CHAPTER VII.

The Measures of Relief for 1846-7--Difficulties--Shortcomings of the

Government--Vigorous action of other countries--Commissary General

Routh's Letter on the state of the depôts--Replies from the

Treasury--Delay--Incredulity of Government--English Press--Attacks

both on the Landlords and People of Ireland--Not the time for such

attacks--View of the _Morning Chronicle_--Talk about

exaggeration--Lieutenant-Colonel Jones--Changes his opinion--His

reason for doing so--Mr. Secretary Redington's ideas--Extraordinary

Baronial Presentments--Presentments for the County Mayo beyond the

whole rental of the county!--The reason why--Unfinished Public

Works--Lord Monteagle--Finds fault with the action of the

Government, although a supporter of theirs--Expenses divided between

landlord and tenant--Discontent at rate of wages on public works

being 2d. per day under the average wages of the district--Founded

on error--Taskwork--Great dissatisfaction at

it--Combination--Attempt on the Life of Mr. W.M. Hennessy--True way

to manage the people (_Note_)--Stoppage of Works--Captain

Wynne--Dreadful destitution--Christmas eve--Opposition to Taskwork

continues--Causes--Treasury Minute on the subject--Colonel Jones on

Committees--Insulting his officers--Insult to Mr. Cornelius O'Brien,

M.P.--Captain Wynne at Ennistymon--A real Irish Committee--Major

M'Namara--His version of the Ennistymon affair (_Note_)--Charges

against the Gentry of Clare by Captain Wynne--Mr. Millet on

Ennistymon--Selling Tickets for the Public Works--Feeling of the

Officials founded often on ignorance and prejudice--The Increase of

Deposits in the Savings Banks a Proof of Irish Prosperity--How

explained by Mr. Twistleton, an official--Scarcity of silver--The

Bank of Ireland authorized to issue it--The Public Works of 1845-6

brought to a close in August, 1846--The Labour-rate Act--Difficulty

of getting good Officials--The Baronies--Issues to

them--Loans--Grants--Total--Sudden and enormous Increase of

Labourers on the Works under the Labour-rate Act--How distributed

over the Provinces--Number of Officials superintending the Public

Works--Correspondence--Number of Letters received at Central

Office--Progress of the Famine--Number employed--Number seeking

employment who could not get it--The Death-roll.

To have met the Potato Famine with anything like complete success, would

have been a Herculean task for any government. The total failure of the

food of a nation was, as Mr. Monsell said, a fact new in history; such

being the case, no machinery existed extensive enough to neutralize its

effects, nor was there extant any plan upon which such machinery could

be modelled. Great allowance must be therefore made for the shortcomings

of the Government, in a crisis so new and so terrible; but after making

the most liberal concessions on this head, it must be admitted that Lord

John Russell and his colleagues were painfully unequal to the situation.

They either could not or would not use all the appliances within their

reach, to save the Irish people. Besides the mistakes they made as to

the nature of the employment which ought to be given, a chief fault of

their's was that they did not take time by the forelock--that they did

not act with promptness and decision. Other nations, where famine was

far less imminent, were in the markets, and had to a great extent made

their purchases before our Government, causing food to be scarcer and

dearer for us than it needed to be. Thus writes Commissary-General Routh

to the Treasury on the 19th of September:--"I now revert to the most

important of our considerations, the state of our depôts. We have no

arrivals yet announced, either at Westport or Sligo, and the remains

there must be nothing, or next to nothing. The bills of lading from Mr.

Erichsen are all for small quantities, which will be distributed, and

perhaps eaten, in twelve or twenty-four hours after their arrival. It

would require a thousand tons to make an impression, and that only a

temporary one. Our salvation of the depôt system is in the importation

of a large supply. These small shipments are only drops in the ocean."

The Treasury replies in this fashion, on the 22nd, to Sir R. Routh's

strong appeal:--"With reference to the remarks in your letter of the

19th instant, as to the insufficiency of the supplies for your depôts,

the fact is that we have already bought up and sent to Ireland all the

Indian corn which is immediately available; and the London and

Liverpool markets are at present so completely bare of this article,

that we have been obliged to have recourse to the plan of purchasing

supplies of Indian corn which had been already exported from London to

neighbouring Continental ports."[139] And again, on the 29th of the same

month, Mr. Trevelyan thus explains the difficulties the Treasury

laboured under in endeavouring to purchase the supplies for which the

Commissary-General had been so emphatically calling:--"It is little

known what a formidable competition we are suffering from our

Continental neighbours. Very large orders are believed to have been sent

out to the United States, not only by the merchants, but by the

Governments of France and Belgium, and in the Mediterranean markets they

have secured more than their share; all which will appear perfectly

credible, when it is remembered that they are buying our new English

wheat in our own market."[140]

Here at home, the fatal error of awaiting events, instead of

anticipating them, and by forethought endeavouring to control and guide

them, was equally pernicious. The most considerable persons in the

kingdom--peers, members of Parliament, deputy lieutenants, magistrates

without number--pronounced the potato crop of 1846 to be hopelessly gone

early in August. But although several members of the Government

expressed their belief in this, and spoke about it with great alarm,

they seem not to have given it full credence, until it was too late to

take anticipatory measures; in short, they regarded it, like everything

Irish, as greatly exaggerated. The most influential portion of the

English newspaper press supported and encouraged this view, making, at

the same time, fierce attacks on Irish landlords for not meeting the

calamity as they ought, and as they were bound in duty and conscience

to do. Equally bitter and insolent was their tone towards the Irish

people, accusing them of many inherent vices--denouncing their

ignorance, their laziness, their want of self-reliance. Whatever of

truth or falsehood may have been in those charges, it was not the time

to put them forward. Famine was at the door of the Irish nation, and its

progress was not to be stayed by invectives against our failings, or by

moral lectures upon the improvement of our habits. Food, food was the

single and essential requisite; let us have it at once, or we die;

lecture us afterwards as much as you please. But there was something to

be said on the other side about our habits and failings; and a liberal

English journalist, taking up the subject, turned their own artillery

upon his countrymen, telling them that those vices, of which they

accused the Irish people, were not an essential part of Celtic nature.

Has not the Irish Celt, he asks, achieved distinguished success in every

country of Europe but his own? The state in which he is to be found in

Ireland to-day must be, therefore, accounted for on some other theory

than the inherent good-for-nothingness of his nature. "The sluggish,

well-meaning mind of the English nation," he continues, "so willing to

do its duty, so slow to discover that it has any duty to do, is now

perforce rousing to ask itself the question, after five centuries of

English domination over Ireland, how many millions it is inclined to

pay, not in order to save the social system which has grown up under its

fostering care, but to help that precious child of its parental nurture

to die easy? Any further prolongation of existence for that system no

one now seems to predict, and hardly any one longer ventures to

insinuate that it deserves."

"This is something gained. The state of Ireland--not the present state

merely, but the habitual state--is hitherto the most unqualified

instance of signal failure which the practical genius of the English

people has exhibited. We have had the Irish all to ourselves for five

hundred years. No one has shared with us the privilege of governing

them, nor the responsibilities consequent on that privilege. No one has

exercised the smallest authority over them save by our permission. They

have been as completely delivered into our hands as children into those

of their parents and instructors. No one has ever had the power to

thwart our wise and benevolent purposes; and now, at the expiration of

nearly one-third of the time which has elapsed since the Christian era,

the country contains eight millions, on their own showing, of persecuted

innocents, whom it is the sole occupation of every English mind to

injure and disparage; on ours (if some of our loudest spokesmen are to

be taken as our representatives) of lazy, lawless savages, whose want of

industry and energy keeps them ever on the verge of starvation; whose

want of respect for life and property makes it unsafe for civilized

beings to dwell among them. England unanimously repudiates the first

theory; but is the other much less disgraceful to us? An independent

nation is, in all essentials, what it has made itself by its own

efforts; but a nation conquered, and held in subjugation ever since it

had a history, is what its conquerors have made it, or have caused it to

become. Yet this reflection does not seem to inspire Englishmen

generally with any feeling of shame. The evils of Ireland sit as lightly

on the English conscience as if England had done all which the most

enlightened and disinterested benevolence could suggest for governing

the Irish well, and for civilizing and improving them. What has ever yet

been done, or seriously attempted, for either purpose, except latterly,

by taking off some of the loads which we ourselves have laid on, history

will be at a loss to determine."[141]

Some of the officers connected with the relief works expressed their

opinion, that the failure of the potato crop and the deficiency of food

in the country were both exaggerated. They threw doubts on the veracity

of those with whom they conversed, and warned the Government to be

cautious about believing, to the full, the statements made by

individuals, committees, or newspapers. Sir Randolph Routh, the head of

the Commissariat Department, in a letter to Mr. Trevelyan, the

Assistant-Secretary to the Treasury, says: "In the midst of much real,

there is more fictitious distress; and so much abuse prevails, that if

you check it in one channel, it presents itself in another."[142] Again,

Assistant Commissary-General Milliken, writing to Sir R. Routh from

Galway, informs him that he met a considerable number of carts loaded

with meal and other supplies; and there did not, he said, appear that

extreme want and destitution that he had expected.[143] More than any

other did Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, Chairman of the Board of Works, keep

the idea of exaggerated and fictitious distress before the mind of the

Treasury, although he began his communications in a far different

spirit. Writing on the 1st of September to Mr. Trevelyan, he says: "The

prospects for the ensuing season are melancholy to reflect upon; the

potato crop may now be fairly considered as past; either from disease,

or from the circumstance of the produce being small, it has been

consumed; many families are now living upon food scarcely fit for hogs."

And again: "I am very much afraid that Government will not find _free

trade_, with all the employment we can give, a succedaneum for the loss

of the potato." Doubtless Colonel Jones soon discovered such views as

these to be distasteful to his superiors; so, like a prudent servant, he

puts them aside, and in his after communications adopts the very

opposite tone. He writes to Mr. Under-Secretary Redington[144] on the

13th of October, from Athlone, this piece of information, intended, he

says, for his Excellency: "On the 11th instant I posted from Dublin to

Banagher. Along the entire line of road I observed the farmyards well

stocked with corn, the crop of the past harvest, unthreshed"--thus

assuming that the four millions of people who lived almost exclusively

on potatoes had such things as farmyards and corn to put in them. In the

same month he writes again to Mr. Trevelyan, that he hears from more

quarters than one that the early potatoes, which were left in the

ground, now prove to be sound. Although small in size, he says, still

from one-third to one-half may be considered available for food. "On my

way here from Athlone," he again writes, "I went into a field where a

man was digging potatoes. The crop looked good, and he told me that it

was an early crop, and that he considered that about half were sound;

and I therefore hope that there is much more food of that description

than the general outcry about famine would lead strangers to suppose."

At the end of December he reports to the Treasury a conversation he had

had with an assistant-engineer from Roscommon, who told him his belief

was, that there were much more provisions in the country than was

generally supposed. He had every day, he said, good potatoes at eight

shillings a cwt. When the disease appeared, the people who held conacres

threw them up, and the potatoes remained undug. Those that were sound

continued so up to the late frost; and the people had, by degrees, been

taking them up. This engineer expected a considerable quantity,

serviceable for food, would be found during the ploughing of the land in

spring.

But the wail of starving millions reached the Lord Lieutenant from

every side, and, in compliance with it, he authorized the "Extraordinary

Baronial Presentment Sessions" to be held. At those sessions the tone of

the speakers was, on the whole, kind and liberal; acknowledging the

universality of the failure of the potato crop, and the necessity of

making immediate provision against its consequences. Sometimes the

presentments for the public works were very large--far beyond the entire

rental of the barony; yet they may not have been too great to meet the

starvation which the assembled ratepayers saw everywhere around them. At

Berehaven, in the County Cork, a place certainly fearfully tried by the

Famine, the presentments at the sessions--at the very first sessions

held in the barony--were said to be quadruple the rental of the entire

barony! This, however, was only one district of the largest Irish

county; but the presentments for the whole County of Mayo, the most

famine-stricken, to be sure, of all the counties, are worth remembering;

and so is their explanation. They were forwarded to the Board of Works

by the County Surveyor. The number of square miles in the county are

given at 2,132, the rent value being £385,100. The County Surveyor

recommended to the Sessions presentments amounting in the aggregate to

£228,000, nearly two-thirds of the entire rental. The Baronial Sessions,

however, were far from resting contented with this. The ratepayers and

magistrates assembled in their various baronies, presented for works to

the amount of £388,000, nearly £3,000 in excess of the entire rental of

the county; but which was finally cut down by the Board of Works to

£128,456 8s. 4d. Prudent people and political economists will at once be

inclined to exclaim, "Very right; it was most fortunate to have an

authority to check such recklessness." But, softly; let there be no

hasty conclusions. Hear the end. The County Surveyor gives the

population of Mayo at 56,209 families, _of whom 46,316 families_, he

says, _were to be employed on the relief works!_ Taking those families

at the common average of five and a-half individuals to each, the total

number would be 254,738 persons. The presentments allowed would thus

give about ten shillings' worth, of employment for each individual, with

nine or ten foodless months before them. The conclusion is inevitable;

the presentments allowed were utterly inadequate to meet the Famine in

Mayo, the fearful consequences of which we shall learn as we

proceed.[145]

Many of the speakers at the Presentment Sessions charged the Government

with a breach of faith, in not finishing the works which were

prematurely closed on the 15th of August, 1846. Those works were

commenced under the law passed by Sir Robert Peel's Government, whereby

the baronies, or, in other words, the ratepayers, paid _one-half the

expense_, and the Government the other; so that even if Lord John

Russell's Government took them up anew, under the Labour-rate Act, _the

whole expense_ should, according to the terms of that Act, fall upon the

baronies. This was looked upon as a grievance, and at the Glenquin

Sessions, in the county Limerick, Lord Monteagle, a friend and supporter

of the Administration, put the grievance in the shape of a resolution,

which was unanimously adopted. In moving the resolution, his lordship

said: "We claim that we have a right to ask from the Government one-half

of the expenses incurred by the completion of these works, on the terms

and conditions upon which we entered into the engagement. The Government

are bound to do this in point of justice." The resolution was: "That

whilst we express our full approval of these works, yet the magistrates

and ratepayers feel that it is also their duty to express their strong

and unanimous opinion, that the just construction of the arrangement

between this barony and the Government for the completion of such works

as have been commenced under the Act 9 Vic. c. 1, requires an adherence

to the terms of that contract."

Some, whilst finding fault with the illiberality of the Government,

still expressed their satisfaction at the expenses under the new Act

being equally divided between landlord and tenant; a proper

responsibility being thus placed upon landlords, which was not the case

under the former Act. Very general discontent was manifested at the rule

by which the rate of wages on the public works was to be twopence a day

under the average wages of the district in which the works were being

carried on. Wages ruled so excessively low at the time, it was felt

that, with rapidly advancing markets, the labourer on the works could

not get food sufficient for his family. The object of this rule,

however, was obvious and well meant enough; it was framed to induce

agricultural labourers to remain at their usual employments, in order

that the crops might be sown. Had the Government been well informed of

the relations subsisting between farmer and labourer in Ireland, they

would have known that this arrangement could not have the desired

effect, _money-wages regularly paid_ being almost a thing unknown to our

agricultural population at the time; whilst the Famine made money-wages,

regularly paid, the first essential of existence.[146]

When the Government began to insist on task, or piecework, instead of

day labour, the greatest amount of dissatisfaction that occurred during

the entire Famine manifested itself. The engineers of the Board of Works

reported over and over again, that an industrious man, willing to

labour, could earn from fifteen to eighteen pence a-day under this

arrangement, yet the people rose in combination--almost in

rebellion--against it, whilst daily wages ranged from eight to tenpence

only. They assaulted overseers; refused to work for them; threatened

their lives, and in one instance at least, attempted the life of a

Government functionary. At the village of Clare, in the county of that

name, some short distance south of Ennis, the capital, this

insubordination seems to have become rather formidable, as a murderous

outrage was committed there on the head steward of the works, Mr. W.

Hennessy, half-way between Clare and Ennis. He was fired upon by one of

four men whom he observed inside the road ditch, as he passed along. The

weapon used was a blunderbuss. It was charged with some of the blasting

powder belonging to the works, and duck shot; so that although Mr.

Hennessy received the contents in his right side, he was not mortally

wounded, and recovered in a little time. Captain Wynne, the local

inspector, giving an account of this outrage to his Board, says, the

cause of the outrage was because Mr. Hennessy was trying to get the men

into proper training. Quite likely. But it must be taken into account,

that a duty of that kind might be done in such a way as neither to

offend the men, nor lose their respect or esteem; and it might be done

in an offensive insolent manner, calculated to exasperate them,

especially as they were in a state of excitement at the period.[147]

Captain Wynne further says, that the perpetrator of the outrage was

known, but could not be brought to justice. The Board of Works, to mark

its indignation at this murderous attack upon one of its servants,

stopped the works in the locality, and the inhabitants, miserably off

before, sank into a state of the most heartrending destitution, as is

testified by Captain Wynne, writing from the same place a fortnight or

three weeks after, to Colonel Jones.[148] "I must again," he says, "call

your attention to the appalling state in which Clare Abbey is at

present. I ventured through that parish this day, to ascertain the

condition of the inhabitants, and although a man not easily moved, I

confess myself unmanned by the extent and intensity of suffering I

witnessed, more especially among the women and little children, crowds

of whom were to be seen scattered over the turnip fields, like a flock

of famishing crows, devouring the raw turnips, and mostly half naked,

shivering in the snow and sleet, uttering exclamations of despair,

whilst their children were screaming with hunger. I am a match for

anything else I may meet with here, but this I cannot stand. When may we

expect to resume the works?" This letter does much credit to the feeling

and manly heart of Captain Wynne. He says the wretched beings were

devouring the raw turnips they found in the fields, but surely very

little such was to be found among the snowdrifts in the last days of

December, for, sad to say, his letter was written on Christmas Eve! Such

a Christmas for the people of Clare Abbey, and of a thousand places

besides!

Beyond doubt, the Government, and those under them, had enormous

difficulties to contend against. Every new scheme, or modification of a

scheme, proposed by them had its inconveniences. Inspectors, engineers,

and overseers appeared to regard the opposition to task work as the

dislike of the lazy Celt to labour for his daily bread, and to his wish

to get the "Queen's pay," as the wages on the works were termed, without

doing anything for it. Hence they were of opinion almost from the

outset, that the sooner the system of task work was enforced the better,

as the people, they said, seemed to be generally under the impression

that no work was really required from them. This was a very wrong and

demoralizing notion, if it were entertained to any considerable extent.

Very probably it had a percentage of truth in it, but no more. Worthless

idlers, in no very urgent distress, must from the nature of things, have

got employed upon works so extensive, but the officials were too fond of

founding general conclusions on isolated, or at least on an insufficient

number of cases. The opposition to task work arose from more than one

cause. Lazy unprincipled people were opposed to it, because they were

lazy and unprincipled; a far larger class were opposed to it, because it

was no secret that the works were carried on not for sake of their

utility, but to keep the people from being idle. Had this class been

employed upon really useful works, such as reclaiming land, tilling the

soil, draining, subsoiling, or railroad-making, they would, no doubt,

have had more heart for their daily labour. There is a natural

repugnance in the mind of a man to apply himself in earnest to what he

has been told is useless,--to what he sees and feels to be useless. If a

labourer were hired, and even given good wages, for casting chaff

against the wind, I make bold to say, he would soon resign his

employment, from sheer inability to work at anything so much opposed to

his common sense. A third and a very large class of the labouring

population were opposed to task work, because they were able to earn so

very little at it. "Those who choose to labour may earn good wages,"

writes Colonel Jones to Mr. Trevelyan; but he forgot, or was ignorant of

the fact, that great numbers of the working class had been already so

weakened and debilitated by starvation, that they were unable to do what

the overseers regarded as a day's work; and it is on record that task

work frequently brought industrious willing workmen less money than they

would have received under the day's-work system.[149]

At the end of October a Treasury Minute was published to the effect that

such prices were to be allowed for Relief Works, executed by task, as

would enable good labourers to earn from one shilling to one shilling

and sixpence a day; the day's work system, at the wages fixed by the

Treasury Minute of the 31st of August, was to be in future confined to

those who were unable or unwilling to work by task. There was some

concession in this. Under it the labourer could choose piece work or

day's work as seemed more advantageous to himself. The spirit, at least,

of the August Treasury Minute was, that all should work by task. "The

persons employed on the Relief Works," says that Minute, "should, to the

utmost possible extent, be paid in proportion to the work actually done

by them." In a few instances task work was reported to have given

satisfaction, but in the great majority of cases it was resisted by the

labourers, and it sometimes resulted in serious disturbances, as we have

seen. The local Committees, who had much to do with preparing the lists

of those whose circumstances made them proper objects for the public

works, were repeatedly complained of by the Government officials.

Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, who appears to have been more severe and

distrustful than his subordinates, accuses Committees of insulting his

officers, producing improper lists, and even of balloting amongst

themselves for the persons who were to be put upon the works.

With regard to the first accusation there was generally a counter-charge

from the Committees, accusing the Board's officers of being insulting

and overbearing to them. One of the most noteworthy cases of this kind

occurred at Ennistymon. Captain Wynne, the Board of Works' inspector,

writes a long complaint about the treatment he had received from the

members of the Committee there; it being, amongst other things, he says,

proposed that he should be kicked out of the Court-house, where the

Committee was assembled. The well-disposed few, he writes, advised him

to stay at Ennistymon for the night, or to take an escort of police with

him, should he persevere in his intention of returning to Ennis; "but,"

he continues, "with my double gun, a rifle, and three cases of pistols,

Mr. Gamble, myself, and Mr. Russell returned home. Mr. Russell was very

anxious to see a Clare Relief Committee. He was indeed astonished. He

said he would not have supposed matters were so bad."[150] There is a

fine dash of the sensational in this. Mr. Russell's anxiety was very

laudable, being evidently akin to that thirst for information which

excites travellers like Captain Cook or Dr. Livingstone to seek an

assembly or encampment of "natives" in some previously unexplored

region; but there happened to be members of the Ennistymon Relief

Committee in every respect the equals, and in some the superiors of

Captain Wynne and Mr. Russell. Major M'Namara, one of the members for

the county, thus gives his version of the affair to the Chief Secretary,

Mr. Labouchere: "I feel it to be my duty towards myself and the

constituency of this county, to state to you, as the organ of the

Government, that I was present on Thursday at Ennistymon, when Mr.

Wynne, an inspecting officer of the Board of Works, gave my colleague,

Mr. O'Brien, in the presence of several magistrates and gentlemen

assembled at the Ennistymon Relief Committee, the most unprovoked

insult, by stating that he treated what Mr. O'Brien said with utter

contempt, although Mr. O'Brien merely observed that certain letters

containing what we all believed to be unfounded charges against the

Liscannor Committee, afforded evidence of a vile conspiracy." Captain

Wynne being called on by the authorities for an explanation, charged the

gentry of Clare with putting their servants and dependants on the lists

for public works without being proper objects for them, and that they

were indignant with him because he took such persons off in great

numbers. He did not, however, deny the insult Major M'Namara had charged

him with giving his brother representative for the county, Mr. Cornelius

O'Brien.[151]

As to the complaint made by Colonel Jones about the preparation of the

lists, there does not seem to be much in it. Men of influence would

naturally try to get their own people on the works in preference to

others, but the efforts of such parties would be calculated to

neutralize each other. The balloting for the lists is explainable on

very legitimate grounds. Great as the extent of the Relief Works

undoubtedly was, these works were lamentably short of the wants of the

time. Let us suppose that five hundred men in a district were, every

one, urgent cases for the Relief Works, and let us suppose employment

could not be given to them all, a very common occurrence indeed, what

more natural--what more just than to select by ballot those who were to

be recommended? It is hard to see what else could be done, unless the

system of influence and favoritism against which Colonel Jones

complained, were adopted. The ballot, in short, would seem in many

instances the only means of defeating that system. It might be said that

five hundred equally pressing cases could not be found in the same

district. Very true. But what was unfortunately found in many districts

was, twice--thrice as many cases as there was employment for, the least

urgent of which might be well pronounced very urgent. Such, for

instance, was the fact in the whole county of Mayo.

After Skibbereen, Bantry, and Skull, there was scarcely any place in the

South so famine-stricken as Ennistymon. The gentry of the place knew the

real wants of the population, and pressed them on the Government

officials; while they, on the other hand, in obedience to orders, felt

bound to keep the labour lists as low as possible. To have reduced those

lists always served an inspector at head-quarters. In such cases it is

no wonder that unpleasant differences sometimes arose between Committees

and inspectors. That Ennistymon was sorely tried appears from many

communications to the Board of Works. A very short time after Captain

Wynne's unpleasant quarrel with the Committee there, I find Mr. Millet,

the officer, I suppose, who succeeded him, writing to the Board from

that town, that he was besieged in his house by men trying to compel him

to put them on the works, on which account he could not get out until

half-past four o'clock in the evening. "Some of the men make a list," he

writes, "and get it sent by the Committee whether men are wanting or

not. The people think this is sufficient authority."[152] From this it

seems clear that the works at Ennistymon were quite insufficient for the

number of the destitute. The starving people wanted to get employment,

_whether men were wanting or not_. What a complaint! Good Mr. Millet,

the question with the people was not whether you required workmen or

not, but it was, that they and their families were in the throes of

death from want of food, and they saw no other way of getting it but by

being employed on those works. Besides, your masters began by stating

that the Public Works were not undertaken on account of their necessity

or utility, but for the purpose of rescuing the people from famine, by

giving them employment.[153]

The inspectors and the local Committees had such frequent differences,

that the Board had it under serious consideration to dispense with those

Committees altogether. This idea was abandoned, but the important

privilege of issuing tickets for the Works was taken away from the

Committees, by an order of the Board, bearing date the 9th of December.

Besides the various other complaints forwarded to Dublin of the way in

which tickets were issued by the Committees, one officer writes that he

finds they had become a "saleable commodity" in the hands of the

labourers. A man, he says, obtains a ticket, disposes of it for what he

can get, and goes back for another, feeling sure that amongst the

numberless applicants he would not be recognized as having been given

one before. This practice, which was not and could not be carried on to

any great extent, was but another proof that the works were insufficient

to meet the demand for employment. Instead of the issue of tickets by

Committees it was ruled by the Board, that the inspecting officer should

furnish to the check clerk, for the engineer, a list of the men to be

employed on any particular work.[154]

As before remarked, an undercurrent of feeling pervaded the minds of

officials that there was not at all so much real distress in Ireland as

the people pretended, and that there was a great deal more food in the

country than there was said to be. This was sometimes openly asserted,

but more frequently hinted at and insinuated in communications to the

Board of Works and the Treasury. It was founded partly on prejudice, and

partly on ignorance of the real state of affairs, which was far worse

than the most anxious friends of the people asserted, as the event,

unfortunately, too truly proved. That there was some deception and much

idleness, in connection with the public works, cannot be doubted for a

moment; such works being on a gigantic and ever increasing scale,

effective supervision was impossible. The mistake of many of the

officials, although not of all, was, that they regarded such exceptional

things as an index to the general state of the country, built theories

upon them, and sent those theories up to their superiors, which helped

to make them close-handed and suspicious. Those officials did not, and,

in many cases, could not sound the depths of misery into which the

country had sunk; the people were dying of sheer starvation around them,

whilst they were writing reports accusing them of exaggeration and

idleness. What the Rev. Jeremiah Sheahan of Clenlure, in the County

Cork, said of his parishioners was equally true in hundreds of other

cases: "The most peaceable have died of want in their cabins. More than

twelve have done so in the last six days."[155]

One of the proofs brought forward that the Irish people were not so

badly off as they pretended--in fact that in many instances they were

concealing their wealth, was, _the increase of deposits in the Savings

Banks_. At a superficial glance there would appear to be much truth in

this conclusion; but we must remember that the millions whom the potato

blight left foodless, never, in the best of times, had anything to put

in Savings' Banks. They planted their acre or half acre of potatoes,

paid for it by their labour; they had thus raised a bare sufficiency of

food; and so their year's operations began and ended. An official of the

Irish Poor Law Board, Mr. Twistleton, gave a more elaborate and detailed

answer to the Savings' Banks argument. Writing to the Home Secretary,

Sir George Grey, under date of the 26th of December, he calls his

attention to leaders in the _Times_ and _Morning Chronicle_ on the

subject. One of those articles is remarkable, he says, since it "seemed

to treat the increase in the deposits as a proof of _successful

swindling on the part of the Irish people_, during the present year." So

far from this being true, an increase, in Mr. Twistleton's opinion,

might show "severe distress," inasmuch as when times begin to grow hard,

deposits would increase for the following reasons:

1. People in employment, who were thoughtless before and did not

deposit, would begin to be depositors in bad times.

2. People in employment, who were depositors before, would increase

their deposits.

3. Thrifty people, who would at other times have gone into little

speculations, would now be afraid to do so, and they would become

depositors instead.

4. Persons of a higher class, say employers, in such times cease to be

employers and become depositors.

An increase of deposits, Mr. Twistleton admits, may arise from

prosperity; he only wishes to show that such increase is not always a

certain sign of it. We know too well now, that the increase of deposits

in some of our Savings' Banks during the Famine, was no sign whatever of

prosperity; yet the _journals_ named above, at once built upon the fact

a theory most damaging to the existing destitution of our people, and

most injurious to their moral character; basing this theory on one of

those general principles of political economy, which often admits of

grave exceptions, and sometimes breaks down utterly, when put to the

test of practical experience.

Amongst the minor difficulties with which the Board of Works had to

contend, were scarcity of silver, and the impossibility of having

suitable tools manufactured in sufficient quantity. Gold and bank notes

were of little or no use on pay day,--and where works were opened in

wild out-of-the-way places, there was no opportunity of exchanging them

for silver coin. Representations on this head having been made by the

Inspectors, the "Comet," a government vessel, was sent to deliver as

much silver as was required, to the various banks in the towns round the

coast of Ireland; but this system was not long persevered in. Towards

the end of October, Mr. Secretary Trevelyan announced that the Treasury

would return to the ordinary mode of supply. The Bank of England, he

informed the Board, is the appointed distributor of silver coin, which

is supplied to it for that purpose by the Treasury; but as there might

be some inconvenience in sending to England, the Board of Works are to

apply to the Bank of Ireland, which is authorized to give silver coin

when they have it, and when it is not in their own vaults, they will

procure it for the Board from the Bank of England.[156] In this manner

the want was met, but there is very little in the official

correspondence about the channels through which it reached the various

parts of the country where it was required; secrecy on the subject

being, no doubt, thought necessary to avoid danger.

The public works projected and carried on by the Government to meet the

distress of 1845-6 were brought to a close on the 15th of August of the

latter year. The Treasury Minute, empowering the Board to begin anew

public works in Ireland under the provisions of the Labour-rate Act, was

published on the 31st of the same month; so that the officials whom the

Board had added to their ordinary staff, when entrusted with the

management of the previous public works, were, we may assume, still in

their hands, when they received their new commission from the Treasury.

Although numerous, they were miserably insufficient for the vast and

terrible campaign now before them. Indeed, throughout those trying and

marvellous times, a full supply of efficient officers the Board was

never able to secure; the pressure was so great, the undertakings so

numerous and extensive, that this is by no means matter for surprise. A

few figures selected from their accounts and reports, will serve to show

the sudden and extraordinary expansion of their operations.

The baronies to which loans had been issued up to the 31st of December,

1846, under the Labour-rate Act, numbered _three hundred and

twenty-two_, and the total sum issued up to the same time was £999,661

4s. 2d.--a million of money, in round numbers. Besides this, many of

those baronies (but not all) had obtained loans under previous Acts;

whilst baronies, which had as yet made no application for loans under

the Labour-rate Act, were also indebted to Government for money borrowed

under previous Acts. The number of baronies which had taken out loans

under the Acts of 1 Vic., cap. 21, and 9 and 10 Vic., cap. 124, was four

hundred and twenty-four. The account between the baronies and the

Government stood thus on the 31st of December, 1846:

Loans to baronies under Acts passed previous

to the Labour-rate Act ... £186,060 1 5

Grants ... 229,464 8 0

Loans to baronies under the Labour-rate Act 999,661 4 2

--------------

Making in all ... £1,415,185 13 7

£229,464 8s. 0d. being the amount of grants, and £1,185, 721 5s. 7d.

being the amount of loans; besides which there was expended by the Board

of Works under various drainage Acts, for the year ending 31st December,

1846, a sum of £110,022 14s. 4d.

In the week ending the 3rd of October, there were 20,000 persons

employed on the public works in Ireland; in the week ending the 31st of

the same month, there were over 114,000. In the very next week, the

first week of November, there were 162,000 on the works; and in the week

ending the 28th of November, the returns give the number as something

over 285,000! A fortnight later, in a detailed account of the operations

of the Board, supplied to the Treasury, this remarkable sentence occurs:

"The works at present are in every county in Ireland, affording

employment to _more than_ three hundred thousand persons."[157] The

increase went on rapidly through December. In the week ending the 5th of

that month, there were 321,000 employed; and in the week which closed on

the 26th, the extraordinary figure was 398,000![158]

The number of persons employed was greatest in Munster, and least in

Ulster. At the beginning of December, they were thus distributed in the

four Provinces: Ulster, 30,748; Leinster, 50,135; Connaught, 106,680;

and Munster, 134,103. At the close of the month the same proportion was

pretty fairly maintained, the numbers being: for Ulster, 45,487; for

Leinster, 69,585; for Connaught, 119,946; and for Munster, 163,213.

According to the Census of 1841, there were in Ulster 439,805 families;

in Leinster, 362,134; in Connaught, 255,694; and in Munster, 415,154.

From these data, the proportion between the number of persons employed

on the relief works in each Province, and the population of that

Province, stood thus at the close of the year 1846: in Ulster there was

one labourer out of every nine and two-thirds families so employed; in

Leinster there was one out of about every five and a quarter families;

in Munster, one out of every two and a-half families; and in Connaught,

one out of every two and about one-seventh families.

At the end of November, the number of employees superintending the

public works were: 62 inspecting officers; 60 engineers and county

surveyors; 4,021 overseers; 1,899 check clerks; 5 draftsmen; 54 clerks

for correspondence; 50 clerks for accounts; 32 pay inspectors, and 425

pay clerks--making in all 6,913 officials, distributed over nine

distinct departments.

The gross amount of wages rose, of course, in proportion to the numbers

employed. At the end of October, the sum paid weekly was £61,000; at the

end of November, £101,000; and for the week ending the 26th of December,

£154,472.

The number of Relief Committees in operation throughout the country at

the close of 1846, was about one thousand. Indeed, everything connected

with the Public Works and the Famine tends to impress one with their

gigantic proportions;--even the correspondence, the state of which is

thus given by the Board in the middle of December: "The letters received

averaged 800 a-day, exclusive of letters addressed to individual members

of the Board, on public business; the number received on the last day of

November was 2,000; to-day, (17th December,) two thousand five hundred."

All this notwithstanding, the Famine was but very partially stayed: on

it went, deepening, widening, desolating, slaying, with the rapidity and

certainty which marked the progress of its predecessor, the Blight. The

numbers applying for work without being able to obtain it, were

fearfully enormous. From a memorandum supplied by the Board of Works to

Sir Randolph Routh, the head of the Commissariat Department, dated the

17th of December, we learn that the labourers then employed were about

350,000, whilst the number on Relief Lists (for employment) was about

500,000,--that is, there were 150,000 persons on the lists seeking work,

who could not, or at least who did not, get it. Those 150,000 may be

taken to represent at least half a million of starving people;--how many

more were there at the moment, whose names never appeared on any list,

except the death-roll!

FOOTNOTES:

[139] Commissariat Series of Blue Books, Correspondence, vol. I., pp. 80

and 83.

[140] _Ib._ p. 98.

[141] _Morning Chronicle_ quoted in _Freeman's Journal_ of October 7th,

1846. The _Standard_, commenting on a letter which appeared in the

_Times_ shortly before on the same subject, and written in the same

spirit of hostility to the Irish people, says it would be "indecent" at

any time; at present it is "intolerably offensive" and "greatly

mischievous." "That the Irish are not naturally an idle race," continues

the _Standard_, "every man may satisfy himself in London streets, and in

the streets of all our great towns, where nearly all the most toilsome

work is performed by Irish labourers."

[142] Letter in Commissariat Series of Blue Books, vol. I., p. 360.

[143] _Ib._ p. 349.

[144] Afterwards Sir Thomas Redington, Knt.

[145] Mr. Brett, County Surveyor of Mayo to the Board of Works. Board of

Works Series of Blue Books, vol. L, p. 125.

[146] "_Employment_, with wages in _cash_ is the general outcry."--_Com.

Gen. Hewitson to Mr. Trevelyan; Commissariat Series, p. 12._

[147] "Those at taskwork had fivepence, and in some cases as low as

threepence per diem. In other cases, again, an opposite extreme existed,

and as much as two shillings and twopence per diem was found in two

instances to have been paid ... I fear there was not, in all cases,

sufficient sympathy for the present sufferings of the poor--a feeling

quite compatible with a firm and honest discharge of duty. This inflames

the minds of the people against the system generally, and they become

victims alike to their own intemperance, and the mismanagement of those

placed over them. Throughout the country, in the majority of cases,

disturbances are attributable wholly, or in a great degree, to such

errors, overseers acting more as slave-drivers than as the messengers of

benevolence to an afflicted but warm-hearted people."--_A Twelvemonth's

Residence in Ireland during the Famine and the Public Works, with

suggestions to meet the coming crisis. By William Henry Smith, C.E.,

late conducting Engineer of Public Works. London, 1848; p. 94._

Again: "I much regretted leaving, and but for the circumstance of some

imperative engagements recalling me to London, my intended sojourn of

two or three months, which I originally named to the Commissioners,

would probably have been prolonged even beyond what it eventually was,

amongst a people whom I saw no reason to fear, even when using necessary

severity, but on the contrary every reason to admire, from their

strongly affectionate dispositions and resignation in deep suffering:

they treated it as the will of God, and murmured, 'Thy will be

done.'"--_Ibid. p. 18._

[148] "In cases where disturbances arose in any one district, the works

of the whole barony were suspended, inflicting injury upon all, the

guilty and innocent indiscriminately."--_Ibid. p. 93._

[149] See Note p. 203, from Mr. Smith's valuable book, _A Twelvemonth's

Residence in Ireland_.

[150] Board of Works Series, vol. L, p. 53.

[151] On the 8th of February, 1847, during the debate on the "Poor

Relief (Ireland) Bill," in the House of Commons, Lord Duncan said, "He

found it stated in the Blue Book he had referred to, that the two

members for Clare had put tenants upon the relief-rate who were paying

them considerable rents. He trusted that they would be prepared to deny

this serious imputation."

Major M'Namara rose and said:--"Sir--As one of the members for Clare, I

beg to say, that every sentence in Captain Wynne's letter is a malicious

falsehood. (Some sensation, amid which the hon. member resumed his

sat)."

[152] He thus complains in italics: "_None of the gentry will take our

part except one_." Board of Works Blue Books, vol. L, p. 352, Appendix.

[153] "The works under 9 and 10 Vic., c. 107, are sanctioned for sake of

the relief and not for sake of the works themselves." Mr. Trevelyan to

Lieut.-Colonel Jones, 5th October, 1846.

[154] The duty of check clerks was to visit the works frequently, to

count the labourers, and prepare the pay lists.

[155] Memorial to Lord John Russell, Dec. 14, 1846.

[156] Letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, 28th October, 1846.

[157] Board of Works' Series of Blue Books, vol. L (50), p. 352.

[158] Another account makes it only 376,133. It is easy to see that

perfect accuracy with regard to the number of persons employed on the

works at any given time was, for obvious reasons, not to be attained.

The figures given above from the official returns are, therefore, only

an approximation to the truth, but they may be accepted as substantially

correct.

The History of the Great Irish Famine of 1847 (3rd ed.) (1902) With Notices of Earlier Irish Famines · 第 7 / 15 章