Every time you read of the vicar of a parish changing pulpits with his

Nonconformist brother; every philanthropic meeting you hear of as

addressed by clergymen of all denominations; every garden party given by

a bishop or a dean to a Dissenters' Conference; every advance you

gratefully note towards a wise and patient tolerance of theological

dissensions, the sinking of sectional differences in the interests of a

higher and purer life--ascribe it all to the beneficent influence of

Immanuel Kant. Before his day all these fraternisings would have been

impossible; the ancestors of these reconciled brethren were ready to

scourge and burn each other, until Kant came and shamed them out of their

narrowness and bigotry. Men talk no more of "mere morality," as though

it paled into positive insignificance by the side of the dogmatical

majesty of articles and creeds. Kant has taught them "a more excellent

way," and in so far as they have learnt that one lesson, they and we are

members of the one great Church--the Church of the ethically redeemed,

the Church of men to come--the idealism, the enthusiasm, of the ages to

be. Never let it be forgotten. We are not concerned to controvert or to

destroy. The message of Kant to the Churches is that in all essentials

we are at one with them, and the trend of thought is now setting visibly

towards the substitution of an ethical for a doctrinal basis of religion.

You are powerless to resist the times, we would urge. Whether the old

names and formulae survive or not, "the irresistible maturing of the

general mind" will make it impossible for men to acquiesce in any

religious belief not grounded on the conviction that the sole test of a

man's status is not what he believes, but what he does. This is Kant,

this is Christ, and this is the message of the ethical Church.

But to return to the teaching of the philosopher of ethics, I must remind

my readers again that I am unable to do more than sketch the outlines of

the great ethical system which he gave to the world. More than that will

not be needed for the moment. But before undertaking even a synoptical

account of the transcendental ethic, I think it advisable to remark that

Kant's title to philosophical immortality rests upon his constructive

work as an ethicist, and not on his critical work as a speculative

thinker. It is well known that the two philosophies of Kant are not

_primâ facie_ harmonious, that he finds himself compelled to deny as a

critic that of which he is most certain as a moralist. Thus the great

facts of theism, immortality and the autonomy or freedom of the will, he

professes himself unable to know save as revelations of the moral order.

His mind, or pure reason, can know nothing of them; it is his will or

practical reason which discerns them as plain deductions from the

overwhelming fact of the moral law. This fact has led some critics to

describe Kant as a sceptic. Nothing could be farther from the truth. We

might almost quote of him what Browning wrote of Voltaire:--

Crowned by prose and verse, and wielding

with wit's bauble learning's rod,

He at least believes in soul and is very sure of God.

No one more so; yet as a thinker he professed himself unable to

_demonstrate_ these high truths. In that sense Kant's famous _Critique

of the Pure Reason_ may be described as the forerunner of the systematic

agnosticism which is set forth in the _First Principles_ of Mr. Spencer.

But there is this immense difference, that Kant was convinced of the

reality of that which the mind of man could not demonstrate. The great

facts were existent indeed, but he was powerless to reach them with the

instruments at his command. In consequence, he laid it down as a

principle that man must ever act as though it were actually demonstrated

that we were free, our innermost being imperishable, and a supreme judge

and dispenser of justice to administer the moral laws which are the guide

of life. It would be out of place to state the arguments whereby Kant

justified his belief in a controlling mind in the universe and in the

spiritual nature of man, while avowing his inability to demonstrate those

truths. It must suffice to state here that the truths which lie at the

foundation of religion were a matter of profound conviction with the sage

of Königsberg, all the deeper perhaps because he would not claim to

subject them to an intellectual dissection or to be able to measure out

heaven and earth in the exiguous terms of human thought.

But as soon as he leaves the plane of the pure or speculative reason and

rises to the level of the practical reason or the will, then the full

truth bursts upon his astonished gaze, clearer than the meridian light.

He sees no more "half shade, half shine," but the truth pours itself

"upon the new sense it now trusts with all its plenitude of power". It

is the will, not the mind, which discloses the full revelation to

Immanuel Kant, and makes him the deeply-reverent, religious man he ever

was, the convinced theist, the believer in his power to control his acts

by the independence of his will, and in the possibility, or rather the

certainty, of his being one day morally perfect--not indeed within the

limits of the life which now is, but in a future life of unlimited

duration. That which to Wordsworth was an intimation was to Kant an

intuition after the vision of the glory of the moral law had flooded his

innermost soul.

And this we may, perhaps, briefly show before bringing the chapter to an

end.

The fundamental principle of the Kantian system is the primacy of the

will. The key to the mystery of man's being Kant finds, not in the

marvellous faculty of intelligence, but in that power of self-movement,

that capacity for self-originated energy which we call the will. Reason

is "regulative," he said, but not "creative" and "constitutive," like the

will. It is the latter faculty which makes us what we are, determines

our life, fixes our character, and decides our destiny. As you act, so

you are. This principle once conceded, the majestic system at once takes

shape. What is it that governs the world of phenomena outside us?

Physical laws, and supreme amongst these laws, that of equilibrium or

gravitation. What is it that governs the reason? The laws of thought,

those aboriginal rules, none of man's creation, but the essentially

necessary guides which he was bound to discover and to follow if he is to

think accurately, that is, if his thoughts are to be in conformity with

fact. And what is it which governs the will of man? "Do you tell me,"

the master would urge, "that the inert masses of the spheres have each

their own movements regulated for them, that nothing from a stone to a

star is shaped or moved without the intervention of eternal laws; that

the lispings of children no less than the meditations of a philosopher

must conform to law, and that the will of man, whereby he makes himself

to be what he is, shapes his character, influences his surroundings, and

fixes his destiny--do you venture to say that that is lawless in a world

where all is law? No," he proclaims in words which burn conviction into

his soul: "it, too, has its laws, the highest, holiest thing in all this

universe, the law of laws which confronts man wherever he goes, fills all

his sublimest thoughts, subdues his soul to the most reverent worship,

and is the holiest inspiration of his religion. It is the moral law, the

supreme concern of the will of man, a revelation to man alone of his own

unspeakable dignity, the norm or standard whereby he is to regulate his

life--this it is which is the law of his will. As gravitation rules the

stars, so the moral law, the sanction of the eternal distinction between

right and wrong, controls the will, not compulsorily, not arbitrarily, as

though it could by any possibility be otherwise, but freely. So

sovereign is its power, so authentic are its claims, that if it had might

as it has right, it would rule the world." It is, therefore, to use

Kant's own language, a _categorical imperative_, that is, an

unconditional command. "Thou canst, and therefore thou must." By the

very manhood you possess you are bound wholly to surrender yourself in

submission to what you know to be the right for the right's sake alone.

You must make it your own law, and obey it as inflexibly as the stars

keep their courses in the everlasting way.

Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong,

And the most ancient heavens, through thee, are fresh and strong.

We may see now how Kant bases his whole system upon the indestructible

fact of ethical law, the primeval intuition of the awakened spirit of man

into the eternal distinction between good and evil. Standing on that

foundation, he is able to descry the world of transcendental

realities--"the land which is very far off"--which the pure and critical

reason could never behold. But though the eyes of the mind were holden,

the intuition of the will enables him to gaze direct into the unseen and

discern freedom, soul, immortality and God as eternal facts. For whence

this sublime law of life unless we conceive mind, not blind chance, as

the arbiter of things? Whence this constraining power within me,

exerting itself to the uttermost to win my allegiance to the right,

unless I am free to obey or disobey? How is not the very conception of

morality entirely obliterated in the false philosophy that would fain

persuade man that because he is _in_ the world he must needs be _of_ it,

and because the tides rise and fall with the phases of the moon, that his

actions are fixed and controlled by influences utterly beyond his power?

We have no room for the "man-machine" in the beautiful school of Immanuel

Kant.

And, finally, the awful question of the future Kant solves in the light

of the same sublime principle. "That law," he urges, "which is the

essential law binding humanity must one day be fulfilled in every one of

us. There is a moral as well as a physical evolution which you try in

vain to confine to the limits of the life which now is. There is no

argument known to science justifying such an attempt." Kant believes in

the Eternities, because every man born of woman is destined to be at last

in absolute conformity with that law of everlasting righteousness which

is for us what the law of balance is to the infinite worlds. All life,

that which now is and whatever is to be in the hereafter, is simply a

never-ending progress towards an ideal whose dignity is infinite. Hence

the command of Jesus, "Be ye perfect as your heavenly Father is also

perfect," would be endorsed by Kant as in strict harmony with the

philosophy which does not teach that the physical act of dissolution

called death fixes the moral state of man for ever, but that all life,

whatsoever it may be and wheresoever it may be lived, is but an approach

towards a goal of infinite value, the will of man absolutely conformed to

justice, or the moral law.

As Kepler described the philosopher and the scientist as "thinking again

the thoughts of God," even so does the Kantian ethic aspire to absolute

conformity of will with that Will which is supreme and eternal, the moral

order itself personified. This is immortality: this is everlasting life,

even as the Christian disciple and philosopher describes it: "This world

passeth away and the desire thereof, but he that doeth the Divine will

endureth for ever". The phenomenal world is a pageant, a scene. Only

"the good will" (Kant's constant expression) in absolute harmony with the

Supreme Will is real and eternal.

[1] _Philosophical Classics_, p. 85.

V.

THE ETHICAL DOCTRINE OF COMPENSATION.

I suppose there is no teaching more frequently insisted upon in the Old

and in the New Testament as the truth of a judgment, now, or in the

future, upon the misdeeds or sins of men. Let criticism prune and cut

as it will, while it exhibits the deplorably low standard of morality

once prevalent among the Hebrew peoples, and therefore prevalent among

their Gods, their Elohim, Adonai and Jahveh, one thing, at least, is

undeniable--that that which is recognised as immoral is reprobated and

forthwith visited with condign punishment. Doubtless, acts which to us

are wholly reprehensible are discussed without attaching any stigma to

them, and are even permitted, and sometimes suggested, by Jahveh

himself, as in the story of Judith and Holofernes. Such ethical

insensibility is wholly natural, viewing the state of development at

which the Hebrew people had arrived, and should cause no wonderment in

those who are familiar with the Deity of Christian Mediaevalism, and

the methods and practices he was supposed to favour. But what should

be carefully noted is, that nothing is adjudged immoral but is

forthwith sternly reprobated and condemned to a fitting retribution.

"The way of transgressors is hard" was a conviction with the race. In

the same way, the ethical note rings out in the New Testament, that

right and wrong are eternally dissevered, sheep ever separated from

goats; that virtue must be rewarded and vice be condemned and punished.

Now, this teaching of the judgment to come, the bare announcement of

which by Paul filled Felix, the Roman governor, with such dire

consternation, is the subject of which we propose to set forth the

philosophical and ethical explanation. In the Bible we have the

mythical setting much as we have the mythical version of the agony of

spirit undergone by Christ before he definitely committed himself to

his prophetical work. It is for us to-day to disentangle the

substantive truth from the maze of legend with which an imperfectly

developed age has surrounded it and discover the true _raison d'être_

of that doctrine which "the Bible Christian" confesses under the aspect

of the "Last Judgment".

Now, I take it that no educated man believes in the drama, or rather,

the panorama, of the "last judgment"; the vision of Jesus sitting in

the clouds, with every human being that ever was or shall be gathered

before his throne to hear definite sentence pronounced upon them. The

_mise-en-scène_ demands of course the presence of bodies, and I suppose

it is needless to point out the dogma of the resurrection of the body,

insisted upon by all the Christian Churches, is a blank impossibility.

We may acquire other bodies in that unknown state, should we stand in

need of such appurtenances--a fact which we may wholly disbelieve--but

of one thing we may rest assured, that these identical bodies in which

we die can by no possibility conceivable to us be brought back.

I once read a highly imaginative article in a religious magazine which

attempted to solve the unsolvable by suggesting that after men's bodies

had been buried in sufficient numbers, the whole soil of our planet

would consist of nothing but the substance of the bodies of the dead,

and that when that momentous epoch arrived, the Almighty would give the

order for the sounding of the final trump, and the whole solid globe

would be forthwith transmuted, or rather re-transmuted, into human

bodies--in what condition it was not stated--for the countless myriads

of "souls" ready to take possession of them. Probably, this pious

romance was woven in the days before cremation, and as the next century

will not be very old before we shall be compelled to resort to that

method of disposal of the dead, at all events in our larger cities, it

becomes increasingly difficult to comprehend how men of the future, to

say nothing of the past, are going to be provided with their own bodies

so as to put in an appearance at the great assize.

We may rightly wonder how men and women of the nineteenth century can

still believe in the Churches and Chapels which teach such deplorable

absurdities as the revelation of God, and how it happens that when

religion appears upon the scene of their daily life, their common sense

can so totally desert them. One need say nothing of the inadequacy of

the judgment pronounced, the summary classification of the myriads of

humanity as white sheep or black goats, or the character of the rewards

and punishments allotted. The one redeeming point in the narrative is

that whatever judgment is pronounced is decided, not on doctrinal

grounds, about which no two of Christ's followers can be got to agree,

but on ethical grounds, on character manifesting itself in public

spirit and care for the unfortunate--the bruised reeds and smoking

flax--of our communities. It would seem impossible to maintain after

this final scene that creeds and faiths have any decisive influence on

our status here or hereafter.

But though now seen to be no more than a variant upon the apocalyptic

tradition and literature which represented that Jesus was to return

speedily to earth and rule among his saints for a thousand years--a

delusion which apparently possessed even the trained intellect of Paul,

and subsequently led to the pseudo-Peter explaining that his

fellow-Christians must not be in too great a hurry, because "a thousand

years are as one day and one day as a thousand years in the sight of

the Lord"--it has done an incalculable amount of harm in the past. It

has shut men's eyes to the awful fact of retribution, administered here

and now, and prevented their realising any punishment other than the

savage, barbarous and wholly vindictive punishment of torturing

eternally by fire. It shuts men's minds to the operation of moral

laws, to the fact that judgment is executed instantaneously upon the

commission of wrong. It has, and it does, to the serious detriment of

moral development, lead man to put off until late in life, sometimes to

the very hour of death itself, restorative work which should have been

undertaken immediately on the recognition or conviction of misdeeds.

The notion that he is not to be called up for judgment until he is

rendered incapable by death of doing any further mischief, has been a

moral obstacle in the path of man, and therefore of the race, wholly

beyond the power of calculation. Foolish priests once thought that by

the invention of the dogma of hell they could terrorise men into

morality, and so they preached their Divinity, the magnified copy of a

fiend, who would have cheerfully created humanity out of nothing and

damned them everlastingly, had not he himself, in the shape of his son,

who is one in being with him, decided to appear upon earth and atone to

himself for the mischief, which presumably he could have very well

foreseen, perpetrated by man.

And what has been the effect of such teaching on humanity? It is

impossible to doubt that it has led to results deplorably,

indescribably wicked. Whence, for instance, arose the horrors of the

mediaeval inquisition, the insensate tortures inflicted upon men like

Huss and Bruno solely for theological errors, if not from belief in

this demon-deity whom the Church worshipped? If their practices were

but a shadow of the horrors he was supposed to be everlastingly

inflicting on mankind, who could raise a protest against them? Shall

man be juster than his God? This perverse Christian morality is

responsible for the worst cruelties which have tormented the human race

since the days of ecclesiastical domination. If the Deity is inhuman,

why should man be otherwise? Therefore, inhuman tortures will be

inflicted on prisoners. The rack and thumb-screw will be used to

extract secrets. Men will be immured alive within narrow walls and

allowed to perish by inches. The Austrian prisons in the northern

Italian provinces will be so constructed that the miserable victim can

neither sit nor lie down nor see the light of day. Floggings and

scourgings will be universal, _lettres de cachet_ an institution. Why

not? Where the god has no sense of justice, why should man? Hundreds

and hundreds of thousands of victims will perish at the stake and in

the flames in atrocious agony because they are wizards or witches or

have had dealings with imaginary devils. Why not? The god does worse

than all this. He keeps his victims alive for the sole purpose of

glutting his ire and satiating his insatiable vengeance. Nay, things

are so ordered that the very happiness of the elect is enhanced, not

only by the knowledge, but by the sight, of the appalling, unavailing

anguish of the lost, and we have seen such a philosopher as Aquinas

representing the Deity as conducting the "elect" in troops and droves

to the heavenly shores and giving them "a glimpse of hell" by way of

stimulating their enjoyment of the celestial beatitude. Why not? I

ask again. My only wonderment is how we ever got rid of it. Picture

the world under the universal dominion of this foul superstition. It

reigns on the thrones of kings, in the cabinets of statesmen, it is

preached in the pulpits, taught in the schools, it is the earliest

lesson that trembles on the lips of innocent children. The most

ingenious, subtly contrived, widespread and all-pervading influence is

especially created to propagate it everywhere in the shape of the

Christian Church--a Divine institution, possessed of the keys of life

and death, of heaven and hell--the sole representative of the Deity on

earth. How, we ask, in wondering gratitude, did the world ever escape

the tyranny of such superstition? This fact alone--this

deliverance--is enough to make one believe that there is a "Power, not

ourselves, which makes for righteousness," that the course of human

events is never wholly retrograde.

And, now, what is the truth about the "judgment to come"? What is the

ethical equivalent of "hell fire"? In the first place, we refuse to

believe in a "last judgment" because we know that judgment is not only

pronounced but executed instantaneously, automatically, I would say, on

the commission of wrong. There is no need to wait for the day of

judgment or even for the hour of death. If a man has done wrong he

sits condemned that self-same moment. _Illo nocens se damnat quo

peccat die_. There is no need of God, angel or devil, to announce the

fact or deliver judgment; the man has pronounced his own sentence,

executed judgment on himself. This is, in essence, the ethical

doctrine of compensation, that this universe is so woven, that the

nature of things is such that "things are what they are, that the

consequences of things will be what they will be," that we can no more

hope to avert them by crying out for help to man, saint or God, than we

can hope to hurl back the waves that dash upon the strand at flood

tide. Our view is that moral laws are as irresistible as physical, and

admit of no more dispensation than the everlasting order of Nature.

One of our main reasons for repudiating the conception of the

miraculous is that it involves a violation of eternal order and

therefore of eternal reason, and if freely admitted in the physical,

would doubtless be speedily introduced into the moral order, to the

destruction of civilised society. We believe that this universe is "so

magically woven" that it is absolutely impossible to escape the

consequences of our deeds, and if the Buddhist doctrine of Karma

represents that teaching, then we are among its most enthusiastic

adherents, because it is absolutely true to fact.

But let us look at the matter more closely.[1]

Have we ever sufficiently reflected how that "all things are double,

one against the other," in this mysteriously governed world, that

everything has its counterpart? the world appears to be split into

halves, which yet cleave to each other, as a man is haunted by his

shadow. "An inevitable dualism bisects Nature, so that each thing is

half, and suggests another thing to make it whole." Thus--spirit,

matter; man, woman; odd, even; subjective, objective; in, out; upper,

under; action, rest; yea, nay. "All things are double, one against the

other."

All the woes of existence arise from our deliberate resistance to the

law of oneness, to that integration which is so conspicuous in Nature.

We are incessantly seeking to take the one half and leave the other,

and straightway Nemesis overtakes us. We want to enjoy the pleasures

of sense without attending to the inexorable requirements of mind, and

such an appalling satiety sickens our souls, that we forget ourselves

in the commission of deeds unspeakably wicked; we possibly degrade

ourselves in the eyes of all men by falling even into the clutches of

the law, or we border on the verge of self-destruction in our

unspeakable _ennui_. We would have the half, while Nature planned the

whole, and we pay the last farthing. The results are naturally so

appalling that it is not to be wondered that men sought to express them

under the image of a fire which will not be quenched, a worm of remorse

which can never die--an immense despair for which there is no relief.

Morality as a religion · 第 4 / 17 段