This trip abroad came at a most opportune time. It gave Cavour a chance

to meet French and English statesmen and learn their views of his policy

of allying Rattazzi's party with his own in order to obtain a working

majority. He knew that Rattazzi was generally regarded as a reckless

revolutionary, but he found that the necessity of using his aid was

generally acknowledged. Cavour talked with the leaders of each party

in England; he found Lord Palmerston then as always his ardent friend

and admirer. Palmerston saw that the overthrow of the Italian tyrannies

must depend upon the home strength of the Sardinian government, and that

if that government were once firmly established on a constitutional

basis it could not be long before Austria would be driven out of Italy.

Palmerston promised Cavour the moral support of England, and the Italian

left London delighted at what he had learned there.

In Paris Cavour met Thiers, who bade him be of good courage, and the

Prince President. To the latter he devoted much time, and succeeded in

making a deep impression upon the astute Napoleon. "Whether we like it

or not," the Italian wrote from Paris, "our destinies depend on France;

we must be her partner in the great game which will be played sooner or

later in Europe." In the French capital Cavour found several leaders

of Italian life who were living in exile; he visited Daniel Manin, the

great Venetian, the idol of his city, and learned from him something of

Venetian hopes. He also saw the many-sided Gioberti, "the same child of

genius, who would have been a great man had he had common-sense," said

Cavour, the man who had once dreamt of a free Italy under the leadership

of a great liberal Pope, and who was now in a book about to be published

to show his gift of prescience by fixing on Cavour as the one man who

understood the essentials of the new Italian civilization.

D'Azeglio was facing a ministerial crisis when Cavour returned to

his home, and, ill with the wound he had received in the last war,

besought the King to let him retire from office. He suggested that

Victor Emmanuel summon Cavour, "who," he wrote at this time, "you know

is diabolically active, and fit in body and soul, and then, he enjoys

it so much!" The King asked Cavour to form a ministry, naming certain

restrictions, the chief one being to come to a friendly agreement with

the Pope on the matter of civil marriage, but Cavour felt that to do

this would be to start his work under a handicap. He suggested Count

Balbo as Premier, but the latter had too small a following, and the

King, judging that his country needed the strong hand of Cavour at the

helm more than the friendship of Rome, asked him to form his cabinet

without imposing any conditions whatever.

So came into existence what was to be known in Italian history as the

"_Gran Ministero_," the first in which Cavour was openly to proclaim

his plans. It is curious to note that even now, when he had become the

most considerable figure in Piedmont, he was not generally popular.

The King did not altogether like him, the public men could not even

now understand him, the people scarcely knew the real man at all. What

King, public men, and people did know was that Cavour was a man of

tremendous force, and a man destined to lead other men. At this time

there commenced to grow up in Piedmont that blind faith in Cavour which

later assumed such great proportions that the people felt that he must

have his own way no matter what they might think of it, because Cavour's

way meant victory, no matter how little they might anticipate it.

Cavour chose to be President of the Council and Minister of Finance,

and at once set to work to increase the resources of the country. The

history of his work at this time is that of an administrator preparing

with scrupulous care each detail against a coming need. He strengthened

fortifications, he allowed La Marmora a free hand in the development of

the army, he completed the railway system, he used all possible means

to stimulate industry and increase agricultural output. He instituted

new taxes, cut down the salt tax, and introduced certain free-trade

measures. He followed a definite plan of preparation, regardless of

popular opinion, which at one time turned so fiercely against him on the

ground that he was a monopolist who was robbing the poor of bread, that

his life was in danger at the hands of a mob.

Cavour had one concern, to strengthen the central government of his

country, and he labored for that with little regard for other things.

He was accused, particularly after Rattazzi had joined his cabinet, of

seeking to win certain constituencies by promises of local aid if they

would return his candidate. He understood too well the uncertain temper

of the people to take any unnecessary risks, he knew that the work he

was doing was essential for Italian independence, and he was willing to

obtain his support as best he could. What concerned him was the fact of

support, not the reason. His ultimate purpose required that the country

be kept at peace until it should have reached full strength, and for

this end Cavour tried to make friends with Austria, dissembling his real

feelings as cleverly as he could, and sought confidence and friendly

offices. To this end he discountenanced Mazzini's attempt at revolution

in Milan in February, 1853; he knew that conditions were not ready for

success; he regarded Mazzini's faith in blind outbreaks of the people as

a deterrent factor in his preparation for ultimate success.

Western Europe was making ready for war in the Crimea, England and

France were aligning themselves against Russia. Cavour felt what

was coming, and conceived a step of marvelous daring. With his old

belief in the prudence of audacity he determined to join Sardinia to

France and England, to stake the future of his little kingdom on an

alliance with the two great western Powers. He felt that Sardinia must

now step forward as a nation or retire to the great group of little

principalities. He could not tell what position Austria would take, but

he resolved no matter how that country might side, to cast his lot with

the west. When one recalls the size of Victor Emmanuel's kingdom and

its resources Cavour's audacity becomes well-nigh inconceivable. When

his intention was made known to the people they gaped in amazement,

after these years of preparation why should they hazard all on a purely

foreign war, why leave their borders unguarded to the Austrians? Cavour

stood firm and unshaken, Victor Emmanuel, trusting to his minister's

star of destiny, stood by him, the people stormed, protested, besought,

but all without avail. Cavour had decided that it was time to act, and

so it must be time, the people had learned that there was no use in

arguing with him, what he must do he must, they became fatalists under

his colossal will. A demand of a guarantee of certain restrictions

against Austria was sought by Cavour's ministry, but the western

Powers would not give it. England and France would both be glad to

have Sardinia as an ally, but would make no promises of future help.

The Sardinian Foreign Minister resigned when the attempt to obtain a

guarantee failed. Cavour offered the position to D'Azeglio, but he

declined it, and so, on January 10, 1855, Cavour assumed the portfolio

of Foreign Affairs himself, and on the same day signed the agreement

binding Sardinia to an offensive and defensive alliance with France and

England. It was the first step towards making Italy again a world power.

Cavour had decided to show Europe that an Italian government could live

under a liberal constitution, and that an Italian army could fight. He

believed that both Lord Palmerston and the French Emperor were convinced

of the former fact; he was now anxious to convince them of the latter.

As matters fell out Austria remained neutral, and the allies opposed

Russia alone. Napoleon, thirsting for glory for French arms, was little

disposed to give the Sardinian forces a chance, and wished to keep them

as a reserve at Constantinople. It required the greatest diplomacy on

Cavour's part to obtain opportunities for his troops, but when he did

they more than justified him. Their spirit and powers of endurance were

admirable, they seemed consciously to feel that they were being made

ready for a greater and more sacred combat. In August the Piedmontese

troops won a victory on the Tchernaia, Turin was delighted, and Cavour

felt that his great step was being justified. The King wrote to General

La Marmora, "Next year we shall have war where we had it before."

It was at this time that Victor Emmanuel visited England and France.

Cavour accompanied him, and, as always, made a close study of opinions

in both those countries. He found Queen Victoria and Prince Albert

deeply interested in Italian affairs, and strongly favorable to

Piedmont's hopes. Napoleon, he found, was determined to end the war in

the Crimea.

In February, 1856, peace was declared. Austria, which had remained

neutral, was apparently the greatest gainer by the war. At home the

Sardinian government had been seriously disturbed over the question

of suppression of the religious houses, a measure which Cavour and

a majority of the people favored, but which the King was very loath

to accept. After the Chamber of Deputies had passed the measure by

an overwhelming majority, and it was being considered by the Senate,

two ecclesiastics wrote to the King, promising to pay into the

national treasury the sum the government expected to realize from the

suppressions. Victor Emmanuel, who was an ardent Churchman, conceived

that this would be a most satisfactory settlement of the whole matter,

and suggested to Cavour that he agree. Cavour saw the impossibility of

compromise at that hour, and declined, offering at the same time his

resignation. The King, who was never quite at his ease with Cavour, and

who thought he was now in a position to dispense with his services,

accepted the resignation.

When the people heard of the proposed compromise they were brought to

an angry crisis, and for a moment it looked as though all the past

careful efforts to establish a stable government might go for nothing.

Then D'Azeglio, with rare courage, wrote to the King, and pointed out

the dangers that lay in his new course. He entreated him not to align

himself with the reactionaries, he pointed out how such a step had

caused the downfall of both Stuart and Bourbon thrones. The people

desired the measure, it was too late now to withdraw it from the Senate.

Victor Emmanuel heeded the words of his old counselor, recalled Cavour

to office, and allowed the bill, practically as at first presented,

to become law. This was the next great step in the progress towards a

united Italy.

At the time of his last visit to Paris Cavour had been asked by Napoleon

to submit a note of what France could do for Italy. This Cavour now

prepared, asking little at this time, the main object being the Austrian

evacuation of Bologna. Cavour found himself in a very difficult

position, the war had closed before Austria had been drawn into it,

and Sardinia was not in a sufficiently strong position to make many

requests. Both the King and Cavour had confidently hoped that Austria

would be forced to side with Russia. Now it was extremely doubtful what

decisions the coming Congress of Paris would make, and Cavour had been

privately given to understand that the Sardinian envoy to the Congress

would only be allowed to attend those sessions which concerned Sardinia,

and not to take his place with the envoys of the great Powers. He was

exceedingly anxious that D'Azeglio should attend, but the latter refused

point-blank when he learned of the subservient position he would in

all probability have to take. Under these circumstances Cavour saw no

alternative but to go himself, and so with considerable misgiving he set

out for Paris, intent on observing and planning rather than on asking

favors that might be unceremoniously refused.

The Congress of Paris of 1856 produced results far different from

those the various plenipotentiaries intended. Austria came to Paris in

the enviable position of the great European peace-maker, she left as

tyrannical upholder of the old régime. Cavour came as the representative

of a small state with interests far inferior to those of the other

nations, he left as the moral champion of the much abused peninsula of

Italy. Austria actually conceded no territory and Sardinia gained none,

but Austria was discredited in the eyes of England and France, and

Sardinia more than justified. Cavour achieved a great moral victory,

perhaps the greatest result any statesman can gain from a treaty of

peace. He did not take a very prominent part in the actual meetings,

he was very reserved, a good listener, a courteous and always affable

companion. He was loyal to both his English and his French allies, he

won over the Russian Count Orloff, and contrived to keep on good terms

with the Austrian Count Buol, whom he had formerly known at Turin. He

waited with indomitable patience until the major matters of the Congress

had been discussed and disposed of, then he addressed a note to the

English and French envoys inquiring into the rights of Austria to remain

in occupation of the Roman Legations. The question was most important,

it struck at the discussion of the temporal power of the Pope, inasmuch

as that power in Romagna was dependent upon Austrian support. Moreover

it gave notice that Sardinia was concerning itself with the affairs of

the other Italian states.

Cavour had other projects, he was anxious to reunite Parma and Modena

with Piedmont, he was eager to have their Lombard estates returned

to those Italians concerned in the last revolt against Austria. He

planned and plotted to accomplish both these ends, and waited. The

treaty of peace was signed on March 30, and then the French President

of the Congress, Count Walewski, called another session by order of

the Emperor. This session was to deal with the Austrian and French

occupation of Naples. The difficulty with regard to Cavour's original

note was that in questioning Austria's right to uphold the Pope in

Romagna it also questioned France's right to occupy Rome for the same

purpose. Cavour spoke on the Austrian occupation, but passed over the

French. It seems, however, that Napoleon, who had originally taken Rome

to please the clerical party, was now willing to withdraw from Rome

if he could do so without offending that party, and at the same time

cause Austria to withdraw. Lord Clarendon, the British plenipotentiary,

urged the withdrawal of both Powers, which he claimed stood on the same

footing. He objected to both occupations as disturbing to the balance

of power, he denounced the government of the King of Naples, he found

occasion to say what the most ardent Italian would have liked to say,

and his unreserved ardor gained added force from the caution of Cavour.

The effect of the Englishman's speech was striking, he put into words

all Cavour's contentions, and left the Italian in the enviable position

of having demanded nothing, but of having all the claims of justice on

his side. The Austrian envoy was indignant, and the session adjourned

without tangible result. The impression left upon every one's mind,

however, was that Sardinia had championed Italy against Austria, and

that it intended to prepare to make its championship more definite than

by diplomatic notes.

Cavour returned to Turin with the satisfaction of having placed Italy's

wrongs openly before the world. The redress of these wrongs was now

matter for European consideration, no longer the mere object of secret

society plots. Patriots in all the Italian states were quick to realize

this, they saw that at last their national rights had been forced into

attention, Cavour's note had cemented all their local causes. There were

still many in Piedmont who did not understand his policy, and many who

would have preferred his winning of a single duchy to Sardinia rather

than urging the withdrawal of Austria from the Papal States, but in

spite of these doubters the great majority acclaimed his cause, and

felt that, whether they understood him or not, he was the one man who

could lead them to deliverance. On his return his policy became more

clear, he was aiming at an Italian nation under one king, he was looking

far ahead, and the other great nationalists who had been puzzled by

his conflicting declarations in the past saw that his goal was theirs.

The goal had unquestionably been in his thoughts throughout all his

political career, now he came out frankly, no longer simply Prime

Minister of Sardinia, but spokesman for Italy.

War must come as the next step. Cavour now for the first time took

account of the practical use to be made of those great waves of popular

feeling that were continually recurring, those heroic forces Mazzini had

been calling into being. He met Garibaldi, and found that he was a great

practical man, likely to be of infinite value to the country. He went

among the people and studied how their enthusiasms could be turned to

best account, he planned with leaders of earlier revolts and convinced

them that he was simply patient until the time came to strike, no more a

reactionary than they.

In addition to the Foreign Office Cavour assumed the Ministry of

Finance. He was unwilling to trust too much to other men, he was anxious

to know exactly how all the affairs of the nation stood. The army

he knew was rapidly improving, he studied how he might increase the

finances without imposing too heavy taxes. He moved the arsenal from

Genoa to Spezia, he insisted on completing the tunneling of Mont Cenis,

and all these steps showed that he was concerned now with the affairs of

the whole peninsula rather than with the guidance of one small state. As

one of his political opponents said of him in detraction at this time,

"the Prime Minister had all Italy in view, and was preparing for the

future kingdom." He had made himself practically the entire government,

from King to peasant all classes followed him with a blind faith in his

triumphant destiny as a leader. Still he waited, preparing for the hour

to strike.

On the evening of January 14, 1858, Felice Orsini, a Romagnol

revolutionist, attempted to assassinate the French Emperor with a bomb

as he was driving to the opera. It was expected that this act would

cause a bitter estrangement between France and Italy, but, although for

a short time there was a considerable diplomatic interchange of notes,

the ultimate result was quite the reverse. We must remember that the

wrongs under which Italy labored were in reality always on Napoleon's

mind, that he sincerely desired to free and reunite the Italian nation,

although at times his ideas of expediency made him appear more of an

enemy than a friend. As a young man he had himself been a revolutionary,

probably at one time a member of the Carbonari, he had thrilled long

ago at Mazzini's call, and he was an ardent nationalist. When he heard

Orsini's last words to him, "Free my country, and the blessings of

twenty-five million Italians will go with you!" he knew that it was

not hatred of himself, but the desire in some way to bring about

Italian independence that had inspired the assassin. The words and acts

of Napoleon wind in and out of this story of Italian liberation in a

manner only too often difficult to reconcile, but it would seem that his

interest was in reality sincere, and that he wished to help Italy as

much as he could without jeopardizing the interests of France.

Events began to march, certain ideas were exchanged between influential

persons at Paris and Turin; in June Dr. Conneau, an intimate of the

Emperor, happened to visit Turin, and saw Victor Emmanuel and Cavour. It

was stated that Napoleon intended to make a private visit to Plombières.

Shortly after Cavour announced that his health required a change of

scene and that he should go away into the mountains. By a strange

coincidence he also went to Plombières. Napoleon saw him, they spent two

days closeted together; when Cavour left the two men understood each

other. The details of what was known as the Pact of Plombières are not

positive, the understanding appears to have been that a rising in Massa

and Carrara should give a pretext for a war to expel the Austrians.

After such expulsion the country in the valley of the Po, the Roman

Legations, and the Ancona Marches were to be united in a kingdom of

Upper Italy. Savoy was to be given to France, possession of Nice was

left unsettled, Victor Emmanuel's daughter, the Princess Clotilde, was

to be given in marriage to Prince Napoleon.

Napoleon had shown his interest in Italy, but Cavour left Plombières

fully alive to the fact that actual help was still far distant. Austria

would be hard to defeat, and Cavour did not wish France to provide all

the forces for war. He already foresaw that it might be difficult to

insure France's withdrawal after victory. Furthermore he realized that

England, to which he was always looking, was well content with the

present peaceful situation of affairs, and would regard any offensive

step by France or Sardinia as unwarrantable. He saw that Prussia and

Russia held the same view. No country wanted war except his own, and

possibly France, provided it could be made to appear that Austria

and not France was the attacking party. It seemed very certain that

Austria would stand much before putting herself in the false position

of wantonly opening war. Again Cavour had to be patient and plan how

Austria might be made to take that step.

While he waited Cavour organized a volunteer Italian army under the

name of the Hunters of the Alps, he laid campaign plans with Garibaldi,

he knit all the patriots of Italy into one common cause. Even the old

conservative leaders came over to him, D'Azeglio wrote him, "To-day

it is no longer a question of discussing your policy, but of making

it succeed." The King supported him magnificently, Cavour found that

his hardest work now was to hold King and people back. Still he would

not open war, he knew too well that he must have the support of other

countries than his own.

At the New Year's Day reception in Paris, 1859, Napoleon made his famous

comment to the Austrian Ambassador, "I regret that relations between

us are so strained; tell your sovereign, however, that my sentiments

for him are still the same." The words created a sensation, no one was

certain what lay back of them in the French Emperor's mind. Cavour heard

them and they gave him hope. When the time came for Victor Emmanuel to

open Parliament Cavour prepared the speech from the Throne with the

greatest care and had a copy submitted in advance to Napoleon. Napoleon

strengthened it, and Victor Emmanuel changed it still further for the

better. When the King read it the effect upon his hearers was that of

a call to arms in an heroic cause. "If Piedmont, small in territory,

yet counts for something in the councils of Europe, it is because

it is great by reason of the ideas it represents and the sympathies

it inspires. This position doubtless creates for us many dangers;

nevertheless, while respecting treaties, we cannot remain insensible

to the cry of grief that reaches us from so many parts of Italy." The

European Powers saw that the old treaties of 1815 were in imminent

danger. None of them realized who had in reality penned these words.

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