OUTLINES
OF
MAHAYANA BUDDHISM
BY
DAISETZ TEITARO SUZUKI
CHICAGO
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY
1908
PREFACE.
{v}
The object of this book is twofold: (1) To refute the many wrong
opinions which are entertained by Western critics concerning the
fundamental teachings of Mahâyâna Buddhism; (2) To awake interest
among scholars of comparative religion in the development of the
religious sentiment and faith as exemplified by the growth of one of
the most powerful spiritual forces in the world. The book is therefore
at once popular and scholarly. It is popular in the sense that it
tries to expose the fallacy of the general attitude assumed by other
religionists towards Mahâyânism. It aims to be scholarly, on the
other hand, when it endeavors to expound some of the most salient
features of the doctrine, historically and systematically.
In attempting the accomplishment of this latter object, however, the
author makes no great claim, because it is impossible to present
within this prescribed space all the data that are available for a
comprehensive and systematic elucidation of the Mahâyâna Buddhism,
whose history began in the sixth century before the Christian era and
ran through a period of more than two thousand years before it assumed
the form in which it is at present taught in the Orient. During this
long period, the Mahâyâna {vi} doctrine was elaborated by the best
minds that India, Tibet, China, and Japan ever produced. It is no
wonder then that so many diverse and apparently contradictory
teachings are all comprised under the general name of Mahâyâna
Buddhism. To expound all these theories even tentatively would be
altogether outside the scope of such a work as this. All that I could
or hoped to do was to discuss a few of the most general and most
essential topics of Mahâyânism, making this a sort of introduction
to a more detailed exposition of the system as a whole as well as in
particular.
To attain the first object, I have gone occasionally outside the
sphere within which I had properly to confine the work. But this
deviation seemed imperative for the reason that some critics are so
prejudiced that even seemingly self-evident truths are not comprehended
by them. I may be prejudiced in my own way, but very frequently I have
wondered how completely and how wretchedly some people can be made the
prey of self-delusion.
The doctrinal history of Mahâyâna Buddhism is very little known to
Occidental scholars. This is mainly due to the inaccessibility of
material which is largely written in the Chinese tongue, one of the
most difficult of languages for foreigners to master. In this age of
liberal culture, it is a great pity that so few of the precious stones
contained in the religion of Buddha are obtainable by Western people.
Human nature is essentially the same the world over, and {vii}
whenever and wherever conditions mature we see the same spiritual
phenomena; and this fact ever strengthens our faith in the universality
of truth and in the ultimate reign of lovingkindness. It is my sincere
desire that in so far as my intellectual attainment permits I shall be
allowed to pursue my study and to share my findings with my
fellow-beings.
In concluding this prelude, the author wishes to say that this little
book is presented to the public with a full knowledge of its many
defects, to revise which he will not fail to make use of every
opportunity offered him.
/Daisetz T. Suzuki/.
{viii}
CONTENTS.
{ix}
Preface
Introduction
(1) _The Mahâyâna and Hînayâna Buddhism._ Why the Two Doctrines?--The
Original Meaning of Mahâyâna.--An Older Classification of
Buddhists.--Mahâyâna Buddhism defined.
(2) _Is the Mahâyâna Buddhism the genuine teaching of Buddha?_ No Life
Without Growth.--Mahâyânism a Living Religion.
(3) _Some Misstatements about the Mahâyânism._ Why Injustice Done to
Buddhism.--Examples of Injustice.--Monier
Monier-Williams.--Beal.--Waddell.
(4) _The Significance of Religion._ No Revealed Religion.--The
Mystery.--Intellect and Imagination.--The Contents of Faith vary.
Chapter I. A General Characterisation of Buddhism.
No God and No Soul.--Karma.--Avidyâ.--Non-âtman.--The Non-âtmanness of
Things.--Dharmakâya.--Nirvâna.--Intellectual Tendency of Buddhism.
Chapter II. Historical Characterisation of Mahâyânism.
Sthiramati’s Conception of Mahâyânism.--Seven Principal Features of
Mahâyânism.--Ten Essential Features of Mahâyânism.
{x}
Speculative Mahâyânism.
Chapter III. Practice and Speculation.
Relation of Feeling and Intellect.--Buddhism and Speculation.--Religion
and Metaphysics.
Chapter IV. Classification of Knowledge.
Three Forms of Knowledge.--Illusion.--Relative Knowledge.--Absolute
Knowledge.--World-Views founded on the three Forms of
Knowledge.--Two Forms of Knowledge.--Transcendental Truth and Relative
Understanding.
Chapter V. Bhûtatathâtâ (Suchness).
Indefinability.--The “Thundrous Silence.”--Suchness
Conditioned.--Questions Defying Solution.--The Theory of
Ignorance.--Dualism and Moral Evil.
Chapter VI. The Tathâgata-Garbha and the Âlaya-vijnâna.
The Garbha and Ignorance.--The Âlaya-vijñâna and its Evolution.--The
Manas.--The Sâmkhya Philosophy and Mahâyânism.
Chapter VII. The Theory of Non-âtman or Non-ego.
Âtman.--Buddha’s First Line of Inquiry.--The Skandha.--King Milinda
and Nâgasena.--Ananda’s Attempts to Locate the Soul.--Âtman and the
“Old Man.”--The Vedântic Conception.--Nâgârjuna on the
Soul.--Non-âtman-ness of Things.--Svabhâva.--The Real Significance of
Emptiness.
Chapter VIII. Karma.
Definition.--The Working of Karma.--Karma and Social injustice.--An
Individualistic View of Karma.--Karma and Determinism.--The Maturing
of Good Stock and the Accumulation of Good Merits.--Immortality.
{xi}
Practical Mahâyânism.
Chapter IX. The Dharmakâya.
God.--Dharmakâya.--Dharmakâya as Religious Object.--More Detailed
Characterisation.--The Dharmakâya and Individual Beings.--The
Dharmakâya as Love.--Later Mahâyânists’ View of the Dharmakâya.--The
Freedom of the Dharmakâya.--The Will of the Dharmakâya.
Chapter X. The Doctrine of Trikâya.
The Human and the Super-human Buddha.--An Historical View.--Who was
Buddha?--The Trikâya as Explained in the _Suvarna-Prabhâ_.--Revelation
in All Stages of Culture.--The Sambhogakâya.--A Mere Subjective
Existence.--Attitude of Modern Mahâyânists.--Recapitulation.
Chapter XI. The Bodhisattva.
The Three Yânas.--Strict Individualism.--The Doctrine of
Parivarta.--Bodhisattva in “Primitive” Buddhism.--We are all
Bodhisattvas.--The Buddha’s Life.--The Bodhisattva and Love.--The
Meaning of Bodhi and Bodhicitta.--Love and Karunâ.--Nâgârjuna and
Sthiramati on Bodhicitta.--The Awakening of the Bodhicitta.--The
Bodhisattva’s Pranidhâna.
Chapter XII. Ten Stages of Bodhisattvahood.
Gradation in our Spiritual Life.--Pramuditâ.--Vimalâ.--Prabhâkarî.
--Arcismatî.--Sudurjanâ.--Abhimukhî.--Dûrangamâ.--Acalâ.--Sâdhumatî.
--Dharmameghâ.
{xii}
Chapter XIII. Nirvâna.
Nihilistic Nirvâna not the First Object.--Nirvâna is Positive.--The
Mahâyânistic Conception of Nirvâna.--Nirvâna as the
Dharmakâya.--Nirvâna in its Fourth Sense.--Nirvâna and Samsâra are
One.--The Middle Course.--How to Realise Nirvâna.--Love Awakens
Intelligence.--Conclusion.
Appendix, Hymns of Mahâyâna Faith.
Index.
Endnotes.
INTRODUCTION.
{1}
1. THE MAHÂYÂNA AND THE HÎNAYÂNA
BUDDHISM.
/The/ terms “Mahâyâna” and “Hînayâna” may sound unfamiliar to most of
our readers, perhaps even to those who have devoted some time to the
study of Buddhism. They have hitherto been induced to believe that
there is but one form of Buddhism, and that there exists no such
distinction as Mahâyânism and Hînayânism. But, as a matter of fact,
there are diverse schools in Buddhism just as in other religious
systems. It is said that, within a few hundred years after the demise
of Buddha, there were more than twenty different schools,[1] all
claiming {2} to be the orthodox teaching of their master. These,
however, seem to have vanished into insignificance one after another,
when there arose a new school quite different in its general
constitution from its predecessors, but far more important in its
significance as a religious movement. This new school or rather system
made itself so prominent in the meantime as to stand distinctly alone
from all the other schools, which later became a class by itself.
Essentially, it taught everything that was considered to be Buddhistic,
but it was very comprehensive in its principle and method and scope.
And, by reason of this, Buddhism was now split into two great systems,
Mahâyânism and Hînayânism, the latter indiscriminately including all
the minor schools which preceded Mahâyânism in their formal
establishment.
Broadly speaking, the difference between Mahâyânism and Hînayânism is
this: Mahâyânism is more liberal and progressive, but in many respects
too metaphysical and full of speculative thoughts that frequently reach
a dazzling eminence: Hînayânism, on the other hand, is somewhat
conservative and may be considered in many points to be a rationalistic
ethical system simply.
Mahâyâna literally means “great vehicle” and Hînayâna “small or
inferior vehicle,” that is, of salvation. This distinction is
recognised only by the followers of Mahâyânism, because it was by
them that the unwelcome title of Hînayânism was given to their rival
brethren,--thinking that they were more progressive {3} and had a more
assimilating energy than the latter. The adherents of Hînayânism, as
a matter of course, refused to sanction the Mahâyânist doctrine as
the genuine teaching of Buddha, and insisted that there could not be
any other Buddhism than their own, to them naturally the Mahâyâna
system was a sort of heresy.
Geographically, the progressive school of Buddhism found its
supporters in Nepal, Tibet, China, Corea, and Japan, while the
conservative school established itself in Ceylon,[2] Siam, and Burma.
Hence the Mahâyâna and the Hînayâna are also known respectively
Northern and Southern Buddhism.
_En passant_, let me remark that this distinction, however, is not
quite correct, for we have some {4} schools in China and Japan, whose
equivalent or counterpart cannot be found in the so-called Northern
Buddhism, that is, Buddhism flourishing in Northern India. For
instance, we do not have in Nepal or in Tibet anything like the
Sukhâvatî sects of Japan or China. Of course, the general essential
ideas of the Sukhâvatî philosophy are found in the sûtra literature
as well as in the writings of such authors as Açvaghoṣa, Asanga, and
Nâgârjuna. But those ideas were not developed and made into a new sect
as they were in the East. Therefore, it may be more proper to divide
Buddhism into three, instead of two, geographical sections: Southern,
Northern, and Eastern.
_Why the two Doctrines?_
In spite of this distinction, the two schools, Hînayânism and
Mahâyânism, are no more than two main issues of one original source,
which was first discovered by Çâkyamuni; and, as a matter of course,
we find many common traits which are essential to both of them. The
spirit that animated the innermost heart of Buddha is perceptible in
Southern as well as in Northern Buddhism. The difference between them
is not radical or qualitative as imagined by some. It is due, on the
one hand, to a general unfolding of the religious consciousness and a
constant broadening of the intellectual horizon, and, on the other
hand, to the conservative efforts to literally preserve the monastic
rules and traditions. Both schools started with the same spirit,
pursuing the {5} same course. But after a while one did not feel any
necessity for broadening the spirit of the master and adhered to his
words as literally as possible; whilst the other, actuated by a liberal
and comprehensive spirit, has drawn nourishments from all available
sources, in order to unfold the germs in the original system that were
vigorous and generative. These diverse inclinations among primitive
Buddhists naturally led to the dissension of Mahâyânism and Hînayânism.
We cannot here enter into any detailed accounts as to what external
and internal forces were acting in the body of Buddhism to produce the
Mahâyâna system, or as to how gradually it unfolded itself so as to
absorb and assimilate all the discordant thoughts that came in contact
with it. Suffice it to state and answer in general terms the question
which is frequently asked by the uninitiated: “Why did one Buddhism
ever allow itself to be differentiated into two systems, which are
apparently in contradiction in more than one point with each other?”
In other words, “How can there be two Buddhisms equally representing
the true doctrine of the founder?”
The reason is plain enough. The teachings of a great religious founder
are as a rule very general, comprehensive, and many-sided: and,
therefore, there are great possibilities in them to allow various
liberal interpretations by his disciples. And it is on this very
account of comprehensiveness that enables followers of diverse needs,
characters, and trainings to {6} satisfy their spiritual appetite
universally and severally with the teachings of their master. This
comprehensiveness, however, is not due to the intentional use by the
leader of ambiguous terms, nor is it due to the obscurity and
confusion of his own conceptions. The initiator of a movement,
spiritual as well as intellectual, has no time to think out all its
possible details and consequences. When the principle of the movement
is understood by the contemporaries and the foundation of it is
solidly laid down, his own part as initiator is accomplished; and the
remainder can safely be left over to his successors. The latter will
take up the work and carry it out in all its particulars, while making
all necessary alterations and ameliorations according to circumstances.
Therefore, the rôle to be played by the originator is necessarily
indefinite and comprehensive.
Kant, for instance, as promoter of German philosophy, has become the
father of such diverse philosophical systems as Jacobi’s, Fichte’s,
Hegel’s, Schopenhauer’s, etc., while each of them endeavored to
develop some points indefinitely or covertly or indirectly stated by
Kant himself. Jesus of Nazareth, as instigator of a revolutionary
movement against Judaism, did not have any stereotyped theological
doctrines, such as were established later by Christian doctors. The
indefiniteness of his views was so apparent that it caused even among
his personal disciples a sort of dissension, while a majority of his
disciples cherished a visionary hope for the advent {7} of a divine
kingdom on earth. But those externalities which are doomed to pass, do
not prevent the spirit of the movement once awakened by a great leader
from growing more powerful and noble.
The same thing can be said of the teachings of the Buddha. What he
inspired in his followers was the spirit of that religious system
which is now known as Buddhism. Guided by this spirit, his followers
severally developed his teachings as required by their special needs
and circumstances, finally giving birth to the distinction of
Mahâyânism and Hînayânism.
_The Original Meaning of Mahâyâna._
The term Mahâyâna was first used to designate the highest principle,
or being, or knowledge, of which the universe with all its sentient
and non-sentient beings is a manifestation, and through which only
they can attain final salvation (_mokṣa_ or _nirvâna_). Mahâyâna was
not the name given to any religious doctrine, nor had it anything to
do with doctrinal controversy, though later it was so utilised by the
progressive party.
Açvaghoṣa, the first Mahâyâna expounder known to us,--living about the
time of Christ,--used the term in his religio-philosophical book
called _Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahâyâna_[3] as
synonymous with Bhûtatathâtâ, or Dharmakâyâ,[4] the {8} highest
principle of Mahâyânism. He likened the recognition of, and faith in,
this highest being and principle into a conveyance which will carry us
safely across the tempestuous ocean of birth and death (_samsâra_) to
the eternal shore of Nirvâna.
Soon after him, however, the controversy between the two schools of
Buddhism, conservatives and progressionists as we might call them,
became more and more pronounced; and when it reached its climax which
was most probably in the times of Nâgârjuna and Âryadeva, i.e., a
few centuries after Açvaghoṣa, the progressive party ingeniously
invented the term Hînayâna in contrast to Mahâyâna, the latter
having been adopted by them as the watchword of their own school. The
Hînayânists and the Tîrthakas[5] then were sweepingly condemned by
the Mahâyânists as inadequate to achieve a universal salvation of
sentient beings.
_An Older Classification of Buddhists._
Before the distinction of Mahâyânists and Hînayânists became definite,
that is to say, at the time of Nâgârjuna or even before it, those
Buddhists who held a more progressive and broader view tried to
distinguish three yânas among the followers of the Buddha, viz.,
Bodhisattva-yâna, Pratyekabuddha-yâna, and Çrâvaka-yâna; yâna being
another name for class.
{9}
The Bodhisattva is that class of Buddhists who, believing in the Bodhi
(intelligence or wisdom), which is a reflection of the Dharmakâya in
the human soul, direct all their spiritual energy toward realising and
developing it for the sake of their fellow-creatures.
The Pratyekabuddha is a “solitary thinker” or a philosopher, who,
retiring into solitude and calmly contemplating on the evanescence of
worldly pleasures, endeavors to attain his own salvation, but remains
unconcerned with the sufferings of his fellow-beings. Religiously
considered, a Pratyekabuddha is cold, impassive, egotistic, and lacks
love for all mankind.
The Çrâvaka which means “hearer” is inferior in the estimate of
Mahâyânists even to the Pratyekabuddha, for he does not possess any
intellect that enables him to think independently and to find out by
himself the way to final salvation. Being endowed, however, with a
pious heart, he is willing to listen to the instructions of the Buddha,
to believe in him, to observe faithfully all the moral precepts given
by him, and rests fully contented within the narrow horizon of his
mediocre intellect.
To a further elucidation of Bodhisattvahood and its important bearings
in the Mahâyâna Buddhism, we devote a special chapter below. For
Mahâyânism is no more than the Buddhism of Bodhisattvas, while the
Pratyekabuddhas and the Çrâvakas are considered by Mahâyânists to be
adherents of Hînayânism.
{10}
_The Mahâyâna Buddhism Defined._
We can now form a somewhat definite notion as to what the Mahâyâna
Buddhism is. It is the Buddhism which, inspired by a progressive
spirit, broadened its original scope, so far as it did not contradict
the inner significance of the teachings of the Buddha, and which
assimilated other religio-philosophical beliefs within itself,
whenever it felt that, by so doing, people of more widely different
characters and intellectual endowments could be saved. Let us be
satisfied at present with this statement, until we enter into a more
detailed exposition of its doctrinal peculiarities in the pages that
follow.
It may not be out of place, while passing, to remark that the term
Mahâyânism is used in this work merely in contradistinction to that
form of Buddhism, which is flourishing in Ceylon and Burma and other
central Asiatic nations, and whose literature is principally written
in the language called Pâli, which comes from the same stock as
Sanskrit. The term “Mahâyâna” does not imply, as it is used here, any
sense of superiority over the Hînayâna. When the historical aspect of
Mahâyânism is treated, it may naturally develop that its over-zealous
and one-sided devotees unnecessarily emphasised its controversial and
dogmatical phase at the sacrifice of its true spirit; but the reader
must not think that this work has anything to do with those
complications. In fact, Mahâyânism professes to be a boundless ocean
in which all form {11} of thought and faith can find its congenial and
welcome home; why then should we make it militate against its own
fellow-doctrine, Hînayânism?
2. IS THE MAHÂYÂNA BUDDHISM THE GENUINE
TEACHING OF THE BUDDHA?
What is generally known to the Western nations by the name of Buddhism
is Hînayânism, whose scriptures as above stated are written in Pâli
and studied mostly in Ceylon, Burma, and Siam. It was through this
language that the first knowledge of Buddhism was acquired by
Orientalists; and naturally they came to regard Hînayânism or Southern
Buddhism as the only genuine teachings of the Buddha. They insisted,
and some of them still insist, that to have an adequate and thorough
knowledge of Buddhism, they must confine themselves solely to the
study of the Pâli, that whatever may be learned from other sources,
i.e., from the Sanskrit, Tibetan, or Chinese documents should be
considered as throwing only a side-light on the reliable information
obtained from the Pâli, and further that the knowledge derived from
the former should in certain cases be discarded as accounts of a
degenerated form of Buddhism. Owing to these unfortunate hypotheses,
the significance of Mahâyânism as a living religion has been entirely
ignored; and even those who are regarded as best authorities on the
subject appear greatly misinformed and, what is worse, altogether
prejudiced.
{12}
_No Life Without Growth._
This is very unfair on the part of the critics, because what religion
is there in the whole history of mankind that has not made any
development whatever, that has remained the same, like the granite,
throughout its entire course? Let us ask whether there is any religion
which has shown some signs of vitality and yet retained its primitive
form intact and unmodified in every respect. Is not changeableness,
that is, susceptibility to irritation the most essential sign of
vitality? Every organism grows, which means a change in some way or
other. There is no form of life to be found anywhere on earth, that
does not grow or change, or that has not any inherent power of
adjusting itself to the surrounding conditions.
Take, for example, Christianity. Is Protestantism the genuine teaching
of Jesus of Nazareth? or does Catholicism represent his true spirit?
Jesus himself did not have any definite notion of Trinity doctrine,
nor did he propose any suggestion for ritualism. According to the
Synoptics, he appears to have cherished a rather immature conception
of the kingdom of God than a purely ideal one as conceived by Paul,
and his personal disciples who were just as illiterate philosophically
as the master himself were anxiously waiting in all probability for
its mundane realisation. But what Christians, Catholics or Protestants,
in these days of enlightenment, would dare {13} give a literal
explanation to this material conception of the coming kingdom?
Again, think of Jesus’s view on marriage and social life. Is it not an
established fact that he highly advocated celibacy and in the case of
married people strict continence, and also that he greatly favored
pious poverty and asceticism in general? In these respects, the monks
of the Medieval Ages and the Catholic priests of the present day
(though I cannot say they are ascetic and poor in their living) must
be said to be in more accord with the teaching of the master than
their Protestant brethren. But what Protestants would seriously
venture to defend all those views of Jesus, in spite of their avowed
declaration that they are sincerely following in the steps of their
Lord? Taking all in all, these contradictions do not prevent them,
Protestants as well as Catholics, from calling themselves Christians
and even good, pious, devoted Christians, as long as they are
consciously or unconsciously animated by the same spirit, that was
burning in the son of the carpenter of Nazareth, an obscure village of
Galilee, about two thousand years ago.
The same mode of reasoning holds good in the case of Mahâyânism, and
it would be absurd to insist on the genuineness of Hînayânism at the
expense of the former. Take for granted that the Mahâyâna school of
Buddhism contains some elements absorbed from other Indian
religio-philosophical systems; but what of it? Is not Christianity
also an amalgamation, {14} so to speak, of Jewish, Greek, Roman,
Babylonian, Egyptian, and other pagan thoughts? In fact every healthy
and energetic religion is historical, in the sense that, in the course
of its development, it has adapted itself to the ever-changing
environment, and has assimilated within itself various elements which
appeared at first even threatening its own existence. In Christianity,
this process of assimilation, adaptation, and modification has been
going on from its very beginning. As the result, we see in the
Christianity of to-day its original type so metamorphosed, so far as
its outward appearance is concerned, that nobody would now take it for
a faithful copy of the prototype.
_Mahâyânism a Living Faith._
So with Mahâyânism. Whatever changes it has made during its historical
evolution, its spirit and central ideas are all those of its founder.
The question whether or not it is genuine, entirely depends on our
interpretation of the term “genuine.” If we take it to mean the
lifeless preservation of the original, we should say that Mahâyânism
is not the genuine teaching of the Buddha, and we may add that
Mahâyânists would be proud of the fact, because being a living
religious force it would never condescend to be the corpse of a
by-gone faith. The fossils, however faithfully preserved, are nothing
but rigid inorganic substances from which life is forever departed.
{15} Mahâyânism is far from this; it is an ever-growing faith and
ready in all times to cast off its old garments as soon as they are
worn out. But its spirit originally inspired by the “Teacher of Men
and Gods” (_çâstadevamanuṣyânam_) is most jealously guarded against
pollution and degeneration. Therefore, as far as its spirit is
concerned, there is no room left to doubt its genuineness; and those
who desire to have a complete survey of Buddhism cannot ignore the
significance of Mahâyânism.
It is naught but an idle talk to question the historical value of an
organism, which is now full of vitality and active in all its
functions, and to treat it like an archeological object, dug out from
the depths of the earth, or like a piece of bric-à-brac, discovered
in the ruins of an ancient royal palace. Mahâyânism is not an object
of historical curiosity. Its vitality and activity concern us in our
daily life. It is a great spiritual organism; its moral and religious
forces are still exercising an enormous power over millions of souls;
and its further development is sure to be a very valuable contribution
to the world-progress of the religious consciousness. What does it
matter, then, whether or not Mahâyânism is the genuine teaching of the
Buddha?
Here is an instance of most flagrant contradictions present in our
minds, but of which we are not conscious on account of our preconceived
ideas. Christian critics vigorously insist on the genuineness of their
own religion, which is no more than a {16} hybrid, at least outwardly;
but they want to condemn their rival religion as degenerated, because
it went through various stages of development like theirs. It is of no
practical use to trouble with this nonsensical question,--the question
of the genuineness of Mahâyânism, which by the way is frequently
raised by outsiders as well as by some unenlightened Buddhists
themselves.
3. SOME MISSTATEMENTS ABOUT THE
MAHÂYÂNA DOCTRINES.
Before entering fully into the subject proper of this work, let us
glance over some erroneous opinions about the Mahâyâna doctrines,
which are held by some Western scholars, and naturally by all
uninitiated readers, who are like the blind led by the blind. It may
not be altogether a superfluous work to give them a passing review in
this chapter and to show broadly what Mahâyânism is not.
_Why Injustice is done to Buddhism._
The people who have had their thoughts and sentiments habitually
trained by one particular set of religious dogmas, frequently misjudge
the value of those thoughts that are strange and unfamiliar to them.
We may call this class of people bigots or religious enthusiasts. They
may have fine religious and moral sentiments as far as their own
religious training goes; but, when examined from a broader point of
view, they are to a great extent vitiated {17} with prejudices,
superstitions, and fanatical beliefs, which, since childhood, have
been pumped into their receptive minds, before they were sufficiently
developed and could form independent judgments. This fact so miserably
spoils their purity of sentiment and obscures their transparency of
intellect, that they are disqualified to perceive and appreciate
whatever is good and true and beautiful in the so-called heathen
religions. This is the main reason why those Christian missionaries
are incapable of rightly understanding the spirit of religion
generally--I mean, those missionaries who come to the East to
substitute one set of superstitions for another.
This strong general indictment against the Christian missionaries,
however, is by no means prompted by any partisan spirit. My desire, on
the contrary, is to do justice to those thoughts and sentiments that
have been working consciously or unconsciously in the human mind from
time immemorial and shall work on till the day of the last judgment,
if there ever be such a day. To see what these thoughts and sentiments
are, which, by the way, constitute the kernel of every religion, we
must without any reluctance throw off all the prejudices we are liable
to cherish, though quite unknowingly; and keeping always in view what
is most essential in the religious consciousness, we must not confound
it with its accessories, which are doomed to die in the course of
time.
{18}
_Examples of Injustice._
As specimen of injustice done to the Mahâyâna Buddhism by Christian
critics, we quote the following passages from Monier-William’s
_Buddhism_, Waddell’s _Buddhism in Tibet_, and Samuel Beal’s _Buddhism
in China_, all of which are representative works each in its own field.
_Monier Monier-Williams._
Monier Monier-Williams is a well-known authority on Sanskrit
literature, and his works in this department will long remain as a
valuable contribution to human knowledge. But, unfortunately, as soon
as he attempts to enter the domain of religious controversy, his
intellect becomes piteously obscured by his preconceived ideas. He
thinks, for instance, that the principal feature of Mahâyânism consists
merely in amplifying the number of Bodhisattvas, who are contented,
according to his view, with their “perpetual residence in the heavens,
and quite willing to put off all desires for Buddhahood and
Parinirvana.” (P. 190.)
This remark is so absurd that it will at once be rejected by any one
who has a first-hand knowledge of the Mahâyâna system, as even unworthy
of refutation, but Monier-Williams takes special pains to give to his
characterisation of the Mahâyâna doctrine a show of rational
explanation. “Of course,” says he, “men instinctively recoiled from
utter self-annihilation, {19} and so the Buddha’s followers ended in
changing the true idea of Nirvana and converting it from a condition
of non-existence into a state of lazy beatitude in celestial regions
(!), while they encouraged all men--whether monks or laymen--to make a
sense of dreamy bliss in Heaven (!), and not total extinction of life,
the end of all their efforts.” (P. 156.)
This view of the Buddhist heaven as interpreted by Monier-Williams is
nothing but the conception of the Christian heaven colored with
paganism. Nothing is more foreign to Buddhists than this distinguished
Sankritist’s interpretation of celestial existence. The life of devas
(celestial beings) is just as much subject to the law of birth and
death as that of men on earth. What consolation would there be for the
Mahâyânists striving after the highest principle of existence, only
to find themselves transmigrated to a celestial abode, that is also
full of sorrows and sufferings? Always working for the welfare of
their fellow-creatures, the Bodhisattvas never desire any earthly or
heavenly happiness for themselves. Whatever merits, according to the
law of karma, there be stored up for their good work, they do not have
any wish to enjoy them by themselves, but they will have all these
merits turned over (_parivarta_) to the interests of their
fellow-beings. This is the ideal of Bodhisattvas, i.e., of the
followers of Mahâyânism.
{20}
_Beal._
Samuel Beal who is considered by Western scholars to be an authority
on Chinese Buddhism, referring to the Mahâyâna conception of
Dharmakâya,[6] says in his _Buddhism in China_ (p. 156): “We can
have little doubt, then, that from early days worship was offered by
Buddhists at several spots, consecrated by the presence of the Teacher,
to an invisible presence. This presence was formulated by the later
Buddhists under the phrase, ‘the Body of the Law’, Dharmakâya.”
Then, alluding to Buddha’s instruction that says after his Parinirvana
the Law given by him should be regarded as himself, Beal proceeds to
say: “Here was the germ from which proceeded the idea or formula of an
invisible presence: teaching and power of the Law (_Dharma_)
represented the Dharmakâya or Law-Body of Buddha, present with the
order, and fit for reverence.”
To interpret Dharmakâya as the Body of the Law is quite inadequate
and misleading. To the Hînayânists, there is nothing beside the
Tripitaka as the object of reverence, and, therefore, the notion of
the Body of the Law has no meaning to them. The idea {21} is distinctly
Mahâyânistic, but Beal is not well informed about its real significance
as understood by the Buddhists. The chief reason of his
misinterpretation, as I judge, lies in his rendering _dharma_ by “law”,
while _dharma_ here means “that which subsists,” or “that which
maintains itself even when all the transient modes disappear,” in
short, “being,” or “substance.” Dharmakâya, therefore, would be a sort
of the Absolute, or Essence-Body of all things. This notion plays such
an important rôle in Mahâyânism that an adequate knowledge of it is
indispensable to understand the constitution of Mahâyânism as a
religious system.
_Waddell._
Let us state one more case of misrepresentation by Western scholars of
the Mahâyâna Buddhism. Waddell, author of _Buddhism in Tibet_,
referring to the point of divergence between the so-called Northern
Buddhism and the Southern, says (pp. 10-11): “It was the theistic
Mahâyâna doctrine which substituted, for the agnostic idealism and
simple morality of Buddha, a speculative theistic system with a
mysticism of sophistic nihilism in the background.”
And again: “This Mahâyâna [meaning Nâgârjuna’s Mâdhyamika school] was
essentially a sophistic nihilism, or rather Parinirvana, while ceasing
to be extinction of life, was converted a mystic state which admitted
of no definition.”
{22}
It may not be wrong to call Mahâyânism a speculative theistic system
in a wide sense, but it must be asked on what ground Waddell thinks
that it has in its background “a mysticism of sophistic nihilism”.
Could a religious system be called sophistry when it makes a close
inquiry into the science of dialectics, in order to show how futile it
is to seek salvation through the intellect alone? Could a religious
system be called a nihilism when it endeavors to reach the highest
reality which transcends the phenomenality of concrete individual
existences? Could a doctrine be called nihilistic when it defines the
absolute as neither void (_çûnya_) nor not-void (_açûnya_)?
I could cull some more passages from other Buddhist scholars of the
West and show how far Mahâyânism has been made by them a subject of
misrepresentation. But since this work is not a polemic, but devoted
to a positive exposition of its basic doctrines, I refrain from so
doing. Suffice it to state that one of the main causes of the injustice
done to Buddhism by the Christian critics comes from their
preconceptions, of which they may not be aware, but which all the more
vitiate their “impartial” judgments.
4. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION.
Those misconceptions about Buddhism as above stated induce me to
digress in this introductory part and to say a few words concerning
the distinction {23} between the form and the spirit of religion. A
clear knowledge of this distinction will greatly facilitate the
formation of a correct notion about Mahâyânism and will also help us
duly to appreciate its significance as a living religious faith.
By the spirit of religion I mean that element in religion which remains
unchanged throughout its successive stages of development and
transformation: while the form of it is the external shell which is
subject to any modification required by circumstances.
_No Revealed Religion._
It admits of no doubt that religion, as everything else under the sun,
is subject to the laws of evolution, and that, therefore, there is no
such thing as a revealed religion, whose teachings are supposed to
have been delivered to us direct from the hands of an anthropomorphic
or anthropopsychic supernatural being, and which, like an inorganic
substance, remains forever the same, without changing, without growing,
without modifying itself in accord with the surrounding conditions.
Unless people are so blinded by a belief in this kind of religion as
to insist that its dogmas have suffered absolutely no change whatever
since its “revelation,” they must recognise like every clear-headed
person the fact that there are some ephemeral elements in every
religion, which must carefully be distinguished from its quintessence
which remains eternally the same.
When this discrimination is not observed, prejudice {24} will at once
assert itself, inducing them to imagine that the religion in which
they were brought up with all its truths and superstitions is the only
orthodox religion in the world, and all the other religions are
nothing else than heathenism, idolatry, atheism, apostasy, and the
like. This attitude of such religionists, however, serves only to
betray their own narrowness of mind and dimness of spiritual insight.
No one who desires to penetrate into the innermost recesses of the
human heart and who longs to feel the fullest meaning of life, should
foster in himself in the least degree a disposition of bigotry.
_The Mystery._
Religion is the inmost voice of the human heart that under the yoke of
a seemingly finite existence groans and travails in pain. Mankind,
from their first appearance on earth, have never been satisfied with
the finiteness and impermanency of life. They have always been
yearning after something that will liberate them from the slavery of
this mortal coil, or from the cursed bondage of metempsychosis, as
Hindu thinkers express it. This something, however, on account of its
transcending all the principles of separation and individuation, which
characterise the phenomena of this mundane existence, has always
remained as something indefinite, inadequate, chaotic, and full of
mystery. And, according to different degrees of intellectual
development in different ages and nations, people have endeavored to
invest this {25} mysterious something with all sorts of human feelings
and intelligence. Most of modern scientists are now content with the
hypothesis that the mystery is unfathomable by the human mind, which
is conditioned by the law of relativity, and that our business here,
moral as well as intellectual, can be executed without troubling
ourselves with this ever-haunting problem of mystery;--this doctrine
is called agnosticism.
But this hypothesis can in no wise be considered the final sentence
passed on the mystery. From the scientific point of view, the maxim of
agnosticism is excellent, as science does not pretend to venture into
the realm of non-relativity. Dissatisfaction, however, presents itself,
when we attempt to silence by this hypothesis the last demand of the
human heart.
_Intellect and Imagination._
The human heart is not an intellectual crystal. When the intellect
displays itself in its full glory, the heart still aches and struggles
to get hold of something beyond. The intellect may sometimes declare
that it has at last laid its hand on what is demanded by the heart.
Time passes on, and the mystery is examined from the other points that
escaped consideration before, and, to the great disappointment of the
heart, the supposed solution is found to be wanting. The intellect is
baffled. But the human heart never gets tired of its yearnings and
demands a satisfaction ever more pressingly. Should they be considered
a mere nightmare of imagination? Surely {26} not, for herein lies the
field where religion claims supreme authority, and its claim is
perfectly right.
But religion cannot fabricate whatever it pleases; it must work in
perfect accord with the intellect. As the essential nature of man does
not consist solely in intellect, or will, or feeling, but in the
coördination of these psychical elements, religion must guard herself
against the unrestrained flight of imagination. Most of the
superstitions fondly cherished by a pious heart are due to the
disregard of the intellectual element in religion.
The imagination creates: the intellect discriminates. Creation without
discrimination is wild: discrimination without creation is barren.
Religion and science, when they do not work with mutual understanding,
are sure to be one-sided. The soul makes an abnormal growth at one
point, loses its balance, and is finally given up to a collapse of the
entire system. Those pious religious enthusiasts who see a natural
enemy in science and denounce it with all their energy, are, in my
opinion, as purblind and distorted in their view, as those men of
science who think that science alone must claim the whole field of
soul-activities as well as those of nature. I am not in sympathy with
either of them: for one is just as arrogant in its claim as the other.
Without a careful examination of both sides of a shield, we are not
competent to give a correct opinion upon it.
But the imagination is not the exclusive possession of religion, nor
is discrimination or ratiocination the {27} monopoly of science. They
are reciprocal and complementary: one cannot do anything without the
other. The difference between science and religion is not that between
certitude and probability. The difference is rather in their respective
fields of activity. Science is solely concerned with things
conditional, relative, and finite. When it explains a given phenomenon
by some fixed laws which are in turn nothing but a generalisation of
particular facts, the task of science is done, and any further attempt
to go beyond this, i.e., to make an inquiry into the whence, whither,
and why of things, is beyond its realm. But the human soul does not
remain satisfied here, it asks for the ultimate principle underlying
all so-called scientific laws and hypotheses. Science is indifferent
to the teleology of things: a mechanical explanation of them appeases
its intellectual curiosity. But in religion teleology is of paramount
importance, it is one of the most fundamental problems, and a system
which does not give any definite conception on this point is no
religion. Science, again, does not care if there is something beyond
or outside its manifold laws and theories; but a religion which does
not possess a God or anything corresponding to it, ceases to be so,
for it fails to give consolation to the human heart.
_The Contents of Faith vary._
The solution of religious problems, as far as they fall within the
sphere of relative experience, is largely {28} a matter of personal
conviction, determined by one’s intellectual development, external
circumstances, education, disposition, etc. The conceptions of faith
thus formulated are naturally infinitely diversified; even among the
followers of a certain definite set of dogmas, each will understand
them in his own way, owing to individual peculiarities. If we could
subject their conceptions of faith to a strict analysis as a chemist
does his materials, we should detect in them all the possible forms of
differentiation. But all these things belong to the exterior of
religion and have nothing to do with the essentials which underlie
them.
The abiding elements of religion come from within, and consist mainly
in the mysterious sentiment that lies hidden in the deepest depths of
the human heart, and that, when awakened, shakes the whole structure
of personality and brings about a great spiritual revolution, which
results in a complete change of one’s world-conception. When this
mysterious sentiment finds expression and formulates its conceptions
in the terms of intellect, it becomes a definite system of beliefs,
which is popularly called religion, but which should properly be
termed dogmatism, that is, an intellectualised form of religion. On
the other hand, the outward forms of religion consist of those
changing elements that are mainly determined by the intellectual and
moral development of the times as well as by individual esthetical
feelings.
True Christians and enlightened Buddhists may, therefore, find their
point of agreement in the recognition {29} of the inmost religious
sentiment that constitutes the basis of our being, though this
agreement does by no means prevent them from retaining their
individuality in the conceptions and expressions of faith. My
conviction is: If the Buddha and the Christ changed their accidental
places of birth, Gautama might have been a Christ rising against the
Jewish traditionalism, and Jesus a Buddha, perhaps propounding the
doctrine of non-ego and Nirvâna and Dharmakâya.
However great a man may be, he cannot but be an echo of the spirit of
the times. He never stands, as is supposed by some, so aloof and
towering above the masses as to be practically by himself. On the
contrary, “he,” as Emerson says, “finds himself in the river of the
thoughts and events, forced onward by the ideas and necessities of his
contemporaries.” So it was with the Buddha, and so with the Christ.
They were nothing but the concrete representatives of the ideas and
feelings that were struggling in those times against the established
institutions, which were degenerating fast and menaced the progress of
humanity. But at the same time those ideas and sentiments were the
outburst of the Eternal Soul, which occasionally makes a solemn
announcement of its will, through great historical figures or through
great world-events.
* * *
Believing that a bit of religio-philosophical exposition as above
indulged will prepare the minds of {30} my Christian readers sincerely
to take up the study of a religious system other than their own, I now
proceed to a systematical elucidation of the Mahâyâna Buddhism, as it
is believed at present in the Far East.
CHAPTER I.
A GENERAL CHARACTERISATION OF BUDDHISM.
{31}
_No God and no Soul._
/Buddhism/ is considered by some to be a religion without a God and
without a soul. The statement is true and untrue according to what
meaning we give to those terms.
Buddhism does not recognise the existence of a being, who stands aloof
from his “creations,” and who meddles occasionally with human affairs
when his capricious will pleases him. This conception of a supreme
being is very offensive to Buddhists. They are unable to perceive any
truth in the hypotheses, that a being like ourselves created the
universe out of nothing and first peopled it with a pair of sentient
beings; that, owing to a crime committed by them, which, however,
could have been avoided if the creator so desired, they were condemned
by him to eternal damnation; that the creator in the meantime feeling
pity for the cursed, or suffering the bite of remorse for his somewhat
rash deed, despatched his only beloved son to the earth for the
purpose of rescuing mankind from universal misery, etc., etc. If
Buddhism is called atheism on account of its {32} refusal to take
poetry for actual fact, its followers would have no objection to the
designation.
Next, if we understand by soul âtman, which, secretly hiding itself
behind all mental activities, direct them after the fashion of an
organist striking different notes as he pleases, Buddhists outspokenly
deny the existence of such a fabulous being. To postulate an
independent âtman outside a combination of the five Skandhas[7], of
which an individual being is supposed by Buddhists to consist, is to
unreservedly welcome egoism with all its pernicious corollaries. And
what distinguishes Buddhism most characteristically and emphatically
from all other religions is the doctrine of non-âtman or non-ego,
exactly opposite to the postulate of a soul-substance which is
cherished by most of religious enthusiasts. In this sense, Buddhism is
undoubtedly a religion without the soul.
To make these points clearer in a general way, let us briefly treat in
this chapter of such principal tenets of Buddhism as Karma, Âtman,
Avidyâ, Nirvâna, Dharmakâya, etc. Some of these doctrines being the
common property of the two schools of Buddhism, Hînayânism and
Mahâyânism, their brief, comprehensive exposition here will furnish
our readers with a general notion about the constitution of Buddhism,
and will also prepare them to pursue a further specific exposition of
the Mahâyâna doctrine which follows.
{33}
_Karma._
One of the most fundamental doctrines established by Buddha is that
nothing in this world comes from a single cause, that the existence of
a universe is the result of a combination of several causes (_hetu_)
and conditions (_pratyaya_), and is at the same time an active force
contributing to the production of an effect in the future. As far as
phenomenal existences are concerned, this law of cause and effect
holds universally valid. Nothing, even God, can interfere with the
course of things thus regulated, materially as well as morally. If a
God really exists and has some concern about our worldly affairs, he
must first conform himself to the law of causation. Because the
principle of karma, which is the Buddhist term for causation morally
conceived, holds supreme everywhere and all the time.
The conception of karma plays the most important rôle in Buddhist
ethics. Karma is the formative principle of the universe. It determines
the course of events and the destiny of our existence. The reason why
we cannot change our present state of things as we may will, is that
it has already been determined by the karma that was performed in our
previous lives, not only individually but collectively. But, for this
same reason, we shall be able to work out our destiny in the future,
which is nothing but the resultant of several factors that are working
and that are being worked by ourselves in this life.
{34}
Therefore, says Buddha:
“By self alone is evil done,
By self is one disgraced;
By self is evil left undone,
By self alone is he purified;
Purity and impurity belong to self:
No one can purify another.”[8]
Again,
“Not in the sky
Nor in the midst of the sea,
Nor entering a cleft of the mountains,
Is found that realm on earth
Where one may stand and be
From an evil deed absolved.”[9]
This doctrine of karma may be regarded as an application in our
ethical realm of the theory of the conservation of energy. Everything
done is done once for all; its footprints on the sand of our moral and
social evolution are forever left; nay, more than left, they are
generative, good or evil, and waiting for further development under
favorable conditions. In the physical world, even the slightest
possible movement of our limbs cannot but affect the general cosmic
motion of the earth, however infinitesimal it be; and if we had a
proper instrument, we could surely measure its precise extent of
effect. So is it even with our deeds. A deed once performed, together
with its subjective motives, can never vanish without leaving some
impressions either on the individual {35} consciousness or on the
supra-individual, i.e., social consciousness.
We need not further state that the conception of karma in its general
aspect is scientifically verified. In our moral and material life,
where the law of relativity rules supreme, the doctrine of karma must
be considered thoroughly valid. And as long as its validity is
admitted in this field, we can live our phenomenal life without
resorting to the hypothesis of a personal God, as declared by Lamarck
when his significant work on evolution was presented to Emperor
Napoleon.
But it will do injustice to Buddhism if we designate it agnosticism or
naturalism, denying or ignoring the existence of the ultimate,
unifying principle, in which all contradictions are obliterated.
Dharmakâya is the name given by Buddhists to this highest principle,
viewed not only from the philosophical but also from the religious
standpoint. In the Dharmakâya, Buddhists find the ultimate
significance of life, which, when seen from its phenomenal aspect,
cannot escape the bondage of karma and its irrefragable laws.
_Avidyâ._
What claims our attention next, is the problem of nescience, which is
one of the most essential features of Buddhism. Buddhists think,
nescience (in Sanskrit _avidyâ_) is the subjective aspect of karma,
involving us in a series of rebirths. Rebirth, considered by itself,
is no moral evil, but rather a necessary {36} condition of progress
toward perfection, if perfection ever be attainable here. It is an
evil only when it is the outcome of ignorance,--ignorance as to the
true meaning of our earthly existence.
Ignorant are they who do not recognise the evanescence of worldly
things and who tenaciously cleave to them as final realities; who
madly struggle to shun the misery brought about by their own folly;
who savagely cling to the self against the will of God, as Christians
would say; who take particulars as final existences and ignore One
pervading reality which underlies them all; who build up an adamantine
wall between the mine and thine: in a word, ignorant are those who do
not understand that there is no such thing as an ego-soul, and that
all individual existences are unified in the system of Dharmakâya.
Buddhism, therefore, most emphatically maintains that to attain the
bliss of Nirvana we must radically dispel this illusion, this
ignorance, this root of all evil and suffering in this life.
The doctrine of nescience or ignorance is technically expressed in the
following formula, which is commonly called the Twelve Nidânas or
Pratyayasamutpada, that is to say Chains of Dependence:
(1) There is Ignorance (_avidyâ_) in the beginning; (2) from Ignorance
Action (_sanskâra_) comes forth; (3) from Action Consciousness
(_vijñâna_) comes forth; (4) from Consciousness Name-and-Form
(_nâmarûpa_) comes forth; (5) from Name-and-Form the Six Organs
(_ṣadâyâtana_) come forth; (6) from the Six Organs {37} Touch
(_sparça_) comes forth; (7) from Touch Sensation (_vedanâ_) comes
forth; (8) from Sensation Desire (_tṛṣnâ_) comes forth; (9) from Desire
Clinging (_upâdâna_) comes forth; (10) from Clinging Being (_bhâva_)
comes forth; (11) from Being Birth (_jati_) comes forth; and (12) from
Birth Pain (_duḥkha_) comes forth.
According to Vasubandhu’s _Abhidharmakoça_, the formula is explained
as follows: Being ignorant in our previous life as to the significance
of our existence, we let loose our desires and act wantonly. Owing to
this karma, we are destined in the present life to be endowed with
consciousness (_vijñâna_), name-and-form (_nâmarûpa_), the six organs
of sense (_ṣadâyâtana_), and sensation (_vedanâ_). By the exercise of
these faculties, we now desire for, hanker after, cling to, these
illusive existences which have no ultimate reality whatever. In
consequence of this “Will to Live” we potentially accumulate or make
up the karma that will lead us to further metempsychosis of birth and
death.
The formula is by no means logical, nor is it exhaustive, but the
fundamental notion that life started in ignorance or blind will
remains veritable.
_Non-Atman._
The problem of nescience naturally leads to the doctrine usually known
as that of non-Atman, i.e., non-ego, to which allusion was made at the
beginning {38} of this chapter. This doctrine of Buddhism is one of
the subjects that have caused much criticism by Christian scholars.
Its thesis runs: There is no such thing as ego-soul, which, according
to the vulgar interpretation, is the agent of our mental activities.
And this is the reason why Buddhism is sometimes called a religion
without the soul, as aforesaid.
This Buddhist negation of the ego-soul is perhaps startling to the
people, who, having no speculative power, blindly accept the
traditional, materialistic view of the soul. They think, they are very
spiritual in endorsing the dualism of soul and flesh, and in making
the soul something like a corporeal entity, though far more ethereal
than an ordinary object of the senses. They think of the soul as being
more in the form of an angel, when they teach that it ascends to
heaven immediately after its release from the material imprisonment.
They further imagine that the soul, because of its imprisonment in the
body, groans in pain for its liberty, not being able to bear its
mundane limitations. The immortality of the soul is a continuation
after the dismemberment of material elements of this ethereal, astral,
ghost-like entity,--very much resembling the Samkhyan _Lingham_ or the
Vedantic _sûkṣama-çârîra_. Self-consciousness will not a whit suffer
in its continued activity, as it is the essential function of the
soul. Brothers and sisters, parents and sons and daughters, wives and
husbands, all transfigured and sublimated, will meet again in the {39}
celestial abode, and perpetuate their home life much after the manner
of their earthly one. People who take this view of the soul and its
immortality must feel a great disappointment or even resentment, when
they are asked to recognise the Buddhist theory of non-âtman.
The absurdity of ascribing to the soul a sort of astral existence
taught by some theosophists is due to the confusion of the name and
the object corresponding to it. The soul, or what is tantamount
according to the vulgar notion, the ego, is a name given to a certain
coördination of mental activities. Abstract names are invented by us
to economise our intellectual labors, and of course have no
corresponding realities as particular presences in the concrete
objective world. Vulgar minds have forgotten the history of the
formation of abstract names. Being accustomed always to find certain
objective realities or concrete individuals answering to certain
names, they--those naïve realists--imagine that all names, irrespective
of their nature, must have their concrete individual equivalents in
the sensual world. Their idealism or spiritualism, so called, is in
fact a gross form of materialism, in spite of their unfounded fear for
the latter as atheistic and even immoral;--curse of ignorance!
The non-âtman theory does not deny that there is a coördination or
unification of various mental operations. Buddhism calls this system
of coördination vijñâna, not âtman. Vijñâna is consciousness, while
{40} âtman is the ego conceived as a concrete entity,--a hypostatic
agent which, abiding in the deepest recess of the mind, directs all
subjective activities according to its own discretion. This view is
radically rejected by Buddhism.
A familiar analogy illustrating the doctrine of non-âtman is the
notion of a wheel or that of a house. Wheel is the name given to a
combination in a fixed form of the spokes, axle, tire, hub, rim, etc.;
house is that given to a combination of roofs, pillars, windows,
floors, walls, etc., after a certain model and for a certain purpose.
Now, take all these parts independently, and where is the house or the
wheel to be found? House or wheel is merely the name designating a
certain form in which parts are systematically and definitely disposed.
What an absurdity, then, it must be to insist on the independent
existence of the wheel or of the house as an agent behind the
combination of certain parts thus definitely arranged!
It is wonderful that Buddhism clearly anticipated the outcome of
modern psychological researches at the time when all other religious
and philosophical systems were eagerly cherishing dogmatic
superstitions concerning the nature of the ego. The refusal of modern
psychology to have soul mean anything more than the sum-total of all
mental experiences, such as sensations, ideas, feelings, decisions,
etc., is precisely a rehearsal of the Buddhist doctrine of non-âtman.
It does not deny that there is a unity of consciousness, {41} for to
deny this is to doubt our everyday experiences, but it refuses to
assert that this unity is absolute, unconditioned, and independent.
Everything in this phenomenal phase of existence, is a combination of
certain causes (_hetu_) and conditions (_pratyaya_) brought together
according to the principle of karma; and everything that is compound
is finite and subject to dissolution, and, therefore, always limited
by something else. Even the soul-life, as far as its phenomenality
goes, is no exception to this universal law. To maintain the existence
of a soul-substance which is supposed to lie hidden behind the
phenomena of consciousness, is not only misleading, but harmful and
productive of some morally dangerous conclusions. The supposition that
there is something where there is really nothing, makes us cling to
this chimerical form, with no other result than subjecting ourselves
to an eternal series of sufferings. So we read in the _Lankâvatâra
Sûtra_, III:
“A flower in the air, or a hare with horns,
Or a pregnant maid of stone:
To take what is not for what is,
’Tis called a judgment false.
“In a combination of causes,
The vulgar seek the reality of self.
As truth they understand not,
From birth to birth they transmigrate.”
_The Non-Atman-ness of Things._
Mahâyânism has gone a step further than Hînayânism in the development
of the doctrine of non-âtman, for it expressly disavows, besides the
denial {42} of the existence of the ego-substance, a noumenal
conception of things, i.e., the conception of particulars as having
something absolute in them. Hînayânism, indeed, also disfavors this
conception of thinginess, but it does so only implicitly. It is
Mahâyânism that definitely insists on the non-existence of a personal
(_pudgala_) as well as a thingish (_dharma_) ego.
According to the vulgar view, particular existences are real, they
have permanent substantial entities, remaining forever as such. They
think, therefore, that organic matter remains forever organic just as
much as inorganic matter remains inorganic; that, as they are
essentially different, there is no mutual transformation between them.
The human soul is different from that of the lower animals and sentient
beings from non-sentient beings; the difference being well-defined and
permanent, there is no bridge over which one can cross to the other.
We may call this view naturalistic egoism.
Mahâyânism, against this egoistic conception of the world, extends
its theory of non-âtman to the realm lying outside us. It maintains
that there is no irreducible reality in particular existences, so long
as they are combinations of several causes and conditions brought
together by the principle of karma. Things are here because they are
sustained by karma. As soon as its force is exhausted, the conditions
that made their existence possible lose efficience and dissolve, and
in their places will follow other conditions and existences. Therefore,
what is organic {43} to-day, may be inorganic to-morrow, and _vice
versa_. Carbon, for instance, which is stored within the earth appears
in the form of coal or graphite or diamond; but that which exists on
its surface is found sometimes combined with other elements in the
form of an animal or a vegetable, sometimes in its free elementary
state. It is the same carbon everywhere; it becomes inorganic or
organic, according to its karma, it has no âtman in itself which
directs its transformation by its own self-determining will. Mutual
transformation is everywhere observable; there is a constant shifting
of forces, an eternal transmigration of the elements,--all of which
tend to show the transitoriness and non-âtman-ness of individual
existences. The universe is moving like a whirl-wind, nothing in it
proving to be stationary, nothing in it rigidly adhering to its own
form of existence.
Suppose, on the other hand, there were an âtman behind every
particular being; suppose, too, it were absolute and permanent and
self-acting; and this phenomenal world would then come to a
standstill, and life be forever gone. For is not changeability the
most essential feature and condition of life, and also the strongest
evidence for the non-existence of individual things as realities? The
physical sciences recognise this universal fact of mutual
transformation in its positive aspect and call it the law of the
conservation of energy and of matter. Mahâyânism, recognising its
negative side, proposes the doctrine of the non-âtman-ness of things,
that is to say, the {44} impermanency of all particular existences.
Therefore, it is said, “_Sarvam anityam, sarvam çûnyam, sarvam
anâtman_.” (All is transitory, all is void, all is without ego.)
Mahâyânists condemn the vulgar view that denies the consubstantiality
and reciprocal transformation of all beings, not only because it is
scientifically untenable, but mainly because, ethically and religiously
considered, it is fraught with extremely dangerous ideas,--ideas which
finally may lead a “brother to deliver up the brother to death and the
father the child,” and, again, it may constrain “the children to rise
up against their parents and cause them to be put to death.” Why?
Because this view, born of egoism, would dry up the well of human love
and sympathy, and transform us into creatures of bestial selfishness;
because this view is not capable of inspiring us with the sense of
mutuality and commiseration and of making us disinterestedly feel for
our fellow-beings. Then, all fine religious and humane sentiments
would depart from our hearts, and we should be nothing less than rigid,
lifeless corpses, no pulse beating, no blood running. And how many
victims are offered every day on this altar of egoism! They are not
necessarily immoral by nature, but blindly led by the false conception
of life and the world, they have been rendered incapable of seeing
their own spiritual doubles in their neighbors. Being ever controlled
by their sensual impulses, they sin against humanity, against nature,
and against themselves.
{45}
We read in the _Mahâyâna-abhisamaya Sûtra_ (Nanjo, no. 196):
“Empty and calm and devoid of ego
Is the nature of all things:
There is no individual being
That in reality exists.
“Nor end nor beginning having
Nor any middle course,
All is a sham, here’s no reality whatever:
It is like unto a vision and a dream.
“It is like unto clouds and lightning,
It is like unto gossamer or bubbles floating
It is like unto fiery revolving wheel,
It is like unto water-splashing.
“Because of causes and conditions things are here:
In them there’s no self-nature [i.e., âtman]:
All things that move and work,
Know them as such.
“Ignorance and thirsty desire,
The source of birth and death they are:
Right contemplation and discipline by heart,
Desire and ignorance obliterate.
“All beings in the world,
Beyond words they are and expressions:
Their ultimate nature, pure and true,
Is like unto vacuity of space.”[10]
_The Dharmakâya._
The Dharmakâya, which literally means “body or system of being,” is,
according to the Mahâyânists, {46} the ultimate reality that underlies
all particular phenomena; it is that which makes the existence of
individuals possible; it is the _raison d’être_ of the universe; it is
the norm of being, which regulates the course of events and thoughts.
The conception of Dharmakâya is peculiarly Mahâyânistic, for the
Hînayâna school did not go so far as to formulate the ultimate
principle of the universe; its adherents stopped short at a
positivistic interpretation of Buddhism. The Dharmakâya remained for
them to be the Body of the Law, or the Buddha’s personality as embodied
in the truth taught by him.
The Dharmakâya may be compared in one sense to the God of Christianity
and in another sense to the Brahman or Paramâtman of Vedantism. It is
different, however, from the former in that it does not stand
transcendentally above the universe, which, according to the Christian
view, was created by God, but which is, according to Mahâyânism, a
manifestation of the Dharmakâya himself. It is also different from
Brahman in that it is not absolutely impersonal, nor is it a mere
being. The Dharmakâya, on the contrary, is capable of willing and
reflecting, or, to use Buddhist phraseology, it is _Karunâ_ (love) and
_Bodhi_ (intelligence), and not the mere state of being.
This pantheistic and at the same time entheistic Dharmakâya is working
in every sentient being, for sentient beings are nothing but a
self-manifestation of the Dharmakâya. Individuals are not isolated
existences, as imagined by most people. If isolated, {47} they are
nothing, they are so many soap-bubbles which vanish one after another
in the vacuity of space. All particular existences acquire their
meaning only when they are thought of in their oneness in the
Dharmakâya. The veil of Mâya, i.e., subjective ignorance may temporally
throw an obstacle to our perceiving the universal light of Dharmakâya,
in which we are all one. But when our Bodhi or intellect, which is by
the way a reflection of the Dharmakâya in the human mind, is so fully
enlightened, we no more build the artificial barrier of egoism before
our spiritual eye; the distinction between the _meum_ and _teum_ is
obliterated, no dualism throws the nets of entanglement over us; I
recognise myself in you and you recognise yourself in me; _tat tvam
asi_. Or,
“What is here, that is there;
What is there, that is here:
Who sees duality here,
From death to death goes he.”[11]
This state of enlightenment may be called the spiritual expansion of
the ego, or, negatively, the ideal annihilation of the ego. A
never-drying stream of sympathy and love which is the life of religion
will now spontaneously flow out of the fountainhead of Dharmakâya.
The doctrine of non-ego teaches us that there is no reality in
individual existences, that we do not have any transcendental entity
called ego-substance. {48} The doctrine of Dharmakâya, to supplement
this, teaches us that we all are one in the System of Being and only
as such are immortal. The one shows us the folly of clinging to
individual existences and of coveting the immortality of the ego-soul;
the other convinces us of the truth that we are saved by living into
the unity of Dharmakâya. The doctrine of non-âtman liberates us from
the shackle of unfounded egoism; but as mere liberation does not mean
anything positive and may perchance lead us to asceticism, we apply
the energy thus released to the execution of the will of Dharmakâya.
The questions: “Why have we to love our neighbors as ourselves? Why
have we to do to others all things whatsoever we would that they
should do to us?” are answered thus by Buddhists: “It is because we
are all one in the Dharmakâya, because when the clouds of ignorance
and egoism are totally dispersed, the light of universal love and
intelligence cannot help but shine in all its glory. And, enveloped in
this glory, we do not see any enemy, nor neighbor, we are not even
conscious of whether we are one in the Dharmakâya. There is no ‘my
will’ here, but only ‘thy will,’ the will of Dharmakâya, in which we
live and move and have our being.”
The Apostle Paul says: “For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ
shall all be made alive.” Why? Buddhists would answer, “because Adam
asserted his egoism in giving himself up to ignorance, (the tree of
knowledge is in truth the tree of ignorance, {49} for from it comes
the duality of me and thee); while Christ on the contrary surrendered
his egoistic assertion to the intelligence of the universal Dharmakâya.
That is why we die in the former and are made alive in the latter.”
_Nirvâna._
The meaning of Nirvâna has been variously interpreted by non-Buddhist
students from the philological and the historical standpoint; but it
matters little what conclusions they have reached, as we are not going
to recapitulate them here; nor do they at all affect our presentation
of the Buddhists’ own view as below. For it is the latter that concerns
us here most and constitutes the all-important part of the problem. We
have had too much of non-Buddhist speculation on the question at issue.
The majority of the critics, while claiming to be fair and impartial,
have, by some preconceived ideas, been led to a conclusion, which is
not at all acceptable to intelligent Buddhists. Further, the fact has
escaped their notice that Pâli literature from which they chiefly
derive their information on the subject represents the views of one of
the many sects that arose soon after the demise of the Master and were
constantly branching off at and after the time of King Açoka. The
probability is, that Buddha himself did not have any stereotyped
conception of Nirvana, and, as most great minds do, expressed his ideas
outright as formed under various circumstances; though of course they
could not be {50} in contradiction with his central beliefs, which must
have remained the same throughout the course of his religious life.
Therefore, to understand a problem in all its apparently contradictory
aspects, it is very necessary to grasp at the start the spirit of the
author of the problem, and when this is done the rest will be
understood comparatively much easier. Non-Buddhist critics lack in
this most important qualification; therefore, it is no wonder that
Buddhists themselves are always reluctant to accede to their
interpretations.
Enough for apology. Nirvâna, according to Buddhists, does not signify
an annihilation of consciousness nor a temporal or permanent
suppression of mentation[12], as imagined by some; but it is the {51}
annihilation of the notion of ego-substance and of all the desires
that arise from this erroneous conception. But this represents the
negative side of the doctrine, and its positive side consists in
universal love or sympathy (_karunâ_) for all beings.
These two aspects of Nirvâna, i.e., negatively, the destruction of
evil passions, and, positively, the practice of sympathy, are
complementary to each other; and when we have one we have the other.
Because, as soon as the heart is freed from the cangue of egoism, the
same heart, hitherto so cold and hard, undergoes a complete change,
shows animation, and, joyously escaping from self-imprisonment, finds
its freedom in the bosom of Dharmakâya. In this latter sense, Nirvâna
is the “humanisation” of Dharmakâya, that is to say, “God’s will done
in earth as it is in heaven.” If we make use of the {52} terms,
subjective and objective. Nirvâna is the former, and the Dharmakâya is
the latter, phase of one and the same principle. Again,
psychologically, Nirvâna is enlightenment, the actualisation of the
Bodhicitta[13] (Heart of Intelligence).
The gospel of love and the doctrine of Nirvâna may appear to some to
contradict each other, for they think that the former is the source of
energy and activity, while the latter is a lifeless, inhuman, ascetic
quietism. But the truth is, love is the emotional aspect and Nirvâna
the intellectual aspect of the inmost religious consciousness which
constitutes the essence of the Buddhist life.
That Nirvâna is the destruction of selfish desires is plainly shown in
this stanza:
“To the giver merit is increased;
When the senses are controlled anger arises not,
The wise forsake evil,
By the destruction of desire, sin, and infatuation,
A man attains to Nirvâna.”[14]
The following which was breathed forth by Buddha against a certain
class of monks, testifies that when Nirvâna is understood in the sense
of quietism or pessimism, he vigorously repudiated it:
“Fearing an endless chain of birth and death,
And the misery of transmigration,
Their heart is filled with worry,
But they desire their safety only.
{53}
“Quietly sitting and reckoning the breaths,
They’re bent on the Anâpânam.[15]
They contemplate on the filthiness of the body,--
Thinking how impure it is!
“They shun the dust of the triple world,
And in ascetic practise their safety they seek:
Incapable of love and sympathy are they,
For on Nirvâna abides their thought.”[16]
Against this ascetic practise of some monks, the Buddha sets forth
what might be called the ideal of the Buddhist life:
“Arouse thy will, supreme and great,
Practise love and sympathy, give joy and protection;
Thy love like unto space,
Be it without discrimination, without limitation.
“Merits establish, not for thy own sake,
But for charity universal;
Save and deliver all beings,
Let them attain the wisdom of the Great Way.”
It is apparent that the ethical application of the doctrine of Nirvâna
is naught else than the Golden {54} Rule,[17] so called. The Golden
Rule, however, does not give any reason why we should so act, it is a
mere command whose authority is ascribed to a certain superhuman being.
This does not satisfy an intellectually disposed mind, which refuses
to accept anything on mere authority, for it wants to go to the bottom
of things and see on what ground they are standing. Buddhism has solved
this problem by finding the oneness of things in Dharmakâya, from which
flows the eternal stream of love and sympathy. As we have seen before,
when the cursed barrier of egoism is broken down, there remains nothing
that can prevent us from loving others as ourselves.
Those who wish to see nothing but an utter barrenness of heart after
the annihilation of egoism, are much mistaken in their estimation of
human nature. For they think its animation comes from selfishness, and
that all forms of activity in our life are propelled simply by the
desire to preserve self and the race. They, therefore, naturally
shrink from the doctrine that teaches that all things worldly are
empty, and that there is no such thing as ego-substance whose {55}
immortality is so much coveted by most people. But the truth is, the
spring of love does not lie in the idea of self, but in its removal.
For the human heart, being a reflection of the Dharmakâya which is
love and intelligence, recovers its intrinsic power and goodness, only
when the veil of ignorance and egoism is cast aside. The animation,
energy, strenuousness, which were shown by a self-centered will, and
which therefore were utterly despicable, will not surely die out with
the removal of their odious atmosphere in which egoism had enveloped
them. But they will gain an ever nobler interpretation, ever more
elevating and satisfying significance; for they have gone through a
baptism of fire, by which the last trace of egoism has been thoroughly
consumed. The old evil master is eternally buried, but the willing
servants are still here and ever ready to do their service, now more
efficiently, for their new legitimate and more authoritative lord.
Destruction is in common parlance closely associated with nothingness,
hence Nirvâna, the destruction of egoism, is ordinarily understood as
a synonym of nihilism. But the removal of darkness does not bring
desolation, but means enlightenment and order and peace. It is the
same chamber, all the furniture is left there as it was before. In
darkness chaos reigned, goblins walked wild; in enlightenment
everything is in its proper place. And did we not state plainly that
Nirvâna was enlightenment?
{56}
_The Intellectual Tendency of Buddhism._
One thing which in this connection I wish to refer to, is what makes
Buddhism appear somehow cold and impassive. By this I mean its
intellectuality.
The fact is that anything coming from India greatly savors of
philosophy. In ancient India everybody of the higher castes seems to
have indulged in intellectual and speculative exercises. Being rich in
natural resources and thus the struggle for existence being reduced to
a minimum, the Brahmans and the Kṣatriyas gathered themselves under
most luxuriously growing trees, or retired to the mountain-grottoes
undisturbed by the hurly-burly of the world, and there they devoted
all their leisure hours to metaphysical speculations and discussions.
Buddhism, as a product of these people, is naturally deeply imbued
with intellectualism.
Further, in India there was no distinction between religion and
philosophy. Every philosophical system was at the same time a religion,
and _vice versa_. Philosophy with the Hindus was not an idle display
of logical subtlety which generally ends in entangling itself in the
meshes of sophistry. Their aim of philosophising was to have an
intellectual insight into the significance of existence and the
destiny of humanity. They did not believe in anything blindly nor
accept anything on mere tradition. Buddha most characteristically
echoes this sentiment when he says, “Follow my teachings not as taught
by a Buddha, but as {57} being in accord with truth.” This spirit of
self-reliance and self-salvation later became singularly Buddhistic.
Even when Buddha was still merely an enthusiastic aspirant for Nirvâna,
he seems to have been strongly possessed of this spirit, for he most
emphatically declared the following famous passage, in response to the
pathetic persuasion of his father’s ministers, who wanted him to come
home with them: “The doubt whether there exists anything or not, is
not to be settled for me by another’s words. Arriving at the truth
either by mortification or by tranquilisation, I will grasp myself
whatever is ascertainable about it. It is not mine to receive a view
which is full of conflicts, uncertainties, and contradictions. What
enlightened men would go by other’s faith? The multitudes are like the
blind led in the darkness by the blind.”[18]
To say simply, “Love your enemy,” was not satisfactory to the Hindu
mind, it wanted to see the reason why. And as soon as the people were
convinced intellectually, they went even so far as to defend the faith
with their lives. It was not an uncommon event that before a party of
Hindu philosophers entered into a discussion they made an agreement
that the penalty of defeats should be the sacrifice of the life. They
were, above all, a people of intellect, though of course not lacking
in religious sentiment.
It is no wonder, then, that Buddha did not make the first proclamation
of his message by “Repent, for {58} the kingdom of heaven is at hand,”
but by the establishment of the Four Noble Truths.[19] One appeals to
the feeling, and the other to the intellect. That which appeals to the
intellect naturally seems to be less passionate, but the truth is,
feeling without the support of intellect leads to fanaticism and is
always ready to yield itself to bigotry and superstition.
The doctrine of Nirvâna is doubtless more intellectual than the
Christian gospel of love. It first recognises the wretchedness of
human life as is proved by our daily experiences; it then finds its
cause in our subjective ignorance as to the true meaning of existence,
and in our egocentric desires which, obscuring our spiritual insight,
make us tenaciously cling to things chimerical; it then proposes the
complete annihilation of egoism, the root of all evil, by which,
subjectively, tranquillity of heart is restored, and, objectively, the
realisation of universal love becomes possible. Buddhism, thus,
proceeds most logically in the development of its doctrine of Nirvâna
and universal love.
Says Victor Hugo (_Les Misérables_, vol. II): “The reduction of the
universe to a single being, the expansion of a single being even to
God, this is love.” When a man clings to the self and does not want
{59} to identify himself with other fellow-selves, he cannot expand
his being to God. When he shuts himself in the narrow shell of ego and
keeps all the world outside, he cannot reduce the universe to his
innermost self. To love, therefore, one must first enter Nirvâna.
The truth is everywhere the same and is attained through the removal
of ignorance. But as individual disposition differs according to the
previous karma, some are more prone to intellectualism, while the
others to sentimentality (in its psychological sense). Let us then
follow our own inclination conscientiously and not speak evil of
others. This is called the Doctrine of Middle Path.