THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR--THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
September, 1870, to February, 1871
On July 19 the French Embassy at Berlin declared a state of war. Paris
was wild with enthusiasm and eager for an advance on Berlin. The
provinces were for the most part cool, but accepted the war calmly
because they were assured of an easy victory. The leaders of the two
nations had for each other equal contempt. "Ce n'est pas un homme
serieux," Napoleon had once said of Bismarck, and Bismarck thought
Napoleon "stupid and sentimental." Meanwhile each nation had eyes on the
territory of the other: France was ready to claim the Rhine frontier;
Prussia wanted all it could get, and certainly Alsace and Lorraine. The
idea, so often repeated by the Germans since the war, that these
provinces were annexed because they had once been German, was not in
Bismarck's mind,--"that is a Professor's reason," he said.[1] He wanted
Strassburg because its commanding position and the wedge of Wissembourg
could cut off northern from southern Germany. The frontier of the Vosges
was as desirable to the Germans as the Rhine to the French.
From the beginning all went wrong in France. The Government found itself
left in the lurch by the European states whose alliance it had expected.
Moreover, mobilization proceeded slowly and in utter confusion. In spite
of Marshal Le Boeuf's famous exclamation ("Il ne manquera pas un
bouton de guetre"), never did a nation enter on a war less prepared than
the French. On the other hand, all Germany, well trained and ready,
sprang to the side of Prussia. The whole military force was grouped in
three armies--under Steinmetz, Prince Frederick Charles, and the Crown
Prince. But, meanwhile, it seemed necessary to the French to give a
semblance of military achievement. The Emperor had started from Paris on
July 28 leaving the Empress as regent. On August 2, a vain military
display with largely superior forces was made across the frontier at
Saarbruecken, a practically unprotected place was taken, and the Emperor
was able to send home word that the Prince Imperial had received his
"baptism of fire" and that the soldiers wept at seeing him calmly pick
up a bullet. The same day King William took command of the German forces
at Mainz, and on August 4 the army of the Crown Prince entered Alsace
and defeated at Wissembourg the division of about twelve thousand men of
General Abel Douay, who was killed. On the 6th Mac-Mahon, with a larger
force, met the still more numerous Germans somewhat farther back at
Woerth, Froeschwiller, and Reichsoffen, and was utterly routed with a loss
of over ten thousand in killed, wounded, and taken. Alsace was thus
completely exposed to the enemy, and the road was open to Luneville and
Nancy. On the same day, German armies under Steinmetz and Prince
Frederick Charles crossed into Lorraine at Saarbruecken and engaged the
troops of the French general Frossard at Forbach and Spicheren,
inflicting on them a severe repulse. Meanwhile Frossard's superior,
Bazaine, though not far away, did not move a finger to help him. "If
Frossard wanted the baton of marshal of France he could win it alone."
The news of these disasters was a terrible shock to Paris. The "liberal"
Ollivier Cabinet was overthrown and replaced by a reactionary one led by
General Cousin-Montauban, comte de Palikao. The Emperor withdrew from
military leadership and Marshal Bazaine received supreme command.
Bazaine was a brave soldier, but a poor general-in-chief, and withal a
self-seeking man, incompetent to deal with the difficulties in which
France found itself. He was perhaps not a conscious traitor in the great
disaster which soon came to pass, but he thought more of himself than of
his country. At the time we are concerned with he was considered the
coming man. Meanwhile Mac-Mahon, cut off from Bazaine's main army, fell
back, between August 6 and August 17, to Chalons. Bazaine was apparently
without intelligent strategic plans. He professed to be desirous of
concentrating at Verdun, but was afraid to get out of reach of Metz. He
won first an indecisive battle at Borny (August 14), which was
unproductive of any concrete advantage. On August 16, he let himself be
turned back, by an enemy only half as numerous, at Rezonville
(Vionville, Mars-la-Tour). On the 18th, he encountered, on the
contrary, a much larger force at Saint-Privat (Gravelotte) and let
himself be cooped up in Metz. Critics of Bazaine say that he could have
turned both Rezonville and Gravelotte to the advantage of the French.
The familiar military uncertainties now began to show themselves in the
movements of Mac-Mahon and his troops. The armies of Steinmetz and of
Frederick Charles were united under command of the latter to beleaguer
Metz, and a smaller force under Prince Albert of Saxony was thrown off
to cooperate with the army of the Crown Prince in its advance on Paris.
Mac-Mahon had collected about one hundred and twenty thousand men, and
Napoleon, without real authority except as a meddler, was with him. The
plan was originally to fall back for the protection of Paris, but the
Empress-Regent was afraid to have a defeated Emperor return to the
capital lest revolution ensue, and Palikao urged a swift advance to
rescue Metz, crushing Prince Albert of Saxony on the way, taking
Frederick Charles between the two fires of rescuers and besieged, with
the Crown Prince still too far away to be dangerous. Meanwhile
Mac-Mahon moved to Reims, which was neither on the direct road to Paris
nor to Metz, and at last started to the rescue of Bazaine by the
roundabout route of Montmedy, continually hesitating and retracing his
steps. On receiving news of his progress, the armies of the Crown Prince
and of Prince Albert converged northward. Mac-Mahon's right wing, under
General de Failly, was surprised at Beaumont, and finally the French
army in disorder drew up in most unfavorable positions between the Meuse
and the Belgian frontier, to face a foe twice as numerous and already
nearly completely surrounding it. The battle of Sedan broke out on
September 1. Mac-Mahon was wounded early in the fight and gave over the
command to Ducrot, in turn superseded by Wimpffen, already designated by
the Ministry to replace Mac-Mahon in case of accident. After a fierce
battle it fell to General de Wimpffen to capitulate on September 2. By
the disaster of Sedan the Germans captured the Emperor, a marshal of
France, and the whole of one of its two armies.
The news of the overwhelming defeat of Sedan struck Paris like a
thunderbolt. Jules Favre proposed to the Corps legislatif the overthrow
of Napoleon and of his dynasty; Thiers, who favored the restoration of
the Orleans family, wished the convocation of a Constituent Assembly;
the comte de Palikao asked for a provisional governing commission of
which he should be the lieutenant-general. But, before anything was
done, the Paris mob invaded the legislative chamber. Gambetta, with the
majority of the Paris Deputies, went to the Hotel de Ville, and to
prevent a more radical set from seizing the Government, proclaimed the
Republic (September 4). A Government of National Defence was constituted
of which General Trochu became President, Jules Favre Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and Gambetta Minister of the Interior. Thiers was not a
member, but gave his support. Eugenie escaped from the Tuileries to the
home of her American dentist, Dr. Evans, and then fled to England.
Jules Favre was innocent enough to think that the Germans would be
satisfied with the overthrow of Napoleon, and he was rash enough to
declare that France would not yield "an inch of its territory or a
stone of its fortresses." But, in an interview with Bismarck at
Ferrieres, on September 19, he realized the oppressiveness of the German
demands. The rhetorical and emotional, even tearful, Jules Favre was
faced by a harsh and unrelenting conqueror, and the meeting ended
without an agreement. Meanwhile Paris was invested by the German forces
of the Crown Prince and the Prince of Saxony after a defeat of some
French troops at Chatillon. William, Bismarck, and Moltke took up their
station at Versailles. Europe, made suspicious by the numerous changes
of government in France in the nineteenth century, and moved also by
selfish reasons, refused its aid and looked on with indifference. Thiers
made a fruitless quest through Europe for practical aid, bringing home
only meaningless expressions of sympathy.
Unfortunately even a number of people in the provinces, relaxed by the
factitious prosperity of the imperial regime, were too willing to yield
to the invaders. Where resistance was brave it appeared fruitless:
Strassburg capitulated on September 28, after the Germans had burned
its library and bombarded the cathedral. A scratch army on the Loire,
under La Motterouge, was beaten at Artenay (October 10) and had to
evacuate Orleans. On October 18, the Germans captured Chateaudun after
heroic resistance by National Guards and sharpshooters.
Though one of the two great French armies was in captivity and the other
besieged in Metz, the idea of submission never for a moment entered
Gambetta's head. Paris was under the command of Trochu, patriotic and
brave, but military critic rather than leader, discouraged from the
beginning, and unable to take advantage of opportunities. A delegation
of the Government of National Defence had established itself at Tours to
avoid the German besiegers, but two of its members, Cremieux and
Glais-Bizoin, were elderly and weak. Admiral Fourichon was the most
competent. Gambetta escaped from Paris by balloon on October 7, and,
reaching Tours in safety, made himself by his energy and patriotic
inspiration, practically dictator and organizer of resistance to the
invaders.
Leon Gambetta, a young lawyer politician of thirty-two, of
inexhaustible energy and impassioned eloquence, was the son of an
Italian grocer settled at Cahors. With the help of his assistant Charles
de Freycinet, he levied and armed in four months six hundred thousand
men, an average of five thousand a day. Everything was done in haste and
unsatisfactorily,--the army of General Chanzy was equipped with guns of
fifteen different patterns. But Gambetta did the task of a giant, in
spite of another crushing blow to France, the surrender of Metz.
Bazaine had let himself be cooped up in Metz. Instead of being moved by
patriotism, he thought only of his own interests and ambitions. In the
midst of the cataclysm which had fallen on France he aspired to hold the
position of power. The Emperor gone and the Republic destined, Bazaine
thought, to fall, he would be left at the head of the only army. His
would be the task of treating for peace with Germany, and then he would
perhaps become in France regent instead of the Empress, or
Marshal-Lieutenant of the Empire, like the Spanish marshals. So he
neglected favorable military opportunities, and dallied over plans of
peace, while Bismarck misled him with fruitless propositions or false
emissaries like the adventurer Regnier. Finally, on October 27, Bazaine
had to surrender Metz, with three marshals (himself, Canrobert, and Le
Boeuf), sixty generals, six thousand officers, and one hundred and
seventy-three thousand men. France was deprived of her last trained
forces, and the besieging army of Frederick Charles was set free to help
in the conquest of France. After the war Bazaine was condemned to death,
by court-martial, for treason. His sentence was commuted to life
imprisonment, but he afterwards escaped from the fortress in which he
was confined and died in obscurity and disgrace at Madrid.
No sooner did the news of the capitulation of Metz reach Paris than a
regrettable affair took place. There was much dissatisfaction with the
indecision of the Provisional Government, and, on October 31, a mob
invaded the Hotel de Ville and arrested the chief members of the
commission. Fortunately they were released later the same day and a
plebiscite of November 3 confirmed the powers of the Government of
National Defence. Fortunately, too, within a few days came news of the
first real success of the French during the war, the battle of Coulmiers
(November 9).
Gambetta had succeeded during October in organizing the Army of the
Loire which, under General d'Aurelle de Paladines, defeated the Bavarian
forces of von der Thann at Coulmiers and recaptured Orleans. The plan
was to push on to Paris and the objections of d'Aurelle were overcome by
Gambetta. But the fall of Metz had released German reinforcements. After
an unsuccessful contest by the right wing at Beaune-la-Rolande (November
28), and a partial victory at Villepion, the French were defeated in
turn on December 2 at Loigny or Patay (left wing), on December 3 at
Artenay. The Germans reoccupied Orleans and the first Army of the Loire
was dispersed. The Government moved from Tours to Bordeaux.
After Coulmiers General Trochu had planned a sortie from Paris to meet
the Army of the Loire. This advance was under command of General Ducrot,
but was delayed by trouble with pontoon bridges. The various battles of
the Marne (November 30-December 2) culminated in the terrible fight and
repulse of Villiers and Champigny. In the north, a small army hastily
brought together under temporary command of General Favre was defeated
at Villers-Bretonneux and Amiens (November 27).
The last phase of the Franco-Prussian War begins with the crushing of
the Army of the Loire and the check of the advance to Champigny. With
unwearied tenacity Gambetta tried to reorganize the Army of the Loire. A
portion became the second Army of the Loire or of the West, under
Chanzy. The rest, under Bourbaki, became the Army of the East. Faidherbe
tried to revive the Army of the North.
To Chanzy, on the whole the most capable French general of the war, was
assigned the task of trying, with a smaller force, what d'Aurelle had
already failed in accomplishing, a drive on Paris. In this task Bourbaki
and Faidherbe were expected by Gambetta to cooperate. Instead of
succeeding, Chanzy, bravely fighting, was driven back, first down the
Loire, in the long-contested battle of Josnes (Villorceau or Beaugency)
(December 7-10), then up the valley of the tributary Loir to Vendome
and Le Mans. There the army, reduced almost to a mob, made a new stand.
In a battle between January 10 and 12, this army was again routed and
what was left thrown back to Laval.
Faidherbe, taking the offensive in the north, fought an indecisive
contest at Pont-Noyelles (December 23) and took Bapaume (January 3). But
his endeavor to proceed to the assistance of Paris was frustrated, he
was unable to relieve Peronne, which fell on January 9, and was defeated
at Saint-Quentin on January 19.
Bourbaki, in spite of his reputation, showed himself inferior to Chanzy
and Faidherbe. He let his army lose morale by his hesitation, and then
accepted with satisfaction Freycinet's plan to move east upon Germany
instead of to the rescue of Paris. On the eastern frontier Colonel
Denfert-Rochereau was tenaciously holding Belfort, which was never
captured by the Germans during the whole war.[2] Bourbaki's
dishearteningly slow progress received no effective assistance from
Garibaldi. This Italian soldier of fortune, now somewhat in his
decline, had offered his services to France and was in command of a
small body of guerillas and sharpshooters, the Army of the Vosges. With
alternate periods of inactivity, failure, and success, Garibaldi perhaps
did more harm than good to France. He monopolized the services of
several thousand men, and yet, through his prestige as a distinguished
foreign volunteer, he could not be brought under control. Bourbaki won
the battle of Villersexel on January 9. Pushing on to Belfort he was
defeated only a few miles from the town in the battle of Hericourt, or
Montbeliard, along the river Lisaine. The army, now transformed into
panic-stricken fugitives, made its way painfully through bitter cold and
snow, and Bourbaki tried to commit suicide. He was succeeded by General
Clinchant. When Paris capitulated, on January 28, and an armistice was
signed, this Army of the East was omitted. Jules Favre at Paris failed
to notify Gambetta in the provinces of this exception, and the army,
hearing of the armistice, ceased its flight, only to be relentlessly
followed by the Germans. Finally, on February 1, the remnants of the
army fled across the Swiss frontier and found safety on neutral soil.
Meanwhile, in Paris the tightening of the Prussian lines had made the
food problem more and more difficult, and the population were reduced to
small rations and unpalatable diet. After Champigny the German general
von Moltke communicated with the besieged, informing them of the defeat
of Orleans, and the means seemed opened for negotiations. But the
opportunity was rejected, and the Government even refused to be
represented at an international conference, then opening in London,
because of its unwillingness to apply to Bismarck for a safe-conduct for
its representative. A chance to bring the condition of France before the
Powers was neglected. Between December 21 and 26, a sally to Le Bourget
was driven back, and, on the next day, the bombardment of the forts
began. On January 5, the Prussian batteries opened fire on the city
itself. On January 18, the Germans took a spectacular revenge for the
conquests of Louis XIV by the coronation of King William of Prussia as
Emperor of the united German people. The ceremony took place in the
great Galerie des Glaces of Louis's magnificent palace of Versailles.
The very next day the triumph of the Germans received its consecration,
not only by the battle of Saint-Quentin (already mentioned), but by the
repulse of the last offensive movement from Paris. To placate the Paris
population an advance was made on Versailles with battalions largely
composed of National Guards. At Montretout and Buzenval they were routed
and driven back in a panic to Paris. General Trochu was forced to resign
the military governorship of Paris, though by a strange contradiction he
kept the presidency of the Government of National Defence, and was
replaced by General Vinoy. On January 22, a riot broke out in the
capital in which blood was shed in civil strife. Finally, on January 28,
Jules Favre had to submit to the conqueror's terms. Paris capitulated
and the garrison was disarmed, with the exception of a few thousand
regulars to preserve order, and the National Guard; a war tribute was
imposed on the city and an armistice of twenty-one days was signed to
permit the election and gathering of a National Assembly to pass on
terms of peace. With inexcusable carelessness Jules Favre neglected to
warn Gambetta in the provinces that this armistice began for the rest of
France only on the thirty-first and that, as already stated, the Army of
the East was excepted from its provisions.
Gambetta was furious at the surrender and at the presumption of Paris to
decide for the provinces. He preached a continuation of the war, and the
intervention of Bismarck was necessary to prevent him from excluding
from the National Assembly all who had had any connection with the
imperial regime. Jules Simon was sent from Paris to counteract
Gambetta's efforts. The latter yielded before the prospect of civil war,
withdrew from power, and, on February 8, elections were held for the
National Assembly.
The downfall of what had been considered the chief military nation of
Europe was due to many involved causes. The Empire was responsible for
the _debacle_ and the Government of National Defence was unable to
create everything out of nothing. Many people were ready to be
discouraged after a first defeat, and few realized what Germany's
demands were going to be. The imperial army was insufficiently equipped
and the majority of its generals were inefficient and lacking in
initiative: there was no preparation, no system, little discipline.
During the period of National Defence the members of the Government
themselves were usually wanting in experience and in diplomacy, and the
badly trained armies made up of raw recruits were liable to panics or
unable to follow up an advantage. There was jealousy, mistrust, and
frequent unwillingness to subordinate politics to patriotism, or, at any
rate, to make allowances for other forms of patriotism than one's own.
Gambetta and Jules Favre were primarily orators and tribunes and
indulged in too many wordy proclamations, in which habit they were
followed by General Trochu. The patriotism and enthusiasm of Gambetta
were undeniable, but he was imbued with the principles and memories of
the French Revolution, including the efficacy of national volunteers,
the ability of France to resist all Europe, and the subordination of
military to civil authority. Consequently, in a time of stress he nagged
the generals and interfered, and gave free rein to Freycinet to do the
same. They upset plans made by experienced generals, and sent civilians
to spy over them, with power to retire them from command. They were,
moreover, trying to thrust a republic down the throats of a hostile
majority of the population, for a large proportion of those not
Bonapartists were in favor of a monarchy. The wonder is, therefore, that
France was able to do so much. M. de Freycinet was not boasting when he
wrote later, "Alone, without allies, without leaders, without an army,
deprived for the first time of communication with its capital, it
resisted for five months, with improvised resources, a formidable enemy
that the regular armies of the Empire, though made up of heroic
soldiers, had not been able to hold back five weeks."[3]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Moritz Busch, _Bismarck_, vol. 1, chap. 1.
[2] He surrendered by order of the Government. The isolated incident of
the resistance of the town of Bitche through all the war is no less
noteworthy.
[3] _La guerre en province_, quoted by Welschinger, _La guerre de 1870_,
vol. II, p. 295.