to manifest the despotic

tendency of his nature and education. The military life of this

chieftain naturally inclined him towards centralism, but he was

altogether unfit either by character or habits for civil authority. As

soon as he assumed the reins of government, a party which had long

drooped began again to lift its head. The monarchists, led by the

Archbishop Manuel Posada y Garduno, and the wily Don Lucas Alaman, soon

got possession of the insurgent general. They were joined by a large

portion of the higher clergy, some influential men of fortune, a few

soldiers, and a number of silly citizens, who promised themselves a

futurity of progress and felicity by calling to the Mexican throne a

monarch from beyond the sea. This party of royalists was strengthened by

dissensions at home, and by the expected attack from the United States.

Many reflecting men cherished no hope of national progress so long as

the turbulent army was unrestrained by paramount authority. They desired

at once to crush freedom and domestic despotism by a foreign prince

supported by European soldiery, whilst they believed that the

continental sovereigns would greedily seize the opportunity of throwing

their forces into America so as to check the aggressive ambition of the

United States.[67] As soon as this scheme of Paredes was disclosed, his

unpopularity increased. His intemperate habits were well known and

destroyed confidence in his judgment. The financial condition of the

country was exceedingly embarrassed, and foreigners, who were the usual

bankers of the government, refused loans on any terms. Payment was

denied by the treasury to all employed in the civil departments, while

money was disbursed to none but the army. The freedom of the press

moreover was suspended; and, to crown the national difficulties, it was

at this very moment that Mexico dreamed of overthrowing the republic at

home and establishing a monarchy in its stead, whilst it simultaneously

encountered our armies abroad in order to reconquer Texas! With such

deplorable fatuity was Mexico misruled, and entangled in a double war

upon the rights of her own people and against the United States. It was

unfortunate that she fell at this crisis into the hands of a despot and

drunkard, whose mind, perplexed between ambition and intemperance, gave

a permanent direction to that false public sentiment, which Herrera had

been anxious to convert into one of peace and good will towards the

United States.

I have thus succinctly narrated the events that led to the war between

the United States and Mexico. The annexation of Texas, without the

previous assent of Mexico, may have annoyed that government. It was

mortifying to patriotic pride, and we should laud the republic for

manifesting a proper sensibility. But true national pride is always

capable of manly and dignified opposition. It does not expend itself in

bravado, petulance or querulousness. It does not assail by threats, but

by deeds; and never provokes an attack until it is prepared to return

the blow with earnest force. It is silent as the storm until it bursts

forth in overwhelming wrath. All other kinds of resistance are nothing

but miserable exhibitions of mortified vanity, and invoke the world's

contempt instead of respectful compassion.

Our government, from the beginning, desired and attempted to allay

excitement, whilst that of Mexico, revolutionary, disorganized and

impotent as it was at home, and as it subsequently proved itself to be

in the field of battle, did all it could to foment animosity between the

two countries. This sturdy resistance of Mexico did not arise from

prudence, patriotism or courage, but from intestine factions,

exasperated by rival usurpers. Our efforts to make peace and establish a

boundary upon the most liberal principles were rejected with

disdain.[68] The authorities, basing their refusal upon a frivolous

subterfuge of diplomatic etiquette, would not even hear our proposals,

or receive our minister. Our presidents were disposed to concede every

thing reasonable in negotiation that could have saved the honor of

Mexico and placed our future relations on the salutary foundation of

alliance.[69] Instead of meeting us with the pacific and compromising

temper of our age, her demagogue chieftains stimulated the passion and

vanity of the mob, until the stormy natures of an ignorant people became

so completely excited that they were unable to control the evil spirit

raised by their wicked incantations.

Blundering onward and blinded by passion, this unfortunate nation

reminds us of that passage in the AEnead wherein the sightless giant is

described:--

"Summo quum monte videmus

Ipsum inter pecudes vasta se mole moventem

Pastorem Polypheum, et littera nota petentem;

_Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum!_

AEnead, B. 3, v. 655.

FOOTNOTES:

[64] Mexico as it was and as it is--see original letter in 4th ed. p.

387.

[65] See Mexico as it was and is, 4th ed. p. 396--and Slidell's

correspondence with our government. Senate doc. No. 337, 29th cong. 1st

sess.

[66] See Mexico as it was and as it is, p. 400.

[67] Tributo a la verdad, Vera Cruz, p. 3.

[68] See Wheaton's Elements of international law. ed. of 1836, part 2d

chap. 1, pp. 88, 89, 90, 91. On the right of interference of governments

for the pacification of belligerent nations.

[69] Mr. Slidell was fully empowered to negotiate on liberal terms.

BOOK SECOND:

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN TEXAS AND ON

THE RIO GRANDE.

BOOK II.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN TEXAS AND ON THE RIO GRANDE.

CHAPTER I.

Boundary of Texas defined by Almonte--Description of Texas--Rivers of

Texas--Army of observation--General Taylor--Army of occupation--How

formed--Difficulty of landing in Texas--Aransas bay--Army lands at

St. Joseph's island--Kinney's rancho--Corpus Christi--State of the

army during the winter--Sufferings of the troops--Alarms of war--

General Gaines's views--Necessity of ample preparation--Our first

aggressive war.

The scene of our observation is now about to change from the cabinet to

the field. The theatre of war properly attracts our attention, and the

spot of earth which was the chief cause of dispute between Mexico and

the United States, and where our armies assembled, justly demands our

first notice.

Texas, until she attained the rank of an independent State, seems to

have been almost an unknown country even to the Mexicans. This was

natural for a people who are not essentially agriculturists, but pass

their lives as herdsmen, miners, or merchants, and whose central

government is far removed from its outposts.

In the year 1834, General Almonte was deputed by the Mexican authorities

to visit this northern province, and prepare a statistical report upon

its extent and character. According to this valuable document, Texas

proper lies between 28 deg. and 35 deg. of north latitude, and 17 deg. and 25 deg. of

longitude, west from Washington. It is bounded on the north by the

territory of Arkansas; east by Louisiana; south by the Gulf of Mexico

and State of Tamaulipas; and west by Coahuila, Chihuahua, and New

Mexico. Almonte was informed, by the State government of Coahuila and

Texas, that instead of the Rio de las Nueces forming the boundary

between Coahuila and Texas, as the map denoted, the true limit commenced

at the embouchure of the Rio Aransaso which it followed to its source,

whence it continued by a direct line until it reached the junction of

the Medina with the San Antonio, and thence proceeded along the eastern

bank of the Medina to its source, terminating, finally, on the borders

of Chihuahua. The territory comprised within these limits is estimated

at near two hundred thousand square miles--a surface almost as extensive

as that of France.[70] But, since Texas receded from the Mexican central

government, these confines have been changed. By an act of her congress,

in December, 1836, the boundary was declared to begin at the mouth of

the Rio Grande, and thence to run up the principal stream of the said

river to its source; thence due north to the 42 deg. of latitude, and

thence, along the boundary as defined in the treaty between the United

States and Spain, to the beginning.[71]

* * * * *

The great body of the territory of Mexico is rich in upland vallies,

extensive plains, noble mountains, fertile soil, beautiful groves, and

rich mines, but it is almost entirely deprived of rivers, whilst Texas

is singularly favored in this respect. On the east, the Gulf of Mexico

affords her an extensive sea coast indented by the mouths of the Sabine

river and lake, the Rio Naches, the Rio Trinidad, the Rio San Jacinto,

Galveston bay, the Rio Brazos, Matagorda bay, the Rio Colorado, the Rios

San Antonio and Guadalupe, Aransaso bay and the Rio Grande, besides

numerous smaller streams that drain her soil and almost cover it with an

interlacing network of water.

Texas presents to the traveller three distinct natural regions. Along

the shores of the gulf from the Sabine to the Rio Grande, a flat country

extends from thirty to one hundred miles in the interior, widening,

towards its centre on the Colorado, and gradually diminishing towards

the Nueces. The sandy wastes and lagunes of the coast give place, at

some distance in the interior, to a rich alluvial country, diversified

by skirts of timber, insulated groves, and open prairies. A large

portion of this part of Texas is described as being singularly free from

those large collections of stagnant water, which, combined with a

burning sun and prolific vegetation, create malaria in our southern

States.

Westward of this level skirt, begins the rolling region. The land

gradually swells in gentle undulations, "covered with fertile prairies

and valuable woodlands, enriched with springs and rivulets." Farther

westward still, these beautiful hills tower up into the steeps of the

_Sierra Madre_, that great chain of gigantic mountains, which, broken at

the junction of the Rio Grande with the Puerco, takes thence a

north-easterly course, and enters Texas near the source of the Nueces.

These elevations are of the third and fourth magnitude, and abound with

forests of pine, oak, cedar, and an extraordinary variety of shrubbery.

Wide vallies of alluvial soil, commonly susceptible of irrigation from

copious streams in the highlands, wind through the recesses of these

mountains and afford a delightful region for the purposes of

agriculture. The table lands beyond these ranges have been but little

explored, and still less is known of the northern region extending to

the 42 deg. of north latitude, as well as of that portion lying between the

Nueces and the Rio Grande. But such, in brief, is Texas from the gulf to

the mountains;--a country adapted alike to the planter, the grazier and

the farmer, while it offers to commerce a wide extent of sea coast whose

harbors may be made perfectly secure by the skill of modern science.[72]

* * * * *

I have already stated that in 1844 President Tyler stationed an army of

observation under General Taylor, at fort Jesup, as soon as he

negotiated the annexation treaty.[73] This corps, but poorly sheltered

from the weather, and in an inhospitable climate, was, for a long time,

left inactive on the banks of the Sabine. In midsummer of 1845, after

the joint resolution was passed, and when our difficulties with Mexico

began to thicken, it was at length ordered to advance, under the same

commander, towards the southern frontier of Texas. The army then

consisted of but two regiments of infantry, one of dragoons, and a

single company of artillery, in all about fifteen hundred efficient men.

As the climate was known to the sickly, the war department despatched

only such an unacclimated force as was deemed absolutely necessary to

protect a tropical region in the month of July, awaiting the colder

months before its numbers were increased. This body was called the army

of occupation, whose appointments seem to have been extremely imperfect.

"The dragoon regiment had just been formed from a rifle corps; half of

its men were raw, undisciplined recruits, and many of them unable to

ride, while their recently purchased horses were small, weak and

undrilled. The infantry regiments were enfeebled by their long

exposure, in miserable tents, to the withering heats and drenching rains

of a low southern latitude; and the artillerists were without their

guns. Towards the end of June, 1845, a company of the last mentioned arm

of the service, equipped as infantry, at fort Moultrie, was ordered to

New Orleans. This body, armed only with muskets, sailed from Charleston

on the 26th of the month, and on its arrival in Louisiana on the 19th of

July, found that it was destined for service in Texas. The instructions

to the commanding officer informed him that his company was to be

mounted and equipped as flying artillery for the campaign under Taylor;

that horses would be sent him and a battery shipped from New York, upon

the arrival of which he was to join his general at the mouth of the

Sabine."[74] Fortunately for these troops they encountered General

Taylor in New Orleans, though they were obliged to depart without their

ordnance, which did not reach them for two months afterwards, while

their horses were even still longer in attaining their destination.

The war in Texas, and the unsettled state of that country, had prevented

the preparation of an accurate map, or indeed, even of a survey of the

coasts or interior. It was difficult, therefore, to find any one in New

Orleans acquainted with the harbors and rivers of the new State, or who

was willing to incur the responsibility of directing the army's steps.

The topographical bureau at Washington had, with infinite pains and

ingenuity, constructed a map of the country from the scant materials in

its possession; but this chart has since been proved to be almost

entirely useless as a guide.

However, after considerable difficulty, General Taylor procured a pilot

for large wages, who professed a thorough acquaintance with the Texan

waters, and a particular knowledge of his destination at Aransas bay.

This individual was immediately put in charge of one of the transports

loaded with troops, and under his lead, the commander in chief sailed

from New Orleans with three ships and two steamers in search of the port

of his disbarkation. The blundering pilot grounded his vessel among the

breakers where it would inevitably have been wrecked, had it not been

extricated by timely assistance, while the captain of another transport

coasted the low shores of the gulf for several days, in sight of land,

seeking an inlet, and when his ship was at length anchored off St.

Joseph's, he asserted that it was the island of Espiritu Santo.[75]

This bay of Aransas was perhaps one of the most unsuitable for the

disbarkation of troops on the coast of Texas, and was selected in utter

ignorance of the country. Indeed we seem to have committed two great and

often fatal errors in warfare when we contemplated hostilities with

Mexico--first, in despising our foe; and secondly, in failing to inform

ourselves of his country's geography.

Aransas bay lies between the south end of St. Joseph's and the northern

point of Mustang island, quite close to the latter, and almost at right

angles with the coast. It has a narrow but shifting sand bar at its

entrance, upon which the depth of water varies according to the action

of the winds. The bay is about twenty-five miles in length and twelve in

width, but is obstructed by a shoal and a range of islands that traverse

it.[76]

On the third of August our whole army had landed on St. Joseph's island,

about thirty miles from the Rio Nueces, across which it was to pass to

its proposed encampment on Corpus Christi bay, near a smuggling village

known as Kinney's _rancho_. As Corpus Christi and Aransas bays are

connected by a shallow and winding channel, it was at once discovered

that steamers were altogether inadequate for the transportation of

troops from the islets to the mainland; and our forces would have

remained where they disembarked had not a few skiffs of light draft,

together with some sail and row boats, been obtained in the neighborhood

at considerable expense. In these frail vessels a detachment of forty

men, armed only with muskets, crossed the Nueces, and landed on the

stormy coast as pioneers in a country asserted to be Mexican. Had the

authorities of that republic been prepared to resist our landing, a few

field pieces might have presented the alleged invasion, as our general

was unable to protect the disembarkation of his troops by cannon. In

addition to these mistakes, the 2d regiment of dragoons was not

despatched from fort Jesup in time to co-operate with our forces when

they first landed at Corpus Christi; and, as the artillery had not yet

been forwarded from our arsenals, the campaign may be said to have

commenced with _infantry alone_. This was a novelty in military science,

and indicated an ignorance of war, an unpardonable imprudence, or a

conviction that the whole drama was got up only to intimidate an enemy

we despised.

* * * * *

It is impossible to narrate every circumstance of interest that occurred

during the encampment of our forces west of the Nueces, a position taken

by General Taylor with the concurrence of the war department. But a

history of this war would be incomplete were not the position as well as

the condition of our army accurately stated. Our government, relying

probably on the acknowledged feebleness of Mexico, and on the fact that

she had not yet declared war, imagined that the mere presence of

American troops would pacify Texas or prevent hostilities. This was an

unfortunate mistake, especially in the unsettled condition of things;

for in May, 1845, Mr. Donelson, our charge to Texas, had warned the

government to be prepared for an immediate blow upon Mexico, if she

should unfortunately declare war against us, and that declaration might

have been expected at any moment.

The details of the organization of our forces seem, nevertheless, to

have been sadly neglected. Sailing vessels, alone, were relied on to

convey despatches to General Taylor; and, from the wreck of one of them,

a drummer boy, strolling along the beach, on the 15th of August, rescued

a valuable package containing the proclamation of the Mexican government

in which the people were summoned to unite in an army for national

preservation, under the sonorous title of "Defenders of independence and

the laws."[77] The day after this despatch was received, the smugglers

along the coast reported that Arista was rapidly advancing to attack us

with three thousand choice troops. Without artillery to defend the camp,

or dragoons to act as scouts, our general could do nothing but order

entrenchments to be thrown up. Entrenching tools, however, had not been

furnished; and, with only a few old and broken spades the troops labored

briskly, and erected, in a few days, a solid field-work a few yards from

the beach, protected in the rear by the bay. But the battery had not yet

arrived, nor was Gen. Taylor able to obtain from the sloop of war St.

Mary's, which was on the station, any guns of a suitable calibre.

Fortunately, however, he procured three pieces, indifferently equipped,

and a small supply of ammunition, from the citizens of Corpus Christi.

These guns added materially to the strength of our position in case we

were attacked, but were entirely unsuitable for field service.[78]

* * * * *

The proclamation to which we have alluded, and the rumors of vigorous

hostility on the part of Mexico, produced great alarm in the United

States, especially along our southern frontier. In New Orleans,

indignation was openly expressed that our gallant men had been

despatched on this forlorn enterprize without the amplest means of

defence and attack, while our arsenals were filled with all the

munitions of war. A large force of volunteers was, therefore, ordered

out in the south, while two companies of artillery were immediately

despatched to Taylor's succor under the command of Maj. Gally.

The report of Arista's progress, however, proved to be false, so that we

were fortunately saved from attack. Yet the sufferings of our army did

not cease with those military inconveniences. "Two thirds of the tents

furnished our soldiers were worn out or rotten, and had been condemned

by boards of survey appointed by the proper authorities in accordance

with the army regulations. Transparent as gauze, they afforded little or

no protection against the intense heat of summer or the drenching rains

and severe cold of winter. Even the dews penetrated the thin covering

almost without obstruction. Such were the tents provided for campaigners

in a country almost deluged three months in the year, and more variable

in its climate than any other region, passing from the extreme of heat

to that of cold in a few hours. During the whole of November and

December, either the rains were descending with violence, or the furious

"northers" which ravage this coast were breaking the frail tent-poles or

rending the rotten canvas. For days and weeks every article in hundreds

of tents was thoroughly soaked; and during these terrible months, the

sufferings of the sick, in the crowded hospital tents, were

indescribably horrible. Every day added to the frightfulness of the

mortality. At one time a sixth of the entire camp was on the sick list,

and at least one-half unfit for service, in consequence of dysentery and

catarrhal fevers which raged like a pestilence."[79] The camp was

without fires, and, being situated on the edge of a vast prairie

sparsely covered with muskeet trees, was but scantily supplied with wood

even for the most needful purposes. The quarter-master's department

furnished only the weak and stunted _mustangs_ of the country; and the

little and inefficient ponies, geared in the large harness made at the

north for American horses, looked as if they would jump through their

collars instead of use them for traction. With such teams only a

sufficiency of wood could be drawn for cooking, and none for camp fires

to comfort the sick and suffering soldiers. "As winter advanced, the

prairie became a quagmire, the roads almost impassable, and as the

_mustangs_ died in large numbers, wood enough for cooking even, could

not be procured. The encampment now resembled a marsh, the water, at

times, being three or four feet deep in the tents of whole wings of

regiments. All military exercises were suspended, and the bleak gloomy

days were passed in inactivity, disgust and sullenness. The troops,

after being thoroughly drenched all day, without fires to dry them, lay

down at night in wet blankets on the soaked ground, as plank for tent

floors was not furnished by the quarter-masters until the rainy season

was over. At times the men, at tattoo, gasped for breath in the sultry

night air, and, at reveille, found their moist blankets frozen around

them and their tents stiff with ice. A portion of the men were kept

without pay for six months, and the rest for four months, although the

law strictly requires payment every two months.

"Officers and soldiers, destitute of funds, were compelled to borrow,

upon the strength of pay due, of their more fortunate companions, or of

the Shylocks, in search of victims, that polluted the camp. Sick

soldiers, directed by their surgeons to return to the United States, had

either to remain and die, or to submit to exorbitant exactions from

unfeeling villains in their pension certificates and pay accounts,

though the law requires the paymasters to cash them in specie.

"On the first landing of the 3d and 4th infantry at Corpus Christi,

"Kinney's Rancho," though a lawless, smuggling town, under the vigorous

sway of its martial proprietor, was as quiet and peaceful as a village

in New England. But every fresh arrival of troops was followed by some

portion of that vast horde of harpies, that are ever to be found in the

train of all armies, ready to prey upon the simple and unsuspecting

among the soldiers. In a short time, hundreds of temporary structures

were erected on the outskirts of the "Rancho," and in them, all the

cut-throats, thieves, and murderers of the United States and Texas, seem

to have congregated. No sight could have been more truly melancholy than

that of their bloated and sin-marked visages, as they lounged through

the purlieus of this modern Pandemonium. The air, by day, was polluted

with their horrid oaths and imprecations,--and the savage yells,

exulting shouts, and despairing groans of their murderous frays, made

night hideous. But, not content with confining their hellish deeds to

their own worthy fraternity, they laid their worthless hands on the

troops. Many of the soldiers, enticed to their dram-shops, were drugged

with stupefying potions, and then robbed of their hard earnings, or

murdered in cold blood."

General Taylor, looking to the probability of a movement against Mexico,

warned the department that a ponton train was indispensable in a country

wherein streams abounded and wood for bridges was scarce; but it was not

despatched until after the next meeting of congress.

"Six months after the army had taken the field, there were not teams and

wagons enough to transport one half of the troops; so that, in case of

hostilities, had a forward movement been ordered, it could only have

been effected by detachments, and, in consequence, that most fatal of

all military errors would have been committed, of permitting the enemy

to attack and beat in detail. The few teams furnished, it is natural to

think, were the choicest to be found in the west. For, it had been said,

that though the "Army of occupation" was small, the great celerity of

its movements, from the superiority of the American horses, would

contribute, as well as the greater bravery of its men, to make it more

than a match for the largest Mexican force. Ninety yoke of oxen and

several hundred mustangs were therefore bought, but not a single

American horse!

* * * * *

"Three batteries of artillery were added to the one which, at length

reached the company from Charleston. Horses were sent with two of them,

to manoeuvre them rapidly on the field of battle, and to transport

them wherever the army might go. But the third came unprovided with

cavalry.

"When the New Orleans volunteers left Corpus Christi, their artillery

horses were turned over to the company from Charleston. This company,

having always acted as infantry, had never even seen a flying artillery

drill,--half of the men could not ride,--many had never ridden at all,

and, in mounting for the first time, made Mr. Winkle's mistake as to

which stirrup to use. It was certainly an original idea, to convert,

_in a single day_, a company of foot into light artillery. However, as

horses had at length been given to the company from Charleston, it was

the ardent desire of the lieutenant commanding, to teach his men to ride

and drive, and the sabre exercise. This the loyal quarter-masters

resolved to prevent, and, at the same time, to show the world how

economical they were. They, therefore, refused to purchase any more hay

and told the dragoons and light artillery, that they, themselves, must

cut and haul the dry and sapless broom straw of the prairie, and forage

their horses on that."[80]

Such is a picture of the sufferings of our army of occupation, drawn by

an eye-witness, and scarcely colored by the warmth of his feelings. If

the advice of military men, and the opinion of persons whose experience

as campaigners entitled them to respect, had been heeded, this war would

have been speedily ended. Ever since the rumor of annexation in 1843,

but, especially, since the inaugural address of President Polk in 1845,

in which he pronounced so emphatic an opinion as to our right to the

whole of Oregon, our political firmament had been clouded. Prudent men

thought it probable that there would be war with Mexico or hostilities

with England, and that the two sources of irritation, by distracting our

powers, would materially increase each other's virulence.

At this time, General Gaines, a chieftain who has become venerable in

the service of his country, and whose skill and bravery on many a field

have manifested his character in actions that no citizen can ever

forget, commanded on our south-western frontier. The delicate character

of our foreign relations, to which allusion has just been made,

attracted his anxious attention in 1845; and his responsibility as

Chief on a long, exposed frontier, compelled him to give timely warning

to the department. It seemed to this officer, if we engaged hastily in

war with Mexico or England, at such a crisis, and with no preparations

either for an army or its instruction, that the conflict would be

disastrous or procrastinated, especially as the latter power had so far

surpassed us in applying steam to naval purposes. Long years of peace

had rendered us indifferent to war; and unvarying success in other

conflicts had made us confident. Accordingly, he recommended the

concentration of a large force of volunteers on the borders of the

probable theatre of war, where they should be trained in military

science, together with the regulars commanded by General Taylor, until

the spring of 1846. If war could not be averted before that period, we

might then be able to march against the enemy with a powerful and

disciplined army. He contended that the true policy of our country, in

such an assault, was to pursue with relentless energy the military

bandits who swayed the destinies of Mexico, whilst, on all sides, we

protected the persons and property of non-combatants; so that in pushing

onward to the capital we would leave throughout the country traversed an

indelible impression of our justice. Thus the confidence of the best

portions of Mexico would be secured, the _prestige_ of her army promptly

destroyed, and peace obtained before she was able to rally. On the other

hand, General Gaines believed that if we began war without large and

instructed forces, we might count on a protracted struggle, as in the

Seminole campaigns from 1836 to 1842. The precipices upon the doubtful

verge of whose summits we tottered during the war, prove the wisdom of

these suggestions. The faithful page of history admonishes that nations

as well as individuals who recklessly disregard the essential maxims

that prescribe their prudent duties, must sooner or later pay the

penalty of neglect. But politicians, uneducated even in the pleasant

discipline of militia trainings, do not view matters in the same light

as military men whose knowledge of detail, and of the responsibilities

of real service, make them unwilling to engage in war, or even to

threaten hostilities, without the amplest preparation to perform all

they promise. Without such true and earnest discipline warlike array is

but a military cheat.

It is vain to predict what might have been the result had the advice of

the gallant and prudent Gaines been adopted; yet it cannot be doubted

that a well equipped body of twenty-five or thirty thousand men would

have marched to the city of Mexico and dictated peace at the cost of one

fourth the blood and treasure that were subsequently expended. A

lingering policy of hesitation together with the acknowledged

inefficiency of Mexico, may palliate the errors of our cabinet; but wise

politicians will not henceforth fail to be impressed with the necessity

of military preparation which this conflict has taught us.

A war which was originally supposed to be one exclusively of defence,

was suddenly changed to an aggressive conflict, and is, perhaps, an

additional excuse for our unpreparedness. Most of the events in this

narrative derive peculiar interest from the fact that it is the first

and only offensive war into which we have been forced. With every known

principle of defence we had been long acquainted; for, in the school of

Washington, we acquired a sound, practical knowledge, which subsequent

experience, under the most perfect system of self-government, enabled us

to improve. But it is to be hoped that many years will elapse before our

volunteers will be again called from their peaceful duties to take part

in an aggressive war, and especially against a government whose theory

of rule is the same as our own.

NOTE.--General Gaines, who commanded the western division,

was censured by the War department for having made a

requisition on the governor of Louisiana for State troops

to be sent to the army in Texas under Taylor's command, at

the moment of apprehended danger described in this chapter.

General Taylor, for more than a year previous to September,

1845, commanded one of the brigades of Gaines's division,

and the latter never knew _by authority_ that the former had

been disconnected from him, except upon temporary service,

until advised by the secretary of war on the 13th of

September. He never received a copy of the authority given

to Taylor to go to Texas until after the date of his

requisition for Louisiana volunteers, on the 15th of August,

1845; consequently he _then_ considered himself responsible

for the strength and support of one of his own brigades, and

bound to succor it speedily when he believed it to be in

imminent danger.--See Senate doc. No. 378, for his

correspondence, and especially p. 48.

FOOTNOTES:

[70] Almonte's report. Kennedy's Texas, chap. 1.

[71] Senate doc. 341, 28th cong. 1st sess. p. 56.

[72] Kennedy's Texas, chap. 1.

[73] Senate doc. No. 341, 28th cong. 1st sess. p. 76.

[74] An account of the army of observation and occupation, written by

one of its officers, in the Southern Quarterly Review for April, 1846.

[75] S. Q. Review, _ut antea_, p. 442. (April, 1846.)

[76] Kennedy's Texas, chap. 2d.

[77] Niles' Reg. vol. 68, p. 305.

[78] S. Q. Rev. _ut antea_. Senate doc. No. 337, 29th cong. 1st sess. p.

93.

[79] S. Q. Rev. _ut antea_.

[80] Southern Quarterly Review, _ut antea_. These statements are made by

an able and distinguished officer of our army, who was on the field, and

is perfectly versed in all the matters he discusses.