It would have been well if Lord Ellenborough had resisted the puerile

temptation to date this proclamation on the 1st of October. That it

was written then is not to be doubted. But, though written, it was

not issued.[333] The Governor-General was not prepared to issue it.

There was no immediate necessity, indeed, for the preparation of such

a notification as this. It might have been delayed for a few weeks

without injury to the state; whilst, on the other hand, it could not

have been delayed for a few days without great advantage to Lord

Ellenborough. On the 1st of October, the Governor-General knew that the

British ensign was floating over the Balla Hissar of Caubul; but he did

not know that the British prisoners had been released from captivity.

Had he suppressed the inclination to write “_October 1_” at the head

of his proclamation, he might have announced in it the attainment of

all those objects which his countrymen had at heart, and fully declared

that the war was at an end. But there were not wanting those who now

commented bitterly on the fact that this proclamation was drawn up

by the Governor-General of India whilst yet in ignorance of the fate

of the prisoners. The delay of a few days would have placed him in

possession of the intelligence, for which all India was looking with

the deepest interest and anxiety; but the temptation of the “1st of

October” was not to be resisted; and Lord Ellenborough sacrificed his

character for humanity for the sake of a little dramatic effect.

Having drawn up this proclamation, and handed it over to the

translators to be arrayed in Oriental costume, Lord Ellenborough began

to take counsel with Sir Jasper Nicolls on the subject of the honorary

distinctions to be conferred on the officers and men who had gained

these great victories in Afghanistan; and to draft another proclamation

to be issued to the Chiefs and Princes of India. This was the famous

proclamation of the Gates. On the 5th of October, he sent a rough

draft of it to Sir Jasper Nicolls, inviting the comments of the Chief.

Freely asked, they were freely given. What they were is not on record.

The Governor-General took the comments of the Commander-in-Chief “in

good part,” and was not wholly impervious to the criticism of the

veteran commander.[334] Subjected to a long and laborious incubation,

this address to “all the Princes, chiefs, and people of India,” was

translated into the Persian and Hindee languages, circulated among

those to whom it especially appealed, and finally published in its

English dress on the 16th of November.[335] It was by no means,

therefore, an ebullition of impulse and enthusiasm on the part of the

Governor-General, but the result of many weeks of thought and study,

and, perhaps, much consultation with others. The Duke of Wellington

called it a “Song of triumph.” Thus rose the pæan, in its English dress:

FROM THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO ALL THE PRINCES AND CHIEFS,

AND PEOPLE OF INDIA.

MY BROTHERS AND MY FRIENDS,

Our victorious army bears the gates of the temple of Somnauth in

triumph from Afghanistan, and the despoiled tomb of Sultan Mahomed

looks upon the ruins of Ghuznee.

The insult of eight hundred years is at last avenged. The gates of

the temple of Somnauth, so long the memorial of your humiliation, are

become the proudest record of your national glory the proof of your

superiority in arms over the nations beyond the Indus.

To you, Princes and Chiefs of Sirhind, of Rajwarra, of Malwa, and of

Guzerat, I shall commit this glorious trophy of successful war.

You will yourselves, with all honour, transmit the gates of

sandal-wood through your respective territories to the restored temple

of Somnauth.

The chiefs of Sirhind shall be informed at what time our victorious

army will first deliver the gates of the temple into their

guardianship, at the foot of the bridge of the Sutlej.

MY BROTHERS AND MY FRIENDS,

I have ever relied with confidence upon your attachment to the British

Government. You see how worthy it proves itself of your love, when,

regarding your honour as its own, it exerts the power of its arms

to restore to you the gates of the temple of Somnauth, so long the

memorial of your subjection to the Afghans.

For myself, identified with you in interest and in feeling, I regard

with all your own enthusiasm the high achievements of that heroic

army; reflecting alike immortal honour upon my native and upon my

adopted country.

To preserve and to improve the happy union of our two countries,

necessary as it is to the welfare of both, is the constant object of

my thoughts. Upon that union depends the security of every ally, as

well as of every subject of the British Government, from the miseries

whereby, in former times, India was afflicted: through that alone has

our army now waved its triumphant standards over the ruins of Ghuznee,

and planted them upon the Balla Hissar of Caubul.

May that good Providence, which has hitherto so manifestly protected

me, still extend to me its favour, that I may so use the power now

entrusted to my hands, as to advance your prosperity and secure your

happiness, by placing the union of our two countries upon foundations

which may render it eternal.

ELLENBOROUGH.

No document that ever emanated from the bureau of a statesman has

been overwhelmed with so much ridicule as this. It is still fresh

in the recollection of men who dwelt in India at this time, how the

authenticity of the proclamation was gravely doubted—how many, at

first, declared their conviction that it was a newspaper satire upon

the Napoleonic style of address which Lord Ellenborough had recently

adopted; and how at last, when it came to be known—thoroughly known

and understood—that it was a genuine emanation from the “Political

Department,” with the right official stamp upon it, such a flood

of ridicule and censure was let loose upon it as had never before

descended upon an Indian state-paper. The folly of the thing was past

all denial. It was a folly, too, of the most senseless kind, for it

was calculated to please none and to offend many. It was addressed to

“all the Princes and Chiefs, and People of India.” The “Brothers and

Friends” thus grandiloquently apostrophised, were a mixed family of

Mahomedans and Hindoos. Upon the Mahomedans it was an open and most

intelligible outrage. To the Hindoos, the pompous offer of the polluted

gates of Somnauth was little better than a covert insult. The temple to

which it was to have been restored was in ruins, and the sacred ground

trodden by Mahomedans. Looking at the effusion from the Oriental side,

it was altogether a failure and an abortion.[336] Among Europeans,

worldly men scouted the proclamation as a folly, and religious men

denounced it as a crime. It was said to be both dangerous and profane.

The question suggested by the latter epithet I do not propose to

discuss; but of the dangers of such a proclamation it may be said that

they existed only in the imaginations of those who discerned them. It

was altogether an event of no political importance. In Afghanistan,

the rape of the Gates created little or no sensation. In India, the

proclamation produced no excitement among the “brothers and friends” to

whom it was addressed. The effect of the measure was personal to Lord

Ellenborough himself. It damaged his reputation, and left the rest of

the world as it was before.

But there was another proclamation published about this time—launched

into the world, indeed, before the proclamation of the Gates, but of a

somewhat later conception. The Afghan drama was now well-nigh played

out. The Afghan policy of Lord Auckland had been publicly declared

a failure, and the grounds on which it had been originated wholly a

mistake. Everything, indeed, was to be reversed. The Tripartite treaty

was at an end. Shah Soojah was dead. The people of Afghanistan had

felt an obvious distaste for foreign interference, and had evinced it

in a very unmistakeable manner. The Suddozye Princes had demonstrated

the feebleness of the tenure by which they could hope to maintain

possession of the throne. It was impossible wholly to revert to the

state of things that had existed in 1838, for thousands of lives and

millions of money had been buried in the passes of Afghanistan—and

there was no earthly resurrection or restoration for them. But there

was one victim of the war in Afghanistan for whom restoration was

yet possible. The first victim of our national injustice was yet

a prisoner in the hands of the British. The Governor-General had

publicly announced, in his proclamation of the 1st of October, that

Dost Mahomed was only “believed to be hostile to British interests,”

and that Shah Soojah was only “represented” to be friendly to those

interests, and popular with his own people. It was announced, too, in

this proclamation, that the British Government had determined to leave

the Afghans to form a government for themselves, and to recognise

that government when formed. After such announcements as these, the

retention of Dost Mahomed in captivity would have been confessedly

inconsistent and unjust.

Ever since the intelligence of the outbreak at Caubul had reached the

provinces of Hindostan, Dost Mahomed had been watched with greater

suspicion, and guarded with greater care. It was believed that he would

place himself in communication with the leaders of the revolutionary

party, and would make an effort to escape from the captivity which

embittered his lot. It does not appear, however, that he manifested

any feelings of exultation at the thought of the calamities which

had befallen his captors, or, in any way, desired to increase the

difficulties which surrounded them. On the other hand, he seemed

willing, if not anxious, to impart to the British Government, through

Captain Nicolson, such local information as he thought would be

serviceable to them in the conjuncture which had arisen; and even

offered suggestions tending to facilitate their re-invasion of his

country. The vigilance with which he was guarded, and the consequent

inconveniences to which he was subjected, seemed to cause him much

vexation and annoyance. He always protested that he knew nothing of

the secret history of the Caubul outbreak—that it was his belief the

Suddozyes had instigated it, as no other family in Afghanistan, since

the overthrow of the Barukzyes, had sufficient influence to initiate a

great national movement. Any expression or intimation of a doubt of his

honesty seemed to pain him. “Recollect,” he said, on one occasion to

Captain Nicolson, “that I have, from the first day I came in, been on

your side, heart and soul. I swear by the most holy God, that since my

submission I have not communicated with Caubul and its people, except

through you. But it is possible that news may have reached my sister at

Loodianah through her other brothers. I am your guest or your prisoner,

whichever you please. I came to you in the hope of being in time

employed by you; and I should say what is not true, if I denied still

entertaining that hope; and I am ready to lay down my life in your

service.”[337] It may be doubted whether he entertained any hope, or

any desire to regain the dominion he had lost. He had resigned himself

submissively to his fate. If it seemed to be the will of God that he

should return to Caubul, he was willing to retrace his steps to the

Balla Hissar. But he was little inclined to take into his own hands the

shaping of his future destinies, and to win his way back to empire by

violence or fraud.[338]

It has been seen that the Government of India, ever since the

disastrous downfall of our efforts to prop up the Suddozye dynasty,

had contemplated the possibility of restoring Dost Mahomed to the

country from which we had expelled him. Lord Auckland had hinted at

the restoration of the ex-Ameer as a measure to which, under certain

circumstances, he would offer no opposition. He would gladly, indeed,

have availed himself of the opportunity afforded, by a proposed

interchange of prisoners, to render tardy justice to the man whom he

had so palpably wronged. The subsequent progress of events had tended

to render more and more obvious the propriety of this resolution. It

was now plainer than ever that the retention of Dost Mahomed as a

prisoner of state could no longer be justified, on the score of either

political rectitude or expediency. So Lord Ellenborough did, as it

became him to do. He issued a proclamation, setting forth that when the

“British army returning from Afghanistan shall have passed the Indus,

all the Afghans now in the power of the British Government shall be

permitted to return to their country.” This was equally reasonable

and just. But the proclamation was not without characteristic

disfigurements, for the Governor-General, who had set his heart upon a

grand pageant at Ferozepore, added a codicil, to the effect that the

released Afghan Princes were to present themselves, before returning

to their desolated country, at the Durbar of the Governor-General in

his camp at Ferozepore.

The popular feeling against this contemplated outrage was strong and

universal. There was not a generous mind in the country which did

not feel deeply the wrong that was to be done to these unfortunate

Princes. But the Governor-General, in a better hour, conscious of

error, consented to forego the pitiful delight of gracing his triumph

with the presence of a dethroned monarch, whose national feelings were

not so wholly extinguished by exile as to render his appearance at the

Ferozepore festivities anything but a painful and humiliating trial.

The order issued in thoughtlessness was revoked in good feeling; and

Dost Mahomed, without suffering this last crowning injury at the hands

of the British Government, returned to Afghanistan, with hopes and

expectations falling far short of the long years of restored dominion,

which actually lay before him.

Quitting Simlah, the Governor-General moved down to the plains of

Ferozepore. There an army, under the personal command of Sir Jasper

Nicolls, was now assembled. It had been originally projected by Lord

Auckland, at a time when it was believed that the presence of such an

army on our north-western frontier would have a great moral effect

upon the neighbouring states. It has been said, that when it did

assemble, at the commencement of the cold season of 1842-1843, it

was intended to answer no other purpose than that of a vast pageant;

that the Governor-General had determined on celebrating the return

of the victorious armies with all possible pomp; and that he looked

forward, with childish delight and anxiety, to the magnificent _fête

champêtre_ of which he had appointed himself director-in-chief. It

must be admitted that Lord Ellenborough took a somewhat undignified

interest in the details of these puerilities; but the justice of the

assertion, that the army was kept together for no other purpose than

that of presenting arms to the “Illustrious Garrison” of Jellalabad,

and turning out for a grand field-day, may be reasonably disputed. The

fidelity of the Sikhs had long been suspected. It was now considered by

no means an impossible event, that the march of our army, worn, sick,

and incumbered, through the Punjab, would offer a temptation too strong

to be resisted by the mutinous Sikh soldiery, whose real feeling had

betrayed itself early in the year at Peshawur. Had the Governor-General

felt secure in the reality of the formal alliance with the Punjab, he

might have dispersed the Army of Reserve when the Afghanistan force

crossed the Attock. Such expositions of the military resources of a

great nation are never wholly without profit in such troubled times;

and as doubts, and not unreasonable doubts, of Sikh fidelity had

arisen, it was sound policy to keep a force on the frontier until the

returning troops had actually crossed the Sutlej.

On the 9th of December the Governor-General arrived at Ferozepore.

The Army of Reserve was drawn out to receive him. A noble sight, it

must have stirred the heart of one who loved to express his regret

that circumstances had not made him a soldier. There was much work

to be done; and he flung himself into it with characteristic energy,

resolute to give the returning warriors an honourable reception, and to

dazzle the eyes of all the native potentates who could be lured to the

scene of triumph. Four years before there had been a grand gathering

at the same place, when Runjeet Sing and Lord Auckland had exchanged

courtesies, and the army of the Indus had commenced its march for the

invasion of the Douranee Empire. The war in Afghanistan had opened with

a grand spectacle at Ferozepore; and now, with due dramatic propriety,

it was to close with a similar effect. The Maharajah of the Punjab,

with his ministers of state and his principal military chiefs, were

invited to grace the festival.[339] The Princes of Sirhind, and other

“brothers and friends,” were asked to take part in the rejoicings. And

everywhere from the neighbouring stations, under lordly encouragement,

flocked our English ladies to Ferozepore—the wives and daughters

of the returning warriors and of the officers there assembled—and

everywhere was a flutter of excitement, such as had not been known in

those regions for years.

Day after day, as Lord Ellenborough busied himself with his

preparations for the reception of the victorious Generals, tidings

reached him from their camps. There was nothing in this intelligence to

dim the pleasure which was animating his Lordship’s breast. Pollock had

brought back his army with little loss through the formidable passes

of Afghanistan, and was now making an uninterrupted march through the

Punjab. The withdrawal of the force had been looked forward to with

some anxiety by many, who believed that the tribes would harass the

rear of the retiring army, and work them grievous annoyance. But so

completely had the strength of the Afghans been broken by continual

defeat, that they made no energetic or combined effort to annoy the

British columns on their line of march. Pollock wrote that he had not

seen an enemy; but M’Caskill and Nott, who followed with the centre

and the rear divisions, were not quite so fortunate. From Caubul to

Jellalabad, however, there was little to contend against, except some

desultory night attacks on our baggage.[340] There was, indeed, no

organised resistance.

The entire force assembled at Jellalabad; and halted there for a few

days. Pollock had determined to destroy the defences of the place. When

the British army was halting at Peshawur in the spring, the question

of the transfer of Jellalabad to the Sikhs, as a _douceur_ to ensure

cordiality of co-operation with us, had been earnestly discussed,

but at that time the project had fallen to the ground. It was felt,

that so long as Shah Soojah survived, and the Tripartite treaty had

not been annulled, any design to dissever the Douranee Empire, and to

invite the Sikhs to share in the partition, would be premature, both

as regarded the justice and the expediency of the measure. But the

death of Shah Soojah gave a new aspect to the state of affairs; and

the British Government lost little time, after authentic intelligence

of that event had been received, in communicating to Mr. Clerk its

willingness that certain territories on the right bank of the Indus

should pass into the possession of the Sikh Government or of the Jummoo

Rajahs, with the permission of the Lahore Durbar; and it was intimated

that the British Government would facilitate the accomplishment of

this object by placing Jellalabad in the hands of the Sikhs. The offer

was formally made; but, in the then uncertain position of affairs,

prudently declined. It was not unreasonably urged by the Durbar, that

until they were in possession of the ultimate intentions of the British

with respect to Afghanistan, it would be hardly politic in the Sikhs

to place themselves in a prominent position, or in any way to identify

themselves with measures the future out-turn of which they could as

yet but dimly foresee. But it was believed, that as soon as ever our

withdrawal from Afghanistan was fully determined upon, and about to

be put in execution, the Sikhs, without further explanation, would

be willing to take possession of Jellalabad. And they were so; but

not having fully made up their minds upon the subject (probably from

some mistrust of our intentions) until the British force had actually

marched from Caubul, their acceptance of the offer came too late to

save the place from destruction. General Pollock had, in accordance

with instructions, destroyed the fortifications of Jellalabad before he

received a communication from the Government, intended, if possible,

to arrest such proceeding, and ordering him to make over the place

uninjured to our allies. It may be doubted whether either party very

much regretted the accident.

Having destroyed the defences of Jellalabad, Pollock pushed on to

Peshawur. The Khybur Pass had now to be traversed again. The Afreedi

Maliks offered to sell us a free passage; but Mackeson answered that

Pollock would take one. The first division, under the General himself,

who effectively crowned the heights as he advanced, passed through

with only the loss of two or three privates. M’Caskill was not equally

successful. He had not taken the same precautions, and the Khyburees

came down upon the rear-guard, under their old enemy, Brigadier Wild.

Favoured by the darkness of night, they rushed among our people, and

threw them into confusion. Two of our officers were killed,[341] and

two of our guns were abandoned. But the chief object of the Khyburees

seems to have been plunder. They made no effort to carry off the

guns.[342]

Altogether, the return march of the British troops was singularly

peaceful and uneventful. If the same precautions to crown the heights

along the line of march, as were systematically taken by Pollock,

had been taken by M’Caskill and Nott, it may be doubted whether we

should even have heard of the appearance of an enemy. The Afghans

are famous plunderers, and they are habitually armed. When they saw

their opportunity, they came down upon our baggage-laden columns, and

molested us as best they could. But there was nothing like organised

resistance.[343]

The fortress of Ali-Musjid was destroyed, and the army then pushed on

to Peshawur. Having partaken of Avitabile’s magnificent hospitality,

the victorious Generals commenced their march through the Punjab. It

was an uneventful, but a melancholy one. Sickness broke out in the

returning army. There had always been a scarcity of carriage-cattle,

and now the number of sick made it more severely felt. But all the

inconveniences of the march were from within. The Sikhs wrought us no

annoyance.

Whilst such were the tidings from the returning army which reached the

Governor-General in the midst of his preparations, there came from

Afghanistan intelligence of a more dubious and, at the same time, a

less interesting character. Lord Ellenborough had left the Afghans to

suffer the punishment due to their crimes; and it little mattered to

him whether one party or another were dominant at Caubul. But the news

which now reached him from the Afghan capital all went to show that the

Suddozye Princes were utterly destitute of power and influence; and

that the new government had not the means of supporting the youthful

puppet upon the throne. The Wuzeer had sought to re-establish the

supremacy of the Douranees, had hedged in the new King with Douranee

influences, and by his exclusiveness given general offence. The

downfall of the Suddozye Prince followed rapidly upon this.[344] Akbar

Khan had been biding his time about the regions of the Hindoo-Koosh.

He was in no hurry to return to Caubul. It was more prudent to leave

the dissensions which were certain to arise at the capital to work out

their own debilitating effects upon those in power, and pave the way

for his triumphant return to the capital.

And so, after a time, there came into Ferozepore tidings, forwarded

from Pollock’s camp, to the effect that the Suddozye prince, Shahpoor,

had been expelled from the Balla Hissar, and had fled for safety to

Peshawur. The poor boy had narrowly escaped with his life. Akbar

Khan had made a descent upon Caubul, and carried everything before

him. The Newab Zemaun Khan, it was said, had been made Governor of

Jellalabad, Shumshoodeen of Ghuznee, Sultan Jan of Candahar; and in the

meanwhile Dost Mahomed was making his way through the Punjab to his old

principality. “Everything,” it was added, with bitter significance, “is

reverting to the old state of things—as it was before we entered the

country.”

And now the heart of the Governor-General began to beat with

expectation of the immediate arrival of the victorious armies.

Everything was ready for their reception. The army of reserve was

spread out over the great plain of Ferozepore. Triumphal arches had

been erected. A temporary bridge had been thrown across the Sutlej.

The elephants, no insignificant portion of the coming spectacle, had

been gorgeously painted and decorated, and tricked out in their gayest

trappings and caparisons; and as much of tinsel, and bamboo-work, and

coloured cloth, as could give effect to the triumph, had been expended

to grace the occasion. On the 17th of December, Sir Robert Sale crossed

the Sutlej at the head of that gallant body of troops which had

composed the garrison of Jellalabad. The Governor-General went forth to

meet them. A street of two hundred and fifty elephants, more or less

caparisoned, had been formed, and through this marched the heroes of

Jellalabad—the 13th Light Infantry, Sale’s own regiment, at the head

of the column; but although the docile animals had been instructed to

make a simultaneous salaam at a given signal, and to snort out a note

of welcome from their huge trunks, they resolutely refused to make an

obeisance, and were obstinately silent as the Illustrious Garrison

filed between the huge walls of caparisoned flesh. The morning was dull

and lowering—not a gleam of sunshine lighted up the festive scene; but

there were sunny hearts and bright faces; and as the horse-artillery

guns boomed forth their welcome, and the band of the Lancers struck

up the ever-animating “Conquering Hero” tune, and each regiment

in succession, as the column passed on, saluted their long-absent

comrades, the heart must have been a dull one that did not acknowledge

that there is something of a bright side even to the picture of war.

On the 19th, General Pollock crossed the Sutlej; and on the 23rd,

General Nott arrived, bringing with him the gates of Somnauth.[345]

Then there was feasting and festivity in the gigantic tents, hung with

silken flags, on which, in polyglot emblazonments, were the names of

the actions that had been fought; many complimentary effusions, in

the shape of after-dinner harangues;[346] and in the mornings, grand

field-days, more or less, according to the “skyey influences.” The

year—a most eventful one—was closed with a grand military display.

The plain was covered with British and Sikh troops, and in the presence

of Pertaub Singh, the heir apparent of Lahore; Dhyan Singh, the

minister; the Governor-General, the Commander-in-Chief, and others of

less note, some forty thousand men, with a hundred guns, were manœuvred

on the great plain. On this grand tableau the curtain fell; and the

year opportunely closed in gaiety and glitter—in prosperity and parade.

The Sepoy regiments having been feasted with their “favourite

_mehtoys_” (sweetmeats), and the important event announced in a

Government notification, the army of reserve was broken up;[347]

but not before the Governor-General, moved by that characteristic

admiration of gallantry, which earned for him in India the title of the

“Friend of the Army,” had done all that lay in his power to reward the

troops who had achieved such brilliant successes. The honours which he

could not bestow he solicited from the Crown, on behalf of the brave

men who had so fairly earned them; and the distribution of honorary

distinctions which ensued gave almost universal satisfaction, It erred

rather on the side of liberality; and, perhaps, there are some old

soldiers, in the scantily-decorated Queen’s army, who think that during

the last few years, honours have been bestowed so profusely as to lower

their real value, by showing how easily they are to be earned. But it

is better to err on the side of liberality than of chariness—better

even that the unworthy should be decorated, than that the worthy should

pine in vain for distinction.[348]

But there was still something more to be done. The prisoners, towards

whom the flood of sympathy had been setting in so strongly for many

months, and whom the English in India now welcomed back with cordiality

and delight, were not to be suffered all at once to sink into privacy

and obscurity. Some of them were to be tried by courts-martial, or to

be summoned before courts of inquiry, for abandoning their posts, going

over to the enemy, or otherwise disgracing themselves. The courts sate,

but they could not pronounce the officers arraigned before them guilty

of any offence. Brigadier Shelton was acquitted. Colonel Palmer,[349]

Captains Anderson, Boyd, Troup, and Waller, and Lieutenant Eyre, were

honourably acquitted; and the court of inquiry, over which Mr. Clerk

presided, must have risen from its investigation into the conduct of

Major Pottinger with increased respect for the high soldierly qualities

of the young officer who had beaten back the Persians at Herat, and

protested against the capitulation of Caubul in the teeth of all the

veterans of the force.

On the 20th of January, 1843, Dost Mahomed arrived at Lahore, on his

way to the frontier of Afghanistan, and was honourably received by

the Sikh Durbar. The Suddozye Princes and their families, to whose

reception in the British provinces Lord Ellenborough had evinced an

insuperable repugnance, found an asylum in the Sikh dominions;[350]

and British connection with Afghanistan was now fairly at an end.

Little more remains to be said. The proclamations which were issued

by the Supreme Government of India in the autumn of 1842, are in

themselves the best commentaries on the war in Afghanistan. The

Governor-General of 1842 passed sentence of condemnation upon the

measures of the Governor-General of 1838. No failure so total and

overwhelming as this is recorded in the page of history. No lesson so

grand and impressive is to be found in all the annals of the world. Of

the secondary causes which contributed to the utter prostration of an

unholy policy, much, at different times, has been written in the course

of this narrative; much more might now be written, in conclusion,

of the mighty political and military errors which were baptised in

the blood and tears of our unhappy countrymen. These errors are so

patent—are so intelligible—they have been so often laid bare by the

hand of the anatomist—and they have been so copiously illustrated in

these volumes, that I do not now purpose to enlarge upon them before I

lay down my pen. But if none of these causes had been in operation to

defeat and frustrate our policy, it must still have broken down under

the ruinous expenditure of public money which the armed occupation of

Afghanistan entailed upon the Government of India. It is upon record,

that this calamitous war cost the natives of India, whose stewards we

are, some fifteen millions of money. All this enormous burden fell

upon the revenues of India, and the country for long years afterwards

groaned under the weight. The bitter injustice of this need hardly be

insisted upon. The Afghan war was neither initiated by the East India

Company, nor at any stage approved of by that great body. The ministers

of the crown were responsible for the invasion of Afghanistan, but the

revenues of the East India Company, in spite of a feeble effort to

shift a part of the burden on to the British Exchequer, were condemned

to bear the expense. It was adroitly designed, indeed, from the

beginning, that the Company should bear the charges of the expedition.

And what was gained by the war? What are the advantages to be summed

up on the other side of the account? The expedition across the Indus

was undertaken with the object of erecting in Afghanistan a barrier

against encroachment from the West. The advance of the British army was

designed to check the aggressions of Persia on the Afghan frontier,

and to baffle Russian intrigues, by the substitution of a friendly

for an unfriendly power in the countries beyond the Indus. After an

enormous waste of blood and treasure, we left every town and village of

Afghanistan bristling with our enemies. Before the British army crossed

the Indus, the English name had been honoured in Afghanistan. Some dim

traditions of the splendour of Mr. Elphinstone’s mission had been all

that the Afghans associated with their thoughts of the English nation;

but, in their place, we left galling memories of the progress of a

desolating army. The Afghans are an unforgiving race; and everywhere,

from Candahar to Caubul, and from Caubul to Peshawur, were traces of

the injuries we had inflicted upon the tribes. There was scarcely a

family in the country which had not the blood of kindred to revenge

upon the accursed Feringhees. The door of reconciliation seemed to be

closed against us; and if the hostility of the Afghans be an element of

weakness, it seemed certain that we must have contrived to secure it.

It has been said that the tendency of all these great movements

in Central Asia has been to diminish the mutual jealousies and

apprehensions of the British and the Muscovite powers, by revealing,

in all their true proportions, the tremendous quicksands which lie

waiting to engulph our armies in the inhospitable countries between

the borders of the Russian and the Indian Empires. But although both

states have learnt—the one from her Afghan, the other from her Khivan

expedition—terrible lessons not to be forgotten, it may still be

questioned whether the Cossack and the Sepoy are further apart than

they were. The “Macadamisation” of Sindh and the Punjab has given

England a forward position, which, advantageous as it is in itself,

may have stimulated Russia to increased activity, whilst our awful

disasters in Afghanistan have encouraged anew the aggressions of the

Persian, and the intrigues of his Muscovite ally, by revealing the

sources of our disinclination to entangle our armies again in its

perilous defiles.

It needed but the announcement of the arrival of a Persian army at

Herat, and the establishment of Persian dominion in the province, to

consummate the completeness of the failure. After a lapse of twenty

years from the date of the first siege of Herat, we found that the very

event which had stimulated our English statesmen to decree the invasion

of Afghanistan, had actually come to pass. The Shah of Persia had

conquered Herat, and his viceroy held the key of the “Gate of India”

in his hand. It was still believed to be essential to the security of

our Indian empire either to maintain the integrity of Herat, as an

independent principality, or to attach it to the territories of the _de

facto_ ruler of Afghanistan. Dost Mahomed was still that ruler. For

some time after his restoration, he had been the enemy of the British

Government; but, as years passed, and the memory of his humiliation

grew fainter and fainter, he had come to recognise the wisdom of an

alliance with his opponents; and, in 1852, a treaty of general alliance

between the two states was concluded at Herat, by Hyder Khan and John

Lawrence. When, therefore, in 1856, the usurpations of the Shah of

Persia again roused England to a sense of the necessity of “doing

something” to wrest Herat from his grasp, she found in the Caubul

Ameer a willing, because an interested, ally. The very policy which

ought to have been pursued in 1837—the policy which was recommended

by Sir John M’Neill—is that which then presented itself, but under

what altered circumstances, for our adoption. If, instead of expelling

Dost Mahomed from his principality, we had advanced him a little money

to raise, and lent him a few officers to drill, an army, the Persians

would not, twenty years afterwards, have been lining the walls of

Herat. When the old difficulty, therefore, presented itself with a new

face in 1856, England adopted, in a modified form this once-rejected

policy. She supplied money and arms to Dost Mahomed, to enable him to

resist the tide of Kujjur invasion. Because Persia was aggressive on

one side of the Afghan frontier, she meditated no aggressions on the

other. She did not make war upon the ruler of Afghanistan, in revenge

for hostile intrigues at the Persian capital, and hostile movements in

the Persian camp. But when Persia offended her she struck promptly at

Persia. The demonstration was successful. Under a treaty, signed at

Paris by the English and Persian ambassadors, Herat was evacuated, and

all claims to sovereignty yielded by the Shah; and, whatever may be its

results,—whatever may be the verdict of history upon the policy of the

Persian War of 1856-1857, it will at least be recorded, that it had

not, like the war which I have endeavoured to chronicle, the foul stain

of injustice upon it.

Whether, as many now contend, a later and more terrible disaster owes

primarily its origin to our humiliating expulsion from Afghanistan,

it is not my duty to inquire. The calamity of 1842 was retribution

sufficient, without any conjectural additions, to stamp in indelible

characters upon the page of history, the great truth that the policy

which was pursued in Afghanistan was unjust, and that, therefore,

it was signally disastrous. It was, in principle and in act, an

unrighteous usurpation, and the curse of God was on it from the first.

Our successes at the outset were a part of the curse. They lapped us

in false security, and deluded us to our overthrow. This is the great

lesson to be learnt from the contemplation of all the circumstances of

the Afghan War—“The Lord God of recompenses shall surely requite.”

APPENDIX.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

THE COMMAND OF THE CAUBUL ARMY.—WILLIAMS, LUMLEY, AND POLLOCK.

[_Book VII., chapter 1, pages 19, 20._]

On the 20th of November the Commander-in-Chief wrote to Lord Auckland:

“I purpose that H.M.’s 9th should proceed with the second army. This

corps is 900 and upwards strong, including serjeants and drummers.

The Buffs are somewhat nearer, but they have been nineteen and a-half

years out of England, and should be moved towards Calcutta for early

embarkation, especially as the 49th and 55th are so far out of reach.

The Buffs have now nearly 200 men in hospital. The right to join, which

the Court’s order gives to Major-General Sir Edmund Williams, may be

especially dispensed with by your Lordship, should you not choose to

give him the command. Sir Edmund is in very good health, a hale, strong

man—moreover, was Lieutenant-Colonel of a Light Infantry battalion of

Portuguese in the Peninsular war.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

On the 15th of December, Sir Jasper Nicolls wrote to Lord Auckland:

“I very much regret that the state of Major-General Lumley’s health

entirely forbids the hope of his being able to undertake the command of

the troops advancing to Peshawur. If, therefore, the force is raised

to six regiments, I shall order the Major-General Sir Edmund Williams

to join my camp by dawk, and push him forward, as soon as I shall have

furnished him with instructions, and armed him with all the information

and advice which the known state of affairs at his departure may seem

to require.”—[_Papers relating to Military Operations in Afghanistan._]

“In your Lordship’s letter of the 8th, you have, I think, given

a preference to General Nott, wherefore Sir E. Williams need not

be disturbed. To send him to Cawnpore merely to force his way to

Jellalabad and Caubul, and then return, giving over the command to a

junior officer, would, I think, be unfair. As to his holding the chief

command, it is a matter of no moment to me. The officer to command,

if your Lordship could find such a man, should be also the Envoy—a

Malcolm, Close, or Ochterlony.”—[_Sir Jasper Nicolls to Lord Auckland:

December 19, 1841. MS. Correspondence._] “Twice I laid before the

Governor-General the name of Major-General Sir Edmund Williams, and

as a Light Infantry officer he was deemed most qualified to meet an

enemy in a mountainous country; he was active, zealous, and in perfect

health. In the command of a division he had shown a clear judgment, and

given me satisfaction.... The Governor-General gave such an unwilling

and discouraging reply to my second communication, that I clearly

saw the whole onus of the appointment and its consequences would be

mine.”—[_Sir J. Nicolls to Lord Fitzroy Somerset: September 2, 1842.

MS. Correspondence._]

“In obedience to your Lordship’s wishes, that Major-General Lumley

should be placed in command of the force assembling at Peshawur, I

requested his attendance at my tent, and placed the despatch now

acknowledged (_Governor-General in Council to Sir J. Nicolls: December

15, 1841_) in his hands. The general is still very weak, though

improved in health; he is willing to proceed, but requested that his

medical adviser should be consulted as to his ability to undertake

such a service. Assistant-Surgeon Turner decidedly assured me that his

state of health would by no means admit of the required exertion and

exposure.”—[_Sir J. Nicolls to Government: December 24, 1841. Papers

relating to Military Operations in Afghanistan._]

LORD AUCKLAND AND THE RETRIEVAL QUESTION.

[_Book VII., chapter 1, page 27._]

Lord Auckland’s private letters to the Commander-in-Chief exhibit

better than anything else the alternations in the Governor-General’s

opinions. On the 3rd of January he wrote: “It is melancholy to think

how mighty interests may be compromised by such errors as seem to have

been committed. Our officers are very wild in their requisitions. We

have given all that we can prudently give—perhaps even more; and the

chance of operations must be measured by those means.”—On the 5th of

January, after describing the tidings from Caubul as “inexplicable

as they are appalling,” and declaring that he “was prepared for

everything but for such misdirection and misconduct as seem to have

taken place,” he proceeded to say, “I can make no further suggestions

to you until I know more; but you may shortly have to consider what

instructions should be given to General Sale, and as to whether it may

not be better that he should fight down, than that Brigadier Wild or

General Pollock should fight up, the pass. This must greatly depend on

the manner in which matters may end at Caubul.”—On the 21st of the

same month he wrote, that he “still adhered to his opinion, that it

would be madness with such force and means of carriage, as we could

easily collect, to attempt a fresh advance upon Caubul; and that such

a movement would only have been justified, if we had been led to it

by objects of rescue. It would be my wish, if it could be done with

safety, that Jellalabad should be retained for some weeks, and until

the fate of the British troops in other parts of Afghanistan should be

ascertained.”—On the 26th he wrote: “I agree with you that, at least

so long at the fate of the force at Caubul is uncertain, the post as

Jellalabad must be maintained. I think it will be absolutely necessary,

under any circumstances, to maintain for a time a strong force at

Peshawur—also at Quettah and Sukkur. If our retirement carry with it a

general appearance of defeat and of flight, it will bring on Peshawur

and the Punjab—on Beloochistan and Sindh—a tide of aggression and

disaster which it may be difficult to stem, and against the chance of

which we must endeavour to guard.”—On the 28th, growing still more

convinced of the expediency of doing something for the recovery of our

lost honour, he wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, speaking first with

reference to the refusal of Sale and Macgregor to evacuate Jellalabad:

“We approve of the determination taken at Jellalabad not to withdraw

the troops as directed. Far from withdrawal, under such circumstances,

I am anxious to learn that Brigadier Wild has found it safe to advance

to Jellalabad.... Whatever happens beyond the passes, we should be

strong for a time in Peshawur.... For the present, at least, Jellalabad

should be firmly held;—General Elphinstone was not in a condition to

make stipulations, except for his own troops at Caubul.”—On the 3rd

of February he expressed his opinion that Jellalabad should be held

so long as there was a chance of assisting the escape of fugitives:

“I apprehend,” he added, “that its evacuation will, in a very short

time, become absolutely necessary; if so, the movement should not be

long delayed.” He expressed a doubt, too, whether, with the “force

that we can employ, the pass (Khybur) can be so occupied as to secure

through it a safe passage of detachments and convoys. A descent through

the Jugdulluck passes to Caubul is beyond our present power. It would

require vast exertions and months of preparation, and in the end

would be an enterprise of no light danger. I almost conceive that it

would be an impossible enterprise with any means that we could bring

to bear upon it, unless some party should separate from the present

combination, and then with what confidence should we render it? I have

therefore, in dissent from many for whom I have the highest respect,

earnestly wished that the force at Jellalabad could be safely and

creditably withdrawn to Peshawur.... I would not have it hastily retire

beyond Peshawur, or any healthy spot near it.... The post should be as

forward as it safely can be; and my successor could then pursue the

line of policy which he may think best. I would not have the government

inextricably pledged to measures which my successor may regard as rash,

impolitic, and ruinous.” But he soon came to modify these opinions

in favour of a forward position; and later on the same day wrote that

the disaffection of the Sikhs might cause him to alter his views with

regard to Peshawur: “I am coming fast to the opinion,” he said, “that

our furthest point of support in advance must be Ferozepore, and that

we must bear the disgrace and disadvantage of retiring to this frontier

with as little of loss as may now be ensured.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

THE JANUARY PROCLAMATION.

[_Book VII., chapter 1, page 27._]

“Fort William, Jan. 31, 1842.

“Intelligence having been received which leaves no room to doubt

that, after the British force at Caubul had maintained its position

against overpowering numbers of insurgents for more than six weeks,

the officer commanding had judged it necessary, in consequence of a

failure of provisions, to agree to a convention of the enemy, and

to retire, in reliance on the faith of that convention, towards

Jellalabad, when the troops, exposed to the worst rigours of cold

and privation, in the mountain defiles, and harassed by treacherous

attacks, suffered extreme disasters—the Governor-General in Council

deems it proper to notify that the most active measures have been

adopted, and will be steadfastly prosecuted, for expediting powerful

reinforcements to the Afghan frontier, and for assisting such

operations as may be required in that quarter, for the maintenance of

the honour and interests of the British Government.

“The ample military means at the disposal of the British Government

will be strenuously applied to these objects, so as at once to support

external operations, and to cause efficient protection for its

subjects and allies.

“A faithless enemy, stained by the foul crime of assassination, has,

through a failure of supplies, followed by consummate treachery, been

able to overcome a body of British troops, in a country removed, by

distance and difficulties of season, from the possibility of succour.

But the Governor-General in Council, while he most deeply laments

the loss of the brave officers and men, regards this partial reverse

only as a new occasion for displaying the stability and vigour

of the British power, and the admirable spirit and valour of the

British-Indian army.

“By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in

Council,

“T. H. Maddock.”

THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL POLLOCK.

[_Book VII., chapter 2, page 45._]

SIR JASPER NICOLLS TO LORD HILL.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to acknowledge your Lordship’s letter of the 13th

of June, calling upon me for an explanation of the appeal made to the

General Commanding in Chief, by Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, in

consequence of his not being permitted to accompany the regiment of

which he is senior Colonel, on service beyond the Indus—I beg you will

apprise his Lordship, that, in addition to the rule quoted by Sir J.

Thackwell, the special appointment of Major-General Pollock prohibited

his employment in Afghanistan.

I shall explain the circumstances of that appointment.

In December, 1841, the Governor-General of India in Council instructed

me to place Major-General Lumley, of the Company’s army, in command of

the reinforcements which passed through the Punjab in January last;

and, in addition to the command of the whole force in Afghanistan,

it was his Lordship’s intention to place in his hands the political

control also.

Major-General Lumley’s health was such as to preclude all hope, or

even desire, that he should undertake so great a charge, and it

became necessary that I should propose another officer for this

important duty. Twice I laid before the Governor-General the name of

Major-General Sir Edmund Williams; and as a Light Infantry officer

he seemed most qualified to meet an enemy in a mountainous country:

he was active, zealous, and in perfect health. In the command of a

division he had shown a clear judgment, and given me satisfaction.

I need not inform Lord Hill that the management of the native army,

or of small portions of it, is a matter, at times, of delicacy

and difficulty. It will not do to distrust or disparage it, as

Colonel Monson did. The Governor-General gave such an unwilling and

discouraging reply to my second communication, that I clearly saw

the whole onus of the appointment and of its consequences would be

mine. This I would not undertake, and Major-General Pollock being

near at hand, and honoured by Lord Auckland’s confidence (as I know),

I ordered him by dawk to join the 9th Foot and other corps. This

done, Government was pleased to confer upon him the political powers

intended for Major-General Lumley; without which Sir Edmund Williams

would have had to act, not from himself, but according to requisitions

made by the local political authorities—viz., Brevet-Captains

Mackeson and M’Gregor. Upon the more abstract question of the

Lieutenant-Colonelcy, it must be remarked that Sir Edmund Williams

held that rank in the 9th Foot, which gave _him_ no claim to go to

Afghanistan, though some officious friend has since asserted it.

I had soon occasion to rejoice that Sir Edmund was not appointed to

the command on my sole responsibility, for the four sepoy corps first

sent, under Brigadier Wild, having been most sadly mismanaged (_at

the instance of the political authorities, against my instructions

and earnest caution_), when Major-General Pollock arrived at Peshawur

he found 1800 men of the four regiments in hospital; the sepoys

declaring that they would not advance again through the Khybur Pass;

the Sikh troops spreading alarm, and in all ways encouraging and

screening their desertion, which was considerable. It was well that

a cautious, cool officer of the Company’s army should have to deal

with them in such a temper, 363 miles from our frontier. General

Pollock managed them exceedingly well, but he did not venture to

enter the pass till April (two months and a-half after Brigadier

Wild’s failure), when reinforced by the 3rd Dragoons, a regiment of

cavalry, a troop of horse artillery, and other details. Lord Hill will

at once perceive that the _morale_ must have been low when _horse

artillery and cavalry_ were required to induce the General to advance,

with confidence, through this formidable pass. Any precipitancy

on the part of a general officer panting for fame might have had

the worst effect. I must now return to Sir J. Thackwell’s appeal.

The General Order, quoted very ingenuously by the Major-General,

contains a full and complete reply to his complaint. He was senior

to Major-General Pollock, and his proceeding with the 3rd Dragoons

would have interfered with a divisional command. He certainly did

offer to serve under that officer, but I could not recommend the

government to suffer him to do so, all such arrangements being in my

opinion most faulty in principle, and, depending chiefly on good

temper, dangerous. I have since called up Sir Joseph Thackwell to my

head-quarters, in order to command the cavalry, had it been necessary

(as seemed possible) last winter to collect an army. The Major-General

is in error when he states that I intended him to command an army of

observation on the Sutlej: that post I retained for myself, aided

by Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Arbuthnot. In November next it is

proposed to collect an army of reserve in this vicinity, and Sir J.

Thackwell will have the command of the cavalry. I cannot have the

smallest objection to the Major-General’s bringing himself to Lord

Hill’s notice as he has done, except the infraction of a rule in doing

so direct. But if he had remembered that he commanded the cavalry of

Lord Keane’s army; had been twice named by me for similar duty; has

long been a Brigadier commanding a division or station; he would have

found little cause to complain of ill-fortune or neglect. I have known

many of Her Majesty’s officers, Colonels and old Lieutenant-Colonels,

to reside ten to fifteen years in India without having had any such

opportunities of service and distinction, and, further, to command

divisions without receiving the smallest remuneration.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) J. NICOLLS.

P.S.—I am happy to say that the Governor-General has displaced all the

minor political agents in Afghanistan but one, and entrusted the power

to the Generals Pollock and Nott.

J. N.

Simlah, _2nd Sept., 1842_.

[_MS. Records._]

SALE’S FRENCH AND ENGLISH LETTERS.

[_Book VII., chapter 2, pages 51, 52._]

Jellalabad, Feb. 14th, 1842.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Captain Macgregor’s cossids yesterday brought me the information of

your arrival at Peshawur, and of full military and political powers

in Afghanistan being vested in you. I lose no time in sending such

a view of the state of this garrison as may enable you to form your

own opinion on the necessity of moving to its relief. Nous avons des

provisionnemens pour les soldats Britanniques pour soixante-dix

jours, pour les Sipahis et les autres natifs demi-provisionnemens pour

le même temps, et pour les chevaux de la cavalerie et l’artillerie

de large pour vingt-cinq jours. Autant que nous pouvons renvoyer nos

parties pour la fourrage, nous ne manquerons cela pour la cavalerie,

mais nous serons entièrement privé de cette ressource après le premier

jour d’investissement. A présent nous n’avons de fourrage que pour

trente jours pour tous les animaux. Les chevaux d’artillerie et les

yaboos des sapeurs sont de ce pays et mangent seulement boozeut

kurlise. Nous manquons beaucoup aussi des munitions de guerre, plomb,

&c.

When our animals can no longer be sustained by corn or forage only,

we must of course destroy them. The hospitals are ill supplied with

medicines, and much sickness may be apprehended when the weather grows

hot. At present the health of the garrison is excellent. We have no

prospect of adding to our resources above detailed even if we had

money, which we have not. The country possesses abundance of supplies,

of which the presence of a force would give us command.

Mahomed Akbar is at Cherbyl, in the Lughman district, and threatens

an attack; and we may, in about fifteen days, though I think not

sooner, be invested by a large force from Caubul, with a considerable

artillery.

Believe me to be, my dear General,

Yours very truly,

RT. SALE, M.-G.

P.S.—I shall view la perte of my cavalry, should such occur, with

much sorrow, as from their successes against the enemy they have

acquired a confidence in themselves, and contempt for their enemies,

which feeling is equally participated in by the rest of the troops.

As I cannot now get an opportunity to send you a return, I give a

memorandum:—Cavalry, effective, deux cents quarante-un; malade,

vingt-un. Artillerie, effective, un cent soixante-onze; malade,

quarante-onze. Sapeurs, effective, trois cents quatre; malade,

quarante-cinq. Infanterie Britannique, effective, sept cents dix-neuf;

malade, trente. Sipahis, effective, huit cents trente-huit; malade,

quarante-huit.

_February 16._—Hier Mahomed Akbar a passe la rivière, et a pris

position sur ce côté près de dix milles de cette ville. On dit qu’il a

des soldats de tous armes et quatre pièces de canon. On peut voir son

camp d’ici.

R. SALE.

_February 16._—I have received this morning yours of the 9th instant.

S’ils n’envoyent pas des canons de siège de Caubul, _peut-être_ je

puis maintenir ma position dans cette ville pour le temps que vous

avez écrit; mais si une force avec les pièces (que nous avons perdu)

arriveront ici, ce sera impossible, et avant cette époque nos chevaux

moureront de faim. Il sera bien difficile et incertain de vous donner

avis de mon intention de retirer, parce qu’à ce moment Mahomed Akbar

est près avec une force de deux milles hommes (qui s’augmente jour par

jour), et à présent ses patrouilles et videttes parcourent tout le

pays.

RT. SALE, M.-G.

THE EARTHQUAKE AT JELLALABAD.

[_Book VII., chapter 3, page 67._]

Sale and Macgregor were both writing to Pollock when this event

occurred. I subjoin their letters:—

Jellalabad, February 19th, 1842.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

* * * A l’égard à mon pouvoir de maintenir ma position ici, j’ai

déjà vous donné avis de tous mes moyens et ressource. Je n’ai pas

rien de craindre de la force à présent avec Akbar Khan, même si il

est joint par tous les colors de Ningraher; mais je veux bien que

vous vous comprenez que nos parapets ne sont pas assez forts pour

résister les bouts de canon, et il est sujet de doubte si nous pouvons

résister une siège pour peu de temps si l’ennemi envoyent des pièces

de siège de Caubul; et en aucune cas les chevaux de la cavalerie et

de l’artillerie comme les yaboos et les chameaux après vingt-cinq

jours periront. Cette époque le rendre impossible pour nous à vous

ajouter dans aucun plan de retraite que vous voudrais; et de plus il

sera impossible communiquer avec vous au moment que je me trouverais

au point d’être écrassé (overwhelmed) par une force irrésistible. En

perdant las yaboos et les chameaux, qui sont absolument nécessaire

pour les travaux de la fortification, je perd aussi tous mes moyens de

transporter mes malades et les munitions de guerre, sans laquelle il

ne faut pas contempler une retraite. J’ai extrême.... Soixante-huite

chameaux et _cinq trente neuf_ yaboos. Ces circonstances me semble de

demander que votre avance à notre secours sera prompt—the only means

of securing the avowed object of government, _i.e._, the relief of the

troops who have so long defended Jellalabad. After writing the above,

the dreadful earthquake of this day a fait tomber deux bastions, et

plusieurs autres sont culles—une brèche de côté de Peshawur dans les

murs et beaucoup des maisons (casèmees) aussi. Sans doute l’ennemi

prend avantage de cet calamité. Nous travaillons sans cesse de réparer

le dedommage.

Believe me to be, my dear General, yours, very truly,

R. SALE, M.-Genrl.

[_MS. Records._—I give the postscript to this letter in a note,

though of no historical importance,[351] as I cannot deny myself the

pleasure of quoting a tribute to the worth of one whom I am proud

to recognise as a fellow-labourer in the field of Afghan history:

“P.S.—Understanding from the 3rd para. of the letter from the

Adjutant-Gen. that the authority of Major-Gen. Elphinstone has ceased,

I venture to mention to you that Captain Havelock, 13th L.I., was

appointed in general orders Persian Interpreter to the M.-General,

so long as he continued to command in Afghanistan. He was by his

permission, however, attached to me from the period of my force leaving

Caubul, and I have received from him very valuable assistance in every

way throughout our operations, as I have already intimated in public

despatches. I trust you will pardon my undertaking to say, that if

you would be pleased to re-appoint him to the same situation under

yourself, I feel persuaded that his local experience would render

him most useful to you. In the meantime, I have nominated him Per.

Intr. to myself, subject to confirmation, as I cannot, under present

circumstances, dispense with his services. Be good enough to make this

known also to H. E. the C. in C.”]

Jellalabad, February 19th, 1842.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

* * * Since I commenced writing to you, we have been visited by a

very severe earthquake, which has in a great measure demolished two

or three of our bastions, and nearly the whole of the parapet of the

ramparts, to raise which cost the troops more than a couple of months

of hard labour. A number of houses in the town have been thrown down

by the shock, and the small court-yard attached to the house in which

the General and myself reside, is filled with the rubbish of a number

of out-offices which fell crashing at our feet, we having sought

the centre of the yard as a place of safety. It was with difficulty

we could preserve our footing, so great was the undulating motion

of the ground we stood upon. Our dwelling-house seemed to heave to

and fro, as if it would topple on us. I have not heard of more than

two or three persons who have been killed by the falling houses or

walls. Colonel Monteith was buried up to the neck; but he has not, I

believe, sustained any serious injury. If this town had been seriously

bombarded for a month, I don’t think it could have suffered more

than at present. God grant that we may not have to witness anything

so fearful again. I feel still giddy, although the earthquake took

place a couple of hours ago. It is to be expected that on the enemy

discovering the damage which our defences have sustained, they will be

encouraged to attack us.

Gold mohurs and bootkees would be of use to us, but I fear that

Mackeson would find it impracticable to send them to us in safety.

Captain Bygrave is alive, and with Mahomed Akbar Khan. Captain Souter,

44th Regiment, is also there. He saved the Queen’s colour of his

regiment by rolling it round his waist, and he writes that a shot

struck him there, and the colour saved his life.

Believe me, very truly yours,

G. H. MACGREGOR.

THE ADVANCE FROM PESHAWUR.

[_Book VII., chapter 3, page 72._]

[The following is the correspondence to which reference is made in the

text.]

Jellalabad, March 8th, 1842, 9 P.M.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I had the pleasure of receiving a few hours ago yours of the 26th

ultimo. I must confess that its contents have deeply disappointed me,

since I gather from it that it is not your intention to advance to

my succour until you shall have been reinforced by the brigade which

you expect to reach Peshawur on the 22nd instant. Now, independently

of other considerations, Macgregor will inform you that he yesterday

got a Dust-i-Khat from the Shah’s Durbar at Caubul, demanding

categorically our evacuation of this place. He referred the King and

his councillors to you, and their next measure will probably be to

march an overwhelming force against us, aided by our captured iron

nine-pounders. I have reiterated in several letters the fact that

mes mains ne sont pas assez forts pour résister tel artillerie, and

therefore desire to make you once more fully aware of the risk, if not

certainty, of our being overpowered if your advance to our support is

not sufficiently prompt to anticipate this movement of our enemies.

The responsibility, therefore, of such a result, will now rest

entirely upon you, and not on me. Money is not now of the slightest

use to me, Mahomed Akbar having established a most rigid blockade,

which effectually prevents all supplies from reaching us. Our foraging

parties are also daily attacked.

Believe me to be, my dear General, yours sincerely,

ROBERT SALE, M.-G.

P.S.—As I remark that your letter does not contain any distinct avowal

of an intention of advancing even when your reinforcements reach

you, I shall be obliged, for the sake of this garrison, if you will

specifically inform me when it is probable I may calculate on its

being relieved.[352]

At the same time Macgregor despatched another letter of a similar

tendency, and to this letter Pollock replied:

March 12th, 1842.

MY DEAR MACGREGOR,

I will write you a very short note in reference to yours and Sale’s of

the 8th. It must no doubt appear to you and Sale most extraordinary

that, with the force I have here, I do not at once move on. God knows

it has been my anxious wish to do so, but I have been helpless. I came

on ahead to Peshawur to arrange for an advance, but was saluted with a

report of 1900 sick, and a bad feeling among the Sepoys. I visited the

hospital, and endeavoured to encourage by talking to them, but they

_had no heart_. I hoped that when the time came they would go. This,

however, I could not write to you or Sale in _ink_, either in English

or French. On the 1st instant the feeling on the part of the Sepoys

broke out; and I had the mortification of knowing that the Hindoos, of

four out of five native corps, refused to advance. I immediately took

measures to sift the evil, and gradually a reaction has taken place,

in the belief that I will wait for reinforcements. This has caused me

the utmost anxiety on your account. Your situation is never out of my

thoughts; but having told you what I have, you and Sale will at once

see that necessity alone has kept me here.

I have sent five expresses to hurry on the first division of the next

brigade. It consists of the 3rd Dragoons, a troop of Horse Artillery,

1st Light Cavalry, the 33rd N.I., and two companies of the 6th N.I.,

all fresh and without a taint. I really believe that if I were to

attempt to move on now without the reinforcement, the four regiments

implicated would, as far as the Hindoos are concerned, stand fast.

Pray, therefore, tell me, without the least reserve, the latest day

you can hold out. If I could, I would tell you the day when I expect

reinforcements, but I cannot. I may, however, I believe with safety

say, that they will arrive by the end of this month.

The case, therefore, now stands thus:—Whether I am to attempt with

my present materials to advance, and to risk the appearance of

disaffection or cowardice, which in such a case could not again be

got over, or wait the arrival of a reinforcement, which will make all

sure. This is the real state of the case. If I attempted now, it might

risk you altogether; but if you can hold out, the reinforcements would

make your relief as certain as any earthly thing can be.

Our only object in going to Jellalabad is to relieve you and bring you

back with us to this; but it is necessary that this should be kept a

profound secret.

I am, &c. &c.

GEORGE POLLOCK.

To this Sale replied:

Jellalabad, 23rd March, 1842.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Yesterday arrived yours of the 12th instant addressed jointly to

Captain Macgregor and myself. I have only, in reply thereto, to say

that in my last I informed you definitively that I would, by God’s

blessing, hold this place to the 31st instant, by which time you

acquainted me that you could arrive at Jellalabad with the dragoons.

You now state to me your expectation that they will only reach your

present encampment by that date. Our European soldiers are now on

two-thirds of their rations of salt meat, and this the commissariat

supply; on the 4th proximo that part of the force will then be without

meat, notwithstanding every arrangement to lessen the consumption.

I have this day directed all the camels to be destroyed, with the

view of preserving the _boosa_ for the horses of the cavalry and

artillery; and these valuable animals cannot receive any rations of

grain whatever after the 1st proximo, but must be subsisted entirely

on _boosa_ and grass, if the latter can be procured.

Believe me to be, yours sincerely,

R. SALE.[353]

GHOLAB SINGH AND THE SIKH ARMY.

[_Book VII., chapter 3, page 77._]

On the 10th of February Mr. Clerk wrote to the Government Secretary:

“There seems to have been no good reason for the delay of Rajah Gholab

Singh in crossing the Attock, unless he really feared a collision

with the Nujeeb battalions, encamped on the other side. But for the

Rajah’s apparent reluctance immediately to undertake to co-operate

in the Khybur Pass, there may be better grounds. These may be either

an apprehension of his inability to oppose the enemy there; or, as

supposed by Captain Lawrence, a want of incentive to exertion—or both

these causes may retard his movements. In regard to the former, the

presence of the large body of British troops assembling at Peshawur

will encourage him. With respect to the latter, I should be glad to be

provided with the instructions of government.”—[_MS. Records._]

Writing again, on the 13th of February, he says: “In regard to the

means of inducing zealous co-operation on the part of the Sikh troops,

I do not think that the expectations of Captains Mackeson and Lawrence

are quite reasonable, or the almost indefinite extent of proposed

reward judicious, or the direct negotiation with the Jummoo Rajahs

for their immediate aggrandisement honourable.... It would not be

compatible with the friendship long subsisting between the British

Government and the Lahore Government, now to assign suddenly and

directly to the Jummoo Rajahs any territories as a compensation for

services demanded of the Sikh Durbar. This would be precipitating the

decline of a power which it may be soon expedient to prop, both against

Afghans and Jummooees.”—[_MS. Records._] But though Mr. Clerk thought,

at this time, that it would not be honourable openly to treat with the

Jummoo Rajahs for the transfer of Jellalabad, he was not unwilling to

place it permanently in their hands by a stroke of _finesse_. I confess

that I cannot see very distinctly how the course suggested by Mr. Clerk

is so much more “honourable,” and “compatible with friendship,” than

that suggested by Captains Mackeson and Lawrence.

POLLOCK’S APPEAL TO HIS ARMY.

[_Book VII., chapter 4, page 84._]

After alluding to the defence of Jellalabad, and the probability that

the Peshawur force would immediately advance to its relief, General

Pollock said: “Success in relieving these troops will raise for this

force the admiration and gratitude of all India, and the Major-General

commanding feels assured that officers and men will cheerfully make

any sacrifices to attain so noble an object. He therefore now calls

upon the Brigadiers to assemble the commanding officers under their

orders, and determine on the least quantity of baggage and the smallest

number of camp-followers with which their regiments can advance. The

success of this enterprise will greatly depend upon the quantity of

baggage taken, as from the nature of the country between Peshawur and

Jellalabad, the line most consistent with safety must be as little

incumbered as possible. The Major-General commanding trusts that the

confidence he feels in the troops will be repaid by their confidence

in him. The soldiers may rest assured that his thoughts are constantly

engaged in ensuring their provisions and securing their comforts, and

they may be convinced they will never be called upon by him to make

useless sacrifices, or to undergo unnecessary hardships. Arrangements

will be made for placing such baggage as may be left behind in perfect

security at Peshawur.”

FORCING THE KHYBUR.—POLLOCK’S GENERAL ORDERS.

[_Book VII., chapter 4, pages 87, 88._]

[The following are the rules laid down for the guidance of commanding

officers, to which allusion is made in the text.]

* * * * *

1. A bugler or trumpeter to be attached to each commanding-officer of a

party or detachment of the several columns.

2. Whenever an obstacle presents itself, or accident occurs, of a

nature to impede the march of any part of either of the columns, and

occasions a break in its continuity, the officer in command nearest to

the spot will order the halt to be sounded, which will be immediately

repeated by the other buglers, and the whole will halt till the removal

of the difficulty enables the columns to proceed in their established

order, when the signal to advance will be given.

3. The baggage-master will superintend the placing of the baggage, &c.,

in the order prescribed, and the Major-General commanding requests that

commanding-officers will use their best exertions to facilitate this

important object. The quarter-master of each corps will see that the

baggage of his regiment is placed in its proper position in the column,

and an officer from each is to be appointed to the duty.

4. No private guards are to be allowed. The parties of cavalry and

infantry, allotted at intervals in the line of march, are to be the

only troops attending it.

5. The officers entrusted with the command of the parties which are

to flank the rear-guard on the heights, must give their most vigilant

attention to the important duty of preventing their men from hurrying

in advance of it; its rear must never be left exposed to fire from the

heights.

6. The troops to be told off on their regimental parades, as above

detailed, and marched at the appointed hour to their respective posts.

7. The force will march to Jumrood to-morrow morning, in the order

above prescribed. The general to beat at four, and the assembly at five

o’clock.

8. The baggage and camp-followers of each corps are to be kept with

their respective regiments till notice is given by the baggage-master

that they are required to take their places in the column.[354]

Camp Jumrood, 4th April, 1842.

The force to be under arms to-morrow morning at half-past three

o’clock, ready to move forward, at which time all the treasure,

ammunition, baggage, &c., will be moved to the low ground to the

right front of the hills now occupied by picquets. No fires are to be

lighted on any account; no drums to beat, or bugles to be sounded.

The six companies of the 60th Regiment, and six companies of the

33rd Regiment, will remain with the baggage, in the vicinity of the

treasure and ammunition. The parties for crowning the heights, under

the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor and Major Anderson, will move

forward to the hill on the right of the pass. The parties for the

same duty, under the command of Major Huish and Lieutenant-Colonel

Moseley, will in like manner move forward to the hill on the left.

Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor’s party will be accompanied by the

Irregulars who lately garrisoned Ali-Musjid.

Captain Ferris’s jezailchees will accompany the left advancing party.

When the heights have been crowned on both hills, four companies

of the 9th Foot, the eight companies of the 26th, under

Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor and Major Huish, also the jezailchees, under

Captain Ferris, will descend the hills to be in readiness to enter the

pass.

Six horse-artillery guns, four from the foot-artillery, with the two

mountain guns, will be drawn up in battery opposite the pass.

The advance guard, seven companies of the 30th, and seven companies of

the 53rd, will accompany the guns.

The whole of the cavalry will be so placed by Brigadier White, that

any attempt at an attack from the low hills on the right may be

frustrated. When the baggage, &c., is directed to advance, the same

order of march will be preserved as was formerly prescribed, with

the following alteration: Six companies of the 60th N.I. will be

together on the right, and six companies of the 33rd, now arrived,

will follow the 53rd N.I. When the rear of the column is entering the

pass, the two rear companies of Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley’s and Major

Anderson’s parties should descend the hills.

G. PONSONBY, Capt., A. A. General.[355]

LORD ELLENBOROUGH’S JELLALABAD PROCLAMATION.

[_Book VII., chapter 4, page 98._]

Secret Department, Benares, 21st April.

The Governor-General feels assured that every subject of the British

Government will peruse with the deepest interest and satisfaction the

report he now communicates of the entire defeat of the Afghan troops,

under Mahomed Akbar Khan, by the garrison of Jellalabad.

That illustrious garrison, which, by its constancy in enduring

privation, and by its valour in action, has already obtained for

itself the sympathy and respect of every true soldier, has now,

sallying forth from its walls, under the command of its gallant

leader, Major-General Sir Robert Sale, thoroughly beaten in open field

an enemy of more than three times its numbers, taken the standards of

their boasted cavalry, destroyed their camp, and recaptured four guns,

which, under circumstances which can never again occur, had during the

last winter fallen into their hands.

The Governor-General cordially congratulates the army upon the return

of victory to its ranks. He is convinced that there, as in all former

times, it will be found, while, as at Jellalabad, the European and

Native troops mutually supporting each other, and evincing equal

discipline and valour, are led into action by officers in whom they

justly confide.

The Governor-General directs that the substance of this notification,

and of Major-General Sir Robert Sale’s report, be carefully made known

to all troops, and that a salute of twenty-one guns be fired at every

principal station of the army.

STATE OF CAUBUL AFTER ITS EVACUATION BY THE BRITISH.

[_Book VII., chapter 5, page 104, et seq._]

The letters of John Conolly written at this time afford a sufficiently

clear insight into the state of parties at Caubul. On the 17th of

January he wrote to Macgregor: “The accounts of our most ill-fated

force become more distressing every day. Hundreds of Sepoys, wounded,

frost-bitten, starving, and naked, come into the city. The Oosbegs

buy many, and some find their way to us, and are relieved in the

hospital, which is now crowded to excess; and the poor wretches are

dying off fast. That villain, Ameen-oollah, is evidently anxious that

the sick should die, for he will not assist them in any way, nor attend

in the least to our repeated requests for assistance. The Newab is

so completely in the hands of the Naib that he cannot afford us any

relief. The Afghans are very sanguine in the expectation of assistance

and co-operation of the Sikhs, and talk in court of Sultan Mahomed

having received instructions from the Durbar to do our force as much

injury as possible, and that Shere Singh has an understanding with

them to prevent our force re-entering the country. You must be aware

whether there is any foundation for these reports.... This morning the

Newab, attended by Ameen-oollah and all the chiefs, went to pay their

respects to the King in the Balla Hissar. The King has paid two lakhs

of rupees already, and has promised one more in ten days. The Newab is

Minister—Ameen-oollah, Naib; and oaths and protestations have been

taken on the Koran that they are to be friends to each other, and

supporters of the true faith. The Newab abuses the King most loudly and

openly. The King does the same with the whole family of the Barukzyes.

Ameen-oollah Khan has sworn eternal faith to the cause of his

Majesty—bares his head and swears most solemn oaths in the Musjids to

uphold the Newab’s dignity against the King and all the royal family.

His Majesty has sent me several messages, saying that he submits to the

extortion of the three lakhs because he is not strong enough to oppose

the demand; but that, _Inshallah!_ when he has received the salaam of

the chiefs, he will gain power daily, and be able, should our troops

come on, to play his own game with advantage to himself and ourselves.

I believe that he is heart and soul in our interest; and it appears

contrary to all reason to suppose otherwise. The measures which obliged

the Newab to resign his throne are, I believe—1st. The dread of our

vengeance, which the people think the King can in some way avert, if a

force is sent strong enough to shut out all hope of opposition. 2nd.

The dread of Akbar’s rising power. 3rd. The suspicions of the fidelity

of their own party, who had shown symptoms of disaffection, and some

of whom had openly espoused the cause of his Majesty. Such a condition

cannot, I should think, last long between such Yorks and Lancasters.

There is one thing very certain, that unless a very large force is

sent up, which will preclude all hope of opposition, every man in the

country will rise against us; and the people in the vicinity of Caubul

have so compromised themselves, and dread our vengeance so much, that

they will strain every nerve to oppose us, and may be his Majesty will

feel that his safest plan is to join his countrymen against us. He said

at the Durbar this morning that he was glad that affairs had taken such

a turn, and that he was now able to call himself defender of the faith.

This much could not have been avoided under the circumstances....

We are amused all day long by abuse and scurrilous verses about the

Kaffirs. Books are being sold by the weight. I have not yet been able

to get hold of the children—most exorbitant prices are demanded. The

Newab promises, but has not the power to fulfil. Salutes are being

fired, and there is a general rejoicing in honour of the coalition

between the two Kings. Artillerymen are being sent to Akbar.”—[_MS.

Correspondence._]

On the 24th of January, John Conolly wrote: “The King holds Durbar

regularly, at which all the chiefs attend. He pretends to have shaken

off all connection with our government, but secretly sends me messages,

professing all sincerity and attachment. There is much talk of a large

force being sent to oppose the army which is said to be advancing from

Hindostan; but money is wanting; the religious feeling against us

continues very strong, and the chiefs have compromised themselves so

much, that they will rise to a man, unless an overpowering force is

sent. The Newab’s kindness is beyond description, and he professes,

and I believe sincerely feels, great anxiety to secure the friendship

of our government. He is most deeply distressed at the treacherous

conduct of the chiefs. We are quite ignorant of the intentions

of government. Mohamed Akbar is continually writing for guns and

ammunition; but not a man can be induced to march without pay, and

every one is jealous of Akbar Khan’s rising power. The Barukzye faction

of his party view each other with great suspicion. Ameen-oollah is the

go-between. Akbar Khan is procuring all the money he can by extortion

from Sourkars and others.”—[_MS. Correspondence_.] This was interlined

invisibly on the advice of a bill drawn by Major Pottinger on the

Ferozepore treasury, and was produced on the application of iodyne

to the paper. On the same day Lieutenant Conolly wrote to Mr. Clerk:

“The King is obliged to talk of sending troops to oppose us at the

Khybur; but he declares secretly to me his sincerity for the British

Government. The chiefs talk of collecting an army, but the sinews

of war are wanting.... Thanks to the Newab, we are safe; but it has

more than once been proposed that we should be killed.... Since our

troops left this, the King has been recognised by the Newab and the

rebel chiefs on the payment of three lakhs of rupees to the Newab and

Ameen-oollah Khan. The former is Vizier; the latter deputy. The Newab

is most anxious to serve our government. He has not been in any way

concerned in the treacherous conduct to our troops. His kindness and

attention to us is great, and he is sincerely anxious to establish

a friendship with the British Government—being afraid of the King

and Mohamed Akbar, and disgusted with the conduct of the chiefs, who

deceived him with oaths and protestations. Great excitement prevails

in the town; the feeling against us continues very strong, and every

man will oppose our re-entering the country, unless a force is sent

which will preclude all hope of successful opposition.”—[_MS.

Correspondence._]

On the 15th of February Conolly wrote to Macgregor: “Since my former

notes, the latest of which was dated the 10th, affairs have assumed

a very different aspect. Naib Ameen-oollah, having given up the guns

entrusted to his charge, has shaken the confidence of the Barukzye

party in his (the Naib’s) sincerity, and exposed the King’s ultimate

designs of making himself strong and independent of, if not inimical

to, the Newab’s clique. Yesterday the Naib called on the Newab, on the

part of his Majesty, to send his guns to the Balla Hissar. His demand

was directly refused; and the Newab declared his determination of not

again attending the Durbar until his Majesty gave proofs of confidence

and honesty. This morning Fuzil-i-Almud, son of Kasee Hussun, brought

an order from his Majesty that I should wait upon him; but I declined

the honour in this instance, as I had done before, feeling that no good

could come from an interview, ignorant as I am of the intentions of

government and of your wishes, and having been, moreover, frequently

warned against moving out of our present residence. I gathered from

the Kasee’s son, that his Majesty was forming a party in opposition to

the Barukzye faction, the principal characters being Ameen-oollah, the

Populzye, many of the Kuzzilbash, and some of the Caubul chiefs. You

will perceive among his partisans the chief conspirators in the late

rebellion, Ameen-oollah, Abdool Salam, and Sekundur,—men who have

nothing to hope for at our hands. I presume the first demand made by

our government will be the persons of these chiefs, who planned and

were most conspicuous in the late revolution; and if the information

I have alluded to be correct, his Majesty may object to give up the

chiefs. But these are matters for future consideration; and should his

Majesty be disinclined to use his utmost endeavours for the furtherance

of the wishes of government, such unwillingness must, of course, be

regarded as hostility. It is generally believed and asserted throughout

the town, that his Majesty instigated the late rebellion. I have never

been able to prove the accusation, though I cannot but think that his

Majesty was, directly or indirectly, the cause of the revolution. When

you know the intentions of government, you will be able to see your

way more clearly. I would, however, suggest that his Majesty be made

to understand, either from yourself or through me, that he must either

meet our wishes or go his own road. Things are so very unsettled here

just now, that the most learned cannot foretell the events of the

morrow. All eyes are turned upon you. The evacuation of Jellalabad will

have the worst possible effect. Every one here has turned soldier and

the people are in a high state of excitement, and hungering after pay,

which is not forthcoming. Our host has assembled a regiment of 1000

bayonets, 1000 horsemen, some Jezailchees, and a park of twelve guns,

the ammunition for which, by the Meerza’s return yesterday, amounted

to about thirty shot, and no cartridges. There must be some serious

disturbance ere long. We are very anxious about the sick, which we fear

will be sacrificed in any popular tumult. For ourselves, we must trust

to Providence; should things come to the worst, we shall try and escape

to your stronghold.—P.S. We have just heard that a change of ministry

has been proposed by his Majesty, and likely to be effected, Oosman

Khan to be acting premier, and the Newab to be a sleeping partner.

“15th, P.M., 10 o’clock.—To-day there has been a noisy debate between

the Newab and Ameen-oollah, the former abusing the latter in rather

round terms. The Naib left the room in a huff, and things are as

unsettled as can be. The Newab says he won’t give up his guns, or

go to the Durbar: and insists upon ... his Majesty pursuing the

non-interference system to which he is bound by the terms of his

treaty. There is nothing but Nifag: everybody suspects his neighbour;

everything is in capital trim for us if our army advances; I only wait

your authority to spend a little money, and above all a guarantee

to our host of a handsome provision if he sides with us, or stands

neutral—for he is a most worthy and honest old gentleman, and had no

hand in the late melancholy occurrences. Ghoolam Mahomed Khan has also

kept aloof from the late rebellion. There is a report that Palmer has

broken up the treaty, and is again besieged in the Balla Hissar. He

writes for orders, which kindly send with all expedition. For God’s

sake beware of Mahomed Akbar.”

In a letter of March 5th, the same writer says: “Futteh Jung (Shah

Soojah’s son) has gone out yesterday to join Akbar. Things are very

unsettled here still, and the Kohistanees are fighting amongst

themselves. The Newab is still treating us with the greatest kindness.

He has enlisted about 3000 men, principally for our protection, and is

determined to fight rather than give us up. The Naib here has been

trying to get us, and has a strong party of Sepoys enlisted also. The

Newab asked me yesterday if, when his money is out, we shall be able

to assist him, as he only has sufficient ready cash to pay his men for

one month and a half more. Can you authorise me to make him an advance

when his money fails? For, as I said before, his entertaining troops

is almost entirely on our account. He would be safe enough were we not

his guests. In the meantime he has bought ammunition, and got his guns

ready in case of an attack.”

And in another letter of the same date: “The bearer will be able to

tell you all the news. I have written to you several times, but have

received no acknowledgment of my letters. Always try solution of iodyne

on my notes.... We are very kindly treated by the Newab, but close

prisoners. Ameen-oollah has tried stratagem and threats to get us out

of the Newab’s hands, with a view of screwing us; but, thanks to the

Newab, we are as yet safe, though our situation is an unpleasant one.

The King is sitting in the Balla Hissar; but his authority is only

nominal, all power being in the hands of Ameen-oollah. Prince Futteh

Jung has started with a few horsemen towards Jellalabad, and will

probably halt for some days at Bootkak. The King sends me occasionally

messages professing sincerity for the British Government; but he does

not, in his present circumstances, do anything which would lead his

subjects to suspect his attachment to us, or the whole population would

rise up against him.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

THE LETTERS OF SHAH SOOJAH.

[_Book VII., chapter 5, page 108._]

[Containing the King’s version of the causes and circumstances of our

disasters at Caubul, and throwing some light upon his own character

and conduct, the unpublished letters of Shah Soojah are sufficiently

curious and interesting to induce me to insert a few of them in this

place. It is important also to consider their bearing upon some of the

events recorded in the chapter on the Defence of Jellalabad.]

FROM SHAH SOOJAH TO CAPTAIN MACGREGOR.

(_Received January 21st, 1842._)

Let it be known to Captain Macgregor: you are aware of all that has

occurred here. Notwithstanding all I said regarding the treachery of

these men, they (the British) did not understand, but were guided by

the advice of my enemies—that is, the Barukzyes—until arrived at

this pitch. The clans of the Barukzyes had this object, that suspicion

and ill-will should exist between the British and me. To the British

they said, that I had instigated the rebellion; and to the Mahomedans

they said, that I and the Feringhees were one, until they made me

generally unpopular. Well; such was fated! It has caused me much grief

and regret. God grant this wish of my heart, that the fate of Sir

William Macnaghten and Mr. Trevor and the other gentlemen may befall

my enemies! I frequently desired them, on the first outbreak of the

rebellion, to bring everything into the Balla Hissar, which is a place

of strength. They did not listen to my advice. I then begged them to

endeavour to gain time—that when I could arrange matters with these

men (Afghans) all would be well. During the time that I was besieged,

I expended all that I had collected with so much labour, until I

brought every one of influence over to my side by payment. Please God

they may remain faithful to me!

No one but myself could manage these people (Afghans) and carry on

the government. My sincerity and friendship to the East India Company

was formerly well known: at present it is as evident to all the world

as the light of day. If I had only some treasure, that during the two

or three remaining months of winter I might strengthen myself, please

God there is no one in this country who could displace me, and, by

the blessing of God, everything would be arranged according to my

desire. The men here are not to be won without money. God grant this

wish of my heart! Before this I spent four lakhs of rupees in this

affair, and I also gave two lakhs more; I have nothing else left. If

some money could be received that I might win over these men, please

God everything could be arranged according to my desire. It is to be

hoped, as you will see, that in a few months I could collect horse and

foot so that no one could stir. God grant this wish of my heart!

The bearer of this will verbally inform you of all other

circumstances. It is advisable that you should send this paper to

Peshawur, or even to the Governor-General. And send me an answer

to this speedily. Whenever you hear of the arrival of this paper at

Peshawur, be good enough to let me know, that I may feel sure of its

having passed out of this country; because the evil-disposed are

spreading reports that I am united to the Feringhees. Until I have

gained my proper footing, it is necessary that, for some time, money

should be sent to enable me to manage matters. When I have succeeded

in establishing my power, I shall not require assistance from any one.

Everything will be easy. Don’t let the men of this country know these

things. Afterwards, whatever may be desirable for my good and for

yours, God will grant. And God grant this wish of my heart! The bearer

will tell you how matters stand. Whenever money has been received and

I have reinstated myself, I shall have these people so much under my

control, that if I order it they will carry the shoes of the Sahibs on

their own heads.—[_MS. Records_].

FREE TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM SHAH SOOJAH TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

OF INDIA.

(_Without date, brought on the 2nd of February, by a messenger fifteen

days from Caubul._)

Be it known to my friend that I am King, and know the people well. It

is right to treat people according to their deserts; some by kindness,

others by severity.

Some evil-disposed persons, from fear of me, took refuge with Sir W.

Macnaghten and Sir A. Burnes, and I could say nothing to them; they

stirred up strife.

During the last two or three years I considered the Sahibs, and

especially the Envoy, whom I valued more than my life, as my equals;

without their pleasure I did nothing.

It was God’s will I should see what I would have wished not to have

seen. May no other have such experiences.

Could it have been my wish to see my enemies and their families in the

place of my friends?

Once or twice I wrote to you to send a person to inquire and inform

you of the state of things in this country; but it was not done.

For two or three years I consoled the people, who told me if I was

not King, they should understand it was the Feringhee; and they (the

former) told me that when I came they expelled Dost Mahomed, but

that I had disappointed them; that now their women left them, their

country was lost; and, although at first they received pay, even that

was stopped. I could not console the people, but I spoke of them

to the Envoy, and told him that, sooner or later, there would be a

disturbance; but he listened not to me. I told him they were deceiving

him; but he believed me not, and desired me to be at ease, for that he

would settle the country with two Pultuns (regiments).

He further told me to confine and expel some evil-disposed persons. I

did so; but they got access to Nizam-oo-dowlah, and through him to the

Envoy, who asked me to release them. I did so. Now I am distressed by

those very people.

When the Envoy was going away I asked him to take me with him; for

that I was in an extremity; I told him of what was going on, and

was not listened to. I told him that complaints were daily made to

me of Afghan women being taken to Burnes’s Moonshee, and of their

drinking wine at his house, and of women being taken to the Chaonee

(cantonments) on horseback, and of my having myself witnessed it.

When people complained to me of such things, I asked who did so,

that I might inquire; and told them not to defame the Sahibs. I

first comforted and then reproved them; and said, if any person uses

violence to your women, tell me, and inquiry shall be made.

The people have often before acted as they have now; they confined

my brother Mahmood in the Balla Hissar; the conspirators then were

Mooktear-oo-dowlah and Ahmed Khan, Noorzye, &c. They pretended it

was a quarrel between the Sheeahs and Soonees; but it proved a great

matter, and they saw that without me they could not settle matters. I

was then among the Kakurs. The Khans sent for me, and all obeyed me.

In the present instance people said, “There are crores of rupees in

the Chaonee; let us strengthen Islam.” Such are the people. Three or

four dogs are gone (dead); as many remain.

Nizam-oo-dowlah was a dog and ruined all. I begged the Envoy not to

ruin the people. Nizam-oo-dowlah said to the Douranees, the King and

Envoy will destroy you. I will help you, but Captain Trevor will not

let me. The people were thus stirred up. I was annoyed, but could not

help myself; now, please God and by the help of friends, much may be

done.

All were against me on account of you. They sent to me to separate

myself from you, and for the sake of the faith to be King myself (some

Sahibs were then in the Balla Hissar). I did not give a reply at the

time, but sent word to the Envoy, who told me to turn them away. I

did so, saying I owed everything to the Sahibs. They told me I would

repent.

For some days there was fighting near the Chaonee and Balla Hissar

and Balla Boorj; at which time I sent word to the Envoy to come with

all his baggage to the Balla Hissar, where the troops could hold

out for a year or two, telling him that three or four thousand of

the inhabitants might be turned out, and guns and stores brought.

After much debate, no answer was given. I said, “Very good! Please

yourselves.”

Some days after I sent to the Chaonee, and warned them not to abandon

it; that I knew the designs of the enemy, who intended to attack them;

and by expending five or six lakhs of rupees I endeavoured to bring

the people from the common enemy towards myself; but they told me to

separate myself from you. On this account three or four Barukzyes

separated themselves from me; but though I could not trust people, I

managed matters by first paying three or four lakhs, and afterwards

two or three, which they asked of me, thinking I would refuse, and

they would have an excuse for separating from me; but I gave all I

had, and now am moneyless. If, however, I had money, I could openly do

much; but nothing is to be done without money (they are dogs). If I

had money I could raise troops, and many of my old (Hindostanee) ones

who returned naked are anxious to serve me; but I have no money. In

heart I am yours, though all the world are separated from me.

Nizam-oo-dowlah knew a night before it occurred what was to happen,

but did not tell me or the Envoy that we might prevent it.

The conspirators told the people that I was with them; and when the

Prince went out with the troops, they (the traitors) said, “They are

with us.”

I sent Mahomed Sherreef to settle matters, but he was not attended to;

and he, as well as many of my troops, was killed, which event opened

the eyes of the people of Caubul; so the conspirators, to implicate

the people, attacked Sir A. Burnes.

If my counsel is taken much may yet be done; or, if not, I will go

to Mecca. Here the people are confirmed traitors, or I could easily

settle the whole country, and Persia and Khorassan.

What was fated has happened. I have not seen it in my sleep, but have

actually witnessed it. May God remove the sorrow, that my enemies and

their families should be in the place of my friends. Is there any in

the world who gave their enemies the means to kill them? The dog

Akbar came as a beggar from Toorkistan. His enmity to the Sahib-Log

and myself was apparent; but lakhs of rupees were given him to escort

the troops in their retreat; and what was the consequence? In the

midst of the discussions I sent several times to the Envoy, and asked

him why he nourished his enemy; but I was not attended to.

All Mussulmans turned from me on account of you; and for three months,

for your sake, I experienced trouble and distress, and then the Envoy

agreed to give the country to Mahomed Akbar, and to allow me a lakh of

rupees a year, or four lakhs in Hindostan; but I knew and said, that

as soon as they left the Chaonee they would be destroyed; and so it

has proved.

Between us there were no differences, and there will not be.

When I saw how things were going, I expended money to draw the

people from Mahomed Akbar; but now I can do nothing. I sent news to

Macgregor, and to Ghuznee, and to Candahar.

The road is unsafe, so I cannot write aright.—[_MS. Records_].

FROM SHAH SOOJAH TO CAPTAIN MACGREGOR (WRITTEN IN SECRET BY HIS

MAJESTY’S OWN HAND).

(_Received February 6th._)

Let it be known to Captain Macgregor what misfortunes have befallen

me! Everything occurs contrary to expectation. I wrote, that after

labouring from earliest morning to nightfall, I had by a thousand

schemes satisfied these men and made them swear fidelity. One came and

another went; but all saying, “Be not united to the Feringhees.” This

is what the Barukzyes are spreading among the people. I said in reply

to them, “You yourselves have said that they (the Feringhees) have

done nothing for the Sirkar, and have not fulfilled their promises;

then how should the Sirkar be well disposed towards them? During the

time that I was with them I felt that my name suffered, and I felt

this disgrace—that it was known to all the world. I continued with

them until the time when Sir William Macnaghten purposely told me

to cast them (the Feringhees) off.[356] I then dismissed them, and

you yourselves informed me that they (the Feringhees) had come to an

understanding with Mahomed Akbar. How then could I still preserve any

understanding with them? Rest perfectly satisfied. At present I have

no understanding with the Feringhees.” At length, by every means in

my power, I pacified them. These men at present, whether Barukzyes or

other Afghans or Parsewans, are all obedient to me. Without my orders

they do nothing. However, I place no trust in them. God grant that

I may obtain the wish of my heart! I have no other desire. I cannot

think that you are possessed of a proper sense of honour, since Dost

Mahomed and his family remain there with honour. Should Akbar fall

into my power, if I am a Mussulman or a man, what treatment he shall

receive! Dost Mahomed and his wives and children, in revenge for the

Sahibs who have fallen in this country, should be seen wandering in

destitution through the bazaars and streets, that it should be known

to all the world. What has been your treatment of that dog (Dost

Mahomed)? So much wealth! And what return have you received from this

faithless wretch (Mahomed Akbar)? May God accomplish this desire of

my heart! It is now some days since they (the Afghans) have requested

me to send Shumshoodeen Khan to Ghuznee. Until to-day I have delayed.

I have also made delays in the direction of the Khybur. At length

I am helpless, and if I do not consent I shall be suspected. And

from Khybur intelligence has come that 200 men have been killed, and

two loads of treasure and two guns abandoned to the enemy, and that

Mackeson Sahib is shut up in Ali-Musjid requiring succour. If this

is true, what management! How often have I said that if I possessed

money I might collect some thousands of troops of my own! I should

not require assistance from any one. I could do anything I liked. But

I have nothing whatever. At this moment there is only remaining two

or three thousand ducats. These men, who are my own servants, have

remained with me; but, poor wretches, how many months are they in

arrears! The other Afghans I have ordered to be mustered daily in my

presence. Such as I may select I shall continue in service. I never

have had and never can have any interest separate from yours. Alas!

that you should not have known my worth! I will delay the despatch

of the men some days longer. I shall be suspected. If I could know

the truth I would arrange accordingly. If you think that this affair

will succeed, and that an army will come, let me know the truth, and

if it is unlikely, write to me that I may make such arrangements

as shall fully satisfy you that not a cat belonging to you shall

be injured. The retreat of the Caubul Pass was quite a different

affair. All were then our mortal enemies. If I had money I should

not require assistance from any one. Since I have no money, if the

Lord (Auckland) does not think it advisable to send it, I must go

somewhere else. There is not another person but myself who could

manage this affair. I know these men well; and I have not seen a man

who could do anything without my permission. Write these circumstances

to the Governor-General, and tear up this paper. What misfortunes have

befallen! Write explicitly, that arrangements may be made accordingly.

They (the Afghans) have made many petitions regarding Candahar, that

an order may be sent to the prince. It has been written and sent,

carefully worded, to the best of my ability.

About this affair of Mackeson, I cannot understand what management

this is. If it is true, you are destroying yourselves. I don’t know

whether there is an understanding between you and Shere Singh that

your troops should have a free passage (through the Punjab). I wrote

to Shere Singh that it was a religious war, that he might understand.

Tear up this paper; and remove from about your person the men of this

country.—[_MS. Records._]

FROM SHAH SOOJAH TO CAPTAIN MACGREGOR.

(_Received February 8th._)

Let it be known to Captain Macgregor, I have no certain intelligence

about affairs. I don’t know what perverseness is this, that up to the

present time you will not appreciate my worth, nor understand your own

position or interests. You do not correctly explain things to me; and

if there is a prospect of your being supported from the rear, and you

have, or are likely to have, a good understanding with Shere Singh,

so that an army may come, then I would act here as such a state of

circumstances would render expedient; but if there be no prospect of

this, and you determine on any other course, I will then take such

measures as may be desirable. May God grant the wish of my heart! I

have prayed God to grant this prayer. God is omnipotent. Write to the

Governor-General. I am not happy in this country; but if my friends

desire it, I cannot oppose myself to their wishes. The settlement of

that country can be satisfactorily managed; but the country could

never have been settled in the manner in which you were making

arrangements.—[_MS. Records._]

FROM H. M. SHAH SOOJAH TO CAPTAIN MACGREGOR.

Let it be known to Mr. Macgregor, to the General, and to the other

gentlemen, that which I did not wish to see, and which never entered

into my imagination, it has been my lot to see. What I have already

suffered, and am suffering, is known only to God.

Although I frequently remonstrated, they paid no attention to my

words. These men have made fraud and deceit their trade. * * * During

the time they were committing these excesses, and would not come

in for some days, they continued plundering the shops and exciting

disturbances in the city; and in this business all the Sirdars were

concerned, and on this account the lower orders became like hungry

dogs: but God shamed them, for they got nothing. What has happened was

fated, and was owing to our own neglect. However much I said, “Come up

above; the fort is strong; for one year no one can be brought within

it; with my servants, and from 500 to 1000 others, the fort would be

strong; and 2000 or 3000 others, with guns, sallying out might collect

grain”—[it was in vain.] However, it has passed—such was our fate. I

sent messages to cantonments, begging them not to defer their coming

from to-day to to-morrow, from to-morrow to next day—that, please

God, all would be right.

I had collected five or six lakhs of rupees in gold mohurs, knowing

that these people, except for money, would not act honestly, even with

God. I spent three or four lakhs of rupees amongst them. Every tribe

made oath, wrote on the Koran, and sealed; but they still said, “The

King and the Feringhees are one.” However, I have managed to bring

them thus far, and given two lakhs more. It is a pity that I have no

more money. If I had any more, and could raise 2000 or 3000 sowars,

and 2000 foot-soldiers of my own, I would defy any one to stir. The

foot-soldiers, too, who returned from the army, I collected—300 or

400—that they might be with my regiment. Oh! that God had never let

me see this day! Although, if money reaches me, God will prosper

everything. To give money to an enemy to collect troops, and to come

and kill you, did ever any one so trust an enemy? Even now have

nothing to say to that dog.[357] This, too, I have said to you, even

as I warned you before. I am night and day absorbed in this one

thought; it has occurred to my mind that it would be better if the

few ladies and gentlemen should be brought here, in order that they

might be released from the hands of that dog. This entered my mind,

and I consulted with the Sirdars, and brought them to agree; before

this, I had sent a paper to this effect to that dog. It struck me

that that dog would not release and send them here. I then decided

that it would be judicious that Jubbar Khan should be sent. I hope

that he will bring them to this place in safety. By the blessing of

God, my mind will be at ease. No one will have power to say anything

to them; they will remain in safety. If this is approved of by you,

I will take this course; but inform me if you do not approve of it,

and can suggest anything else, that it may be arranged. Now, men of

all ranks are flocking to me. * * * I have asked of God—if some

money could be obtained all would go well, by God’s assistance. * *

* At present, my subjects make petition to me to send money, and one

of the princes with guns and an army to Candahar. * * * I had sent

for Mr. Conolly, and other gentlemen, to consult with them, as they

had themselves asked the Sirdar to send for them; but some one said

to them, “If you go to the King he will kill you.” It was their (the

Sirdars’) intention that the King should kill them. They had sent me

word secretly beforehand. I replied, that if the world was upset, and

every one my enemy, I would not do so. They then said, that it was

really true what Jubbar Khan and Oosman Khan had said—that the King

was not separate from the Feringhees. If he is, they said, give these

(English gentlemen) to the king, that he may kill them. I heard this,

and gave them answer. They understood their position, and repented of

the step they had taken. Since this occurrence they come and go; and

I have re-assured them. They now swear and protest that they will do

nothing whatever without my wishes. If you think it can be done, God

will shame my enemies.—[_MS. Records._]

FROM SHAH SOOJAH TO CAPTAIN MACGREGOR.

(_Written in secret by the Shah himself. Received at Jellalabad on the

7th of March._)

This is the state of affairs—that night and day I am disturbed about

you. God help us! I did not wish to see such a day as this. All day I

am thinking of this. The evil-disposed Mahomed Akbar, from the day he

went to Lughman, has managed matters by the means of the money which

was given to him. From that quarter letters arrived here (Caubul),

and money was given to men who went to join him; at length it was

put a stop to, some men were even stripped (on their way to join) in

Bootkhak. At last, people went under the plea of Gazza (religious

war); by these means only a few now go. It is nearly one month that

I have delayed (sending troops to Jellalabad): no accounts have been

received (from you). I have made myself unpopular with all Mahomedans

on your account, and you have not comprehended it. This is an affair

affecting life. Up to this time nothing is known (of your intentions).

I know not upon what misfortunes I have fallen; and these men are

displeased with me (saying) “It is not the Shah’s wish that we should

go to Jellalabad; he wishes to destroy the true faith.” God help us!

There is no saying when those men (British troops) will arrive. If

things are thus managed, what may be expected in Hindoostan?

I am altogether devoted to you—may God protect me! If they (British

troops) arrive within the next ten or fifteen days, it is well; but

if not, what ought to be done? Whatever you think advisable, write to

me plainly, that it may be well understood and arrangements made. I

am always thinking how I can obtain possession of those gentlemen and

ladies, that they may be in safety, and that this villain (Mahomed

Akbar) may not injure them.

I sent a message to Mahomed Shah (Ghilzye) that, if any injury

happened to them (the English prisoners), I would revenge it on him

and his family, and root out his race, and that I would seize him. God

will prosper this matter, though it is very difficult and complicated.

These rascals (Afghans) make numerous oaths, and in their hearts there

is villany. May God put them to shame!

The true state of the case is this; if you think it will succeed, and

that they (British troops) will arrive, the sooner the better. This is

not a matter to be trifled with.

Shumshoodeen Khan, who went to Ghuznee, I ordered not to press the

garrison hard until I had completed an engagement with you.

I have forgotten my own sorrows, and am grieving for yours. Neither

day nor night can I rest, nor think of anything else.

If I came myself (to Jellalabad), I could arrange the affair as

I wished. It has two advantages and one objection. I am puzzled.

God deliver me! All that has happened has been caused by want of

forethought. Now may God give me assistance!

I always said to Sir William Macnaghten that this affair would end

badly.

The day that he made arrangements for leaving (Caubul for Bombay) I

was ready to precede him, saying that I did not like the appearance of

things here. He did not listen to me. The bearer will inform you of

other particulars. What can I do? These men are the greatest curse in

the world. If I had any money I could collect my army—then “could

it be in the power of any one to injure even a dog that belonged to

you?”—[_MS. Records._]

The letters which Macgregor wrote in reply to the Shah were very brief,

and intended to convey as little meaning as possible. One or two

specimens will suffice:

CAPTAIN MACGREGOR TO HIS MAJESTY SHAH SOOJAH.

Your Majesty’s letter was received by me on the 21st of January, and I

feel much honoured. The fact is, that what has occurred was fated. It

is true that they (the British) made a mistake in not following your

Majesty’s advice.

Please God, you may rest at ease regarding affairs here. In this

quarter there is no enemy except Mahomed Akbar, who is at Lughman, and

is the foe both of your Majesty and the British Government. The rabble

of Ghilzyes who were with him have carried away to their homes what

they were able to steal. With the exception of 200 or 300 Barukzyes

there is no one else with him. And please God, if he comes, he will

meet with a warm reception.

A copy of your Majesty’s letter was immediately forwarded to Peshawur,

requesting that it might be sent with all possible haste to the

Governor-General, and that an answer might be received, which may be

soon expected. Rest at ease, that while I breathe I will not fail to

assist your Majesty to the utmost of my ability. The army with the

artillery may be considered to have arrived near this; indeed, they

will be here as soon as the distance can be crossed.

FROM CAPTAIN MACGREGOR TO HIS MAJESTY SHAH SOOJAH.

March 9th.

Your Majesty’s letter, which was sent by the hands of a trustworthy

person, has been received. Please God, if you can only cause delay for

one month, whatever may be your wish can be arranged. Rest at ease,

since the army under General Pollock, together with the Sikh force,

has arrived at Peshawur, and may be considered as having arrived near

this. Whatever the bearer of this may say is worthy of belief.—[_MS.

Records._]

NOTT’S LETTERS TO ENGLAND AND POLLOCK.

[_Book VIII., chapter 1, page 179, et seq._]

Candahar, April 18th, 1842.

SIR,

I have been favoured with your letters of the 1st and 10th instant.

I have also heard of the affair you had with the enemy on the 28th

ultimo, and deeply regret the result. I have attentively perused the

government despatch of the 15th ultimo forwarded through you. I have

looked at our position in Afghanistan in every point of view that my

judgment, aided by three years’ experience of its people, will admit

of. I now deliberately note what I consider to be necessary to carry

out the intention of the Supreme Government, and to assert and uphold

the honour of our country, even should the government ultimately

determine on withdrawing the British troops from the right of the

Indus, it would be impossible to retire the troops below the passes

before October. The troops at Candahar are four months in arrears,

and we have not one rupee in the treasury. In the event of much field

service we should run short of musket ammunition, and we are without

medicine for the sick and wounded. I think it absolutely necessary

that a strong brigade of 2500 men should be immediately pushed

from Quettah to Candahar with the supplies noted in the foregoing

paragraph. I therefore have to acquaint you that I will direct a

brigade of three regiments of infantry, a troop of horse artillery,

with a body of cavalry, to march from Candahar on the morning of

_the 25th instant_. This force will certainly be at Chummun, at the

northern foot of the Kojuck, on the morning of the 1st of May, and

possibly on the 30th of this month. I shall, therefore, fully rely

on your marching a brigade from Quettah, so that it may reach the

southern side of the pass on the above-mentioned date. I believe there

can be no difficulty whatever in accomplishing this, nor of crossing

the Kojuck without loss, provided the heights are properly crowned on

either side. I have crossed it three times in command of troops, and

I know that what I now state is correct. There can be no danger in

passing through Pisheen provided a careful and well-ordered march is

preserved, and patroles and flanking parties of horse are thrown well

out. The people of this country cannot withstand our troops in the

open field. I am well aware that war cannot be made without loss, but

yet, perhaps, the British troops can oppose Asiatic armies without

defeat; and I feel and know that British officers should never despair

of punishing the atrocious and treacherous conduct of a brutal enemy.

You say you are not aware if I know the localities of Quettah. I know

them well and I hope I shall be excused when I express my surprise

that the authorities at Quettah should for a moment have thought of

throwing up breastworks and entrenching that straggling and wretched

cantonment, when the town and its citadel is so well calculated for

every purpose which can render a post at all desirable in Shawl, and

I am quite certain may be well defended by 500 men. Did I command at

Quettah, I would relinquish the cantonment—it is useless. Quettah is

not a place for a large body of troops. I feel obliged to you for

pointing out the many difficulties attending our position, but you

are aware that it is our first and only duty to overcome difficulties

when the national honour and military reputation is so deeply

concerned—nothing can be accomplished without effort and perseverance.

On the last para. of your letter of the 10th instant, I have only to

observe that I have not yet contemplated falling back. Without money

I can neither pay the long arrears due to the troops, nor procure

carriage for field operations. I deeply regret this state of things,

which ought to have been attended to months ago. Had this been done,

I should now have been on my march to Ghuznee. I shall fully rely on

your brigade being at the Kojuck on the 1st of May or before. This

letter I request may be forwarded to Major Outram.

W. NOTT, Major-General.

To Major-General England, commanding

S. F. Force.

P.S.—You will of course perceive that I intend your brigade should

join and accompany the detachment sent from this to Candahar. I have

no cattle for treasure or stores.

[It was with no common anxiety that Nott awaited the return of

his regiments from Candahar. He had sent them reluctantly to the

Kojuck, and was eager to commence operations in another direction—to

march upon Ghuznee, and then onward to meet Pollock at the capital.

In the letters which he addressed at this time to his brother

General at Jellalabad, his feelings found vent. They are eminently

characteristic:]

Candahar, April 29th, 1842.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

My last news from your side was of the 5th instant. I regret I am not

on my way to Ghuznee—I am tied to this place. My troops have had no

pay since December, 1841. I am in want of almost everything. I have

not carriage even for three regiments, and I have not a rupee to buy

or to hire cattle. For five months I have been calling for aid from

Sindh--none whatever has been sent. At last Major-General England

moved with money and stores, but received a check in Pisheen, and then

retired to Shawl! I have now been obliged to send the best part of my

force to the Kojuck Pass, in hopes of getting the treasure and stores

I have so long been expecting, and without which my small force is

paralysed. It is dreadful to think of all this. I ought to have been

on my way to extend my hand to you from Ghuznee instead of which I

am obliged to make a movement on the Kojuck. I have felt the want of

cavalry. I have the Shah’s 1st Regiment, but I have never been able to

_get them to charge_. My Sepoys have behaved nobly, and have licked

the Afghans in every affair, even when five times their number. The

moment my brigade returns from the Kojuck I move on Kelat-i-Ghilzye

and Ghuznee, in hopes of saving some of our officers and men at the

latter place. Instead of sending me cavalry, money, &c., the authority

in Sindh coolly says, “When you retire bodily I hope to render you

some assistance.” I believe I shall go mad! I have much to say, but am

confined to a slip of paper.

Yours sincerely,

W. NOTT.[358]

* * * * *

Candahar, May 6th, 1842.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I have this day received your letter of the 14th ultimo. I had before

heard of your progress up to the 6th of April: this is the only note

I have received from you. I enclose a copy of my note of the 29th

of last month, which was sent _viâ_ Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and by which

you will perceive how much I have been disappointed, and the state

of the force under my command. It drove me almost mad to be forced

to send the best part of my force to the Kojuck Pass instead of

marching towards Caubul; but I had not a rupee to pay the long arrears

of the troops, or to purchase cattle. The people of this country

unfortunately have an idea that we are to retire whether we are

successful or not, and therefore they will part with nothing; and,

as far as cattle are concerned, we are nearly helpless. God knows

why such delay has occurred in sending me money and stores. This is

dreadful. I shall move towards Caubul the moment I can get carriage.

General England’s retrograde movement has been a sad disappointment to

me.

Yours sincerely,

W. NOTT.[359]