In virtue of the idea that the soul is a spark, and that the production

of fire resembles generation, _Bhrigu_, lightning, is a creator. The son

of _Bhrigu_ marries the daughter of _Manu_, and they have a son who at

his birth breaks his mother's thigh, and therefore takes the name of

_Aurva_ (from _uru_ a thigh). This is only the lightning which rends the

clouds asunder.

Many Graeco-Latin myths, beginning with that of Prometheus must be

referred to _Mataricvan_ and to the _Bhrigu_, and we can trace in the

name of Prometheus the equivalent of a Sanscrit form _pramathyus_, one

who obtains fire by friction. Prometheus is, in fact, the ravisher of

celestial fire (a phase of the polytheistic myth in a perfectly human

form); he is a divine _pramantha_. It is Prometheus who in one version

of the myth cleaves open the head of Zeus, and causes Athene, the

goddess who uses the lightning as her spear, to issue from it. The

Greeks afterwards carried on the evolution of myth in its transition

from the physical to the moral phenomenon, and, forgetful of his origin,

they made Prometheus into a seer. As _Bhrigu_, he created man of earth

and water, and breathed into him the spark of life. Villemarque tells us

that in Celtic antiquity there was an analogous myth, as we might

naturally expect, since the Celts belong to the Aryan stock; Gwenn-Aran

(albus superus) was a supernatural being which issued like lightning

from a cloud.

The more thoughtful Greeks did not limit the Promethean myth to the idol

and to anthropomorphic fancies, but it passed into a moral conception,

and we have a proof of this transition in AEschylus.

In fact, as Silvestro Centofonti observes in a lecture on the

characteristics of Greek literature, the grand figure of the AEschylean

Prometheus is a poetic personification of Thought, and of its mysterious

fates in the sphere of life as a whole. First, in its eternal existence,

as a primitive and organic force in the system of the world; then in the

order of human things, fettered by the bonds of civilization, and

subject to the necessities, lusts, and evils which constantly, arise

from the union of soul and matter in unsatisfied mortals. Thought is

itself the source of tormenting cares in this earthly slavery, yet the

sense of power makes it invincible, firm in its purpose to endure all

sufferings, to be superior to all events; assured of future freedom, and

always on the way to achieve it by reverting to the grandeur of its

innate perfection; finally attaining to this happy state, by shaking off

all the enslaving bonds and anxious cares of the kingdom of Zeus, and by

obtaining a perfect life through the inspirations of wisdom, when the

revolutions of the heavens should fill the earth with divine power, and

restore the happiness of primeval times. It is evident that in this

stupendous tragedy AEschylus is leading us to the truth in a threefold

sense: aesthetic, morally political, and cosmic. The supreme idea which

sums up the whole value of the composition is perhaps that of an

inevitable reciprocity of action and reaction between mind and effective

force, between the primitive providence of nature and the subsequent

laws of art, both in the civilization of mankind and in the order and

life of the universe.

In this way the evolution of the special myth was transformed into

poetry by the interweaving, collection, and fusion with other myths, and

in the minds of a higher order it was resolved into an allegory or

symbol of the forces of nature, into providential laws or a moral

conception.

This law of progressive transformation also occurs in the successive

modifications of the special meaning of words, so far as they indicate

not only the thing itself, but the image which gave rise to the

primitive roots. For a long while, those who heard the word were not

only conscious of the object which it represented, but of its image,

which thus became a source of aesthetic enjoyment to them. As time went

on, this image was no longer reproduced, and the bare indication

remained, until the word gradually lost all material representation, and

became an algebraical sign, which merely recalled the object in question

to the mind.

When, for example, we now use the word (_coltello_), _coulter_, the

instrument indicated by this phonetic sign immediately recurs to the

mind and nothing else; the intelligence would see no impropriety in the

use of some other sign if it were generally intelligible. But in the

times of primitive speech, the inventors of this rude instrument were

conscious of the material image which gave rise to it, and they were

likewise conscious of all the cognate images which diverged from the

same root, and in this way a brief but vivid drama was presented to the

imagination.

If we examine this word with Pictet and others, we shall find that the

name of the plough comes from the Sanscrit _krt, krnt, kart_, to cleave

or divide. Hence _krntatra_, a plough or dividing instrument. The root

_krt_ subsequently became _kut_ or _kutt_, to which we must refer _kuta,

kutaka_, the body of the plough. This root _krt, kart_, is found in many

European languages in the general sense of cutting or breaking, as in

the old Slav word _kratiti_, to cut off. It is also applied to labour

and its instruments: _kartoti_, to plough over again, _karta_, a line or

furrow, and in the Vedic Sanscrit, _karta_, a ditch or hole. Hence the

Latin _culter_ a saw, _cultellus_, a coulter, and the Sanscrit

_kartari_, a coulter. The Slav words for the mole which burrows in the

earth are connected with the root _krt_, or the Slav _krat_. In very

remote times, men not only understood the object indicated in the word

for a coulter, but they were sensible of the image of the primitive

_krt_ and its affixes, which were likewise derived from the primitive

images, and with these they included the cognate images of the several

derivatives from the root. In these days the word coulter and the

Sanscrit _kartari_ are simply signs or phonetic notations, insignificant

in themselves, and everything else has disappeared. But in primitive

times an image animated the word, which by the necessary faculty of

perception so often described was transformed into a kind of subject

which effected the action indicated by the root. As this personality

gradually faded away, the actual representation of the image was lost,

and even its remote echo finally vanished, while the phonetic notation

remained, devoid of life and memory, and without the recurrence of

cognate images which strengthened the original idea by association. All

words undergo the like evolution, and this may be called the mythical

evolution of speech.

Thus the Sanscrit word for daughter is _duhitar_; in Persian it is

_dochtar_, in Greek [Greek: Thugater], in Gothic _dauhtar_, in German

_Tochter_. The word is derived from the root _duh_, to milk, since this

was the girl's business in a pastoral family. The sign still remains,

but it has lost its meaning, since the image and the drama have

vanished. This analysis applies to all languages, and it may also be

traced in the words for numbers. The number _five_, for example, among

the Aryans and in many other tongues, signifies _hand_. This is the

case in Thibet, in Siam, and cognate languages, in the Indian

Archipelago and in the whole of Oceania, in Africa, and in many of the

American peoples and tribes, where it is the origin of the decimal

system. In Homer we find the verb [Greek: pempazein], to count in fives,

and then for counting in general; in Lapland _lokket_, and in Finland

_lukea_, to count, is derived from _lokke_, ten; and the Bambarese

_adang_, to count, is the origin of _tank_, ten.

When the numerical idea of five was first grasped, the conception was

altogether material, and was expressed by the image of the five-fingered

hand. In the mind of the earliest rude calculators, the number five was

presented to them as a material hand, and the word involved a real

image, of which they became conscious in uttering it. The number and the

hand were consequently fused together in their respective images, and

signified something actually combined together, which effected in a

material form the genesis of this numerical representation. But the

material entity gradually disappeared, the image faded and was divested

of its personality, and only the phonetic notation five remained, which

no longer recalls a hand, the origin of the several numerals, nor words

connected with it. It is now a mere sign, apart from any rational idea.

The same may be said of the other numerals.

We give these few examples, which apply to all words, since they all

follow the same course, beginning with the real and primitive image,

subjectively effecting their peculiar meaning. Hence we see how the

intrinsic law of myth is evolved in every human act in diverse ways, but

always with the same results.

In fact, before articulate speech, for which man was adapted by his

organs and physiological conditions, was formulated into words for

things and words for shape, man like animals thought in images; he

associated and dissociated, he composed and decomposed, he moved and

removed images, which sufficed for all individual and immediate

operations of his mind. The relations of things were felt, or rather

seen through his inward representation of them as in a picture,

expressing in a material form the respective positions of figures and

objects which, since they are remote from him, can only be expressed by

such words as _nearer, lower_ or _higher, faint_ or _clear_, by more

vivid or paler tints, such as we see in a running stream, in the forms

of clouds, in the reciprocal relations of all objects represented in

painting.

In order to understand the primeval process of thought by means of

images, it is necessary to conceive such a picture as living and mobile,

and constantly forming a fresh combination of parts. Animals have not,

and primeval man had not, the phonetic signs or words which give an

individual character to the images, and so represent them that by

combining these images in an articulate form, thought may be

represented by signs; and in and through these a universal and objective

mode of exercising the intellectual faculty of reasoning has been

created.

Speech can, by means of reflex memory, produce at will the particular

images already classified in the mind, and this makes the process of

reasoning possible; since such a process becomes more easy by the use of

signs to which the attention can revert. The relative size of objects,

and the like qualities, which are at first regarded as so many different

intuitions in space, are defined by words or gestures, and are thus

subjected to comparative analogy; but in the early stages of language

these relations were presented in an extrinsic form by phonetic signs,

and became images which in some sort represented one particular state of

consciousness with respect to the two things compared. Galton, speaking

of the Damaras, tells us that they find great difficulty in counting

more than five, since they have not another hand with which to grasp the

fingers which represent the units. When they lose any of their cattle,

they do not discover the loss by the diminution of the number, but by

missing a familiar object. If two packets of tobacco are given to them

as the regulation price of a sheep, they will be altogether at a loss to

understand the receipt of four packets in exchange for two sheep. Such

examples might be multiplied to any extent.

We repeat that when not endowed with speech, or some analogous means,

animals and man think in images, and the relations between these images

are observed in the simultaneousness and succession of their real

differences; these images are combined, associated, and compared by the

development of reflex power, and hence arises the estimate of their

concrete relations. Of this we have another proof, observed by Romanes

in a lecture on the intelligence of animals, and confirmed by myself, in

the condition of deaf-mutes before they are educated, in whose case the

extrinsic sign and figure takes the place of the phonetic and articulate

sign. Where speech is wanting, it is still possible to follow a

conscious and imaginative process of reasoning, but not to rise to the

higher abstract ideas which may be generated by such reasoning. The

thought of deaf-mutes always assumes the most concrete form, and one who

was educated late in life informed Romanes that he had always before

thought in images. I know no instance of a deaf-mute who has

independently attained to an advanced intellectual stage, or who has

been able without education to form any conception of a supernatural

world. R.S. Smith asserts that one of his deaf-mute pupils believed,

before his education, that the Bible had been printed in the heavens by

a printing press of enormous power; and Graham Bell speaks of a

deaf-mute who supposed that people went to church to do honour to the

clergyman. In short, the intellectual condition of uneducated deaf-mutes

is on a level with that of animals, as far as the possibility of

forming abstract ideas is concerned, and they think in images. There is

a well-known instance in the deplorable condition of Laura Bridgman, who

from the time she was two years old, was deaf and dumb, blind, and even

without the sense of taste, so that the sense of touch was all that

remained. By persevering and tender instruction, she attained to an

intellectual condition which was relatively high. A careful study of her

case showed that she had been altogether without intuitive knowledge of

causes, of the absolute, and of God. Howe doubts whether she had any

idea of space and time, but this was not absolutely proved, since as far

as distance was concerned, she seemed to estimate it, by muscular

sensation. Everything showed that she thought in images. Although

without any sensation of light or sound, she made certain noises in her

throat to indicate different people when she was conscious of their

presence or when she thought of them, so that she was naturally impelled

to express every thought or sensation, not externally perceived, by a

sign; and this shows the tendency of every idea and image towards an

extrinsic form. She often conversed with herself, generally making signs

with one hand and replying with the other. It was evident that a

muscular sign or the motion of the fingers was substituted for the

phonetic signs of speech, and in this way ideas and images received

their necessarily extrinsic form. The image was embodied in a muscular

act and motion, and in this way thought had its concrete representation.

The same results would, as far as we know, be obtained from others in

the same unhappy conditions as Laura Bridgman.

It is therefore clear that primitive language was only a vocal and

individual sign of material images, and it was for a long while

restricted to these concrete limits. Since the vocal signs of the

relations of things are less easily expressed, these relations were at

first set forth by gestures, by a movement of the whole person, and

especially of the hands and face. This preliminary action is helped by

the imitative faculty with which children and uncultured peoples are

more especially endowed, of which we have also instances in the higher

animals nearest to man. The negroes imitate the gestures, clothing, and

customs of white men in the most extraordinary and grotesque manner, and

so do the natives of New Zealand. The Kamschatkans have a great power of

imitating other men and animals, and this is also the case with the

inhabitants of Vancouver. Herndon was astonished by the mimic arts of

the Brazilian Indians, and Wilkes made the same observation on the

Patagonians. This faculty is still more apparent in the lower races.

Many travellers have spoken of the extraordinary tendency to imitation

among the Fuegians; and, according to Monat, the Andaman islanders are

not less disposed to mimicry and imitation. Mitchell states that the

Australians possess the same power.

This fact also applies to the languages of extremely rude and savage

peoples. Some American Indians, for instance, help out their sentences

and make them intelligible by contortion of their features and other

gesticulations, and the same observation was made by Schweinwurth of an

African tribe. The language of the Bosjesmanns requires so many signs to

make the meaning of their words intelligible that it cannot be

understood in the dark. These facts partly explain the natural genesis

of human languages.

We have learned from our earlier observations that phenomena appear to

the perceptive faculty of primitive man as subjects endowed with power.

The subjectivity of these phenomena, their intrinsic conditions and

actions are fused into speech, which is their living and conscious

symbol; and it is clear that the evolution of language from the concrete

to the symbolical, and hence to the simple sign of the object, divested

of its original power, is analogous to that of myth.

This law of evolution also applies to the art of writing, which is at

first only the precise copy of the image; it is next transformed into an

analogous symbol, and then into an alphabetical sign, which serves as

the simple expression of the conception, divested of its originally

representative faculty. Hence it is apparent that the evolution of myth

conforms to the general law of the evolution of human thought, of all

its products and arts in their manifold ramifications. From the image,

the informing subject, from the conception and the myth, the necessary

cycle is accomplished in regular phases, wherever the ethnic temperament

and capacity and extrinsic circumstances permit it, until the rational

idea is reached, the sign or cipher which becomes the powerful

instrument of the exercise and generalization of thought. In order to

show the efficacy of the mythical and scientific faculty of thought

comprised in the systems of ancient and modern philosophy, and its slow

progress towards positive and rational science, we will adduce an

instance from the people in whom such an evolution was accomplished,

aided by all the civilized peoples in reciprocal communication with

them. Let us see how this faculty was manifested in the Greeks at a time

when they first attempted to reduce the earlier and scanty knowledge of

nature to a system.

In Greece the historical course of this faculty ramified into two

classes of research, which were at that time objective, the Ionic and

the Pythagorean schools. In the former, the phenomenon and nature were

assumed to be the direct object of knowledge, while in the latter the

object in view was the idea and harmony of things. Influenced by earlier

and popular traditions, a mythical and philosophic system arose in the

Ionic school, which was exclusively devoted to physical speculations. In

Lower Italy, on the contrary, and in colonies which were for the most

part Doric, a science was constituted which, although it included

physics and natural phenomena, did not only consider their material

value, but sought to extract from their laws and harmony a criterion of

good and evil. Ritter observes that the intimate connection between the

Pythagorean philosophy and lyrical music--of which the origin was sought

as a clue to explain the world--shows how far this philosophy was

consonant with Doric thought. This historic process is quite natural,

since the speculations of philosophy are first directed to physical

phenomena, as they are displayed in inward and in external life, and

then rise to the consideration of specific types, in a word, to the

general and the universal.

Throughout this philosophical evolution the consideration is mainly from

the objective point of view, and this is in conformity with the

intellectual evolution of reason, since the mind is first occupied with

the knowledge of things. In accordance with tradition and the logic of

things, Ionic speculation was developed before the Doric. The Eleatic

school followed from the two former, although its development was

contemporary with the more perfect stage of these, and its influence

upon them was to some extent reactionary.

Thales taught that everything was derived from one unique principle,

namely water. The ancients believed that the land was separated from the

water by a primitive and mythical process, a belief which had its source

in the appearance of aqueous and meteorological phenomena; so that the

teaching of Thales followed the earliest popular traditions, of which we

find traces in the Indies, in Egypt, in the book of Genesis, and in many

legends diffused through the world even in modern times. He said that

everything was nourished by moisture, from which heat itself was

derived, and that moisture was the seed of all things; that water is the

origin of this moisture, and since all things are derived from it it is

the primitive principle of the world. We see how much this theory is

concerned with natural phenomena in their life, nutrition, and birth by

means of seed. He regarded the world as a living being, which had been

evolved from an imperfect germ of moisture. This mode of animating the

world, which consists in tracing the development of a germ already in

existence, reappears in other parts of his philosophy. He saw life in

the appearance of death, and held the loadstone and yellow amber to be

animate bodies, declaring generally that the world is alive, and filled

with demons and genii.[32]

We trace the basis of these ideas in traditions prior to Thales,

declaring the world to be a living being, and that everything was

derived from a primitive condition of germs. The same opinion was held

by Hippo, by Diogenes of Apollonia, by Heraclitus, and by Anaxagoras.

Aristotle states that the theory of development by germs was extremely

ancient in his time. The other philosophers of the Ionic and successive

schools mingled these fanciful ideas with the systematic arrangement of

their theories as to the origin and constitution of the world, so that

it is unnecessary to refer to them, since the method and conceptions are

identical.

It is evident from this sketch that while thought gradually evolved a

more rational system of general knowledge, the earlier idols and

primitive mythical interpretations were not abandoned, although they

assumed a larger and more scientific form. Thales and others assigned a

mechanical origin to things, such as water, fire, or the like, which was

contrary to anthropomorphic ideas; yet they still regarded the world as

a living being, developed and perfected by the same laws and functions

as all plants and animals, and they peopled it with genii and demons,

thus handing on the earliest and rudest traditions of the race.

While the scientific faculty was gathering strength and leading the way

to a more rational consideration of the world and natural phenomena,

really advancing beyond the earlier ideas which had been almost wholly

mythical, myth was still the matrix of thought, although its

envelopment was partly rent asunder and was becoming transparent. From

this brief notice of the Ionic philosophy, sufficient for our purpose,

let us return to the Pythagorean school, in which, although the faculty

at work is essentially objective, there is a closer consideration of the

analogies between thought and the world, and the ground is more often

retraced, so that theory assumes a more intellectual form.

The Pythagoreans represented the origin of the world as the union of the

two opposite principles of the illimitable and the limited, of the equal

and the unequal. Yet they conceive this to be a primitive union, since

they formulated the supreme principle as equal--unequal (Arist. _Met_.

xii. 7.) They held the infinite to be _the place of the one_. There was

an attraction between the two principles, which was termed the _act of

breathing_; hence the void entered into the world and separated things

from each other. Thus their conception of the world was that of a

concourse of opposite principles. They represented its limits as a unity

and as the true beginning of multiplicity. They regarded the development

of the world as a process of life regulated by the primitive principles

contained in the world; its breath or life depended on the breaking

forth of the infinite void in Uranus, and the time which is termed the

_interval_ of all nature penetrates at once and with the breath into the

world. All therefore emanates from one, and all is at the same time

governed by one supreme power. Number is everything, and is the essence

of things, but the _triad_ includes all number, since it contains the

beginning, middle, and end. Everything is derived from the primitive

_one_ and from the principal number; and since this number in breathing

its vital evolution into the void is divided into many units, everything

is derived from the multiplicity of these units or numbers.

Since, by his idea of the source of universal order, Pythagoras partly

accepted the theocosmic monad as the final and necessary root of all

life, and of all that is knowable, he could not fail to see the

convertibility of the unit into the Being. But if the unit must always

precede the manifold, there is a first unit from which all the others

proceed; if this first and eternal unit is at the same time the absolute

being, it follows that number and the world have a common origin and a

common essence, and that the intrinsic causes and possible combinations

of number are virtually accomplished in the development of the world,

and these causes and combinations are ideal forms of this development.

The monad is developed by these laws through all the generative

processes of nature, while at the same time it remains eternal in the

system of the universe; so that things not only have their origin and

essence, their place and time according to numerical causes, but each is

in effect a number as far as its individual properties and the

universal process of cosmic life are concerned. The reason of the number

must depend upon the substance, by the configurations of which it is

defined, divided, added, and multiplied, and to this geometry is added,

which measures all things in relation to themselves and others. This

eternal cause makes it intelligible that if immaterial principles

precede and govern the whole material world, it is also by means of

these that the classification of science is in intrinsic agreement with

that of nature. Numbers have their value in music, in gymnastics, in

medicine, in morals, in politics, in all branches of science. The

Pythagorean arithmetic is the bond and universal logic of the knowable.

But at the same time Pythagoras and his school peopled the world with

demons and genii, which were the causes of disease; they did not abandon

the old mythical ideas of the incarnation of spirits and the

transmigration of souls--theories and beliefs which recur in nearly all

primitive and savage peoples.

In this vast Pythagorean scheme, which contrasts with that of the Ionic

school of physics, thought is more explicitly freed from the ruder

mythical ideas, and rises to a more intelligent and rational conception

of the world, but the ancient popular traditions still persist, and

there is an evident _entification_ of number. The primitive monad,

numbers, their genesis and relations, are not regarded as abstract

conceptions, necessary for understanding the order of nature, and a

merely logical function of the mind; they are the substantial essence

which underlies all mythical representations. Although the essential

life of the world is considered from a more abstract point of view, yet

the mythical analogy of animal life evidently finds a place in the

breath of the void and of time, assumed to be independent entities. The

subsequent train of beliefs in spirits, of their incarnations and

transmigrations, are closely connected with the phantasmagoria of the

past, and display their mythical genesis; yet by their deeper and more

explicit thought they may be said to infuse intellectual life into the

world and into science which relates to it. In this first rational

classification of science by the Greeks, both on its physical and its

ideal side, thought sometimes issues in the simple contemplation of

manifold nature, while it still continues mythical in its fundamental

conceptions and spiritual corollaries; myth, however, instead of being

altogether anthropomorphic, begins to become scientific.

I must here be allowed to quote a hymn in the Rig-Veda, which was

historically earlier than the primitive philosophy of Greece, but which

reveals the same tendency, the same mythical and scientific teaching in

its interpretation of the world. In this hymn, which has been translated

and explained by Max Mueller, we see how boldly the problem of the origin

of the world is stated (hymn 129, book x.)--

"Nor Aught nor Nought existed; yon bright sky

Was not, nor heaven's broad woof outstretched above.

What covered all? what sheltered? what concealed?

Was it the water's fathomless abyss?

There was not death--yet was there nought immortal,

There was no confine betwixt day and night;

The only One breathed breathless by itself,

Other than It there nothing since has been.

Darkness there was, and all at first was veiled

In gloom profound--an ocean without light--

The germ that still lay covered in the husk

Burst forth, one nature, from the fervent heat.

Then first came love upon it, the new spring

Of mind--yea, poets in their hearts discerned,

Pondering, this bond between created things

And uncreated. Comes this spark from earth,

Piercing and all-pervading, or from heaven?

Then seeds were sown, and mighty powers arose--

Nature below, and power and will above--

Who knows the secret? who proclaimed it here,

Whence, whence this manifold creation sprang?

The gods themselves came later into being--

Who knows from whence this great creation sprang?

He from whom all this great creation came,

Whether his will created or was mute,

The Most High Seer that is in highest heaven,

He knows it--or perchance even He knows not."

It is evident that in this hymn, the expression of the moment when human

thought was partly freed from the earlier anthropomorphic ideas, the

scientific faculty which attempts a rational explanation of the world is

shown; and although this is an isolated inspiration of the prophet, yet

it shadows forth the conclusions to which the primitive Hellenic

speculation came when it was deliberately exerted to solve the problem

of creation. In fact, there is here an intimation of the waters, of the

void or deep abyss, as the beginnings of the world; of the breath of the

One, the hidden germ of things developed by means of heat; of

productive powers as a lower, and energy as a higher form of nature; of

conceptions found in the Ionic, the Pythagorean, and the Eleatic

philosophies, which all converge into _the one_. All belong to the same

Aryan race.

The Vedic composition represents in _Dyavaprthivi_ the close connection

between the two divinities, Heaven and Earth, the one considered as the

active and creative principle, the other as that which is passive and

fertilized; the same ideas, more or less worked out, underlie not only

the first philosophies, but successive theories and systems. The worship

of water, of fire, and of air involved their personification, and they

then became exciting principles, in accordance with the law of evolution

which we have laid down. In the Rig-Veda, as well as in the Zendavesta,

the waters are collectively invoked by their special name _apas_, and

they are termed the _mothers_, the _divine_, which contain the _amrta_

or ambrosia, and all healing powers. In _Agni_ and its Vedic

transformations we clearly trace the worship of fire, and its cosmic

value. The Vedic worship of the air is Vayu, from _va_, to breathe, who

is associated with the higher gods, and especially with _Indra_, ruler

of the atmosphere: next comes _Rudra_, the god of storms, accompanied by

the _Maruti_, the winds; and in the Zendavesta the air is invoked as an

element. Hence we see that a more rational conception of the genesis of

the world succeeds to these earlier representations and

personifications of the elements; representations which in another form

endure throughout the course of human thought.

It is now necessary to consider the other period of the mythical and

scientific evolution which had its definitive conclusion in Plato and

Aristotle, teachers who even now to some extent influence the two great

currents of speculative science. For us, however, it is more important

to consider the Platonic teaching as that in which the mythical

evolution of the earlier representations has full and clear expression;

while in the Aristotelian philosophy an element of dissolution is

already at work which throws some light on the illusions of the Platonic

school.

We must bear in mind that the spontaneous and even the reflective

intellectual faculty gradually assimilated special and independent myths

into comprehensive types, which referred to all natural objects. Next,

the incarnation of spirits produced the earliest forms of polytheism,

and these were slowly classified into more concentric circles, and

finally into a single hierarchical system. Owing to the attitude and

ethnic temperament of the Greeks, the glorious anthropomorphism of their

Olympus arose in a more vivid form than elsewhere, and it was

impersonated in the all-powerful and all-seeing Zeus, ruler of the

world, of gods and men. This process, modified in a thousand ways, was

carried on in all races. Hence it resulted that every object had a type,

its god; everything was typically individuated in an anthropomorphic

entity in such a way that there arose a natural dualism between the

phenomena, facts, and cosmic orders on the one side, and on the other

the hierarchy of gods who represented them and over whom they presided.

The Hellenic philosophies prior to Plato, both physical and

intellectual, and also the psychological morality of Socrates, had

already accomplished the first evolution of this typical stage of

universal polytheism, substituting for anthropomorphic representations

physical and intellectual principles and powers. Thought was educated in

its inward exercise, as well as in the observation of facts and ideal

representations. But--and this constituted the first evolution of

anthropomorphism in general--these powers all expressed the thing in its

general and phenomenal form; it was endowed with merely zoomorphic

force, and the world was regarded as physiologically living.

Plato, impelled by the foregoing evolution, and by the large and

exquisitely aesthetic character of his genius, accomplished the second

and altogether intellectual stage of evolution by inverting the problem;

he affirmed that the final and intrinsic result of the exercise of

thought was its earlier and eternal essence, extrinsic and objective.

The types which were first fetishes and then polytheistic were

transformed into the physical and intellectual principles of the world,

divested of all mythical and extrinsic form as far as their material

organization was concerned. Plato held that such types were really

ideal, as in fact they had unconsciously been from the first; that is,

that it was simply a logical conception of species and genera which is

natural to human thought; a conception necessary for the spontaneous as

well as for the reflex and scientific processes of thought. From the

type, the specific idea, the generalization into the idea of each

special object was easy, since each object has its psychical

representation in the mind. Special and specific ideas were then

arranged in a certain order, and those which are more general in a

concentric and systematic classification; this had been also the case in

the earlier polytheistic system, since the process of the intelligence

naturally arranges all its representations. But he did not stop here,

nor indeed was it possible for him to do so.

We know that the intelligence does not only understand objects, but

their relations to each other, by means of its comparative faculty;

these relations were, as in the case of animals, at first intuitively

perceived by direct observation and the alternate and reciprocal motion

of the images, and they were first presented to the imagination and then

embodied in speech. We have said in the foregoing chapters that in

primitive thought these relations involved an active entity, and were in

a word entified. Plato, pursuing his intellectual process of reasoning,

and the reciprocal properties of ideas, noted the _ideality_ of these

relations so far as they are a psychical representation, and hence he

was constrained by the unconscious evolution of thought to affirm that

an idea was present in every relation, and thus the great, the little,

the less, the more, had their ideal representatives in the general

construction of his theory. But man is not only an intellectual, but an

active, sentient, living being, tending to an object as an individual

and a social subject. So that he not only attains to the understanding

of ideal truth, but also of the good and the beautiful. According to

Plato, the Good and the Beautiful must also necessarily be Ideas of a

general character, like those which embrace all ideal relations

whatever. Since they are universal, and due to the innate impulse of

thought towards concentric ascension, they must rank as the sum and apex

of ideas, so that the Good is emphatically _the_ Idea, or God. On

turning to the world of sensations, or of particular objects, ideas are

the eternal model (_paradigm_) according to which things are made; these

are the images (_idoli_) of which the others are the imperfect copies

(_mimesi_). The world of sense is itself only a symbol, an allegory, a

figure. As in the sensible world there is a scale of beings from the

lowest to the most perfect, that is to the material universe, so in the

sphere of intellect, the type of the world, ideas are combined together

by higher ideas, and these again by others still higher, and so on to

the apex, the ultimate, supreme, omnipotent Idea, the Good which

includes and sums up the whole.

Plato holds that matter is not the body, but that which may become the

body by the plastic action of the idea, as Weber well expresses it;

matter considered in itself is the indefinite (_apeiron_), the

indefinable (_aoriston_), and the amorphous, and it is co-eternal with

ideas, and inert; from the union of ideas and matter the cosmos had its

origin, the image of the invisible deity, God in power, the living

organism (_Zoon_), possessing a body, sense, a definite object, a soul.

The body of the universe has the form of a sphere, the most beautiful

which can be conceived; the circle described in revolving is also the

most perfect motion.

The stars first had their source in the Idea of Good; first the fixed

stars, then the planets, then the earth, _created deities_; the earth

produced organized beings, beginning with man, the crowning work and

object of all the rest; the fruits of the earth were made to nourish

him, and animals were made to become the abode of fallen souls. Man, the

microcosm, is reason within a soul, which is in its turn contained in a

body. The whole body is organized with a view to this reason. The head,

the seat of reason, is round because this is the most perfect form. The

breast is the seat of generous passions, while the bestial appetites are

found in the belly and intestines.

The human soul, like the soul of the world, contains immortal and mortal

elements; the intelligence or reason, and sensuality. The immortality of

the soul is also proved by the memory. The subsequent union of life and

matter in the production of the universe is the work of an intermediate,

equivocal being, the _demiurgos_. Thus Plato opposes the eternity of the

intelligence to Ionic materialism, and the eternity of matter to the

monistic theory of the Eleatics.

In the genesis of nature we again find the synthetic conception of the

elements, which he estimates to be four; to which geometrical forms

correspond, and the world was finally organized after its human type. He

divides the soul into several distinct and independent powers, which are

ever revolving between life and death: they inhabit the stars and depend

upon them, since the soul which has been righteous on earth will be

happy after death in the star to which it was originally destined; but

those who on earth only desire here bodily pleasures will wander as

shades round the tombs, or will migrate into the bodies of various

animals. He constitutes the stars into contingent and sensible gods:

they have beautiful and immortal bodies of a round form, and are made of

fire. He asserts poetic inspiration and madness to be the result of

demoniac possession, and says with Socrates that those who deny demoniac

powers are themselves demoniacs.

We see from this account the mythical origin of all that concerns the

organization and genesis of the world, the destinies and nature of the

soul, since these are sublimated myths; the elements are first regarded

as deities, and the world is made in the image of man, and considered to

be alive; the stars and the earth are endowed with life and

intelligence; the fate of souls before and after death, their

recollection of a prior existence, their transmigrations and wanderings

around the tombs, demoniac possession in inspiration and madness, are

all very ancient mythical representations, which form a great part of

the theoretical and spiritual cosmogony of savages in all times and

places. We have seen that not only relatively civilized peoples, but

those which are quite savage divide souls into distinct parts:

throughout Africa, America, and Asia, there is a belief in the

transmigration of souls into animals, plants, and other objects. The

Tasmanians believed that their souls would ascend to the stars and abide

there; and all savages hold the demoniac possession of inspired persons,

of madmen, and of the sick, which has led to what may be called a

diabolic pathology. The general conception of the world as a living

animal, with all the tendencies ascribed to it by Plato, is only the

primeval fact of the animation and personification of phenomena applied

to the general idea of the universe. Hence it is easy to see how much of

Plato's physics and psychology are due to the necessary and historic

course of myth, and to the schools into which myth had been modified

before his time.

We must dwell more particularly on his theory of ideas, since in this

the advance made by Plato in the evolution of myth really consists, and

it marks a very definite stage which had and still has a powerful

influence on subsequent and modern thought.

We have already shown how, by the logical power of thought, this phase

in the ideal evolution of myth was reached, and we have traced it in an

inchoate form in various rude peoples, as well as in its ultimate

modification in Plato. In his writings it takes the form of a complete,

vast, and organic theory. The logical conceptions and representative

ideas, idols peculiar to the mind, which were at first involved in

fetishtic and anthropomorphic images, are now divested of their earlier

wrappings, and are classified as the intellectual ideas which they

really are, and which they have become by the innate and reflex exercise

of human thought. But on account of the faculty which ever governs our

immediate perception of internal and external things they could not in

Plato's time, nor indeed in that of many subsequent philosophers, remain

as simple intellectual signs of the process of reason. This faculty

influenced these conceptions, these psychical forms, whether particular,

specific, or general, and they became living subjects, like phenomena,

objects, shades, images in dreams, normal and abnormal hallucinations.

Thus the Ideas in Plato became, reflectively and theoretically,

_entities_ with an intrinsic existence, eternal, divine, and absolute

essences. But the fetish, the anthropomorphic idol, was not only

regarded as a living but as a causative subject; the same power was

likewise infused into the Ideas, and they were held to be causes of

particular things, of which they were the earlier and eternal type. Thus

the myth in the Platonic Ideas became scientific, but it continued to be

a myth; the substance varied, but the form was the same. The objective

phenomena of the world had first been personified, or their fanciful

images were assumed to be objective; now the world of reason was

personified, and mythology became intellectual instead of cosmic.

Those who opposed Plato's theory of ideas said that he realized

abstractions, or personified ideas; but no one, as I think, perceived

the natural process which led him to do so, nor explained the faculty by

which he was necessarily influenced. Plato's theory was only an ultimate

phase of the evolution of the vague and primitive animation of the

world, which had passed through fetishism, polytheism, and the worship

of the elements of nature, and had reached the entification and

subjectivity of ideas, which was also attained by natural science, after

passing through its mythical envelopment. We have noted the causes,

which in the case of the earlier philosophers happened to be objective,

while they were in Plato's case subjective, owing to the character and

temperament of his mind; both conduced to the development and aesthetic

splendour of this teaching among the Greeks. The teaching of Plato,

which had more or less influence on all the earlier civilized peoples,

of his own and subsequent times, and which was also involved in the

mythical representations of later savages, assumed an aspect which

varied with the special history, the ethnic temperament, the

geographical and extrinsic conditions of different peoples; but

considered in itself, it is always the same, and is the necessary result

of the evolution of myth and of thought. Since the evolution of myth

leads to the gradual genesis of science, which becomes more rational as

myth is transformed from the material to the ideal, ideas are

substituted for myths, and laws, as Vico well observes, for the canons

of poetry.

This noble and more rational theory of eternal and causative Ideas

resembles anthropomorphic polytheism in concentrating into one supreme

Idea the intellectual Zeus, the Being of beings, according to another

mythical and scientific representation by Aristotle, and it was

afterwards combined with the Semitic idea of the Absolute. This was

fused with the Logos, the Platonic demiurgos of Messianic ideas, and

afterwards produced the universal philosophy and religion of

Catholicism, which dominated and still dominates over thought with

vigorous tenacity, and extends into all the civilized world inhabited by

European races. We do not only trace the same thought, modified,

classified, and perfected in the Fourth Gospel, in the Councils, the

Fathers, and the schoolmen, but also in independent philosophies. In

our own time it has assumed new forms, derived from the rapid progress

made in cosmic and experimental sciences, even in those which are

apparently the most rationalizing. It is manifest in Hegel, Fichte, and

Schelling, nor is it difficult to trace it in the latest and artificial

theories of the schools of Schopenhauer and Hartmann. In all these cases

the entification of logical conceptions is evident; in all there is an

arbitrary personification of a conception or of a fundamental Idea.

In order fully to understand the evolution of thought in myth and

science, it is necessary to consider the other schools which arose in

Greece, prior to, and contemporaneously with, Plato, as we shall thus

obtain a more comprehensive idea of the course of such a development. In

addition to the natural and partly ideal schools, the Ionic, the

Eleatic, the Pythagorean and the Platonic, there arose those of

Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, which might be called mechanical,

and that of Aristotle, which takes a middle course between the idea and

the fact, between the dynamic and the mechanical explanation of the

universe.

In an intellectual people like the Greeks there arose, in addition to

the speculative theories already mentioned, other opinions which were

derived from minds singularly free from mythical ideas; the world was

considered as a concourse of independent atoms; its genesis thus became

more conformable with abstract mathematical calculation, effected by

this combination of simple bodies and the evolution of elements. This

was what Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus undertook to teach, passing

beyond the natural and ideal myths, in order to take their stand on the

movement of isolated parts as the maker of the universe. Hence followed

the theory of atoms, and the mechanical construction of the world, of

bodies and souls, their continual composition and decomposition. Since,

however, these were mere speculations, not supported by experimental

methods and adequate instruments, mythical forms were confounded with

the mechanical explanation of the world, such as the altogether

anthropomorphic conception of gods who were dissolved and formed again;

the sensible effluvium from images, an effluvium which revealed the

ancient belief in the normal and abnormal personification of imaginary

forms, and of ideas. Yet the character of this teaching was progressive

and rational in comparison with the mythical and ideal theory of Plato,

and with the schools and religions which emanated from him, even up to

our time, and thought was strongly stimulated in its opposition to the

continuance of myth.

The influence of this school was confirmed by the Aristotelian teaching;

if on the one side Aristotle inclined towards the mythical entities of

Plato, and the old zoomorphic conception of the world, on the other his

theory of perception and of ideas, his amazing observations in

physiology and anatomy, and his natural classification of the animal

kingdom, induced a positive tendency of thought, an _a posteriori_

method of observation, which awakened the intelligence and predisposed

it to a more rational and scientific evolution. His geocentric ideas of

cosmogony, his logical forms, the human architecture of the world, his

conception of the Being who was the end and cause of motion in all

things, were indeed obstinately maintained by the philosophy of

Catholics and schoolmen, and served as an obstacle to the real progress

of science; but on the other hand, his general method of observing

nature, the discoveries which he made, and the tendency of his

researches, as well as the importance he assigned to consciousness in

the formation of ideas, did much to foster independent inquiry in the

history of human thought; and coupled with the earlier mechanical

schools, he prepared the way for the evolution of modern science. This

is not the place for tracing the simultaneous course of the evolution of

the ideal and mechanical schools during the ages which separate us from

their origin; and while the influence of the one gradually waned, the

other gained strength, although in a sporadic way, first among

privileged minds, and then more generally.

It necessarily happened that as the evolution of thought went on,

impelled by its early tendencies, both mechanical and positive, the

ideal system was also modified, and gave place to sounder and truer

theories. This great fact, the ultimate evolution of our own time, was

effected on the one side by psychological analysis, and on the other by

the direct and experimental observation of nature. Setting aside the

gradual preparation which led up to this point, we can consider

Descartes and Galileo as the representatives of these two great factors;

since the one by the analysis of thought, the other by natural

experiments, overthrew the mythical ideas, although without being aware

that the achievement would produce such grand results.

The Platonic Ideas were objective to the mind, and independent of it,

since they were regarded as a divine, concrete, absolute world in

themselves. The earlier evolution of myth and science relied upon this

and were resolved into it. But we know that the process of thought is

continuous in historic races, and that myth is gradually divested of its

personality and assumes a more intellectual form in the mind. Thus the

material Idea passed into an intellectual conception; that which first

appeared in an objective and extrinsic form became subjective and

intrinsic, a transition which was effected by the nominalists. This gave

rise to a cognition which was altogether psychological; at first reality

was wholly objective, and the ideas were only a sublime intellectual

myth, but now the objective world disappeared, and the intellect which

formulated the conception was the only real thing. In virtue of the

faculty of entification, only the mind and its ideas were real, the

world and all which it contained had a doubtful existence. This tendency

had its ultimate expression in Fichte, who created the universe by means

of the Ego, thus transforming the earlier objective myth into one which

was wonderfully subjective. Descartes doubted about everything beyond

the range of his own thought, and was the first to overthrow the former

ideal realism, and to lead the way to science, and to more rational

analysis. To him the teaching of Spinoza and Kant was really due, as

well as the English schools which had so much to do with the destruction

of the earlier mythical edifice of ideas.

But, as I have already observed, if this great rational progress were

important on the one side, on the other it produced a more spiritualized

form of myth, namely the subjective, which became still more powerful in

the philosophy of Kant. While some thinkers sought to resolve and

dissolve the objective myth, they did it in such a way as to add

strength to the subjective form of myth and science, for which Descartes

had prepared the way; the theory of Spinoza and of the German school in

general fundamentally consists in the substitution of entified forms and

dialectics of the mind for the earlier objective forms of ideas. A great

error was rectified, and the former phase of the intellectual evolution

of myth disappeared, in favour of another which, although still

erroneous, was more rational and independent.

The subjective and still mythical representations, either of the mind or

of external objects, were afterwards reduced to true science by positive

and experimental methods, aided by instruments, and confirmed by the

discoveries of Galileo and of his disciples throughout the civilized

world. He was in modern times another great factor of the dissolution of

myth, so far as it is definitive. Nature was made subordinate to weight

and measure, and to their mathematical and mechanical proportions in

various phenomena; these were deduced from experiment and the use of

instruments, the factors which in the hands of Galileo and his great

successors in all civilized nations, destroyed and are still destroying

the old mythical conception of the world. In astronomy they overthrew

the catholic tenet of the geocentric constitution of the heavens; they

shattered the spheres in which they were confined, opened infinite

space, and peopled it with an infinite number of stars, and in the

attraction of gravity they discovered the universal law of motion in the

firmament. Thus all the mythical representations of the system of the

world, whether Aristotelian, Ptolemaic, or Biblical, vanished for ever,

and the great zoomorphic body of the universe was dissolved; to be

replaced by worlds circulating in infinite space, subject to the laws of

number and of geometry.

Measure, weight, and proportion were applied to all celestial and

terrestrial phenomena, and physics, chemistry, and all the organic

sciences became the manifestation of facts, of observed and calculated

laws, arranged in a natural order, and in this way an immense advance

was made in all branches of science. The history of mankind, first

regarded as the arbitrary arrangement of a superior being, as it was

formulated in the teaching of Judaism and Christianity, had its own laws

in the facts of which it consisted, and thus the mythical conception

which endowed it with personal life was dissolved. The origin of things

was explained by this method of observation, and by these positive

conceptions; the records which had hitherto been regarded as a divine,

extrinsic revelation came to be considered as simple documents, in which

truth was to be separated from the myth which obscured and encompassed

it. So by degrees, from fact to fact, from analysis to analysis, by

observation, experiment, and decomposition, the rational, mechanical

explanation arose and gathered strength. The generation of things, the

variety of phenomena and their order, were derived from the primitive

chemical atom, and from the various changes of form and rapidity of

motion to which they are subjected. The old conception of atoms, which

had never been forgotten, and which had unconsciously swayed and

influenced the minds of men, reappears; but it reappears transformed by

observation, by weight and measure and experiment, and it has become a

science instead of a simple speculation. The atomistic evolution of the

ancients, accepted by one school of speculative thought, which sought to

overthrow the mythical representation of the world, was only an isolated

anticipation of a few philosophers; it has now become a scientific

evolution, common to all modern civilization. The theory of descent,

transformation, and the general evolution of species, followed as a

necessary corollary and immediate result of the dissolution of Plato's

mythical conception of specific ideas, and of all the generic but

material personifications with which nature had been peopled. When such

conceptions of the ideal world were dissipated, those of the actual

world of nature soon followed, and this de-personification of natural,

mythical species in the vast organic kingdom is one of the most splendid

intellectual achievements of the age.

This victory of the natural sciences has reacted on those which are

psychological, and on the theory of the mind, and has subjected them to

the necessities and form of this new phase of the evolution of thought.

The subjective had been substituted for the objective myth and had

created the forms of mind, its logical laws and intrinsic process, the

objective synthesis of the world, and it was now influenced by the

stupendous discoveries and analyses of other sciences, so that

psychology was in its turn transformed into a science, not only of

observation, but of experiment. Measure, weight, numerical proportion,

in short the experimental method, took possession of the facts, acts,

and processes of the mind, as of every other object and subject of

nature. In addition to the great names of modern psychologists in

England, we may mention among other experimental psychologists in

Germany, Fechner, Wundt, Lotze, Helmholtz, Weber, Kammler, etc.;

illustrious men in France and elsewhere might also be cited to show what

progress has been made and is about to be made in this field. The

destruction of myth and of the subjective myths of psychology is always

going on, and a positive science of mental phenomena has arisen, like

that of natural phenomena. The ultimate phase of myth is so near its end

that it has been possible to create a psychology implying the absence of

a soul. The scientific faculty has now indeed a complete ascendency over

the mythical representation with which it was originally coeval.

Yet we do not mean to say that myth is extinct. In the case of the great

majority of the human race, a small and elect portion excepted, myth and

all the superstitions which proceed from it persist in an ideal, cosmic,

spiritual, or religious form, and these are only slowly disappearing

among the common people, and even among the educated classes. Owing to

the primordial and innate necessity which it is so difficult to

overcome, science itself still nourishes myths within its pale, although

unconsciously and in their most rational form. Within our own

recollection _the imponderable_ was a tenet of physics, and this was

indeed, in spite of all the enlightenment of science, a mythical

entification of forces. The same mythical entifications were found in

physiology, in chemistry, in nearly all the sciences. Undoubtedly these

scientific myths had no anthropomorphic value, yet they are

notwithstanding truly mythical entifications, inasmuch as they virtually

personify laws, or mere modes of motion.

Ether, according to our present conception of it, differing in its laws

and influences from the atoms which constitute the world, and working

among and above them, is perhaps only a grand myth like that of the

imponderable, which has been exploded; that is, it is held to be a

material entity, while it may be only another modification of the

elementary matter in a state differing from the three already known to

us; some of Crooke's late experiments on one condition of extremely

gaseous matter leads to this assumption. The divided forces of matter,

and the dualism which still survives, are also mythical conceptions.

Although so much progress has been made in a rational direction, and

truth is widely diffused, yet the old mythical instinct constantly

reappears in some form or other. I must be permitted to say that this is

an evident proof of the truth of my theory. Unless myth were due to an

intrinsic psychical and organic law, it would not so persistently

reappear. As soon as men are rationally conscious of this entifying

faculty and its immediate effects on knowledge, the illusion will cease.

Myth will be destroyed in every kind of facts and phenomena, and

science, no longer the unconscious victim of this illusion, will advance

with caution and assurance.

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