_”Never Greece, never Rome, never any people of the ancient world,
exposed the motives of its independence with a more noble simplicity,
nor based them upon more evident truths.”_
_Gudin de la Brenellerie, Histoire de Beaumarchais._
The Declaration of Independence and Its Effect in
Europe—Beaumarchais’s Activity in Getting Supplies to
America—Difficulties Arise About Sailing—Treachery of du
Coudray—Lafayette’s Contract with Deane—His Escape to
America—Beaumarchais’s Losses—Baron von Steuben Sails for America
in Beaumarchais’s Vessel, Taking the Latter’s Nephew, des
Epinières, and His Agent, Theveneau de Francy—The Surrender of
Burgoyne—Beaumarchais Finds Himself Set Aside While Others Take
His Place—Faces Bankruptcy—Vergennes Comes to His Assistance.
“The Act,” says _Doniol_ (I, p. 561), “which proclaimed to the civilized
world the institution of the American Republic and which was destined to
open a new phase of civilization, was announced in Europe only as an
incident, secondary to the resistance of the rebels.
“The English Government would not admit that the solemn act produced any
visible emotion in London. In the beginning Garnier, the French
Ambassador, was no more struck than the cabinet of London by the page of
political philosophy put into being by the declaration of Congress, and
which was to respond so loudly in the country of Voltaire and the
Encyclopædia.” In France, “when it became known,” continues Doniol, “it
produced the most vivid sensation which was possible to create a century
ago by the means of publicity then existing.”
But though the action of the colonies was greeted with wild enthusiasm
by the populace, the government remained cold and undemonstrative. Silas
Deane had written to Congress, January 17, 1777, “The hearts of the
French people are universally for us and the opinion for an immediate
war with Great Britain is very strong, but the court has its reasons for
postponing a little longer.”
The chief cause of the apparent inaction of the government arose from
the ruined condition of its finances. Beaumarchais, as was seen in the
last chapter, already had been commissioned to draw up a plan of finance
which should aid in the present crisis. This he had done, basing his
scheme of reform upon the wise and prudent measures adopted by the great
Sully. He endeavored to prove that these reforms would, if put into
execution, cause such an increase of revenue as would enable France
safely to declare war, without increasing the rate of taxation or
incurring the risk of bankruptcy. His scheme, however, had been set
aside. On the 30th of March, 1777, he addressed a lengthy memoir to the
prime minister, M. le Comte de Maurepas, of which the following is an
extract:
“ ... I have doubtless explained badly my ideas of help for the
Americans, since it seems that you have not adopted them. The
fear of giving you too much to read makes me concise to the point
of being perhaps obscure.... Read the letter of M. Deane....
Judge if a good Frenchman, a zealous subject of the King, a good
servitor of M. de Maurepas, who respects him and wishes to see
his administration honored among all the people of the world,
judge if he can support your constant refusal to lend him a hand,
the earnest solicitations of America at bay, and the insolent
triumph of armed England.... M. le Comte, spare your servitors
the sorrows of one day hearing you reproached with having been in
a position to save America at small cost and you have not done
it, to tear her from the yoke of England and to unite her to us
by commerce, and that you have neglected it.
“Hear me, I pray you; you distrust too much your own powers and
my resources; and above all I fear that you do not sufficiently
esteem the empire, which your age and your wisdom gives you over
a young prince whose heart is formed, but whose politics are
still in the cradle. You forget that that fresh young soul has
been turned and brought back from very far. He is tractable,
helpless, weak in his whole being. You forget that while dauphin,
Louis XVI had an invincible repugnance to the old parliaments,
yet that their recall honored the first six months of his reign;
you forget also that he swore never to be vaccinated, yet that
eight days afterwards he had the vaccine in his arm. No one is
ignorant of this, and no one will excuse you for not employing
the beautiful power of your place in causing to be adopted the
great things which you have in your mind.
“If you find my liberties too daring, go back to their respectful
motives, and you will pardon them to my attachment.
“It was not play on my part, M. le Comte, when attaching myself
to you, I said with feeling: ‘I shall never have a day of true
happiness, if your administration passes away without having
accomplished the three greatest acts which could illustrate it:
the humiliation of England by the union of America and France;
the re-establishment of the finances, following the plan of
Sully, which I have placed several times at your feet, and the
rendering of civil existence to protestants.... These three
things are to-day in your hands; I wish only the honor of having
often recalled them to you. What work, M. le Comte, what success
more beautiful, could crown your career? After such actions,
there is no death. The dearest existence of man, his reputation,
survives all and becomes eternal. Hear me then, I beg you, in
favor of the Americans. Remember that the deputies await my
answer to dispatch a courier who will carry encouragement or
desolation into Congress.... Do not render my pains unfruitful,
through not concurring in them, and may the recompense of my
works be the honor of having made them acceptable to you!
“I am, with the most respectful devotion, M. le Comte,
“Your very, etc.,
“de Beaumarchais.”
To all this Maurepas made no reply, and the unhappy agent, still
harassed and thwarted in his plans, wrote to Vergennes:
“April 13, 1777.
“ ... If I do my duty, as M. de Maurepas had before the goodness
to say to me, in presenting without ceasing and under all its
faces, the picture of so important an affair, permit me to
represent to you, M. le Comte, what you know better than I, that
loss of time, silence and indecision are even worse than refusal.
Refusal is a deed, one can act afterwards, but from nothing,
nothing ever comes—it remains nothing....”
[Illustration: GENERAL JOHN SCHUYLER]
In the same letter he warmly pleaded his own cause. “In so far as I work
alone,” he said, “my secret is secure. If the indiscretion of the
officers of the _Amphitrite_ and their foolish chief make known the
destination of the vessel, what can I do more than you? I defy any man
in this country, beginning with the ministers themselves, to cite either
what name, what charge, from what port and for what destination I have
sent the vessels dispatched since.... In a word, M. le Comte, now that
all is in operation, when the first pains and labors of so vast an
establishment have obtained a certain success, when my profound disdain
for the idle gossip of society has turned aside the babblers and now
that I can assure the happy consequence of the enterprise, do you refuse
to concur any longer? and does my active perseverance inspire the same
in no one?... In the name of Heaven, of honor, of the interests of
France, retard no longer your decision, M. le Comte! Confer again with
M. de Maurepas. No object is more important, and none so pressing.
“In the instant of closing this letter, I receive one from Nantes, by
which I am informed of the refusal to provide sailors, and so my richest
ship is stopped at the moment it is ready to sail.... I implore you, M.
le Comte, promptly to arrange with M. de Sartine what is necessary for
the departure of my vessel.... I hope to go myself for your orders upon
very many objects Thursday evening, if you do not send them before. I
recommend the Americans to your remembrance and their advocate to your
good will.... The hour of the post has passed while I was writing. I
send this therefore by a man on horseback.”
In striking contrast to the outspoken and independent tone assumed by
Beaumarchais when addressing the ministers, is the friendly yet
authoritative manner which he employs when it is question of a
subordinate. To de Francy, his confidential agent, he had written
February 28, 1777, in relation to the dispatching of the _Amphitrite_,
after it had been brought back by du Coudray: “We shall have to say,
like Bartholo (one of the characters in the _Barbier de Séville_) ‘_le
diable est entré dans mon affaire_,’ and remedy as best we may the evil
that is past, by preventing its happening again. Give the enclosed
letter to M. du Coudray. I send it to you open, in order that you may
reply in my behalf to his objections, should he make any. Show to
Captain Fautrelle, the enclosed order which we give him, in quality of
proprietor of the vessel which he commands, and take his word of honor
to conform to it entirely. I received yesterday a letter from my nephew
along with yours. As unreasonable as the rest of them, my nephew seems
to be unwilling to go back to his place on the _Amphitrite_. You can
understand the little attention which I pay to such childishness. Simply
recommend him again to the special care of M. de Conway and to the
Chevalier de Bore. Command the captain to receive on board M. le Marquis
de la Rouërie, who comes to us with special recommendations. Give to the
Captain the general rule and the secret of the route. If the force of
circumstances obliges him to put into Santo Domingo, arrange with him
and M. de Conway not to stop there, but to write to the governor of the
island in order to notify him that the fear of some unlucky encounter,
alone prompted the drawing up of the fictitious order in regard to the
destination of the _Amphitrite_, and take from him a new fictitious
order for France, in order to shelter yourself by that order in case you
encounter an English vessel between Santo Domingo and the true
destination of the ship. You know very well that all the precautions of
the Ministry are taken in accord with us; it is upon this that we can
count.
“As soon as the _Amphitrite_ has set sail, go on to Nantes, where, by
the way, you will probably find _le Mercure_ started, because it is
ready now to set sail. Good-bye, my dear Francy. Come quickly back to
Paris. You have trotted about enough for this time; other work awaits
you here: but I will be there to divide it with you. Bring me back this
letter.”
The fear of a possible reconciliation of the colonies with Great
Britain, which constantly haunted the agent of the French Government,
had of late been greatly augmented. The 8th of March, 1777, he had
written to Vergennes:
“Sunday morning.
“M. le Comte; Another letter you will say. Will they never stop!
Eh! how can I stop, M. le Comte, when new objects unceasingly
excite my attention and my vigilance? A private secretary of Lord
Germaine arrived yesterday, secretly sent to Messrs. Deane and
Franklin. He brings propositions of peace. The most superb
recompenses are promised him if he succeeds.” ...
Monday morning, he wrote ... “America is doing the impossible to
hold her own. But be sure that she cannot go much farther without
you, or without a reconciliation with Great Britain.... While I
am treating with you, I warn you that England is secretly
attempting to treat with M. Franklin.... Deane is regarded as a
formidable obstacle to any project of adjustment: They will
attempt to dislodge him at whatever price. My news is so positive
as to the intention of the ministers that my conjectures become
facts. They have the project to compel Deane to leave France, and
to make of him the expiatory victim.” A short time before
Beaumarchais had written to the same minister: “The doctor
Franklin at this moment, wishes to send away M. Deane from
France. My special object is to prevent his leaving. The manly
firmness of this Republican alone, can arrest the insinuations
of every kind employed against the doctor.”
As a matter of fact, Franklin was well aware of the dismay which the
noise of his secret communications with agents of Great Britain had
caused the ministers, nor did he desire to allay their suspicions. He
knew well the value for France of an alliance with the colonies, at
least supposing the fact of their independence. He knew, also, how far
it was to the interest of England to prevent such an alliance. So long
as France remained outwardly inactive, Franklin did nothing to allay the
fears of the one government nor to weaken the hopes of the other,
although there can be no doubt that in his heart he was bent only upon
concluding a treaty with France. In March, 1777, he wrote: “I did not
come to make peace, but to procure the aid of European powers to permit
us to defend our liberty and our independence, which it is certainly to
their interest to guarantee, because our great and growing commerce will
be open, and cease to be the monopoly of England.... I think we shall be
capable with a little help, of defending our possessions long enough, so
that England will be ruined if she persists in destroying us.... I
flatter myself to live to see my country established in peace and
prosperity, while Great Britain will no longer be so formidable a figure
among the powers of Europe.” There also seems no doubt but that he had
at last secretly concurred with Deane in aiding the escape of Lafayette
from the restrictions imposed upon him by the French government,
although subsequently, the whole blame was allowed to rest upon Deane
alone.
The situation in regard to Lafayette was as follows: Some time during
the year 1775, the young Marquis who was then scarcely eighteen, and who
was serving under the Comte de Broglie at the garrison of Metz, was
present at a dinner given in the fortress where the English Duke of
Gloucester was guest. The latter was bitterly opposed to the policy of
George III in regard to America, and at table spoke freely of the
uprising among the colonists; it was then, so Lafayette tells us in his
memoirs, that he formed the resolution of offering his services to the
insurgents. Through the intervention of De Broglie, the Baron von Kalb,
a Prussian general serving in France, introduced to Silas Deane on
November 5, 1776, the young marquis with two of his cousins who had
formed the same determination to offer their services to America. Silas
Deane received them with enthusiasm, and promised all high positions in
the American Army (see _Doniol_ Vol. II, p. 63). Eleven other officers
were added and the entire group were to sail from Havre on _La Seine_,
one of the fleet of Hortalès et Cie. when the order already spoken of,
came from the government to prevent further operations of the house.
Moreover, a special prohibition was issued regarding the young officers,
because it was of great importance for the French Government to seem to
oppose the enlistment of such prominent members of the high nobility as
Lafayette and his colleagues. Nothing daunted, Lafayette, whose fortune
made him independent, bought a vessel of his own, _La Victoire_, and
having decided “to go in spite of everything and without regard to
consequences” secretly negotiated with Deane, and set sail, April 20,
1777, with some twenty other commissioned officers.
The agreement which had been drawn up between them was signed by
Lafayette, the Baron von Kalb, and Silas Deane; it bore the date of
December 7, 1776, although it was not really issued until February,
1777. This discrepancy was owing to the fact that since the arrival of
Franklin in December, Deane’s commission had changed in nature, so that
he no longer was empowered to enlist officers for the American service.
The date of December 7, 1776 had been chosen because on that day the two
noblemen had been presented to the American Commissioner and an informal
engagement entered into. This was immediately before the arrival of
Franklin in France.
The true patriotism which inspired Deane led him to adopt this
subterfuge, feeling as he did that the services of so brilliant an
officer as Lafayette, and one belonging to such an illustrious house,
would be of sufficient value to his country to warrant the irregularity
of the act. The Baron von Kalb had originally, it would seem, stipulated
with Deane for a considerable salary, part of which was to be paid in
advance. (See _Our French Allies_, Stone, p. 39.) Deane rightly
understood the effect which would be produced in the different courts of
Europe by the daring deed of the young nobleman and foresaw the
consequent fury of the English which could not help but hasten the final
decision of the ministry. Therefore he willingly concurred in the
designs of Lafayette, aiding them to the utmost of his power (_Doniol_,
Vol. II, Chap. VII). Congress afterwards disavowed all the commissions
granted by Deane, so that most of the officers were obliged to return to
France. Lafayette and the Baron von Kalb, having fortunes of their own,
were willing to serve without pay; they were therefore given
appointments. The romantic escape of the young nobleman caused all the
commotion that was expected of it. The Capital went wild with
exultation, openly vindicating his act, while the anger of the English
knew no bounds.
England, indeed, had good grounds for discontent with the conduct of her
rival. “Public opinion in London,” says Doniol, “was more and more for
war. France everywhere was accused of aiding the colonies.... It was
said that open war was preferable to the insidious peace which we
pretended to maintain while according every advantage to the revolted
colonies.”—(_Doniol_ II, p. 455.) Other causes of grievance, especially
in regard to the protection granted to American vessels in all French
ports, were constantly coming up. “England,” says Doniol, “incriminated
especially the authorities of Martinique. According to Lord Weymouth,
the Americans armed openly in the island, favored by the most notable
persons. So much pressure was brought to bear upon the French Government
by the English Ambassador, that, not yet ready for war, it was forced to
grant the satisfaction which was demanded. As in previous instances, the
blow fell heaviest upon Beaumarchais. July 1, 1777, he wrote:
“I have just received news that afflicts me.... M. de Bouille,
the new governor of Martinique, has notified the merchants that
it is agreed between the courts of France and England, that the
English Navy seize the French vessels coming from their islands,
taking all the commodities of America which they find.... This is
so impossible, that though I have read it, I still cannot believe
it!
“Afternoon.... I am indeed, in despair to receive the
confirmation of that trying announcement. It seems certain that
France has ceded to the English the right to seize all French
vessels coming from the islands, which are charged with American
commodities. What distress, M. le Comte, could have brought about
such an arrangement?... I learn by letters from Cape Francis of
the 18th of May, that the cargo of the _Amétie_, happily arrived
in that port, has started for America, divided on several
American and Bermudan vessels, bought at my cost at Santo Domingo
for....
“P. S. You are not to blame, M. le Comte, for the consequences of
that sorrowful convention with the English. Your hands were tied
to sign it. But I am in despair. I made my payment of the 30th
yesterday, selling all the paper money which I had, at a
disadvantage. A quarter of an hour is so important, that a
million arriving the next day could not repair the lack of but
thirty thousand _louis d’or_. I was compelled to pay yesterday
£184,328 2s., and £21,864 8s. 4d. remain unpaid from the 15th on
which I have only received £200,000 instead of £221,864 8s. 4d.
From now until the 15th, I must pay £268,304 8s. 3d. I am lacking
therefore £490,168 16s. 7d. with the loss of my paper money, and
the three last payments which I must replace so as to be abreast
of my affairs. I therefore beg you to send me an order for
5,000,000 fr., after that I can go forward, but as my destination
is not a matter of indifference, I shall have the honor of
conferring with you about it.”
The documents deposited in the bureau of foreign affairs, show that M.
de Vergennes “taking into consideration the desperate situation into
which Beaumarchais found himself thrown, owing to the obstinate refusal
of Congress to send him returns, had advanced successively, the 13th
May, 1777, 400,000 livres, the 16th of June, 200,000 livres, and the 3rd
of July 474,496 livres.” (_Loménie_ II, p. 145.) By this means alone,
Beaumarchais was able to continue his active services in the cause of
America.
Although the court of Louis XVI were making pretense of not favoring the
Americans, they already had decided on war and were endeavoring to bring
the court of Spain to a similar decision.
“The 26th of June,” says Doniol, “a memoir was addressed to the Spanish
cabinet explaining the seasonableness of associating themselves
positively with the colonies, and in consequence, of making war upon
England.”
“By the means so far employed,” wrote Vergennes, “the reconciliation of
the colonies with Great Britain cannot be prevented; those means have
been all that have been prudent, but they will not suffice any longer;
it is necessary that the assistance become sufficiently effective to
assure a total separation and so compel the Americans to gratitude.”
Madrid was finally forced to follow the course laid out for it at
Versailles; but before openly declaring their alliance, both courts
awaited some decisive act of the Americans. The capture of Burgoyne
determined the King, although several months more elapsed before the
treaty was actually signed.
But if the court was thus apparently inactive, Beaumarchais continued as
assiduous as ever in aiding the Americans, and this notwithstanding the
coldness of the commissioners, the total absence of returns and the
unbroken silence of the Continental Congress. The Hon. John Bigelow, in
his admirable paper _Beaumarchais, the Merchant_, speaking of
Beaumarchais at this period, said: “He received no tobacco, nor money,
nor thanks, nor even a letter from Congress.... His funds were
exhausted, and all his expectations of returns were disappointed.... At
last, reduced to extremities, he resolved to send a confidential agent
to the United States, to obtain, if possible some explanation of results
so chilling to his enthusiasm, and for which he was so poorly prepared.
For this mission he selected a young man named Theveneau de Francy, a
person of considerable talent, generous and enthusiastic, but poorly
trained for the delicate duty assigned him. De Francy embarked for the
United States at Marseilles on the 26th of September, 1777, on board of
one of Beaumarchais’s ships, carrying twenty-four guns, called _Le
Flammand_.”
“De Francy,” says Loménie, “went out with the double mission of
obtaining justice from Congress for the past, and to prevent cargoes
from being delivered gratis in the future.”
But before entering into a consideration of his mission, let us pause to
note among the passengers of the _Flammand_ a now justly celebrated
personage, who was destined to render such effective aid in training the
American troops; this was Baron von Steuben. In his life of that famous
Prussian officer, Frederick Kapp has given a detailed account of the
incidents which led up to his entering the American service. The French
minister of war, the Comte de St. Germain, had long been a pronounced
admirer of the military tactics employed by the king of Prussia. He had
endeavored to have those tactics introduced into the French army but
without success. Being on intimate terms with the Baron, the latter made
a halt in Paris with the intention of visiting his friend at Versailles
on the occasion of a voyage to England in the spring of 1777. Having
notified the count of his desire to wait upon him, the Baron was
surprised to be requested not to come to Versailles, but to meet him at
the arsenal in Paris. “You have arrived very apropos,” the count said;
opening a map and pointing to America, he continued, “Here is your field
of action, here is the Republic you must serve. You are the very man she
needs at this moment. If you succeed, your fortune is made and you will
acquire more glory than you can hope for in Europe for many years to
come.” He then pictured the bravery, the resources of the Americans, and
intimated the possibility of an open alliance. After this he sketched
the other side of the situation; spoke of the disadvantages under which
the Americans labored: bad training, lack of order and discipline among
the troops, and ended by saying “You see now why you must not be seen at
Versailles.” The Baron, however, seemed but little touched by the
eloquent appeal of his friend. He told the count that he was no longer
young, that he had no ambition; though he was without fortune, yet his
position was all that he desired.
After a second interview, his interest seemed somewhat aroused. The
Count gave him a letter to Beaumarchais, who introduced him to Deane;
and Deane took him to Passy to see Franklin. Both commissioners seemed
anxious that Steuben should enter the service. “But,” says his
biographer, “when Steuben mentioned a disbursement for the expenses of
his journey, they expressed some doubts of their power to grant it. Mr.
Deane made no difficulties; Franklin, however, made several. He spoke a
great deal of presenting him with a couple of thousand acres of land,
... but Steuben did not care for them.... As to any advances, Franklin
positively declared that it was out of the question; he told him this
with an air and manner to which Steuben, as he remarked in a letter
written at that time, ‘was then little accustomed,’ whereupon he
immediately took leave, without any further explanation.
“He went thence to M. de Beaumarchais, telling him that he intended to
set out immediately for Germany, and that he did not wish to hear any
more of America. As soon as Beaumarchais was informed of the cause of
Steuben’s resolution, he said to him, that if he wanted nothing but
money, a thousand _louis d’or_ and more were at his disposal. Steuben
thanked him for his generous offer, but said his determination was
fixed. The Count of St. Germain endeavored to dissuade him, but to no
effect.
“Arrived at Rastadt, he found a very persuasive letter from M. de
Beaumarchais, who wrote that the Comte de St. Germain expected his
prompt return to Versailles; that a vessel was ready at Marseilles for
his embarkation, and that Beaumarchais’s funds were entirely at the
Baron’s disposal.
“Prince William of Baden, with whom Steuben conferred, urged him to
accept; accordingly he returned to Paris, August 17, 1777.”
On the 26th of September he set sail. Beaumarchais wrote to Congress:
“The art of making war successfully being the fruit of courage
combined with prudence, knowledge and experience, a companion in
arms of the great Frederic, who stood by his side for twenty-two
years, seems one of the men best fitted to second M. Washington.”
Baron von Steuben was well received in America. As he asked for
no pay, and wished to enter the army as a simple volunteer, no
objection was made to his enlistment. He soon was raised to a
position suitable to his rank and talents. A little more than a
year after his arrival, Beaumarchais, overjoyed at the success
which had attended the Baron, wrote to his agent, Theveneau de
Francy: “Recall me often to the memory of M. the Baron von
Steuben.
“I congratulate myself from that which I learn of him, to have
given so great an officer to my friends, the free men of America,
and to have forced him in a way to follow that noble career. I am
in no way disquieted about the money that I lent him for his
voyage. Never have I made an investment which gave me greater
pleasure, because I have been able to put a man of honor in his
true place. I learn that he is Inspector General of all the
American troops. Bravo! Tell him that his glory is the interest
of my money, and that I do not doubt but at that title, he will
pay me with usury.”
On the same vessel went also the nephew of Beaumarchais, the son of his
elder sister married to the watchmaker, De Lépine, who on entering the
American service took the name of des Epinières. It was the same of whom
Beaumarchais had spoken impatiently on the occasion of his refusing to
continue his voyage upon the _Amphitrite_, when du Coudray had brought
that vessel back to port. That he had his way, is proved by the fact
that his name is mentioned amongst the six aids who accompanied the
Baron von Steuben to America. An idea of the young man’s character may
be gained from the following brief extract of a letter written by him
the evening of an engagement: “Your nephew,” he wrote, “my very dear
Uncle, may perhaps lose his life, but he will never do a deed unworthy
of one who has the honor of belonging to you. This is as certain as the
tenderness which he always will have for the best of uncles.” According
to Loménie, he never returned to France, but died on the field of
battle, after having attained the rank of Major.
At the time when the Baron von Steuben set sail for America,
Beaumarchais was no longer the confidential agent of the government. As
has been seen, Franklin had from the first, refused to treat with him,
while Lee’s influence at home and abroad was at all times used to bring
about his ruin. More than this “everything,” says Doniol, “seemed to
cost too much; they (Franklin and Lee) had allowed themselves to be
persuaded that Beaumarchais ought to serve them for nothing. The
_Barbier de Séville_, as he was called familiarly, passed with too many
people for gaining great profit, for there not to be many interested in
ruining him. It was also of the utmost importance to England to
interfere with his operations, and the English Ambassador fed the
flames.... Dubourg had his part to play ... but whatever the reasons, it
remains true that Franklin never missed an opportunity openly to contest
the operations of Roderigue Hortalès et Cie., and to attempt to bring
them to naught.” (Doniol II, 611.) Other intermediaries, therefore,
began to be employed.
Although less recognition was given to Beaumarchais by the government,
the ministers continued to make use of his advice. “At the moment,” says
Doniol, “when he was treated with the greatest coldness, his counsels
were appropriated.... They used his political estimates almost in the
terms in which he expressed himself, sometimes textually. At the end of
October he was admitted to discuss with Vergennes and Maurepas the
definite stand to take in offering propositions of alliance with the
American colonies. Three months later when the King was about to sign
the treaty, it was evident that the Secretary of State had demanded of
Beaumarchais a résumé of their discussion. This résumé entitled,
_Mémoire particulière pour l’Etat_,” was drawn up by Beaumarchais under
circumstances peculiarly distressing. It was at the moment when he first
realized with absolute certainty that his coöperation in the aid soon to
be freely and openly accorded the Americans was no longer desired.
Nevertheless, he continued to express himself with the same manly vigor
as previously. After setting forth the actual situation of France and
Spain with regard to England, he said: “What remains for us to do?
“Three courses are open to us. The first is worth nothing, the second is
the most sure, the third, the most noble; but a wise combination of the
third and second could instantly raise the King of France to be the
first power of the civilized world.
“The first course, which is worth nothing, absolutely nothing, is to
continue to do what we are doing, or rather what we are not doing; to
remain longer passive by the side of the turbulent activity of our
neighbors, and obstinately to refuse to take sides while still awaiting
events.” After setting forth at length the actual condition of affairs
in England, the perils which menaced France, the desire which actuated
all parties in Great Britain to make peace with America while wreaking
their vengeance upon France, he continues warningly, “But the first step
towards peace being once taken, be sure that it will be too late for
France to declare in favor of America.” Then follows a narration of
preparations then making in England to take France unawares. “After
having become the laughing stock of all Europe,” cries the daring
advocate of the alliance, “a fatal war and the bankruptcy of America
will be the worthy reward of our inaction.
“The worst course therefore, of all the courses, is now, to take no
course and to attempt none in conjunction with America, waiting until
England shall have closed up every way; something which will certainly
happen very shortly.
“The second course which I regard as the most sure, would be to accept
publicly the treaty of alliance proposed to us for more than a year by
America, ... As soon,” he says, “as the English learn that there is no
longer any hope to treat with a country which has treated with us, they
will instantly make war upon us, declaring us to be aggressors.” ... One
objection after another that might present itself to the minds of the
ministers is then taken up and weighed, especially in relation to the
ignorance which existed among them with regard to the “extent of the
powers entrusted to the legation at Passy, the uncertainty of the
consent of Congress, the possible mobility of an assembly of which the
majority was the only law, and which made them fearful that France might
have to regret too late, a step which naturally would exasperate the
English.
“These fears, Beaumarchais knew how to turn aside by reasons and
considerations (_Doniol_ II, p. 742) which would not have been out of
place in the mouth of a minister.”
The third course open to France, “the noblest of all,” was to declare to
the English in a manifesto which should be announced at the same time
to the other potentates of Europe, that the King of France, after
having, through delicacy and regard to England, long remained a passive
spectator of the war existing between England and America, to the great
disadvantage and injury of French Commerce; “that conditions being so
and so,” which he proceeded to clearly define, “His Majesty obliged by
circumstances to decide upon some definite course ... and not wishing to
declare war against England, nor to insult her ... His Majesty contents
himself with declaring that he will hold the Americans for independent,
and desires to regard them as such from henceforward, relatively to
their commerce with France, and the commerce of France with them.” ...
“After drawing up his manifesto, Beaumarchais entered into the
exposition of the measures to take, and discussed the shades of opinion
of each minister exactly as though he had been part of the council....
It is not one of the least singularities of the times to see the author
of the _Barbier de Séville_ deliberating as it were with the ministers,
saying ‘I would do’ and putting himself naïvely in the place of the King
of France.” (_Loménie_, II, p. 160.)
It was early in December that news of the surrender of Burgoyne reached
Europe. “The joy of the news of Saratoga brought Beaumarchais to Passy,
in spite of the bitter griefs which he had against the Commissioners.”
(_Doniol_ II, 646.) The same day he wrote to Vergennes:
“December 5, 1777.
“Monsieur le Comte:
“ ... Yesterday I was at Passy with the courier who arrived from
Congress, and I passed the morning in comforting my heart with
the excellent news of which we had that moment received the
announcements.
“I came back to Paris, bringing M. Grand in a light carriage with
a postillion and two horses. The carelessness of my postillion
... caused us to be overturned.... Mr. Grand had his shoulder
broken; the violence of the fall made me bleed profusely at the
nose and mouth;—a piece of broken glass entered my right arm—the
negro who followed was badly hurt. See me then prostrated, but
more ill in mind than body ... it is not the postillion who kills
me, but M. de Maurepas. Nevertheless the charming news from
America is a balance to my soul.... I am the voice which cries
from the depths of my bed, ‘_De profundis clamavi ad te Domine;
Domine exaudi orationem meam_.’ Although you received the
_Gazette_ of Boston yesterday, I will send you the extract which
I myself made to insert in _le Courrier d’Europe_. It is just
that I give them in England by my phrases all the poniard thrusts
which their Ambassador gives me here with his. I salute you,
respect and cherish you, and will sign, if I can with my wounded
arm, the assurance of the unalterable devotion with which I am,
etc.
“Beaumarchais.”
Two days later, he wrote:
“M. le Comte:
“Your honorable and sweet interest consoles me for everything. In
thanking you for the counsels which you have been so good as to
give me I can assure you that I did not allow myself to be too
vivacious in the letter of which I sent you a copy; I cannot
explain myself in writing, but you will be much more surprised
than I, because you are less acquainted with the persons of whom
it is a question, when I give you an account of all that has
happened. I always have put a great difference between the honest
deputy Deane, and the insidious Lee, and the silent Dr. Franklin.
“The movement which the news of America has given to all idle
heads is inconceivable; the English of the cafés do not know
where to hide themselves;—but all that is nothing like so curious
as what will take place in London from the shock of the different
reports. I await the details with a pleasure equal to all the
trouble which they have tried to make me. I thank you for the
interest which you take in my health. I am getting up to-day for
the first time, and to-morrow I hope to go out.... Receive with
your ordinary goodness the assurances of the very respectful
devotion with which I am, etc.
“Beaumarchais.”
Wounded in body and sick at heart, the zealous patriot and vigilant
friend of America continued to give notice to the government of the news
which, through his agents and friends in London, he received before
anyone else.
Thursday, the 11th of December, he wrote:
“To M. le Comte de Vergennes, to be communicated, if he pleases,
to M. le Comte de Maurepas.
“M. le Comte:
“Although I find it difficult to use my right arm, still I must
force it to aid me in announcing to you that I received last
night very particular news from London. Everything is in such a
state of fermentation since the news of Burgoyne that the crisis
has arrived, when the deceived King, the audacious ministry, and
the most corrupt parliament must cede to the cries of a furious
nation....
“What is the true moral sense of this crisis? It is, that
whichever one of the two nations, France or England, recognizes
first the independence of America, she alone will reap all the
fruits, while that independence will certainly be ruinous to the
one which allows her rival to get the advance. This word sums up
everything; this moment accomplishes everything. As to the
details, in spite of my grievances and my sufferings, if my poor
body can endure the _broutage_, and if you have the time and the
desire to receive me to-day, or better, to-morrow, my postillion
has orders to await yours.
“I renew, with the same devotion, M. le Comte, the assurances of
the very profound respect of the poor turned and overturned
“Beaumarchais.”
A few days later he had still more startling news to announce; a
mysterious stranger had arrived in Paris, had visited M. Deane, had
dined with him, remaining more than two hours. At the end of that time,
a lackey of Mr. Deane came into the street, looked anxiously about;
seeing a cab (which was none other than the one in the employ of
Beaumarchais) he asked if it was engaged; being told that it awaited two
ladies, the lackey entered the house and soon the mysterious stranger
came into the street and went away on foot, followed, of course, by the
cab.
Two more days passed, and at the end of that time, Beaumarchais was able
to give more definite information. The mysterious stranger proved to be
a secretary of the Lord Germaine. “Beaumarchais,” says Doniol, “informed
as usual before all others, dispatched at once a notice to the
ministers. He had followed the English Emissary from the moment of his
arrival, informed himself of what he already had accomplished, found out
his lodgings and notified the ministers, who sent at once an agent to
confer with Deane.” (_Doniol_ II, 64.) Vergennes hastened to inform the
Court of Spain of the secret actions of England, with a design to rouse
it to action. The moment was indeed a critical one, for the English
government was leaving nothing undone to come to terms with the
Americans.
January 1, 1777, Beaumarchais wrote to Vergennes:
“I hasten to inform you that an emissary from Lord North arrived
in Paris yesterday. He has been watched ever since he left
London. He has orders to gain the deputation at Passy at any
price whatever. This is the moment or never, to cry _tu dors
Brutus_. But I know that you are not asleep. From your side you
see very well that I do not keep bad guard either.... Be sure
that the English ministers are working seriously to make peace
with America, and that it is of as much value to the nation that
they make it, as it is for Lord Chatham and others.... And so
peace with America is absolutely resolved; this is what has been
very expressly communicated to me. As for myself, I am informed
by the same avenue that the minister of France has given the
Americans here help of money by means of Messrs. Grand, that the
English ministers know it on good authority and that I am shifted
off, which annoys no one in England. I easily believe it. Then I
have lost the fruits of the most noble and unbelievable labors,
by the very means that lead others to glory; I have several times
guessed as much by the strange things which have struck me in the
conduct of the Americans towards me.... Miserable human prudence,
thou canst save no one when intrigue is bent upon ruining us.
“M. le Comte, you are the man upon whose equity I have the most
counted; you have not even refused at times esteem and
well-wishing to my active zeal. Before I perish as merchant, I
demand to be fully justified as agent and trader. I demand to lay
before you my accounts, in order that it be proved well that no
one else could have done so much with so little means across so
many difficulties. It is certain that this summer M. le Comte de
Maurepas permitted me to send guns to America, and he promised me
that when they were gone I should be reimbursed, because he
feared at that time the indiscretion of those about M. le Comte
de St. Germain. I bought them, sent them and gave my notes which
fall due soon, and yet M. de Maurepas seems to have forgotten his
promise. This article and the charging of my vessel at Rochefort,
arrives at more than 800,000 francs.
“By the unbelievable retention of my vessel in port, everyone
considers me lost and demands his money; nevertheless, though
ready to perish through this delay and money not reimbursed, I do
not lose my head. You can judge of that by the cold and reasoned
work which I put into your hands Saturday. But I avow that I am
at the end of my courage and my strength by the assurance that
Messrs. Grand have secured the confidence which I believed I so
well merited.[1] This breaks my heart. I have fulfilled the most
thorny of tasks; I must be allowed to prove that I have fulfilled
it well; it is in giving my accounts that this truth will
appear....
“Be happy, M. le Comte, this year and all years. No one merits to
be so, more than you, and no one desires it more truly than
“Beaumarchais.”
[1] Beaumarchais had aided in placing Grand on firm
footing with the American Commission (Doniol II, 613).
Although no longer made use of as intermediary, the former agent of the
government was not wholly abandoned by Vergennes.
A few days previously Beaumarchais had written:
“M. le Comte: I felt yesterday the sweet influences of your
goodness. If I did not obtain what I asked for, at least
I could judge by the gentle tone of the prohibitions that they were
less directed against me than forced by events and promises already
made. To lose much money is a great evil, when one has very little;
but to carry in one’s heart the mortal sorrow of displeasing when one
has done one’s best, and even the best that could be done, under the
circumstances, is a state which kills me. Receive, M. le Comte the
warmest testimony of my gratitude.”
On the 22nd of January, 1778, the discarded agent handed in the résumé
required of him by the ministers. In writing to Vergennes he said: “This
sorrowful Memorial (_Mémoire Particulière, pour les ministres du Roi, et
une manifeste pour l’Etat_) which at another time, and on another
subject, I could have finished in two hours, has taken me eight days to
write, my head being so confused by the frightful medley of objects
which it contains, and in regard to which I claim your justice while
invoking your mercy.
“I even thought for four days that it had become useless through delay,
and abandoned everything to work upon my consular balance-sheet. By a
_tour de force_, I put myself on my feet for twelve or fifteen days;—But
_grand Dieu_, is this to live? The more I assume a tranquil air, the
more my secret torment increases. I have examined myself well, I have
not done the least wrong, and in going over my papers to assure myself
of my state, I have been frightened at all it has been necessary to
overcome in the last two years, to arrive where I am. If I am to be
aided, you cannot do it too quickly or too secretly for the letters of
change are like death, they wait for no one.... If I am not to be,
Amen—I have done what I ought, and more than what I could. I learn by
sure news that my two vessels of Marseilles are certainly at
Charlestown. This, in spite of France and England. Sixty-six cannons,
twenty-two mortars, bombs and bullets in proportion; eighty thousand
weight of sulphur and my poor guns which have not yet been paid for. All
this is in America, by my indefatigable labor, and I have had to deceive
all the world, with unbelievable pains, in order to make this shipment
secretly. Ah, M. le Comte, it is my balance sheet which will show what
an active man you have allowed to be lost and dishonored if you permit
this fearful misfortune to accomplish itself. I have no courage to talk
of England, because in truth I am dying of sorrow.”
[Illustration: GENERAL BARON VON STEUBEN]
That the Comte de Vergennes did not lend an altogether deaf ear to this
cry of despair, may be judged from the following letter, dated February
15, 1778,
“M. le Comte:
“You have seemed to take a too obliging interest in my fearful
situation, for me to allow you to remain ignorant a moment of the
excessive joy which I have felt since yesterday. Yesterday, my
teeth clenched with fury to be without news, I waited the moment
to close my case, refusing to make any payment the 15th, which
falling due to-day Sunday, was exigible yesterday, the 14th.
Read, M. le Comte, read I implore you what I received at 2
o’clock, and what I replied this morning, see, my joy is
excessive. I am no longer exposed to the dishonor of a
bankruptcy, which, notwithstanding all my efforts, I could never
have justified, without an involuntary and fatal indiscretion. M.
le Comte de Maurepas received me Monday, like a corsaire who had
failed in respect to our flag. I did not say a word, I would have
had too much to say. I withdrew, death in my heart. Not that I
thought the interests of America abandoned. I know very well that
they are not....
“The profound silence which I have imposed upon myself for the
past two months, since the departure of the brother of M. Deane,
secretly embarked at Bordeaux and bearing ... but this shall be
matter for another letter. It is just that M. de Maurepas learns
through me of this affair, for if the fear of the most frightful
misfortune has rendered me pressing solicitor, I am not a man
without virtue; it will be the strongest proof which I can offer
of the resignation with which I know how to support the coldness
and disdain of those who have protected me. Ah! but I am again
saved. It is to you that I render a million thanks for all the
efforts which you have made in my favor. Never will I forget the
generous efforts which you have made to save me from ruin....”
The moment of the open alliance between France and America was now
hastening forward. With it, ends the first phase of the war of the
United States against England, “phase heroic by its enterprise, its
constancy, its privations, by the serenity of its chief and by the
results obtained, if one considers the nature and quality of the
soldiers.” (_Doniol_ III, 260.)
It was to this period that the activities of Beaumarchais in the cause
of America essentially belong. The operations, however, now so well
under way, he continued to carry on through his agent de Francy, though
from henceforward they are wholly private in character.