HISTORICAL CHARACTERISATION OF
MAHÂYÂNISM.
{60}
/We/ are now in a position to enter into a specific exposition of the
Mahâyâna doctrine. But, before doing so, it will be well for us first
to consider the views that were held by the Hindu Buddhist thinkers
concerning its characteristic features; in other words, to make an
historical survey of its peculiarities.
As stated in the Introduction, the term Mahâyâna was invented in the
times of Nâgârjuna and Âryadeva (about the third or fourth century
after Christ), when doctrinal struggles between the Çrâvaka and the
Bodhisattva classes reached a climax. The progressive Hindu Buddhists,
desiring to announce the essential features of their doctrine, did so
naturally at the expense of their rival and by pointing out why theirs
was greater than, or superior to, Hînayânism. Their views were thus
necessarily vitiated by a partisan spirit, and instead of impartially
and critically enumerating the principal characteristics of Mahâyânism,
they placed rather too much stress upon those points that do not in
these latter days appear to be very essential, but that were then
considered by them to be of paramount importance. These points,
nevertheless, {61} throw some light on the nature of Mahâyâna Buddhism
as historically distinguished from its consanguineous rival and
fellow-doctrine.
_Sthiramati’s Conception of Mahâyânism._
Sthiramati[20] in his _Introduction to Mahâyânism_ states that
Mahâyânism is a special doctrine for the Bodhisattvas, who are to be
distinguished from the other two classes, viz, the Çrâvakas and the
Pratyekabuddhas. The essential difference of the doctrine consists in
the belief that objects of the senses are merely phenomenal and have
no absolute reality, that the indestructible Dharmakâya which is
all-pervading constitutes the norm of existence, that all
Bodhisattvas[21] are incarnations of the Dharmakâya, who not by
their evil karma previously accumulated, but by their boundless love
for all mankind, assume {62} corporeal existences, and that persons
who thus appear in the flesh, as avatars of the Buddha supreme,
associate themselves with the masses in all possible social relations,
in order that they might thus lead them to a state of enlightenment.
While this is a very summary statement of the Mahâyâna doctrine, a
more elaborate and extended enumeration of its peculiar features in
contradistinction to those of Hînayânism, is made in the _Miscellanea
on Mahâyâna Metaphysics_,[22] _The Spiritual Stages of the
Yogâcâra_,[23] _An Exposition of the Holy Doctrine_,[24] _A
Comprehensive Treatise on Mahâyânism_,[25] and others. Let us first
explain the “Seven General Characteristics” as described in the first
three works here mentioned.
_Seven Principal Features of Mahâyânism._
According to Asanga, who lived a little later than Nâgârjuna, that
is, at the time when Mahâyânism was further divided into the Yogâcârya
and the Mâdhyamika school, the seven features peculiar to Mahâyânism
as distinguished from Hînayânism, are as follows:
(1) _Its Comprehensiveness._ Mahâyânism does not confine itself to
the teachings of one Buddha alone; {63} but wherever and whenever
truth is found, even under the disguise of most absurd superstitions,
it makes no hesitation to winnow the grain from the husk and
assimilate it in its own system. Innumerable good laws taught by
Buddhas[26] of all ages and localities are all taken up in the
coherent body of Mahâyânism.
(2) _Universal love for All Sentient Beings._ Hînayânism confines
itself to the salvation of individuals only; it does not extend its
bliss universally, as each person must achieve his own deliverance.
Mahâyânism, on the other hand, aims at general salvation; it
endeavors to save us not only individually, but universally. All the
motives, efforts, and actions of the Bodhisattvas pivot on the
furtherance of universal welfare.
(3) _Its Greatness in Intellectual Comprehension._ Mahâyânism
maintains the theory of non-âtman not only in regard to sentient
beings but in regard to things in general. While it denies the
hypothesis of a metaphysical agent directing our mental operations, it
also rejects the view that insists on the noumenal or thingish reality
of existences as they appear to our senses.
(4) _Its Marvelous Spiritual Energy._ The Bodhisattvas never become
tired of working for universal salvation, {64} nor do they despair
because of the long time required to accomplish this momentous object.
To try to attain enlightenment in the shortest possible period and to
be self-sufficient without paying any attention to the welfare of the
masses, is not the teaching of Mahâyânism.
(5) _Its Greatness in the Exercise of the Upâya._ The term _upâya_
literally means expediency. The great fatherly sympathetic heart of
the Bodhisattva has inexhaustible resources at his command in order
that he might lead the masses to final enlightenment, each according
to his disposition and environment. Mahâyânism does not ask its
followers to escape the metempsychosis of birth and death for the sake
of entering into the lethargic tranquillity of Nirvâna; for
metempsychosis in itself is no evil, and Nirvâna in its coma is not
productive of any good. And as long as there are souls groaning in
pain, the Bodhisattva cannot rest in Nirvâna; there is no rest for
his unselfish heart, so full of love and sympathy, until he leads all
his fellow-beings to the eternal bliss of Buddhahood. To reach this
end he employs innumerable means (_upâya_) suggested by his
disinterested lovingkindness.
(6) _Its Higher Spiritual Attainment._ In Hînayânism the highest bliss
attainable does not go beyond Arhatship which is ascetic saintliness.
But the followers of Mahâyânism attain even to Buddhahood with all its
spiritual powers.
(7) _Its Greater Activity._ When the Bodhisattva {65} reaches the
stage of Buddhahood, he is able to manifest himself everywhere in the
ten quarters of the universe[27] and to minister to the spiritual
needs of all sentient beings.
These seven peculiarities are enumerated to be the reasons why the
doctrine defended by the progressive Buddhists is to be called
Mahâyânism, or the doctrine of great vehicle, in contradistinction to
Hînayânism, the doctrine of small vehicle. In each case, therefore,
Asanga takes pains to draw the line of demarcation distinctly between
the two schools of Buddhism and not between Buddhism and all other
religious doctrines which existed at his time.
_The Ten Essential Features of Buddhism._
The following statement of the ten essential features of Mahâyânism as
presented in the _Comprehensive Treatise on Mahâyânism_, is made from
a different standpoint from the preceding one, for it is the
pronunciamento of the Yogâcâra school of Asanga {66} and Vasubandhu
rather than that of Mahâyânism generally. This school together with
the Mâdhyamika school of Nâgârjuna constitute the two divisions of
Hindu Mahâyânism.[28]
The points enumerated by Asanga and Vasubandhu as most essential in
their system are ten.
(1) It teaches an immanent existence of all things in the
_Âlayavijñâna_ or All-Conserving Soul. The conception of an
All-Conserving Soul, it is claimed, was suggested by Buddha in the
so-called Hînayâna sûtras; but on account of its deep meaning and
of the liability of its being confounded with the ego-soul conception,
he did not disclose its full significance in their sûtras; but made
it known only in the Mahâyâna sûtras.
According to the Yogâcâra school, the Âlaya is not an universal, but
an individual mind or soul, whatever we may term it, in which the
“germs” of all things exist in their ideality.[29] The objective
world in reality does not exist, but by dint of subjective {67}
illusion that is created by ignorance, we project all these “germs” in
the Âlayavijñâna to the outside world, and imagine that they are
there really as they are; while the Manovijñâna (ego-consciousness)
which is too a product of illusion, tenaciously clinging to the
Âlayavijñâna as the real self, never abandons its egoism. The
Âlayavijñâna, however, is indifferent to, and irresponsible for, all
these errors on the part of the Manovijñâna.[30]
(2) The Yogâcâra school distinguishes three kinds of knowledge: 1.
Illusion (_parikalpita_), 2. Discriminative or Relative Knowledge
(_paratantra_), and 3. Perfect Knowledge (_pariniṣpanna_).
The distinction may best be illustrated by the well-known analogy of a
rope and a snake. Deceived by a similarity in appearance, men
frequently take a rope lying on the ground for a poisonous snake and
{68} are terribly shocked on that account. But when they approach and
carefully examine it, they become at once convinced of the
groundlessness of this apprehension, which was the natural sequence of
illusion. This may be considered to correspond to what Kant calls
_Schein_.
Most people, however, do not go any further in their inquiry. They are
contented with the sensual, empirical knowledge of an object with
which they come in contact. When they understand that the thing they
mistook for a snake was really nothing but a yard of innocent rope,
they think their knowledge of the object is complete, and do not
trouble themselves with a philosophical investigation as to whether
the rope which to them is just what it appears to be, has any real
existence in itself. They do not stop a moment to reflect that their
knowledge is merely relative, for it does not go beyond the phenomenal
significance of the things they perceive.
But is an object in reality such as it appears to be to our senses?
Are particular phenomena as such really actual? What is the value of
our knowledge concerning those so-called realities? When we make an
investigation into such problems as these, the Yogâcâra school says,
we find that their existence is only relative and has no absolute
value whatever independent of the perceiving subject. They are the
“ejection” of our ideas into the outside world, which are centred and
conserved in our Âlayavijñâna and which are awakened into activity by
subjective {69} ignorance. This clear insight into the nature of
things, i.e., into their non-realness as âtman, constitutes perfect
knowledge.
(3) When we attain to the perfect knowledge, we recognise the ideality
of the universe. There is no such thing as an objective world, which
is really an illusive manifestation of the mind called Âlayavijñâna.
But even this supposedly real existence of the Âlayavijñâna is a
product of particularisation called forth by the ignorant Manovijñâna.
The Manovijñâna, or empirical ego, as it might be called, having no
adequate knowledge as to the true nature of the Âlaya, takes the latter
for a metaphysical agent, that like the master of a puppet-show manages
all mental operations according to its humour. As the silkworm
imprisons itself in the cocoon created by itself, the Manovijñâna,
entangling itself in ignorance and confusion, takes its own illusory
creations for real realities.
(4) For the regulation of moral life, the Yogâcâra with the other
Mahâyâna schools, proposes the practising of the six Pâramitâs (virtues
of perfection), which are: 1. _Dana_ (giving), 2. _Çîla_ (moral
precept), 3. _Kṣânti_ (meekness), 4. _Vîrya_ (energy), 5. _Dhyâna_
(meditation), 6. _Prajñâ_ (knowledge or wisdom). In way of explanation,
says Asanga: “By not clinging to wealth or pleasures (1), by not
cherishing any thoughts to violate the precepts (2), by not feeling
dejected in the face of evils (3), by not awakening any thought of
indolence while practising goodness (4), {70} by maintaining serenity
of mind in the midst of disturbance and confusion of this world (5),
and finally by always practising _ekacitta_[31] and by truthfully
comprehending the nature of things (6), the Bodhisattvas recognise the
truth of _vijñânamâtra_,--the truth that there is nothing that is not
of ideal or subjective creation.”
(5) Mahâyânism teaches that there are ten spiritual stages of
Bodhisattvahood, viz., 1. Pramuditâ, 2. Vimalâ, 3 Prabhâkarî, 4.
Arcismatî, 5. Sudurjayâ, 6. Abhimukhî, 7. Dûrangamâ, 8. Acalâ, 9.
Sâdhumatî, 10. Dharmameghâ[32]. By passing through all these stages
one after another, we are believed to reach the oneness of Dharmakâya.
(6) The Yogâcârists claim that the precepts that are practised by the
followers of Mahâyânism are far superior to those of Hînayânists. The
latter tend to externalism and formalism, and do not go deep into our
spiritual, subjective motives. Now, there are physical, verbal, and
spiritual precepts observed by the Buddha. The Hînayânists observe the
first two neglecting the last which is by far more important than the
rest. For instance, the Çrâvaka’s interpretation of the ten Çikṣas[33]
is literal and not spiritual; {71} further, they follow these precepts
because they wish to attain Nirvâna for their own sake, and not for
others’. The Bodhisattva, on the other hand, does not wish to be bound
within the narrow circle of moral restriction. Aiming at an universal
emancipation of mankind, he ventures even violating the ten çikṣas, if
necessary. The first çikṣa, for instance, forbids the killing of any
living being; but the Bodhisattva does not hesitate to go to war, in
case the cause he espouses is right and beneficient to humanity at
large.
(7) As Mahâyânism insists on the purification of the inner life, its
teaching applies not to things outward, its principles are not of the
ascetic and exclusive kind. The Mahâyânists do not shun to commingle
themselves with the “dust of worldliness”; they aim at the realisation
of the Bodhi; they are not afraid of being thrown into the whirlpool
of metempsychosis; they endeavor to impart spiritual benefits to all
sentient beings without regard to their attitude, whether hostile or
friendly, towards themselves; having immovable faith in the Mahâyâna,
they never become contaminated by vanity and worldly pleasures with
which they may constantly be in touch; they have a clear insight into
the doctrine of non-âtman; being free from all spiritual faults, they
live in perfect accord with the laws of Suchness and discharge their
duties without the {72} least conceit or self-assertion: in a word,
their inner life is a realisation of the Dharmakâya.
(8) The intellectual superiority of the Bodhisattva is shown by his
possession of knowledge of non-particularisation (_anânârtha_).[34]
This knowledge, philosophically considered, is the knowledge of the
absolute, or the knowledge of the universal. The Bodhisattva’s mind is
free from the dualism of samsâra (birth-and-death) and nirvâna, of
positivism and negativism, of being and non-being, of object and
subject, of ego and non-ego. His knowledge, in short, transcends the
limits of final realities, soaring high to the realm of the absolute
and the abode of non-particularity.
(9) In consequence of this intellectual elevation, the Bodhisattva
perceives the working of birth and death in nirvâna, and nirvâna in
the transmigration of birth and death. He sees the “ever-changing
many” in the “never-changing one,” and the “never-changing {73} one”
in the “ever-changing many.” His inward life is in accord at once with
the laws of transitory phenomena and with those of transcendental
Suchness. According to the former, he does not recoil as ascetics do
when he comes in contact with the world of the senses; he is not
afraid of suffering the ills that the flesh is heir to; but, according
to the latter, he never clings to things evanescent, his inmost
consciousness forever dwells in the serenity of eternal Suchness.
(10) The final characteristic to be mentioned as distinctly
Mahâyânistic is the doctrine of Trikâya. There is, it is asserted,
the highest being which is the ultimate cause of the universe and in
which all existences find their essential origin and significance.
This is called by the Mahâyânists Dharmakâya. The Dharmakâya, however,
does not remain in its absoluteness, it reveals itself in the realm of
cause and effect. It then takes a particular form. It becomes a devil,
or a god, or a deva, or a human being, or an animal of lower grade,
adapting itself to the degrees of the intellectual development of the
people. For it is the people’s inner needs which necessitate the
special forms of manifestation. This is called Nirmânakâya, that is,
the body of transformation. The Buddha who manifested himself in the
person of Gautama, the son of King of Çuddhodâna about two thousand
five hundred years ago on the Ganges, is a form of Nirmânakâya. The
third one is called Sambhogakâya, or body of bliss. This is the
spiritual {74} body of a Buddha, invested with all possible grandeur
in form and in possession of all imaginable psychic powers. The
conception of Sambhogakâya is full of wild imaginations which are not
easy of comprehension by modern minds.[35]
These characteristics enumerated at seven or ten as peculiarly
Mahâyânistic are what the Hindu Buddhist philosophers of the first
century down to the fifth or sixth century of the Christian era
thought to be the most essential points of their faith and what they
thought entitled it to be called the “Great Vehicle” (_Mahâyâna_) of
salvation, in contradistinction to the faith embraced by their
conservative brethren. But, as we view them now, the points here
specified are to a great extent saturated with a partisan spirit, and
besides they are more or less scattered and unconnected statements of
the so-called salient features of Mahâyânism. Nor do they furnish much
information concerning the nature of Mahâyânism as a coherent system
of religious teachings. They give but a general and somewhat obscure
delineation of it, and that in opposition to Hînayânism. In point of
fact, Mahâyânism is a school of Buddhism and has many characteristics
in common with Hînayânism. Indeed, the spirit of the former is also
that of the latter, and as far as the general trend of Buddhism is
concerned there is no need of emphasising {75} the significance of one
school over the other. On the following pages I shall try to present a
more comprehensive and impartial exposition of the Buddhism, which has
been persistently designated by its followers as Mahâyânism.
SPECULATIVE MAHÂYÂNISM.
{76}