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A HISTORY OF THE THIRD FRENCH REPUBLIC
BY
C. H. C. WRIGHT
_Professor of the French Language and Literature in Harvard University_
WITH ILLUSTRATIONS
[Illustration]
BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
COPYRIGHT, 1916, BY CHARLES H. C. WRIGHT
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
_Published May 1916_
TO
MY WIFE
CONTENTS
I. THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR. 1
II. THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR--THE GOVERNMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENCE (SEPTEMBER, 1870, TO FEBRUARY,
1871). 11
III. THE ADMINISTRATION OF ADOLPHE THIERS (FEBRUARY,
1871, TO MAY, 1873). 31
IV. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MARECHAL DE MAC-MAHON
(MAY, 1873, TO JANUARY, 1879). 50
V. THE ADMINISTRATION OF JULES GREVY (JANUARY,
1879, TO DECEMBER, 1887). 75
VI. THE ADMINISTRATION OF SADI CARNOT (DECEMBER,
1887, TO JUNE, 1894). 96
VII. THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF JEAN CASIMIR-PERIER (JUNE,
1894, TO JANUARY, 1895) AND OF FELIX FAURE
(JANUARY, 1895, TO FEBRUARY, 1899). 115
VIII. THE ADMINISTRATION OF EMILE LOUBET (FEBRUARY,
1899, TO FEBRUARY, 1906). 134
IX. THE ADMINISTRATION OF ARMAND FALLIERES (FEBRUARY,
1906, TO FEBRUARY, 1913). 159
X. THE ADMINISTRATION OF RAYMOND POINCARE (FEBRUARY,
1913-). 176
APPENDIX: PRESIDING OFFICERS OF FRENCH CABINETS. 187
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 193
INDEX. 199
ILLUSTRATIONS
RAYMOND POINCARE _Frontispiece_
ADOLPHE THIERS 32
EDME-PATRICE-MAURICE DE MAC-MAHON 50
LEON GAMBETTA 70
JULES FERRY 78
SADI CARNOT 96
MARIE-GEORGES PICQUART 124
RENE WALDECK-ROUSSEAU 136
[Illustration: Raymond Poincare]
A HISTORY OF THE THIRD FRENCH REPUBLIC
CHAPTER I
THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR
Two men were largely responsible, each in his own way, for the third
French Republic, Napoleon III and Bismarck. The one, endeavoring partly
at his wife's instigation to renew the prestige of a weakening Empire,
and the other, furthering the ambitions of the Prussian Kingdom, set in
motion the forces which culminated in the Fourth of September.
The causes of the downfall of the Empire can be traced back several
years. Napoleon III was, at heart, a man of peace and had, in all
sincerity, soon after his accession, uttered the famous saying:
"L'empire, c'est la paix." But the military glamour of the Napoleonic
name led the nephew, like the uncle, into repeated wars. These had, in
most cases, been successful, exceptions, such as the unfortunate Mexican
expedition, seeming negligible. They had sometimes even resulted in
territorial aggrandizement. Napoleon III was, therefore, desirous of
establishing once for all the so-called "natural" frontiers of France
along the Rhine by the annexation of those Rhenish provinces which,
during the First Empire and before, had for a score of years been part
of the French nation.
On the other hand, though France was still considered the leading
continental power, and though its military superiority seemed
unassailable, the imperial regime was unquestionably growing "stale."
The Emperor himself, always a mystical fatalist rather than the hewer of
his own fortune, felt the growing inertia of his final malady. A
lavishly luxurious court had been imitated by a pleasure-loving capital.
This had brought in its train relaxed standards of governmental morals
and had seriously weakened the fibre of many military commanders.
Outwardly the Empire seemed as glorious as ever, and in 1867 France
invited the world to a gorgeous exposition in the "Ville-lumiere." But
Paris was more emotional year by year, and the Tuileries and Saint-Cloud
were dominated by a narrow-minded and spoiled Empress. Court intrigues
were rife and drawing-room generals were to be found in real life, as
well as in Offenbach's "Grande Duchesse." But nobody, except perhaps
Napoleon himself, realized how the Empire had declined. The Empress
merely felt that it was time to do something stirring, and, without
necessarily waging war, to assert again the pre-eminence in Europe of
France, weakened in 1866 by the unexpected outcome of the rivalry
between Austria and Prussia for preponderance among the German States.
Beyond the eastern frontier of France a nation was growing in ambition
and power. Prussia still remembered the warlike achievements of
Frederick the Great, although since those days its military efficiency
had at times undergone a decline. But now, under the reign of King
William, guided by a vigorous minister, Bismarck, an example, whatever
his admirers may say, of the brutal and unscrupulous _Junker_, the
Prussian Government had for some time tried to impose its leadership on
the other German States. Some of these were far from anxious to accept
it. In the furtherance of Prussian schemes, Bismarck had been able to
inflict a diplomatic rebuff on Napoleon, as well as a severe military
defeat on Austria.
In 1866, Prussia won from Austria the important victory of Koeniggraetz or
Sadowa, and thereby asserted its leadership. The outcome was a check to
Napoleon, who had expected a different result. Moreover, by it Bismarck
was encouraged to pursue his plans for the consolidation of Germany
under a still more openly acknowledged Prussian supremacy. A crafty and
utterly unscrupulous diplomat, he was able to mislead Napoleon and his
unskilful ministers.
Soon after Sadowa the Emperor tried to obtain territorial compensation
from Prussia. He wished, in return for recognition of Prussia's new
position and of the projected union of North and South Germany minus
Austria, to obtain the cession of territories on the left bank of the
Rhine, or an alliance for the conquest and annexation of Belgium to
France. Such schemes having failed, Napoleon tried next to satisfy
French jingoism by the acquisition of the Duchy of Luxembourg. This move
resulted only in securing the evacuation by its Prussian garrison of the
Luxembourg fortress and the neutralization of the duchy. From that time
on, tension increased between France and Prussia. Bismarck was, indeed,
more anxious for war than Napoleon. He suspected the weakness of the
French Empire, he despised its leaders, he realized the advance in
military efficiency of his own country, and his aim was unswerving to
establish a Prussianized German Empire at the cost, if possible, of the
downfall of France. As a matter of fact, France, as now, was far from
being permeated with militarism and, a few months before the war in
1870, the military budget was actually reduced.
The occasion for a dispute arrived with the suggested candidacy of
Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a German prince related to the King
of Prussia, to the crown of Spain. As early as 1868, intrigues had begun
to put a Prussian on the Spanish throne, but Napoleon had not as yet
been disturbed. It was not until 1870 that he took the matter seriously.
In July, Prince Leopold accepted the crown, egged on by Bismarck, and
with the fiction of the approval of King William as head of the
Hohenzollerns, as distinguished from his position as King of Prussia.
At that time the French Emperor was in precarious health and scarcely in
full control of his powers. The French people at large were pacifically
inclined and would have asked for nothing better than to remain at home
instead of fighting about a foreigner's candidacy to an alien throne.
But, unfortunately, the Empress Eugenie was for war. The Government,
too, was in the hands of second-rate and hesitating diplomats. Emile
Ollivier, the chief of the Cabinet, was an orator more than a statesman,
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the duc de Gramont, was a conceited
mediocrity more and more involved in his own mistakes. In consequence,
the attitude of the Government was not so much deliberate desire for war
as provocative bluster, of which Bismarck was quick to take advantage.
The Cabinet was egged on by Eugenie's adherents, the militants, who had
been looking for an insult since Sadowa, and by obstreperous journalists
and noisy boulevard mobs, whose manifestations were unfortunately taken,
even by the Corps legislatif, for the voice of France.
In consequence, blunder after blunder was made. The ministers worked at
cross-purposes, without due consultation and without consideration of
the effect of their actions on an inflamed public opinion or on
prospective European alliances. Stated in terms of diplomatic procedure,
the aim of the French Cabinet was to humiliate Prussia by forcing its
Government to acknowledge a retreat. King William was not seeking war
and was probably willing to make honorable concessions. Bismarck, on the
contrary, desired war, if it could be under favorable diplomatic
auspices, and the Hohenzollern candidacy was a direct provocation. He
wanted France to seem the aggressor, in view of the effect both on
neutral Europe, and particularly on the South German States, which he
wished to draw into alliance under the menace of French attack.
The French Ambassador to the King of Prussia, Benedetti, was instructed
to demand the withdrawal of Prince Leopold's candidacy. This demand
followed a very arrogant statement to the Corps legislatif, on July 6,
by the duc de Gramont. The assumption was that Prince Leopold's presence
on the Spanish throne would be dangerous to the honor and interests of
France, by exposing the country on two sides to Prussian influence.
King William was, on the whole, willing to make a concession to avoid
international complications, but he obviously wished not to appear to
act under pressure. M. Benedetti went to Ems and, on July 9, he laid the
French demands before the King. After long-drawn-out discussion the
French Government asked for a categorical reply by July 12. On that day
the father of Prince Leopold, Prince Antony of Hohenzollern, in a
telegram to Spain, formally withdrew his son's name. The King had
planned to give his consent to this apparently _spontaneous_ action on
the part of the candidate's family, when officially informed. Thus
France would obtain its ends and the King himself would not be involved.
Unfortunately the thoughtlessness of the head of the French Ministry
spoiled everything. Instead of waiting a day for the King's
ratification, Emile Ollivier, desirous also of peace, hastened to make
public the telegram from the Prince of Hohenzollern. Thereupon the
leaders of the war party in the Corps legislatif at once pointed out
that the telegram was not accompanied by the signature of the Prussian
monarch, declared that the Cabinet had been outwitted, and clamored for
definite guarantees. Stung by the charge of inefficiency, the would-be
statesman Gramont immediately accentuated his stipulations and demanded
that the King of Prussia guarantee not to support in future the
candidacy of a Hohenzollern to the Spanish throne.
Matters were rapidly reaching an _impasse_, and Bismarck was
correspondingly elated, because France was appearing to Europe a
trouble-maker. The duc de Gramont and Emile Ollivier committed the error
of dictating a letter to the Prussian Ambassador for him to transmit to
the King, to be in turn sent back as his reply. King William was
offended by this high-handed procedure. He had already told comte
Benedetti at Ems that a satisfactory letter was on its way from Prince
Antony and had promised him another interview upon its arrival. After
receiving the dispatch from his ambassador at Paris communicating
Gramont's formulas, he sent word to Benedetti that Prince Leopold was no
longer a candidate and that the incident was closed. Nor was the King
willing to grant Benedetti's urgent requests for an interview (July
13).
The King and the French Ambassador had remained perfectly courteous, and
the next day, at the railway station, they took leave of each other with
marks of respect. Things were not yet hopeless, until Bismarck, by a
trick of which he afterwards bragged, caused a dispatch to be published
implying that Benedetti had been so persistent in pushing his demands
that King William had been obliged to snub him. The French were led to
believe that their representative had been insulted, and neutrals sided
with Prussia as the aggrieved party. After deliberation the French
Ministry decided on war and the decision was blindly ratified by the
Corps legislatif on July 15. At this meeting Emile Ollivier made his
famous remark that the Ministry accepted responsibility for the war with
a "clear conscience." His actual words, "le coeur leger," seemed,
however, to imply "with a light heart", and thereafter weighed heavily
against him in the minds of Frenchmen.