opportunity of acquiring an accurate knowledge of the sound and healthy
state of the thoracic and abdominal viscera, none of which appeared to
have ever been the seat of inflammation or disease. There were no morbid
indications to be seen; other than those unavoidably attending the human
body six weeks after death, even under circumstances more favourable to
its preservation. The heart was small, and dense in its substance; its
valves, pericardium, and the large vessels, were sound, and firm in
their structure. The lungs were sound, and free from adhesions. The
liver was very small, in its colour natural, firm in its texture, and
every way free from the smallest appearance of disorganization. The
stomach, as well as the spleen and other abdominal contents, was alike
free from the traces of disease. Indeed all the vital parts were so
perfectly healthy in their appearance, and so small, that they resembled
more those of a youth, than of a man who had attained his forty-seventh
year; which state of the body, associated with habits of life favourable
to health, gives every reason to believe that HIS LORDSHIP might have
lived to a great age.
The immediate cause of HIS LORDSHIP'S death was a wound of the left
pulmonary artery, which poured out its blood into the cavity of the
chest. The quantity of blood thus effused did not appear to be very
great: but as the hemorrhage was from a vessel so near the heart, and
the blood was consequently lost in a very short time, it produced death
sooner than would have been effected by a larger quantity of blood lost
from an artery in a more remote part of the body. The injury done to the
spine must of itself have proved mortal, but HIS LORDSHIP might perhaps
have survived this alone for two or three days; though his existence
protracted even for that short period would have been miserable to
himself, and highly distressing to the feelings of all around him.
W. BEATTY.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] By this ship His LORDSHIP received some newspapers from England, one
of which contained a paragraph stating that General MACK was about to be
appointed to the command of the Austrian armies in Germany. On reading
this, His LORDSHIP made the following observation: "I know General MACK
too well. He sold the King of Naples; and if he is now entrusted with an
important command, he will certainly betray the Austrian monarchy."
[2] CAPTAIN HARDY left England in a bad state of health, with which he had
been afflicted during the last twelve months; but was now in a progressive
state of amendment. Lord NELSON asked the Surgeon this day, "how long he
thought it might be before Captain HARDY'S perfect recovery;" and on the
Surgeon's answering that "he hoped not more than a fortnight,"--"Ah!"
replied His LORDSHIP, "before a fortnight the Enemy will be at sea, the
business will be done, and we shall be looking out for England."
[3] These Instructions will be found at the end of the Narrative.
[4] HIS LORDSHIP did not wear his sword in the Battle of Trafalgar: it had
been taken from the place where it hung up in his cabin, and was laid ready
on his table; but it is supposed he forgot to call for it. This was the
only action in which he ever appeared without a sword.
[5] It has been since recollected that on the 21st of October 1757, His
LORDSHIP'S maternal uncle, Captain SUCKLING, in the Dreadnought, in company
with two other line of battle ships, attacked and beat off a French
squadron of four sail of the line and three frigates, off Cape François.
The French Commodore was towed into Cape François; and the English ships,
being too much disabled to follow up their success, bore away to Jamaica to
refit.
[6] This phrase has been subjected to misconstruction; to the Writer of
these pages, however, both the purport and expression of it seem very
clear, thus; "_might have been_ offered" (though it _was not_).
[7] The Victory's sick-report for this day numbered only ten convalescents,
who all attended their respective quarters during the battle; and the whole
Fleet was in a high state of health. Indeed the excellent health enjoyed by
the crew of the Victory from December 1804 up to this period, is perhaps
unprecedented: and is attributable solely to Captain HARDY'S attention to
their subordination, temperance, warm clothing, and cleanliness; together
with the means daily adopted to obviate the effects of moisture, and to
accomplish the thorough ventilation of every part of the ship.
The Victory arrived at Spithead from the memorable and arduous chace of the
Enemies' Fleets to Egypt and the West Indies, in August 1805: and
notwithstanding the operation of the unfavourable circumstances of rapid
change of climate, and the privation of refreshments experienced in that
chace, as well as frequent increase of numbers (as in the West Indies there
were at one time embarked in her above 990 souls), there was not now a
single hospital-patient on board, nor did any occur during the several
weeks of her stay in England; with which Lord NELSON expressed himself
highly pleased when he joined the ship again, on the 14th of September, at
St. Helen's. The Victory's casualties from the 29th of December 1804 to the
20th of October following, were only five fatal cases (one of these by
accidental injury), and two patients sent to a naval hospital.
[8] It has been reported, but erroneously, that His LORDSHIP was actually
requested by his Officers to change his dress, or to cover his stars.
[9] His LORDSHIP just at this time found fault with the Officer commanding
on the forecastle, because the lee (or starboard) lower studding-sail had
not been set sooner; a circumstance which, though trivial in itself, shews
how well Captain HARDY knew His LORDSHIP'S sentiments.
[10] His LORDSHIP in a few minutes after this called Lieutenant PASCO, Mr.
OGILVIE, and some other Officers, near him, and desired them to set their
watches by the time of that which His LORDSHIP wore.
[11] The Enemy's fire continued to be pointed so high throughout the
engagement, that the Victory did not lose a man on her lower deck; and had
only two wounded on that deck, and these by musket-bulls.
[12] The reader may judge of the Surgeon's feelings at this momentous
period, when informed that that excellent young Officer Mr. RAM was one of
his dearest friends.
[13] The instance here alluded to occurred in the month of July, in the
Victory's return to Europe from the West Indies; and the man survived the
injury thirteen days. HIS LORDSHIP, during the whole of that time,
manifested much anxiety at the protracted sufferings of an individual whose
dissolution was certain, and was expected every hour.
[14] CAPTAIN HARDY deemed it his duty to give this information to Admiral
COLLINGWOOD as soon as the fate of the day was decided; but thinking that
HIS LORDSHIP might feel some repugnance to this communication, he left
directions for Lieutenant HILLS to be detained on deck at his return, till
he himself (Captain HARDY) should come up from the cockpit. Lieutenant
HILLS was dispatched on this mission from the Victory, at the very time
when the Enemy's van ships that had tacked were passing her to windward and
firing at her.
[15] Meaning that in case of HIS LORDSHIP'S surviving till all resistance
on the part of the Enemy had ceased, Captain HARDY was then to anchor the
British Fleet and the prizes, if it should be found practicable.
[16] Alluding to some wishes previously expressed by HIS LORDSHIP to
Captain HARDY respecting the place of his interment.
[17] IT must occur to the reader, that from the nature of the scene passing
in the cockpit, and the noise of the guns, the whole of His LORDSHIP'S
expressions could not be borne in mind, nor even distinctly heard, by the
different persons attending him. The most interesting parts are here
detailed.
[18] Immediately after HIS LORDSHIP expired, Captain HARDY went on board
the Royal Sovereign, to communicate the melancholy event, and the nature of
HIS LORDSHIP'S last orders, to Admiral COLLINGWOOD.
[19] The Redoutable lay alongside and still foul of the Temeraire for some
time after this, and till several Seamen were sent from the latter to the
assistance of the two Officers and men belonging to the Victory who had
before taken possession of the prize.
[20] These were the ships commanded by Admiral DUMANNOIR, and afterwards
captured by the squadron under the command of Sir RICHARD STRACHAN. They
were nearly half an hour in passing to windward, during the whole of which
time they continued firing on the British ships.
[21] About twenty of the Redoutable's guns were dismounted in the action.
Those on that side of her lower deck opposed to the Victory, were all
dismounted except five or six.
[22] Many of those who were slightly wounded did not apply for assistance
till after the public return of killed and wounded had been transmitted to
Admiral COLLINGWOOD, which therefore reports a smaller number than here
stated.
[23] Brandy was recommended by the Surgeon in preference to rum, of which
spirit also there was plenty on board. This circumstance is here noticed,
because a very general but erroneous opinion was found to prevail on the
Victory's arrival in England, that rum preserves the dead body from decay
much longer and more perfectly than any other spirit, and ought therefore
to have been used: but the fact is quite the reverse, for there are several
kinds of spirit much better for that purpose than rum; and as their
appropriateness in this respect arises from their degree of strength, on
which alone their antiseptic quality depends, brandy is superior. Spirit of
wine, however, is certainly by far the best, when it can be procured.
[24] Of the Victory's wounded, three died before she reached Gibraltar, one
on the day of her arrival there, and another at the naval hospital at that
place a few days afterwards: all the rest got well on board except the five
left at Gibraltar, and five others not perfectly recovered from their
wounds in January following; when the Victory being put out of commission
at Chatham, they were sent to the Sussex hospital-ship at Sheerness.
[25] The ball was _not_ fired from a rifle piece.
[26] It was not deemed necessary to insert in this Report the precise time
which HIS LORDSHIP survived his wound. This, as before stated, was in
reality two hours and three quarters.
[27] FIG. 1. in the annexed Plate represents the Ball in the exact state in
which it was extracted. Drawn by Mr. W.E. DEVIS, who was then on board the
Victory.
FIG. 2. (drawn also by Mr. DEVIS) shews the Ball in its present state; as
set in crystal by Mr. YONGE, and presented to the Writer of this Narrative
by Sir THOMAS HARDY.
The Ball, in perforating the epaulette, passed through many of the silk
cords supporting the bullions, and through the pad and a doubling of silk
besides; as the bag of the pad was composed of yellow silk. This
circumstance militates strongly against an opinion entertained by some,
that silk possesses in an eminent degree the power of resisting the force,
or arresting the velocity, of a musket or pistol ball.
[28] The stock of spirit of wine on board was exhausted and from the sound
state of the Body, brandy was judged sufficient for its preservation.
[29] These complaints were the consequence of indigestion, brought on by
writing for several hours together. HIS LORDSHIP had one of these attacks
from that cause a few days before the battle, but on resuming his
accustomed exercise he got rid of it. This attack alarmed him, as he
attributed it to sudden and violent spasm; but it was merely an unpleasant
symptom (_globus hystericus_) attending indigestion.
_APPENDIX._
_INSTRUCTIONS_
_Issued by_ LORD NELSON _to the Admirals and Captains of his Fleet,
several days previous to the Battle_.
Victory, off Cadiz, 10th of October, 1805.
GENERAL MEMORANDUM _sent to the Commanders of Ships_.
Thinking it almost impossible to bring a Fleet of forty sail of the line
into a line of battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other
circumstances which must occur, without such a loss of time that the
opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the Enemy to battle in
such a manner as to make the business decisive, I have therefore made up
my mind to keep the Fleet in that position of sailing, with the
exception of the First and Second in Command, that the order of sailing
is to be the order of battle: placing the Fleet in two lines, of sixteen
ships each with an advanced squadron of eight of the fastest-sailing
two-decked ships; which will always make, if wanted, a line of
twenty-four sail, on whichever line the Commander in Chief may direct.
The Second in Command will, after my intentions are made known to him,
have the entire direction of his line; to make the attack upon the
Enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed.
If the Enemy's Fleet should be seen to windward in line of battle, and
that the two lines and advanced squadron could fetch them, they will
probably be so extended that their van could not succour their rear. I
should therefore probably make the Second in Command's signal to lead
through about their twelfth ship from their rear; or wherever he could
fetch, if not able to get so far advanced. My line would lead through
about their centre: and the advanced squadron to cut three or four ships
ahead of their centre, so as to ensure getting at their Commander in
Chief, on whom every effort must be made to capture.
The whole impression of the British Fleet must be, to overpower from two
or three ships ahead of their Commander in Chief (supposed to be in the
centre) to the rear of their Fleet.
I will suppose twenty sail of the Enemy's line to be untouched: it must
be some time before they could perform a manoeuvre to bring their force
compact to attack any part of the British Fleet engaged, or to succour
their own ships; which indeed would be impossible, without mixing with
the ships engaged. The Enemy's Fleet is supposed to consist of forty-six
sail of the line; British, forty:[30] if either is less, only a
proportional number of Enemy's ships are to be cut off; British to be
one-fourth superior to the Enemy cut off.
Something must be left to chance: nothing is sure in a sea-fight, beyond
all others; shot will carry away masts and yards of friends as well as
foes: but I look with confidence to a victory before the van of the
Enemy could succour their rear; and then that the British Fleet would
most of them be ready to receive their twenty sail of the line, or to
pursue them should they endeavour to make off.
If the van of the Enemy tack, the captured ships must run to leeward of
the British Fleet: if the Enemy wear, the British must place themselves
between the Enemy and captured, and disabled British ships: and should
the Enemy close, I have no fear for the result.
The Second in Command will, in all possible things, direct the movements
of his line, by keeping them so compact as the nature of the
circumstances will admit. Captains are to look to their particular line
as their rallying-point; but in case signals cannot be seen or clearly
understood, no Captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside
that of an Enemy.
Plan of the intended attack from to-windward, the Enemy in line of
battle ready to receive an attack:
--------- Advanced squadron.}
------------------ Weather line. } British.
------------------ Lee line. }
-------------------------------------------------
Enemy's line.
The divisions of the British Fleet will be brought nearly within
gun-shot of the Enemy's centre. The signal will be made for the lee line
to bear up together; to set all their sail, even studding-sails, in
order to get as quickly as possible to the Enemy's line; and to cut
through, beginning from the twelfth ship from the Enemy's rear. Some
ships may not get through their exact place, but they will always be at
hand to assist their friends. If any are thrown in the rear of the
Enemy, they will effectually complete the business of twelve sail of the
Enemy.
Should the Enemy wear together, or bear up and sail large, still the
twelve ships composing in the first position the Enemy's rear, are to be
the object of attack of the lee line, unless otherwise directed by the
Commander in Chief: which is scarcely to be expected; as the entire
management of the lee line, after the intentions of the Commander in
Chief are signified, is intended to be left to the Admiral commanding
that line.
The remainder of the Enemy's Fleet, thirty-four sail, are to be left to
the management of the Commander in Chief; who will endeavour to take
care that the movements of the Second in Command are as little
interrupted as possible.
NELSON AND BRONTE.
By Command of the Vice Admiral.
JNO. SCOTT.
MEMORANDUM BOOK
_The following interesting Extracts are faithfully copied from_ HIS
LORDSHIP'S _Memorandum Book, written entirely with his own hand_.
Saturday, September 14th, 1805. At six o'clock arrived at Portsmouth;
and having arranged all my business, embarked at the bathing-machines
with Mr. ROSE and Mr. CANNING, who dined with me. At two got on board
the Victory, at St. Helen's.
Wednesday, Sept. 25th, 1805. Light airs southerly. Saw the rock of
Lisbon S.S.E. ten leagues. At sunset the Captain of the Constance came
on board, and sent my letters for England to Lisbon, and wrote to
Captain SUTTON[31] and the Consul. The Enemy's Fleet had not left Cadiz
the 18th of this month, therefore I yet hope they will wait my arrival.
Saturday, Sept. 28th, 1805. Fresh breezes at N.N.W. At day-light bore
up, and made sail. At nine saw the Ætna cruising. At noon saw eighteen
sail. Nearly calm. In the evening joined the Fleet under Vice Admiral
COLLINGWOOD. Saw the Enemy's Fleet in Cadiz, amounting to thirty-five or
thirty-six sail of the line.
Sunday, Sept. 29th. Fine weather. Gave out the necessary orders for the
Fleet. Sent Euryalus to watch the Enemy with the Hydra off Cadiz.
Wednesday, October 9th. Fresh breezes easterly. Received an account from
BLACKWOOD, that the French ships had all bent their top-gallant-sails.
Sent the Pickle to him, with orders to keep a good look-out. Sent
Admiral COLLINGWOOD the Nelson truth.[32] At night wind westerly.
Monday, Oct. 14th. Fine weather: westerly wind. Sent Amphion to
Gibraltar and Algiers. Enemy at the harbour's mouth. Placed Defence and
Agamemnon from seven to ten leagues west of Cadiz; and Mars and Colossus
five leagues east of the Fleet, whose station is from fifteen to twenty
west of Cadiz: and by this chain I hope to have a constant
communication with the frigates off Cadiz.
Wednesday, Oct. 16th. Moderate breezes westerly. All the forenoon
employed forming the Fleet into the order of sailing. At noon fresh
breezes W.S.W. and squally. In the evening fresh gales. The Enemy as
before, by signal from Weazle.
Thursday, Oct. 17th. Moderate breezes north-westerly. Sent the Donegal
to Gibraltar, to get a ground-tier of casks. Received accounts by the
Diligent storeship, that Sir RICHARD STRACHAN was supposed in sight of
the French Rochefort squadron; which I hope is true.
Friday, Oct. 18th. Fine weather: wind easterly. The Combined Fleets
cannot have finer weather to put to sea.
Saturday, Oct. 19th. Fine weather: wind easterly. At half past nine the
Mars, being one of the look-out ships, made the signal that the Enemy
were coming out of port. Made the signal for a general chace S.E. Wind
at south; Cadiz bearing E.S.E. by compass, distance sixteen leagues. At
three the Colossus made the signal that the Enemy's Fleet was at sea. In
the evening made the signal to observe my motions during the night; for
the Britannia, Prince, and Dreadnought, to take stations as most
convenient; and for Mars, Orion, Belleisle, Leviathan, Bellerophon, and
Polyphemus, to go ahead during the night, and to carry a light, standing
for the Straits' mouth.
Sunday, Oct. 20th. Fresh breezes S.S.W., and rainy. Communicated with
Phoebe, Defence, and Colossus, who saw near forty sail of ships of war
outside of Cadiz yesterday evening; but the wind being southerly, they
could not get to the mouth of the Straits. We were between Trafalgar and
Cape Spartel. The frigates made the signal that they saw nine sail
outside the harbour. Sent the frigates instructions for their guidance;
and placed the Defence, Colossus, and Mars, between me and the frigates.
At noon fresh gales, and heavy rain: Cadiz N.E. nine leagues. In the
afternoon Captain BLACKWOOD telegraphed that the Enemy seemed determined
to go to the westward;--and _that_ they shall _not_ do, if in the power
of NELSON AND BRONTE to prevent them. At five telegraphed Captain
BLACKWOOD, that I relied upon his keeping sight of the Enemy. At five
o'clock Naiad made the signal for thirty-one sail of the Enemy N.N.E.
The frigates and look-out ship kept sight of the Enemy most admirably
all night, and told me by signal which tack they were upon. At eight we
wore, and stood to the S.W.; and at four wore and stood to the N.E.
Monday, Oct. 21st. At day-light saw Enemy's Combined Fleets from east to
E.S.E. Bore away. Made the signal for order of sailing, and to prepare
for battle. The Enemy with their heads to the southward. At seven the
Enemy wearing in succession.
* * * * *
_Then follow the Prayer and Codicil already inserted in pages_ 14 _and_
15 _of the Narrative, which conclude_ HIS LORSHIP'S _manuscript_.
FOOTNOTES:
[30] With such an inferiority of force as this, HIS LORDSHIP confidently
expected not only to gain a decisive victory, but (to use his own favourite
phrase) "completely to _annihilate the Enemy's Fleet_!"
[31] Of his Majesty's ship Amphion, then in the Tagus.
[32] It is presumed that HIS LORDSHIP here meant the preceding
Instructions, which were transmitted the next day to the whole Fleet.