CLASSIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
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_Three Forms of Knowledge._
/Mahâyânism/ generally distinguishes two or three forms of knowledge.
This classification is a sort of epistemology, inasmuch as it proposes
to ascertain the extent and nature of human knowledge, from a
religious point of view. Its object is to see what kind of human
knowledge is most reliable and valuable for the annihilation of
ignorance and the attainment of enlightenment. The Mahâyâna school
which has given most attention to this division of Buddhist philosophy
is the Yogâcâra of Asanga and Vasubandhu. The _Lankâvatarâ_ and the
_Sandhinirmocana_ and some other Sûtras, on which the school claims to
have its doctrinal foundation, teach three forms of knowledge. The
sûtra literature, however, as a rule does not enter into any detailed
exposition of the subject; it merely classifies knowledge and points
out what form of knowledge is most desirable by the Buddhists. To
obtain a fuller and more discursive elucidation, we must come to the
Abhidharma Pitaka of that school. Of the text books most generally
studied of the {88} Yogâcâra, we may mention Vasubandhu’s
_Vijñânamâtra_ with its commentaries and Asanga’s _Comprehensive
Treatise on Mahâyânism_. The following statements are abstracted
mainly from these documents.
The three forms of knowledge as classified by the Yogâcâra are: (1)
Illusion (_parikalpita_), (2) Relative Knowledge (_paratantra_), and
(3) Absolute Knowledge (_pariniṣpanna_).
_Illusion._
Illusion (_parikalpita_), to use Kantian phraseology, is a
sense-perception not co-ordinated by the categories of the
understanding; that is to say, it is a purely subjective elaboration,
not verified by objective reality and critical judgment. So long as we
make no practical application of it, it will harbor no danger; there
is no evil in it, at least religiously. Perceptual illusion is a
psychical fact, and as such it is justified. A straight rod in water
appears crooked on account of the refraction of light; a sensation is
often felt in the limb after it has been amputated, for the nervous
system has not yet adjusted itself to the new condition. They are all
illusions, however. They are doubtless the correct interpretation of
the sense-impressions in question, but they are not confirmed by other
sense-impressions whose coördination is necessary to establish an
objective reality. The moral involved in this is: all sound inferences
and correct behavior must be based on critical knowledge and not on
illusory premises.
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Reasoning in this wise, the Mahâyânists declare that the egoism
fostered by vulgar minds belongs to this class of knowledge, though of
a different order, and that those who tenaciously cling to egoism as
their final stronghold are believers in an intellectual fata morgana,
and are like the thirsty deer that madly after the visionary water in
the desert, or like the crafty monkey that tries to catch the lunar
reflection in the water. Because the belief in the existence of a
metaphysical agent behind our mental phenomena is not confirmed by
experience and sound judgment, it being merely a product of
unenlightened subjectivity.
Besides this ethical and philosophical egoism, all forms of
world-conception which is founded on the sandy basis of subjective
illusion, such as fetichism, idolatry, anthropomorphism,
anthropopsychism, and the like, must be classed under the
_parikalpita-lakṣana_ as doctrines having illusionary premises.
_Relative Knowledge._
Next comes the _paratantra-lakṣana_, a _welt-anschauung_ based upon
relative knowledge, or better, upon the knowledge of the law of
relativity. According to this view, everything in the world has a
relative and conditional existence, and nothing can claim an absolute
reality free from all limitations. This closely corresponds to the
theory advanced by most of modern scientists, whose agnosticism denies
our intellectual capability of transcending the law of relativity.
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The _paratantra-lakṣana_, therefore, consists in the knowledge
derived from our daily intercourse with the outward world. It deals
with the highest abstractions we can make out of our sensuous
experiences. It is positivistic in its strictest sense. It says: The
universe has only a relative existence, and our knowledge is
necessarily limited. Even the highest generalisation cannot go beyond
the law of relativity. It is impossible for us to know the first cause
and the ultimate end of existence; nor have we any need to go thus
beyond the sphere of existence, which would inevitably involve us in
the maze of mystic imagination.
The _paratantra-lakṣana_, therefore, is a positivism, agnosticism, or
empiricism in its spirit. Though the Yogâcâra Buddhists do not use all
these modern philosophical terms, the interpretation here given is
really what they intended to mean by the second form of knowledge. A
world-conception based on this view, it is declared by the
Mahâyânists, is sound as far as our perceptual knowledge is concerned;
but it does not exhaust the entire field of human experience, for it
does not take into account our spiritual life and our inmost
consciousness. There is something in the human heart that refuses to
be satisfied with merely systematising under the so-called laws of
nature those multitudinous impressions which we receive from the
outside world. There is a singular feeling, or sentiment, or yearning,
whatever we may call it, in our inmost heart, which defies any plainer
{91} description than a mere suggestion or an indirect statement. This
somewhat mystic consciousness seems despite its obscureness to contain
the meaning of our existence as well as that of the universe. The
intellect may try to persuade us with all its subtle reasonings to
subdue this disquieting feeling and to remain contented with the
systematising of natural laws, so called. But it is deceiving itself
by so doing; because the intellect is but a servant to the heart, and
so far as it is not forced to self-contradiction, it must accommodate
itself to the needs of the heart. That is to say, we must transcend
the narrow limits of conditionality and see what indispensable
postulates are underlying our life and experiences. The recognition
of these indispensable postulates of life constitutes the Yogâcâra’s
third form of knowledge called _pariniṣpanna-lakṣana_.
_Absolute Knowledge._
_Pariniṣpanna-lakṣana_ literally means the world-view founded on the
most perfect knowledge. According to this view, the universe is a
monistico-pantheistic system. While phenomenal existences are
regulated by natural laws characterised by conditionality and
individuation, they by no means exhaust all our experiences which are
stored in our inmost consciousness. There must be something,--this is
the absolute demand of humanity, the ultimate postulate of
experience,--be it Will, or Intelligence, which, underlying and
animating all existences, forms {92} the basis of cosmic, ethical, and
religious life. This highest Will, or Intelligence, or both may be
termed God, but the Mahâyânists call it religiously Dharmakâya,
ontologically Bhûtatathâtâ, and psychologically Bodhi or Sambodhi.
And they think it must be immanent in the universe manifesting itself
in all places and times; it must be the cause of perpetual creation;
it must be the principle of morality. This being so, how do we come to
the recognition of its presence? The Buddhists say that when our minds
are clear of illusions, prejudices, and egotistic assumptions, they
become transparent and reflect the truth like a dust-free mirror. The
illumination thus gained in our consciousness constitutes the
so-called _pariniṣpanna_, the most perfect knowledge, that leads to
Nirvâna, final salvation, and eternal bliss.
_World-views Founded on the Three
Forms of Knowledge._
The reason will be obvious to the reader why the Yogâcâra school
distinguishes three classes of world-conception founded on the three
kinds of knowledge. The _parikalpita-lakṣana_ is most primitive and
most puerile. However, in these days of enlightenment, what is
believed by the masses is naught else than a _parikalpita_ conception
of the world. The material existence as it appears to our senses is to
them all in all. They seem to be unable to shake off the yoke of
egoistic illusion and naïve realism. Their God must be transcendent
and anthropopathic, {93} and always willing to meddle with worldly
affairs as his whim pleases. How different the world is, in which the
multitudes of unreflecting minds are living, from that which is
conceived by Buddhas and Bodhisattvas! Hartmann, a German thinker, is
right, when he says that the masses are at least a century behind in
their intellectual culture. But the most strange thing in the world is
that, in spite of all their ignorance and superstitious beliefs, the
waves of universal transformation are ever carrying them onward to a
destination, of which, perhaps, they have not the slightest suspicion.
The _paratantra-lakṣana_ advances a step further, but the fundamental
error involved in it is its persistent self-contradictory disregard
for what our inmost consciousness is constantly revealing to us. The
intellect alone can by no means unravel the mystery of our entire
existence. In order to reach the highest truth, we must boldly plunge
with our whole being into a region where absolute darkness defying the
light of intellect is supposed to prevail. This region which is no
more nor less than the field of religious consciousness is shunned by
most of the intellectual people on the plea that the intellect by its
very nature is unable to fathom it. But the only way that leads us to
the final pacification of the heart-yearnings is to go beyond the
horizons of limiting reason and to resort to the faith that has been
planted in the heart as the _sine qua non_ of its own existence and
vitality. And by faith I mean _Prajñâ_ (wisdom), transcendental {94}
knowledge, that comes direct from the intelligence-essence of the
Dharmakâya. A mind, so tired in vainly searching after truth and bliss
in the verbiage of philosophy and the nonsense of ritualism, finds
itself here completely rested bathing in the rays of divine
effulgence,--whence this is, it does not question, being so filled
with supramundane blessings which alone are felt. Buddhism calls this
exalted spiritual state Nirvâna or Mokṣa; and _pariniṣpanna-lakṣana_
is a world-conception which naturally follows from this subjective,
ideal enlightenment.[38]
_Two Forms of Knowledge._
The other Hindu Mahâyânism, the Mâdhyamika school of Nâgârjuna,
distinguishes two, instead of three, orders of knowledge, but
practically the Yogâcâra and the Mâdhyamika come to the same
conclusion.[39]
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The two kinds of knowledge or truth distinguished by the Mâdhyamika
philosophy are _Samvṛtti-satya_ and _Paramârtha-satya_, that is,
conditional truth and transcendental truth. We read in Nâgârjuna’s
_Mâdhyamika Çâstra_ (Buddhist Text Society edition, pp. 180, 181):
“On two truths is founded
The holy doctrine of Buddhas:
Truth conditional,
And truth transcendental.
“Those who verily know not
The distinction of the two truths.
Know not the essence
Of Buddhism which is meaningful.”[40]
The conditional truth includes illusion and relative knowledge of the
Yogâcâra school, while the transcendental truth corresponds to the
absolute knowledge.
In explaining these two truths, the Mâdhyamika philosophers have made
a constant use of the terms, _çûnya_ and _açûnya_, void and not-void,
which unfortunately became a cause of the misunderstanding by Christian
scholars of Nâgârjuna’s transcendental philosophy. Absolute truth is
void in its ultimate nature, for it contains nothing concrete or real
or individual that makes it an object of particularisation. But this
must not be understood, as is done by some superficial critics, in the
sense of absolute {96} nothingness. The Mâdhyamika philosophers make
the _satya_ (transcendental truth) empty when contrasted with the
realness of phenomenal existences. Because it is not real in the sense
a particular being is real; but it is empty since it transcends the
principle of individuation. When considered absolutely, it can neither
be empty nor not-empty, neither _çûnya_ nor _açûnya_, neither _asti_
nor _nâsti_, neither _abhâva_ nor _bhâva_, neither real nor unreal.
All these terms imply relation and contrast, while the _Paramârtha_
Satya is above them, or better, it unifies all contrasts and antitheses
in its absolute oneness. Therefore, even to designate it at all may
lead to the misunderstanding of the true nature of the _Satya_, for
naming is particularising. It is not, as such, an object of
intellectuation or of demonstrative knowledge. It underlies everything
conditional and phenomenal, and does not permit itself to be a
particular object of discrimination.
_Transcendental Truth and Relative
Understanding._
One may say: If transcendental truth is of such an abstract nature,
beyond the reach of the understanding, how can we ever hope to attain
it and enjoy its blessings? But Nâgârjuna says that it is not
absolutely out of the ken of the understanding; it is, on the
contrary, through the understanding that we become acquainted with the
quarter towards which our spiritual efforts should be directed, only
{97} let us not cling to the means by which we grasp the final
reality. A finger is needed to point at the moon, but when we have
recognised the moon, let us no more trouble ourselves with the finger.
The fisherman carries a basket to take the fish home, but what need
has he to worry about the basket when the contents are safely on the
table? Only so long as we are not yet aware of the way to
enlightenment, let us not ignore the value of relative knowledge or
conditional truth or _lokasamvṛttisatya_ as Nâgârjuna terms it.
“If not by worldly knowledge,
The truth is not understood;
When the truth is not approached,
Nirvâna is not attained.”[41]
From this, it is to be inferred that Buddhism never discourages the
scientific, critical investigation of religious beliefs. For it is one
of the functions of science that it should purify the contents of a
belief and that it should point out in which direction our final
spiritual truth and consolation have to be sought. Science alone which
is built on relative knowledge is not able to satisfy all our religious
cravings, but it is certainly able to direct us to the path of
enlightenment. When this path is at last revealed, we shall know how
to avail ourselves of the discovery, as then Prajñâ (or Sambodhi, or
Wisdom) becomes the {98} guide of life. Here we enter into the region
of the unknowable. The spiritual facts we experience are not
demonstrable, for they are so direct and immediate that the uninitiated
are altogether at a loss to get a glimpse of them.