In the campaign of 1697, Prince Eugene caused the courier to be
intercepted, who was bringing him orders from the emperor forbidding
him to hazard a battle, for which everything had been prepared, and
which he foresaw would prove decisive. He considered, therefore,
that he did his duty in evading the orders of his sovereign; and the
victory of Zanta, in which the Turks lost about thirty thousand men,
and four thousand prisoners, rewarded his audacity. In the meantime,
notwithstanding the immense advantages which accrued from this victory
to the imperial arms, Eugene was disgraced on his arrival at Vienna.
In 1793, General Hoche, having received orders to move upon Treves with
an army harassed by constant marches in a mountainous and difficult
country, refused to obey. He observed, with reason, that in order to
obtain possession of an unimportant fortress, they were exposing his
army to inevitable ruin. He caused, therefore, his troops to return
into winter quarters, and preferred the preservation of his army, upon
which the success of the future campaign depended, to his own safety.
Recalled to Paris, he was thrown into a dungeon, which he only quitted
on the downfall of Robespierre.
I dare not decide if such examples are to be imitated; but it seems to
me highly desirable that a question so new and so important, should be
discussed by men who are capable of determining its merits.