every effort to secure Napoleon's consent to a definite treaty. He
succeeded in that the Emperor, delighted at the marriage of Prince
Napoleon to a princess of one of the oldest houses in Europe, directed
the bridegroom to sign an agreement obligating France to come to
Piedmont's aid should the latter nation be subjected to any overt act
of aggression on the part of Austria. This agreement was intended to be
kept altogether secret, but rumors that a treaty had been signed crept
abroad. Cavour now waited for Austria's aggressive act, and sought to
gain national loans at home, and to arouse interest on Piedmont's behalf
abroad. The English government would not enthuse over Italian wrongs,
they were zealous to maintain the present footing, but Cavour maintained
his diplomatic suavity and kept the English friendship against the day
when he might need it against France.
The spring of 1859 saw the natural crisis rapidly approaching,
Mazzini's world forces again ready to break loose. Into Piedmont swarmed
the youth of all northern Italy, girt with sword and gun, palpitant
for strife. The government could not hold the rising tide much longer.
Cavour exclaimed, "They may throw me into the Po, but I will not stop
it!" And yet he had to wait. Austria must first act on the offensive.
The last week of Lent came and Cavour stood face to face with the climax
that was to make or mar his plans.
The story of those two weeks is tremendously dramatic. The Russian
government proposed a Congress of the Powers at Paris to adjust the
disordered state of Italy. England and Prussia agreed, Austria accepted
subject to the two conditions that Piedmont should disarm and that
she should be excluded from the Congress. The French Minister, Count
Walewski, said for Napoleon that France could not plunge into war on
Piedmont's account, and that Piedmont was not entitled to a voice in
the Congress. Napoleon seemed to have listened to the counsels of the
Empress and his ministers, who were opposed to war, and Cavour found
himself without a spokesman. It was a black hour when he wrote to the
Emperor that Italy was desperate; in reply he was called to Paris. He
saw Napoleon, but obtained no promise of help. He threatened that Victor
Emmanuel would abdicate, he himself go to America and publish all the
correspondence between Napoleon and himself. He used every entreaty, but
to no effect. He returned to Turin, where he was met with the wildest
demonstrations of regard.
Now England made a suggestion, the government proposed that all the
Italian states should be admitted to the proposed Congress, and that
Austria as well as Piedmont should disarm. The French government
considered this a happy proposal, and wrote to Cavour strongly
recommending consent. The Minister understood what the disbanding of
all his volunteers, the reduction of his army, would mean to Italy, but
he saw no choice but to submit. All the Powers were against him, either
course seemed to presage absolute defeat. On April 17 he sent a note
agreeing to the disarming, and gave himself up to despair. History says
that he was on the point of committing suicide, and was only saved by a
devoted friend who pleaded with him. At the end of a long stormy scene
Cavour controlled himself. "Be tranquil; we will face it together," he
said.
Fortune changed; the very day on which Cavour submitted, the Austrian
government replied slightingly to the English proposal and stated that
Austria would itself call upon Piedmont to disarm. It was an error of
the first magnitude, the act of aggression for which Cavour had so long
waited. At the time Austria was probably ignorant of Napoleon's secret
agreement with Piedmont, and also that Cavour had consented to disarm.
The fact of Piedmont's submission to the wishes of France and England,
and Austria's arbitrary note, revolutionized the situation. Piedmont was
saved by a marvelous turn of fortune.
April 25, while the Piedmont Chamber was conferring absolute powers on
the King, Cavour was handed a note, on which was written: "They are
here. I have seen them." "They" meant the Austrian envoys. Cavour left
the Chamber, saying, "It is the last Piedmontese parliament which has
just ended; next year we will open the first Italian parliament." He met
the envoys and read their message, the Sardinian army to be put on a
peace footing, the Italian volunteers to be disbanded; an answer, yes or
no, to be given within three days. If that answer is unsatisfactory to
Austria a resort to arms.
Cavour accepted the three days allowed him in order to push his
preparations, then he replied to the Austrian note, saying that Piedmont
had agreed to the English proposals with the assent of Prussia, Russia,
and France, and that he had nothing further to add. He took leave of
the Austrian envoys courteously, and then, radiantly happy, joined his
colleagues, saying, "The die is cast." Fortune had stood by him and had
placed Piedmont in the most enviable position he could have wished. He
had staked everything on his acquiescing, with scarcely one chance of
success, but that chance had come and he had won.
The war opened with the victory of the allies at Magenta, Milan was
free, and at Solferino the Italians and French gained Lombardy. The
Sardinian army won its spurs gloriously. Cavour, who had sent La Marmora
to lead the troops, and had himself become Minister of War, showed the
greatest skill in attending to his army's commissariat. At the same time
he was watching the rest of Italy, Parma and Modena returned to the
old alliance of 1848, and Cavour sent special commissioners to control
them. He was anxious that all the states should unite. He was constantly
afraid that one of the Powers would step in and seize Tuscany. He kept
his eye on Florence and supported the efficient dictatorship of Ricasoli.
Mazzini had prophesied to Cavour some months earlier: "You will be
in the camp in some corner of Lombardy when the peace which betrays
Venice will be signed without your knowledge." That was exactly what
happened. On July 6 Napoleon opened negotiations at Villafranca with
Austria for peace. Perhaps he had learned that the French people were
no longer enthusiastic over the war and wished to devote himself to his
own defense, perhaps he saw that victories were building up a stronger
Italy than he cared to have, perhaps he feared a possible intervention
by Prussia. His whole conduct towards Italy was one of most perplexing
changes, certain it is that he now deliberately threw away all the
advantages of victory and made every loyal Italian his enemy. Had he
been more of a statesman he would have foreseen the consequences of his
acts. The terms of the peace were that Venice should be left to Austria,
Modena, Tuscany, and Romagna given back to their petty Princes, the Pope
made president of a league in which Austria was to be a party. It was
the basest betrayal of Italian hopes. Cavour was absolutely prostrated,
he saw all his wonderful plans shattered beyond redemption, he saw
himself totally dishonored in the sight of the people he had led into
war. He rushed to the camp of Victor Emmanuel and advised him either to
abdicate or fight on alone. In that moment the King rose superior to
his great Minister, he decided to sign the treaty and to wait. Victor
Emmanuel, more bitterly disappointed than on the battlefield of Novara,
showed that he was as great a statesman as he was a leader of his people.
Cavour thought of plunging into battle in the hope of being killed,
he thought of joining Mazzini in extreme revolutionary measures, but
meanwhile until a new ministry could be formed he was compelled to
continue his government at Turin. It became his duty to notify the
commissioners he had appointed for Florence, Parma, and Modena to
abandon those charges, and he did so, but wrote them privately to stay
where they were. Farini wrote him from Modena that he should treat the
returning Duke as an enemy of Italy, and Cavour replied, "The Minister
is dead; the friend applauds your decision." He had thrown off his old
mask of diplomacy and become for the moment one with the revolutionaries.
Succeeded by Rattazzi as Prime Minister, Cavour went to stay for a short
period of rest with his relatives in Switzerland. He expected to see
Napoleon seize Savoy and Nice, although he had not performed his part
in the Pact of Plombières. Again Napoleon surprised him, he returned to
Paris without pressing any claim to new territory. Meanwhile the people
of central Italy were asking for union with Piedmont, and all the Powers
were much concerned with their disposition, particularly England, which
under the ministry of Lord Palmerston, an old and warm friend of Cavour,
was now commencing openly to champion Italian independence. Palmerston
did not trust Napoleon and regretted that the only Italian statesman
whom he considered able to cope with the French was out of office. The
British Premier wrote at this time, "They talk a great deal in Paris
of Cavour's intrigues. This seems to me unjust. If they mean that he
has worked for the aggrandisement and for the emancipation of Italy
from foreign yoke and Austrian domination, this is true, and he will be
called a patriot in history. The means he has employed may be good or
bad. I do not know what they have been, but the object in view is, I am
sure, the good of Italy. The people of the Duchies have as much right
to change their sovereigns as the English people, or the French, or the
Belgian, or the Swedish."
Napoleon still had five divisions of his army in Lombardy and his
attitude toward the annexation of the central states was most important.
No one knew exactly what that attitude was. He told the Piedmontese
that he could not allow the union of Tuscany, but at the same time he
told Austrian and Papal sympathizers that he was too deeply attached to
the principle of Italian independence to allow him to make war on the
nationalists. Rattazzi did not know which course to adopt, although the
King was quite willing to risk everything in succoring Tuscany. Then
Napoleon suddenly proposed another of his Paris Congresses to settle
the difficulty, and Piedmont turned to Cavour to speak its claims.
The Congress never met, but Cavour's appointment as envoy and the
zealous support of the English government caused the downfall of the
ministry, and in January, 1860, Cavour again took command of the state.
His policy now was plain, "Let the people of central Italy declare
themselves what they want," he said, "and we will stand by their
decisions, come what may." The people of central Italy wanted union and
Cavour turned again to see what Napoleon would do. What he would do
was gradually becoming plainer. He would only sell his assent to the
annexation of the states in return for Savoy and Nice. They were the old
stakes of the Pact of Plombières, and Cavour had to decide whether they
should go.
His decision to sacrifice Savoy and Nice for the peaceful annexation
of central Italy has been the most bitterly criticised act in Cavour's
life. It can never be determined whether the sacrifice was absolutely
essential, or whether in time Italy might not have been united without
that step. In that day the judgment of the best-informed was that
Napoleon would have sent his army into Tuscany unless his desire was
met. Cavour had only agreed to consider the sacrifice at Plombières
because he was willing to go to any length to secure Italy from
foreign domination. He was willing to pay the same price now although
he realized what the cost would be to his name. The King had given his
daughter as the price of the French alliance. He sadly agreed to the
further sacrifice. Both Victor Emmanuel and Cavour were looking towards
their ultimate goal.
It was a tremendous responsibility. Napoleon insisted that the treaty
should be secret and should not be submitted to the Piedmont Parliament.
He knew that England would be indignant when the news became known. So
Cavour was forced to keep the decision secret and to prepare to shoulder
by himself all the wrath of his people. On March 24, 1860, after hours
of consideration, Cavour signed. Then he prepared to summon a Parliament
which might as he foresaw indict him on a charge of high treason for his
unconstitutional act.
The Parliament which for the first time represented Piedmont, Lombardy,
Parma, Modena, and Romagna, met on April 2. Guerrazzi made a most bitter
attack on the ministry, in which he likened Cavour to the Earl of
Clarendon under Charles the Second, "hard towards the King, truculent to
Parliament, who thought in his pride that he could do anything." Cavour
replied with a stinging description of the men with whom he had had to
contend, and avowed his complete responsibility for the treaty. A large
majority of the Parliament voted with him, but it was a severe test of
his power and popularity. Garibaldi, born in Nice, never forgave him,
many of his countrymen considered his act absolutely unwarrantable, a
monstrous piece of base ingratitude; he himself knew the price he had
paid only too well, but he believed that it was a price he was forced to
pay if Italy were ever to be free.
The next step in the dramatic history followed almost immediately, and
although it took place without the open approval of Cavour there is no
question but that he was secretly hoping for its success. The King of
Naples and Sicily was in hard straits, his people were now continually
fomenting revolutions, Austria no longer came to his aid as she had
formerly. The feeling throughout Europe was so general that Francis II.
stood on the edge of the precipice that on April 15 Victor Emmanuel
wrote him and told him that his only hope of safety lay in granting
his subjects an immediate constitution. Francis, like a true Bourbon,
postponed action until it was too late. Meantime northern revolutionists
were waking to the idea of sending an expedition south to free Sicily,
and Garibaldi's name was on every tongue. Cavour did not wish Garibaldi
to go, he knew the tremendous odds against his succeeding, and he
realized that in case of success serious difficulties must at once
arise. He was tempted to keep Garibaldi at home by force, but the King
would not listen to such action. On May 5 Garibaldi and his famous
Legion sailed from Quarto, and with their sailing an accomplished fact
Cavour gave them such help as he could.
Good fortune tended on Garibaldi and the Thousand, they made their
landing on the Sicilian coast and swept the royal troops before them.
The English fleet did not actually aid them, but were not sorry for
their happy progress. The rest of the world looked on and wondered if
this sudden attack on southern Italy was another of Cavour's coups. Most
observers considered that it was. The King of Naples said that Garibaldi
was a blind; behind him was ranged Piedmont, intent on the fall of his
dynasty.
Garibaldi was hailed at Palermo as dictator and his victory over Sicily
was complete. He had always acted in Victor Emmanuel's name, but
Cavour feared that his followers were too deeply imbued with Mazzini's
republican ideas to be eager to join with Piedmont. He was mistaken, he
did not then altogether understand Garibaldi, and he never did entire
justice to Mazzini's principles.
If the European Powers had protested, Garibaldi could not have crossed
to the mainland, but England would not accept Napoleon's proposal
to intervene, and Naples was left to itself. Cavour understood that
the Kingdom of Francis must fall, and only hoped that it might be by
diplomacy rather than at the hands of Garibaldi's troops. His plans to
this end failed, Garibaldi reached Calabria and began his triumphal
march to Naples. He had become a name with which to conjure all classes
of the people, victory over every evil must follow his footsteps, the
Kingdom of Naples, wretchedly weak, fell before him. Garibaldi became a
hero throughout Europe, it was now Cavour's task to treat diplomatically
with such a victorious force.
In order that Garibaldi might not attempt to sweep north through Papal
territory Cavour determined to send the army of northern Italy down
into Umbria and the Marches of Ancona. It was a direct defiance of the
temporal power of the Pope, but all discerning men had seen that the
step must soon come. Moreover it was the desire now of practically
all Italy to be united, the flood had swept so far that they would be
content with nothing but the whole peninsula. Again Europe made no
effectual protest, Napoleon was as usual undetermined, Lord Palmerston
eager for Italy's success. Ancona fell, and Victor Emmanuel marched on
into Neapolitan territory, delivering the last central provinces from
Austrian influence. The Austrian government did not declare war, perhaps
they realized at last that the world was moving forward, not backward,
and that they had had their day.
Garibaldi's last victory occurred on the Volturno on October 1. The
royal forces and the victorious Legion had practically met. Cavour was
strongly tempted to declare Victor Emmanuel dictator, but his belief
in constitutional methods triumphed. He would not bedim one ray of
Garibaldi's glory, but he wanted to cement the constitutional monarchy.
Disputes arose between the royal generals and the revolutionists, Cavour
insisted that the Garibaldian troops should be honorably treated. He
knew that Garibaldi had not forgiven him for the sacrifice of Nice, but
he could place higher his own admiration for the hero. "Garibaldi," he
wrote to the King, "has become my most violent enemy, but I desire for
the good of Italy, and the honor of your Majesty, that he should retire
entirely satisfied."
Tremendous popular influences were at work to have a dictator appointed
to govern southern Italy for at least a year. Cavour might have
consented to the popular acclaim for Garibaldi, or have compelled
the appointment of one of his own party. He did neither, instead
he appealed to the Parliament. He introduced a bill authorizing the
Government to accept the immediate annexation of such provinces of
central and southern Italy as expressed by universal suffrage their
desire to become a part of the constitutional Kingdom of Victor
Emmanuel. Parliament passed this bill on October 11. It was still in
doubt whether the Garibaldians would agree. On October 13 Garibaldi
called his followers together, and declared that if the people voted
for annexation they should have it. Then he issued the order that "the
two Sicilies form an integral part of Italy, one and indivisible under
the constitutional King, Victor Emmanuel, and his successors." He had
made the King a present of his conquests. It is probable that Cavour had
truly estimated Garibaldi's depths of patriotism.
Napoleon still kept his troops at Gaeta, but was finally brought to
see that the conflict could only end in the one way. The French fleet
withdrew, and the city surrendered February 13, 1861. Francis II. went
into exile. Rome still held out, but Cavour was determined that the
Pope's temporal power must end and that city become the capital of the
new kingdom. A general election to the new Parliament took place, and
the returns showed a large majority pledged to Cavour's views. When the
new Chamber met their first act was to vote Victor Emmanuel's assumption
of the title of King of Italy. It had been proposed by some that the
title be King of the Italians, but Cavour insisted that only King of
Italy spoke of the accomplished fact of the new nation.
On March 25, 1861, Cavour stated in Parliament that Italy must have
Rome as its capital, but on the distinct understanding that this act
should in no sense denote the servitude of the Church. He proclaimed a
free church in a free state as the solution of the historic problem,
events had shown that a power which could only be sustained by means of
foreign support was not destined to last. Parliament voted for Rome as
the capital, and Cavour opened negotiations with the Vatican. He found
argument there vain, and turned to France in the hope of securing an
ally who could conciliate the Pope. Meanwhile he was busied with the
disposition of Garibaldi's troops, which were persistently disregarded
by the regular army. Garibaldi was indignant and stated in Parliament
that Cavour was "driving the country into civil war." Cavour, stung by
the words, nevertheless held his peace and replied calmly. The breach
between the two men was made up, they met as friends a little later at
the King's desire.
In May, 1861, it was seen that Cavour was ailing, he had worked too
hard and given himself no chance to rest. The last day he sat in
Parliament he fell ill with fever, and from that he never recovered.
Unto the very end he was deep in plans for the new nation; on June 6 he
died.
The tale of the birth of the Italian nation reads like a romance,
barrier after barrier, seemingly insurmountable, fell at the touch of
a wand, and the wand was ever in Cavour's hand. Mazzini had breathed a
new hope into Italy, Victor Emmanuel had given a noble leader to the
cause, Garibaldi had fought and conquered, but it was Cavour who had so
fused their efforts that they led to the single goal. He was always the
Italian first, the Minister of Piedmont afterwards. In history he will
figure as a great patriot, in his lifetime he was recognized throughout
Europe as the great statesman.
It is reported that Metternich in his old age said, "There is only
one diplomatist in Europe, but he is against us; it is M. de Cavour."
Palmerston always recognized him as the one man who could unite his
country and foil Napoleon, Bismarck studied him as a pattern for his
own later efforts, and Napoleon, his lifelong ally and opponent,
conceded that Cavour alone impressed him as a genius of the first rank
in statecraft. His contemporaries could not always understand him, he
had so often to give up the immediate advantage for the future gain, he
had to wear his mask so frequently even among his own people that men
grew to believe he preferred the circuitous to the straight path. From
the vantage point of a later day it is possible to see how frail was
the skiff he navigated and how perilous the seas. It was so easy for
the Powers of Europe, secure themselves, to prefer peace to any fresh
disturbance. What did the welfare of a few small states matter to them?
Italy was chronically misgoverned. Cavour had to take each forward step
in fear that he might call down upon Piedmont the avalanche of Europe;
his one ally, the French Emperor, was as stable as quicksilver, never
two days the same. It almost passes belief that Cavour did manage to
sail his skiff into port, he could only have done it by alternate
patience and audacity.
Cavour did not live to see Rome or Venice become part of the Kingdom,
but it was his work that made those later triumphs possible. He had
foreseen their coming, he had a genius for foresight, even in the early
days when he seemed speaking only for Piedmont he was planning for
Italy. But in his planning for the great goal he never forgot to make
certain of each step, his diplomacy was a logical sequence of accepted
opportunities, he believed in taking the straight path if that were
possible, if not in circling the obstacle that blocked his way.
The story is told that when the wife of the Russian Minister at Turin
was shopping in that city the clerk suddenly left her and ran to the
door. When he returned he said, "I saw Count Cavour passing, and wishing
to know how our affairs are going on, I wanted to see how he looked.
He looks in good spirits, so everything is going right." The story
illustrates how, after Cavour had once taken the helm, the people of
Piedmont trusted him, growing more and more confident that he would lead
them aright although they could not always see the logic of his steps.
Few statesmen have received more complete allegiance from a people than
Cavour ultimately won, but no statesman ever deserved the gratitude of
his countrymen more unreservedly.
[Illustration: GARIBALDI]
GARIBALDI, THE CRUSADER