CHAPTER XIX

_”I should never have completed what I have but for the generous, the

indefatigable and spirited exertions of Monsieur de Beaumarchais, to

whom the United States are in every account greatly indebted, more so

than to any other person on this side the water.”_

_Silas Deane to Congress, November 29, 1776._

Suspicions of English Aroused Through Indiscretions of Friends of

America—Treachery of du Coudray—Counter Order Issued Against

Shipments of Beaumarchais—Franklin’s Arrival—England’s Attempt to

Make Peace Stirs France—Counter Order Recalled—Ten Ships Start

Out—Beaumarchais Cleared by Vergennes.

While Beaumarchais, through the intervention of the Ministry, was

bringing his own personal interests to a successful termination, he was

at the same time carrying vigorously forward his operations in the cause

of America. These operations were the most difficult. In the words of

Loménie: “It was a question of an officially prohibited commerce, which

prohibition was under the vigilant supervision of the English

Ambassador,—and could receive the official support of the French

government only on condition that it was carefully hidden. The least

indiscretion, the slightest diplomatic embarrassment occasioned by the

affair would immediately transform this support into persecution. It was

under these conditions that the author of the _Barbier de Séville_

was obliged to extract without noise and in small quantities, from the

different arsenals of the state, 200 pieces of cannon, mortars, bombs,

bullets, 25,000 guns, 100 tons of powder; to manufacture the stuffs

necessary for the equipment of 25,000 men, collect all these objects in

the different ports and send them to the insurgents without arousing the

suspicion of the English Ambassador.”

It was, however, humanly impossible that suspicions should not be

aroused; too many people were interested in the cause of America; too

many were eager to aid in the struggle of the colonies for liberty.

Especially was the _cher bon ami_ of Dr. Franklin constantly bringing

things to the brink of exposure through his officious intermeddling.

Although he knew nothing of the real basis upon which the commercial

house, Roderigue Hortalès et Cie., was founded, yet he was very well

aware that Beaumarchais had supplanted him in the confidence of the

ministers. Forced to see himself set aside, Dubourg none the less

continued collecting supplies on his own account, which he forwarded to

the insurgents. His indiscreet zeal led him often into grave

difficulties.

“With the best intentions in the world,” says Doniol, “he was in danger

of interfering with, rather than aiding the cause he hoped to serve.”

The letters of Beaumarchais to Vergennes during this period constantly

revert to this theme, “Dubourg must be made to keep silence and not to

compromise the ministry.” “If,” he writes in another place, “while we

are closing the doors on one side, someone opens the windows on the

other, it is impossible that the secret does not escape.” At length

quite out of patience at some new and serious indiscretion which the

good doctor in his simplicity had told to Beaumarchais himself, the

latter wrote to Vergennes, “Is there then no way to stop the mouth of

that cruel gossiper?... As he told me I could scarcely refrain from

dealing him a blow, but I restrained myself, simply turning my back and

walking away.... I depend upon you, M. le Comte, to deliver us from this

fatal and mischief-making agent.”

But Dubourg was by no means the only person interested in the cause of

America who was sowing snares in the pathway of Beaumarchais and of

Deane. At the worst, the good doctor was only indiscreet, he was never

guilty of that personal ambition which in times of great crisis delights

to bring ruin upon the schemes of others, and which uses all its power

to thwart those enterprises which it cannot lead. Many enemies of this

latter type were destined soon to manifest themselves. On the 1st of

October, 1776, Silas Deane wrote to Congress of a certain Mr. Hopkins of

Maryland, then in Paris, who without official authority was interesting

himself in the same cause. “Offended at some supposed personal slight,

he formed the dark design,” says Deane, “of defeating at one stroke my

whole prospect as to supplies.... However thunderstruck I was, as well

as my friend Monsieur Beaumarchais at this treachery ... we exerted

ourselves and truth prevailed.... It would be too tedious to recount

what I have met with in this way.... I do not mention a single

difficulty with one complaining thought for myself.... I am happy in

being so far successful, and that the machinations of my enemies, or

rather the enemies of my country ... have been brought to nought.”

But perhaps the most dangerous enemy in the pathway of Deane and

Beaumarchais was a man in whom from the first they had reposed the most

entire confidence. This was Trouson du Coudray, a French officer of rank

and genius, a personal friend of the minister of war, the Comte St.

Germain, who had been the military preceptor of le Comte d’Artois. He

had afterwards been stationed at the garrison of Metz, where he was

associated with the drawing out of old arms and of replacing them by

ones of more recent date. As it was precisely these old arms which the

French Government was willing to part with to Hortalès et Cie.,—at a

reasonable price, du Coudray was admirably placed to further the

proceedings of its agent. Had he been truly disinterested in his

proffered services, his coöperation would have been invaluable. As a

matter of fact, “this officer,” says Doniol, “certainly capable, was one

of those who whatever employment is made of their services, look first

to the personal advantage they can draw from them. Having fascinated

Deane and Beaumarchais, he succeeded in having himself named one of the

staff officers of artillery and was to go out to the colonies in command

of the chief vessel of Hortalès et Cie., the _Amphitrite_. Deane at once

wrote to Congress, announcing the great acquisition which he had made.

He bestowed the highest praise upon du Coudray, but at the same time

evinced a fear lest Congress might consider that he had overstepped the

bounds of his commission in appointing him to so high a rank. He excused

himself for having been forced to confer upon the officer special marks

of favor in order to secure his services, which, he felt sure, would, in

the end, justify him for the step he had taken. He humbly expressed a

hope that Congress would not consider as too high the salary he had

promised, and begged it to confirm the wisdom of his choice.”

Du Coudray was not long in showing himself unworthy of the confidence

thus reposed in him. It was this unfortunate step of Deane, afterwards

imputed to him as a crime by Arthur Lee, which was the chief cause of

his subsequent recall and the semi-disgrace inflicted upon him.

Beaumarchais, being as deeply inculpated as Deane, fell equally in the

opinion of American patriots. But as yet, no foreshadowing of coming

events had dampened the zeal of the colonial commissioner, or of his

indefatigable friend. On October 15, 1776 (Spark’s _Dip. Corres._, I, p.

51), a contract was signed M. de Monthieu, Roderigue Hortalès et Cie.

and Silas Deane, for furnishing armed vessels and merchandise on

condition that risks and perils be on account of the U. S. and that “in

case the vessels be detained in American ports more than two months,

without returning them laden with the cargoes proposed, wages and

expenses shall be paid by the United States.”

While Deane was thus busily engaged in carrying out the commission with

which he was entrusted, he was being left, as far as Congress was

concerned, absolutely without support or approval. Communication between

the two continents was slow in those days, and it has been shown already

that before Deane was able to send any definite information to Congress

of his reception by the French Government, Lee had forestalled him by

giving that body his own private and unfounded interpretation of the

relation entered into between the commissioner and the agent of the

French Government. When Lee’s letter reached America, Congress was

deeply engrossed with the weightier matters which were forcing

themselves upon its attention, owing to the decisive step which it was

about to take in declaring itself free from British rule. The matter,

therefore, was allowed to rest in _statu quo_ for the present. Congress

preferred to await developments before setting on foot any

investigations, and so, though Deane continued to give frequent and full

accounts of all his transactions, no reply was ever made to any of his

letters. This rendered his situation cruel in the extreme. Wholly

unsuspicious by nature, it never occurred to him that an enemy was

busily at work, undermining his character and poisoning the minds of his

compatriots in regard to the disinterestedness of the motives which

actuated him. His irritation began at last to manifest itself. “For

heaven’s sake,” he wrote in a letter to Congress, dated October 1, 1776

(Spark’s _Diplomatic Correspondence_, Vol. II), “if you mean to have any

connection with this kingdom, be more assiduous in getting your letters

here. I know not where the blame lies, but it must lie heavy somewhere,

when vessels are suffered to sail from Philadelphia and elsewhere, right

down to the middle of August, without a single line. This circumstance

was near proving a mortal blow to my whole proceedings.”

October 17th of the same year he says:

“Warlike preparations are daily making in this kingdom and in

Spain. I need not urge the importance of immediate remittances

towards paying for the large quantity of stores I have engaged

for, and I depend that this winter will not be suffered to slip

away unimproved. I have the honor to be, etc.

“Silas Deane.”

By the end of November, notwithstanding the delays and discouragements

encountered by the agents of the two governments, several vessels had

been loaded with supplies and were about to set sail. Silas Deane wrote

to Congress, Nov. 29th, 1776.

“I should never have completed what I have, but for the generous,

the indefatigable, and spirited exertions of M. Beaumarchais, to

whom the United States are on every account greatly indebted,

more so than to any other person on this side the water ...

therefore I am confident you will make the earliest and most

ample remittances.” After giving further details, he proceeds: “A

nephew of Beaumarchais, a young gentleman of family, education

and spirit, makes a voyage to America with M. Ducoudray (in the

various documents, the name of this officer appears, sometimes

written as above by Mr. Deane, but more often ‘du Coudray,’ which

is the correct form) and is ambitious of serving his first

campaign in your cause. I recommend him therefore to your

particular patronage and protection, as well on account of the

great merits of his uncle, as on that of his being a youth of

genius and spirit.... I have confidently assured his uncle that

he will receive protection and paternal advice from you, and am

happy in knowing that you will fulfill my engagements on that

score.

“I cannot in a letter do full justice to M. de Beaumarchais, for

his address and assiduity in our cause. His interest and

influence, which are great, have been exerted to the utmost, in

the cause of the United States.”

On the 3rd of December, 1776, in a letter to John Jay written when the

last measures were being taken for the despatching of the vessels

equipped by Hortalès et Cie., Deane thus expressed himself:

“If my letters arrive safely they will give you some idea of my

situation:—without intelligence, without orders, and without

remittances, yet boldly plunging into contracts, engagements,

negotiations, hourly hoping that something will arrive from

America.

“By M. du Coudray I send 30,000 guns, 200 pieces of brass cannon,

30 mortars, 4,000 tents, and clothing for 30,000 men, with 200

tons of gunpowder, lead balls, etc., etc., by which you may judge

we have some friends here. A war in Europe is inevitable. The

eyes of all are on you, and the fear of your giving up, or

accommodating is the greatest obstacle I have to contend with.

Monsieur Beaumarchais has been my minister in effect, as this

court is extremely cautious and I now advise you to attend

carefully to the articles sent you. I could not examine them

here. I was promised they should be good, and at the lowest

price, and that from persons in such station that had I hesitated

it might have ruined my affairs....

“Large remittances are necessary for your credit, and the

enormous price of tobacco, of rice, of flour and many other

articles, gives you an opportunity of making your remittances to

very good advantage. Twenty thousand hogsheads of tobacco are

wanted immediately for this kingdom, and more for other parts of

Europe.” ... (_Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay_,

1890, p. 97.)

In spite of the remonstrances of Deane, Congress continued deaf and dumb

in regard to their Commissioner, neither condemning nor approving his

acts, but passing all by with like indifference. In the meantime,

Beaumarchais was pushing forward his gigantic operations, being taken

with “a sort of drunkenness of activity and of confidence in himself,

which,” says Doniol, “turned him at times from precautions. He was at

this juncture, really a political agent. He had indicated to M. de

Maurepas a plan of finance which would enable France to arm itself,

without increasing taxation, and the mission had been given him to study

the execution of the plan with M. Necker, who had been called to the

management of the Treasury. He had discussed with Deane, perhaps

somewhat with Vergennes, the creation of a bank, in view of making loans

on the lands of America.” (_Doniol_ II, p. 57.)

Extracts from a Memoir by Beaumarchais, addressed to Vergennes, in

regard to a loan to be made to the Congress: “Supposing always,” he

wrote, “that your intention is neither to let America perish nor to

force her to arrange with England through lack of the succor which is

indispensable for her defense, if you can procure it; supposing also

that my work and my ministry have not ceased to be agreeable to you; I

have found a means of supporting the Americans without disbursing

considerable sums, which you do not possess, but which the Americans

cannot dispense with.

“If you look upon me as the important advocate of that nation before the

Ministry of France,—an employment which I have assumed because it was as

noble as it was useful to my country; knowing that I have not done this

without your secret agreement, you must hear me to-day, even aid me, if

you do not wish to leave without results a plan which is without

danger.” After developing the details of his scheme for rendering more

effective aid to the Americans, Beaumarchais continues, “As you see, M.

le Comte, this is only an extension adroitly given, to that which I have

been doing for the last year. For the past two weeks I have been buried

in the meditations and the correspondence which this work requires.

To-day I am in condition to treat secretly with you and M. de Maurepas.

Any evening which you wish, I will attend upon your orders.”

Things were moving, however, far too slowly for the impatient spirit of

Beaumarchais. The 14th of October he had written to Vergennes.

“Every time that I think how we hold in our hands the destiny of

the world, and that we have the power to change the system of

things—and when I see so many advantages, so much glory ready to

escape, I regret infinitely not to have more influence over the

resolutions of the councils, and not to be able to multiply

myself, so as to prevent the evil on one hand, and aid the good

on the other. I know too well your patriotism to fear offending

you in speaking thus....

“I expect to be at Fontainebleau Thursday at the latest. Until

then I shall not sleep until I have finished the work on Finance,

promised to M. de Maurepas.”

Obstacles of every kind were being thrown in the path of Beaumarchais,

though he remained ignorant of their source. He continued to insist that

the government permit him to carry forward what it had encouraged him to

commence. His letters of this period testify to “a consciousness of

being hampered, a desire to act, fear of being too presumptive in his

demands, and intentions of rendering effective service.” (_Doniol_ II,

p. 58.) He thought the delays came from Maurepas, whose coldness had

distressed him, so he urged Vergennes to plead for him. “If I were not

certain,” he wrote, November 12, 1776, “that I do not displease you in

desiring you to raise as far as possible the obstacles which retard my

course, I would not have the indiscretion to make observations when it

seems I ought simply to submit. But I know that you are as much annoyed

as I by all that tends to spoil my plans. This idea consoles me and

enables me not to lose patience....” “Do not,” he pleads, “do not, M. le

Comte, look upon my impatience as insubordination, it is nothing but

zeal.” Then he proceeded to urge Vergennes to send him an order through

the minister of war, the Comte de St. Germain, that there be delivered

to him 2,000 hundredweight of powder, which would enable him to set

sail, and he ended by saying how he had “_le cœur bien serré_ to see how

things are going or in reality, not going.”

The fall of New York offered an opportunity for Beaumarchais to press

his solicitations, urging that the Americans had been beaten only from

lack of supplies. “If I were asking a personal favor,” he wrote to

Vergennes, “I would have patience, but I shall lose it if you do not

come to my assistance.” On the second of October he had written:

“Everything about me follows me with talk and does all that it can to

ruin me. Across all these bitter things I walk with assurance to my

ends; unless a pistol shot stops me, I will be found ready to treat with

all who present themselves. My zeal and my disinterestedness are the

basis of my defense. I have no important paper about me—everything is

secure.”

In the midst of so many hidden dangers Beaumarchais was soon made to

feel a still graver one. The French government suddenly began to thwart

all his operations, and this without a word of warning or explanation.

The fact was that the suspicions of the Court of St. James had been

thoroughly aroused, and, pressed by the English Ambassador, the minister

had been forced to take a stand. The fifteenth of November the English

Court notified the Spanish Ambassador that everything was known, and the

twenty-second of the same month, they expressed themselves still more

strongly through other avenues. Vergennes was informed that the aid

being rendered by France was no longer a secret. Something had to be

done immediately to allay the fears of the English, and from this had

arisen the apparent hostility of the ministers.

Even had there been no one directly to blame for these disclosures,

entire secrecy still could not have been maintained. The very

multiplicity of the operations, “the goings and comings of Deane and

Beaumarchais and their intermediaries, the confidence that was inspired

by the support of the government leading to indiscretions, all this

divulged the acts.” (_Doniol_ II, 35.) More than this, officers

enrolled, or those who wished to be, were spread about in the

cafés and public places, in Paris or the seaports, awaiting the moment

of embarkation. All these men, “infatuated and needy,” were under the

control of du Coudray, who was expecting to sail on the largest of

Beaumarchais’s ships, _l’Amphitrite_, a vessel of 480 tons, which

already had received its cargo, and was only awaiting the presence of

the officer in order to set sail. For some unaccountable reason, he had

returned to Versailles without giving any notice. He remained there for

more than a week, causing a delay which threatened to spoil everything.

Beaumarchais, supposing that the ministry was at fault, wrote to

Vergennes in the following impatient manner: “Everything has gone,

everything is waiting. Why cannot I have the whole management of the

affair? Then nothing would be delayed and my vessels would already be in

America.” The truth was that du Coudray, relying upon his powerful

support at court, had gone to Versailles in order to succeed in escaping

if possible from the hands of Beaumarchais, so as not to go over as his

envoy. He had all along been lengthening “by every means in his power

the delay in getting off, had sown discontent among the enrolled,

sending away such as he could not gain, had encouraged complaint,

confided the place of embarkation to indiscreet persons, and then threw

upon Beaumarchais the blame of the noise which he himself had made.”

(_Doniol_ II, 61.) In addition to all the rest, Beaumarchais was guilty

of a particular indiscretion of his own. Having gone the 6th of

December, 1776, to Havre, under the assumed name of Durand, in order to

superintend, without arousing suspicion, the despatching of three of his

vessels, the _Amphitrite_, _La Seine_, _La Romaine_, he could not resist

the temptation of busying himself at the same time with his literary

productions. Displeased with the way in which his famous comedy, _Le

Barbier de_ _Séville_, was being performed, he imprudently collected

the actors, making them rehearse the play under his direction. His

presence in the seaport thus became known; the English Ambassador was

notified and the latter at once addressed to the Government the most

vehement remonstrances.

“On the 16th of December a counter order was issued and sent to Havre

and Nantes, prohibiting the officers from embarking and the vessels from

setting out. But when the counter order reached Havre, _l’Amphitrite_,

which bore the greater part of the officers and munitions, already had

set sail. The _Seine_ and the _Romaine_ were alone sequestered,

Beaumarchais then returned with all haste to Paris, in order to obtain

the revocation of the counter order.” (Loménie II, p. 136.)

But in the meantime, an event had happened which, as soon as it became

known, roused the French people to the highest pitch of enthusiasm,

while it deepened the distrust and anger of the English Ambassador. This

event was the arrival of Dr. Franklin upon the shores of France.

Beaumarchais already had announced the fact in a letter to Vergennes.

“The noise,” he said, “caused by the arrival of Mr. Franklin is

inconceivable.... The courageous old man allowed the vessel to make two

captures, in spite of the personal danger he ran.”

Though the French people might welcome with heartfelt enthusiasm, the

venerable old democrat and philosopher, yet his presence at this moment

was a serious matter to the Court of France. The Government was moving,

it is true, directly towards open war with Great Britain, but she was as

yet very unwilling that the English should have cause of offense in her

attitude towards the country which had now declared itself free and

independent. All the supplies which she was allowing to be sent by

Hortalès et Cie. went out in vessels bound direct to her West Indian

possessions, and were ostensibly intended for her own colonists, so that

the English Government had no legal right to interfere. England

therefore redoubled her watchfulness at the court of her rival, and

knowing as she very well did that it was in every way to the interest of

France to aid the Americans in their fight for liberty, she was all the

more determined to harass and thwart every operation which tended in

that direction.

All this time the Americans were far too deeply engrossed with the

difficulties of their own situation to spend much thought upon those

that surrounded their friends in Europe. On the 26th of September,

Congress had appointed three commissioners to the Court of France. Silas

Deane already on the spot had been retained; to him were added Benjamin

Franklin and Thomas Jefferson. The latter declining to serve, was

replaced by Arthur Lee, who was still in London.

Immediately after setting foot in France, Franklin wrote to his _cher,

bon ami_, the Doctor Dubourg, a letter full of warm expressions of

friendship and of polite messages to Madame. He enclosed under the same

cover a letter to Silas Deane, begging his dear friend to see to its

speedy delivery. The letter to Deane informed him of his new

appointment, and gave orders that Lee be summoned immediately to join

them. He bore with him no letter from Congress, nor any message relating

to the past services of Deane, news of which, in fact, had hardly

reached the colonies at the time of the doctor’s embarkation.

Franklin had no personal interest in the work already accomplished,

since his _cher, bon ami_ had been set aside, as soon as Deane saw

“where the confidence of the Government was placed.” From the first he

had determined not to interfere in the quarrel that existed between Lee

and Deane, and he steadily refused to enter into the merits of the zeal

displayed by Beaumarchais under cover of Hortalès et Cie. Warned against

him by so many of his friends, and having particular reasons for not

showing marked favor to Deane (the suspicious jealousy of Lee’s

character threatened from the start to thwart the entire object of the

commission), he chose the course of ignoring all that already had been

accomplished. For the moment Deane, himself, seemed alienated from

Beaumarchais. Vexed at the delay in despatching the supplies (for he

knew nothing of the counter-order issued by the Government), irritated

by Lee, annoyed at the indifference of Franklin and dismayed by the

silence of Congress, Deane in turn assumed an attitude of cold

indifference which perplexed and disquieted his friend. The new duties

which were forced upon him, the change in the character of his mission,

occupied for the time all his thoughts.

As soon as the three commissioners were united in Paris, Franklin wrote

asking for an audience with the minister of foreign affairs, M. de

Vergennes. “Sir,” he wrote, “we beg leave to acquaint your Excellency

that we are appointed and fully empowered by the Congress of the United

States of America to propose and negotiate a treaty of amity and

commerce between France and the said states.... (Doniol II, 112.)” The

minister, however, really anxious to further the plans of Beaumarchais,

was slow to give additional umbrage to the English Ambassador by

receiving the three commissioners whose presence in Paris it was

impossible to hide.

Already Franklin had taken up his quarters in Passy, where he held a

little court of his own. Imbert de St. Amand, in his _Les Beaux Jours de

Marie Antoinette_, has given a vivid picture of the impression made upon

the inhabitants of Paris by the presence in their midst of the aged

philosopher. “The idol of the day,” he says, “in that Paris, so

capricious and so versatile, was Franklin—that peasant, that

septuagenarian philosopher, that learned democrat, that man of the

future—was acclaimed by the French aristocracy. The philanthropists, the

apologists of perpetual peace, demanded war with loud cries. Louis XVI,

notwithstanding his scruples of conscience, allowed himself to be won

over. The apartments of Versailles filled themselves with solicitors of

peril and of glory. All the young nobility wished to start at once. What

transport! what madness! what valor in those paladin philosophers, those

chivalrous democrats, having the double passion of glory and liberty,

full of superb illusions, of generous follies, and so eloquent, so

amiable, so brave! With what gaiety these quitted their pleasures, their

châteaux, their theatres, to live the life of a soldier, to go to seek

the other side of the Atlantic, perils and unknown dangers!”

All this excitement caused by the presence of Franklin did not tend to

lessen the vigilance of the English, although from the first they had

hope that if France could be prevented from aiding the Colonies,

Franklin might in the end be obliged to enter into negotiations with

England. It was precisely this fear which haunted the French Government

and induced the King to revoke the counter-order issued to prevent the

sailing of the ships of Hortalès et Cie. Happy at last in gaining

permission to leave port, Beaumarchais thought only of despatching his

retarded vessels, when he learned that the _Amphitrite_, the one ship

that had set out before the arrival of the counter-order, was at

Lorient, a seaport on the west coast of France, whither it had been

brought by du Coudray “under the pretext that bad weather encountered in

the channel had shown the defective condition of the vessel.” (_Doniol_

II, p. 314.)

Beaumarchais, still deceived, wrote to Vergennes: “_L’Amphitrite_, after

sixteen days of bad weather, has been obliged to return for a moment to

take on fresh provisions, those on board having been saturated by the

sea. This is what I have from M. du Coudray, who asks that it be kept

secret, and who expects to depart in a few days.”

The treachery of this officer could not, however, long remain secret.

“The English Ambassador, learning the details, complained loudly to

Vergennes, who, irritated to find himself again compromised, laid the

blame on Beaumarchais withdrawing the permission newly accorded to set

sail.” (Loménie II, p. 137.) Du Coudray then wrote a long letter full of

lame excuses. Beaumarchais, furious on learning the truth, replied as

follows:

“Paris, January 22, 1777.

“As your conduct, sir, in this affair is inexplicable, I will not

waste time in trying to comprehend it. All that concerns me is to

guarantee myself and my friends against occurrences of the same

kind in future. As the veritable owner, therefore, of the

_Amphitrite_, I send herewith an order to Captain Fautrelle, to

take absolute command. You are sagacious enough to see that I

have not taken so decisive a step without previously consulting

powerful and judicious friends. Have the kindness, sir, to

conform to it, or find another vessel to take you wherever you

please, with no pretension on my part to hinder you in any

respect, except in matters which relate to myself and which tend

to injure me.”

When Deane learned of the disgraceful conduct of the man in whom he had

reposed such entire confidence, he withdrew the commission which he had

granted him, and the 8th of February wrote to Beaumarchais. “The

strange, ungrateful and perfidious conduct of this man, mortifies and

embarrasses me strangely, and as I wish with all my heart that I had

never seen him, I wish equally that he may never see America.”

Beaumarchais at once forwarded this letter to Vergennes, begging him to

prevent du Coudray from setting out for the new world. An order from

Vergennes arrived commanding him to return to his garrison at Metz.

Instead of obeying, he hastened to Versailles, where, as has been shown,

he had powerful protection. He succeeded in being privately presented to

Franklin and through the intervention of the ministers of war and the

navy, du Coudray received from Franklin a recommendation to Congress,

which recommendation Deane himself finally consented to sign, although

with reluctance, for he informed Beaumarchais at once of the act,

assuring him that he had done no more than admit that du Coudray was a

good officer. Vergennes, not wishing a quarrel either with the Comte de

St. Germain or with M. de Sartine (minister of war and the navy), was

obliged to close his eyes to the action of the officer, who at once

hastened to set sail for America. (See _Doniol_ II, p. 317.)

The 11th of February, Beaumarchais wrote to Vergennes: “Everyone knows

the evil which that officer wishes to do me. Having made to myself a law

to explain to no one the wise and pressing motives which oppose

themselves to the departure of that officer, and owing to the necessity

of preventing his indiscretions, I am liable to be taxed with a design

to persecute him, whom on the contrary I have from the first endeavored

to advance and have aided in sincere good faith.... It is neither in my

character nor in my principles to revenge myself on anyone—I should be

obliged to pass my life at that odious business....”

“Neither the orders of Vergennes nor the interference of Beaumarchais or

Deane having prevented du Coudray from crossing the Atlantic, the evil

which followed was inevitable. Arrived in America, he hastened to accuse

Beaumarchais of the very acts which he himself had attempted to perform,

and he accused not him alone, but in consequence Silas Deane of

complicity, as well as the Comte de Vergennes.” (_Doniol_ II, p. 353.)

“Dreaming of great position in America, he built upon the order to

retain him on the continent, and gave it out as an intrigue of

Beaumarchais.” He at once issued a pamphlet to Congress, in which he

explained, “It is to my credit alone, and to my zeal in your service,

that you are indebted for the extent of the aid accorded to your

commissioner, and in nothing to the Sieur de Beaumarchais; everything

was finished when he arrived.” He further dilated upon the greed of gain

which characterized the French agent, and accused him of fraud in his

dealings with the colonies. To minds already prepossessed with similar

ideas, this pamphlet was not calculated to increase the confidence of

Congress in the good faith either of their commissioner or of his

friend. During the two months preceding the open exposure of the perfidy

of this officer, the difficulty of the situation of Beaumarchais hardly

can be overestimated. “Denounced by the conspiracies of du Coudray as

being only incited by desire for lucre; obliged to resort to complicated

expediencies in order to spare the Government the recriminations of the

English, constrained to defend himself against the mistrust aroused even

in the spirit of M. de Vergennes by his at times inevitable

indiscretions; forced to fall back on justifications which might seem

equivocal, he lent himself to doubt, even to suspicion.” (_Doniol_ II,

p. 308.) On the 30th of January he wrote to M. de Vergennes:

“When one writes to a minister whom one respects and cherishes,

one is very much embarrassed to find terms to explain a fact like

the one that suffocates me. After Mr. Deane had shown during a

month a very bad humor, and saying to myself the whole time that

there was something very mysterious in the delay of the vessels

at Havre, I was anxious to have an explanation of his offensive

tone. He replied that, tired himself of not knowing where the

blame lay, he had the honor to send you a memoir by M. Lee, and

that the latter reported that Your Excellency had clearly assured

him that for a long while there had been no obstacle on the part

of the ministry and that if I said there was, it could only be an

imposture of mine or of M. Montieu. Pardon, M. le Comte, if after

swallowing all the other bitter pills without complaint, this

rests in my throat and strangles me in passing. Your Excellency

will perhaps be so good as to cast a glance over the four letters

that I join to this, written by me to M. de Sartine the 3rd,

18th, 22d and 29th of January. They will inform you of the true

state of affairs if it is possible that you are ignorant of it,

and you will tell me afterwards up to what point you order me to

keep silent and sacrifice myself. This blow crushes me and makes

me desire that my whole conduct as a vigilant man and faithful

servitor be promptly examined and with the utmost rigor. It is

impossible for me to take an instant’s repose until you have

accorded me this grace. Read, I beg you, my letters to M. de

Sartine and judge of my suffering.”

Vergennes immediately replied, and the whole situation grew brighter.

Beaumarchais wrote the next day, February 1, 1777, “I sincerely thank

you for your goodness in tranquilizing me. I have force against

everything except your discontent. Never judge me without hearing me,

this is the only favor I ask. I know well that you are accused of

irresolution, which is very far from your character. Afterwards they

cast upon me the reflections of their discontent, making you speak, so

that I may feel it more keenly—I will never believe anything again. I

have the intimate consciousness that I do my best and even the best that

can be done under the circumstances. Across all the obstacles that

surround me, a small success pays me for great labor. I feel myself

already light-hearted again since yesterday’s letters have told me that

three of my vessels have started.” Beaumarchais was thus after so many

delays given full power to act. On the 4th of February, 1777, he wrote

to Vergennes:

“At last I have my delivery.... It is a pity that the Dutch

should be destined to have the principal gain from the transport

of these materials. No matter, the most important thing is, not

to let America come to grief through lack of good munitions....”

By the beginning of March ten vessels of Roderigue Hortalès et Cie. were

floating towards America. The seventh of that month he announced the

fact to Vergennes: “Never,” he wrote, “has commercial affair been pushed

with so much vigor, in spite of obstacles of every nature which have

been encountered. May God give it good success!”

“Beaumarchais,” says M. de Loménie, “naturally expected soon to receive

very many expressions of gratitude from Congress, as well as very much

Maryland and Virginia tobacco. He did not even receive a reply to his

letters.” Nevertheless, he continued to send out ships laden with

supplies, all through the spring and summer, receiving from his agents

alone information of their safe arrival.

The failure of Congress to ratify the conditions offered by its

commissioner would have brought to ruin the commercial house of

Roderigue Hortalès et Cie. in spite of the subsidy of two millions with

which it had been founded, had not the Government again come to its

assistance. But though the ministers in general, and Vergennes in

particular, never entirely deserted Beaumarchais, other and wholly

different measures for aiding the Americans were now seriously occupying

their attention. The colonies in declaring themselves free from British

rule had forced upon France the necessity of coming to some definite

decision. This she was slow in doing, but so inevitable was it that she

should take an active part in the great struggle that already the

measures necessary for the arming and equipping of her forces were being

discussed in her councils, while the nation, gone mad with enthusiasm,

was urging her forward in the pathway which could lead to nothing but

open war.

[Illustration: LAFAYETTE]

Beaumarchais and the War of American Independence, Vol. 2 · 第 5 / 12 章