1838.
The facility with which the French had taken possession of Mascara and
Tlemsen, convinced Abdel Kader of the necessity of having strongholds
beyond the easy reach of their incursions. The plan which he projected
and carried into effect had the double object of resisting the French
invasion, and of cementing his own authority over the Arabs. It bears
the highest testimony to his military genius. No better explanation of
this design can be given than in the words which Abdel Kader addressed
in after times to General Daumas, who had for three years resided at his
head-quarters in the capacity of consul.
“With the twofold view of imposing on the turbulent tribes of the
Sahara, and keeping myself beyond the reach of your attacks, I had
constructed on the limits of the Tell, at great expense and amidst
innumerable difficulties, a certain number of forts, which you
afterwards destroyed. They were situated, in setting out from the west,
at Sebdou; to the south of Tlemsen, at Saida; to the south of Mascara,
at Tekedemt; to the south-east of the same town, at Taza; to the south
of Miliana, at Boghar; to the south of Medea, at Bel Kherout, south-east
of Algiers; and, lastly, at Biskra, to the south of Constantine.
“I was convinced, in fact, that whenever the war re-commenced, I should
be obliged to abandon to you all the towns of the central line of the
Atlas; but that it would be impossible for you, at least for a long
time, to reach the Sahara; because the transports which encumber your
armies would be a great obstacle in your way. Marshal Bugeaud proved to
me that I was mistaken; but at the time I had only the experience of my
action with his predecessors.
“Nevertheless, even in face of the system pursued by Marshal Bugeaud,
you would have found almost insurmountable difficulties in trying to
reach my true line of defence, if the Arabs had only agreed to my
proposition of rasing to the ground, and utterly destroying, the towns
of Medea, Miliana, Mascara, and Tlemsen: that is to say, the steps of
the ladder by which you gradually mounted so high.
“Some argued that the French would soon re-build what I had destroyed;
others, that it would be cruel to throw down, merely in view of an
eventuality, what it had cost so much to erect. Both sides were wrong: I
ought to have followed out my own inspiration.
“Tekedemt, according to my project, was to have become a large town—a
binding centre of commerce—between the Tell and the Sahara. The Arabs
were pleased with its situation. They came there with much pleasure,
because it afforded them great advantages. It was also a thorn I had
placed in the eye of the independent tribes of the desert. They could
neither escape me, nor incommode me. I held them by their bodily wants.
The Sahara producing no crops, they would have been obliged to come to
me for food. I had built Tekedemt over their heads. They felt it, and
hastened to make their submission.
“In fact, from this time, I could always come upon them unexpectedly
with my _goums_ (irregular cavalry), and at least carry off their flocks
and herds, if I did not stop to take their tents. The severe examples I
made of some of the most distant tribes soon made them give up all hopes
of being able to elude me. Thus all had finished by submitting to my
authority, and regularly paying the _ashur_ and the _zekka_. I used even
to send and count their flocks, and they said not a word.
“There are only four points in the desert which my authority had not
reached: Mzab, Ourgla, Tougourt, and the Souf. The Benis Sidi Cheikh,
however, had all acknowledged me. It is true I had granted them certain
privileges, and I allowed them to pay a reduced impost; but they were a
tribe of Marabouts, and it was my duty to pay them a certain degree of
deference. As to the _ksours_ (entrenched villages in the Sahara), they
paid me little; nor did I care to be strict with them. They looked on my
forbearance as a concession to their poverty. At a later period,
however, I should have made them amenable to my orders, and have brought
them into complete subjection.”
Tekedemt, the town which Abdel Kader raised from its ruins, intending to
make it the capital of his kingdom, had been built by the Romans. It is
situated sixty miles to the south-east of Oran. Judging from the remains
of its walls, it must have been ten miles in circumference. It contained
two large temples. During the prosperous days of Arab dominion in
Algeria, it was a seat of government, had a college, and produced its
doctors and poets. The wars between the Caliphs of Kerouan and Fez,
towards the close of the tenth century, doomed it to final destruction
and oblivion.
The first stone of the new fortress was laid by Abdel Kader in May,
1836. He himself supplied the plans for the fortifications which were to
surround it. He remitted the payment of tribute to all the tribes within
a certain distance, on the condition of their sending labourers to
assist in the construction of the ramparts. The people of Mascara
brought baskets, shovels, and pickaxes. Medea and Miliana sent supplies
of cheese and fruits of all kinds, which, with excellent white bread,
and occasionally meat rations, formed the food and wages of the workmen.
Soon houses and streets arose. A population poured in. Families of
Arabs, of Moors, of Kolouglis, from Mascara, Mazagnan, and Mostaganem,
came and settled. Old Roman vaults were turned into stores for
ammunition, sulphur, saltpetre, brass, lead, and iron; and for all the
machines, implements, and utensils which Miloud-ibn-Arasch had bought in
France for the sum of £4,000. A musket manufactory turned out eight
muskets a day, the work of French mechanics procured from Paris at
liberal salaries.
A mint struck off silver and copper coins, ranging in value from five
shillings to twopence, and bearing on one side the inscription, “It is
the will of God: I have appointed him my agent;” on the other, “Struck
at Tekedemt, by the Sultan Abdel Kader.” Finally, twelve pieces of
cannon and six mortars frowned from the ramparts; and the defences were
complete.
Abdel Kader superintended all the works by constant personal inspection.
M. de France, who was one of his prisoners during the time that these
works were in their highest activity, thus describes what he saw:—“After
having visited the ruins, we came to a redoubt which Abdel Kader was
erecting at about two hundred paces from his citadel. We approached the
Sultan, who was reclining, in company with Ibn About, his secretary, and
Miloud-ibn-Arasch, on the ground recently thrown up from a ditch which
some men were busily digging.
“His costume is so simple, that one can hardly distinguish him from the
labourers. He wore a large straw hat, plaited with palm leaves. The
brim, tied up to the body of the hat with woollen cords and tassels,
must have been three feet in circumference. The hat itself was at least
a foot and a half in height, and looked like a tunnel terminating in a
peak.
“As I passed the Sultan, he saluted me with that incomparable grace and
fascinating smile for which he is so remarkable, and waved his hand for
me to be seated. ‘To judge by the ruins,’ I remarked, ‘the town which
was formerly here must have been large and flourishing.’ ‘Yes, it was
very fine and very powerful,’ he answered. ‘Does the epoch of its
foundation remount to a very ancient date?’ ‘Tekedemt is a very ancient
town.’ ‘Do you think I shall be able to discover any stones with
inscriptions?’ ‘You will find none. This town was never Christian. It
was one of the first cities built by the Arabs. The sultans, my
ancestors, who had their residence at Tekedemt, ruled from Tunis to
Morocco.’
“The Sultan then asked me what I thought of the construction of the
fortifications. I replied that they appeared to me to be well
proportioned and ably laid out, and that it was evident he had profited
by a critical examination of our block-houses. He seemed quite pleased
with my answer.
“‘Yes,’ he resumed, ‘with animation, I hope yet to restore Tekedemt to
its ancient splendour. I will gather the tribes in this place, where we
shall be secure from the attacks of the French; and when all my forces
are collected, I will descend from this steep rock, like a vulture from
his nest, and drive the Christians out of Algiers, Bona, and Oran.
“‘If, indeed, you were content with those cities, I would suffer you to
remain there; for the sea is not mine, and I have no ships. But you want
our plains and our inland cities, and our mountains. Nay, you even covet
our horses, our tents, our camels, and our women; and you leave your own
country to come and take that in which Mohammed has placed his people.
But your sultan is not a horseman or a saint; and your horses will
stumble and fall on our mountains, for they are not surefooted like our
horses; and your soldiers will die of sickness; and those whom the
pestilence spares, will fall by our bullets.’”
Had Abdel Kader been allowed time to complete his intentions, it was his
design to have made Tekedemt not merely a place of strength, but a seat
of learning; to have established a library and founded a college. “But,”
to use his own expression, “God did not so will it. The books which I
had brought from all parts of the east for this institution, were taken
when the king’s son seized my smala; and to my other misfortunes was
added that of being able to mark the traces of the French column, on
their return to Medea, by the torn and scattered leaves of the books
which it had cost me so much time and pains to collect.”
During the years 1838 and 1839 Abdel Kader pushed on his plans of reform
and improvement with wonderful rapidity. His army, his police, his
schools, his local tribunals of justice, were all fully constituted. His
projected fortresses were completed. Manufactories conducted by
Europeans were in full operation in all his principal towns. At Tlemsen,
a Spaniard superintended a cannon foundry, which turned out twelve and
six pounders.
In Miliana, an eminent French mineralogist, M. de Casse, established a
musket manufactory and powder-mills. Iron was procured from a mine in
the neighbourhood. Cloth of superior quality was also manufactured.
Mines of saltpetre, sulphur, iron, and brass, were diligently worked.
Europeans were invited to come and settle in the country, with the right
of holding freehold property. The land seemed to be waking up from a
long slumber. The spirit of European civilisation everywhere percolated
the torpid mass, lighting up the dark places, and piercing its way into
the strongholds of ignorance and superstition.
The irregular force at Abdel Kader’s disposal, during the early part of
his career, amounted nominally to nearly 60,000 men. This included all
the contingents which the tribes could, on emergency, supply. But rarely
more than a third of that number ever assembled at one time, for the
purpose of carrying out a military operation. A finer irregular cavalry
did not exist.
But Abdel Kader soon discovered the incompetency of such warriors to
compete with the disciplined legions of the great military power he
confronted. But to raise regular troops amongst a people who, even in
the days of Turkish rule, had never been harassed by a conscription, and
whose nature revolted at the very idea, was a hazardous experiment,
requiring great tact and circumspection. Such a design could only be
hinted at as a suggestion, not promulgated as a command.
Accordingly, the following friendly invitation was posted up in all the
towns and douairs:—“Whoever wishes to be clothed in fine cloth, and to
become the son of the Sultan, let him come and engage himself: he shall
be well paid, and indulged in everything.” Several young men were
tempted by the inducement thus held out to present themselves for
enlistment; and the formation of a regular army almost imperceptibly
began.
Abdel Kader thus describes his military organisation:—“Besides the
contingents of tribes who rallied at my call, or that of my Khalifas,
and which constituted a powerful auxiliary force, although merely
temporary, inasmuch as I was never able to keep them away from their
tribes for any great length of time, I had latterly a regular army of
8,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry or spahis, and 240 artillerymen. I had
twenty field-pieces, without reckoning a large store of cannons both in
iron and brass left by the Turks, many of which, however, it is true,
were unfit for service.
“I could thus afford to give each of my Khalifas 1,000 infantry, 250
horsemen, two or three pieces of cannon, and thirty artillerymen. My
infantry was recruited only by volunteers; but they were sufficient,
considering my pecuniary means and the arms at my disposal. Later, if
time had been afforded me, I should have used the French mode of raising
soldiers. My religion would not have prevented me, for a Sultan may have
recourse to enrolments to sustain the honour of his flag, and to save
his country from Christian invasion.
“The instructors of my regular infantry were soldiers of the _nizam_,
from Tunis and Tripoli, and French deserters. The latter became so
numerous at last as to form a battalion of themselves, and fought
against their own countrymen with a fury and desperation which was
hardly rivalled by my own Mussulmans. I distributed them amongst my
Khalifas.
“As for my regular cavalry, they refused to be placed under instructors.
In their style of war they were led by an independent pride which
disdained to acknowledge a master. They knew they were worth nothing for
a shock; but they thought themselves unrivalled in single combat, in
ambuscade, surprise, and light skirmishing. It was no dishonour to them
to fly before even inferior forces; their flight being often a mere
feint. To do as much injury as possible to the enemy without exposing
themselves to loss—that was the principle I inculcated on them.
“All my regulars were armed with French or English muskets. I got them
in battles, from deserters, or by purchase from Morocco. Every Arab
found with a French musket in his possession, was obliged to sell it to
me for a sum amounting to two English pounds sterling. He then provided
himself with a _fusil_ as best he could, either in the bazaars, or, when
the tribe of the desert, coming to the Tell, inundated the country with
arms from Tunis, from Tougourt, from the Mzab, and the Oulad-Sidi-
Cheikh. I made my own powder at Tlemsen, Mascara, Miliana, Medea, and
Tekedemt. I bought a good deal, also, from Morocco, where I also
procured flints, of which our own country was completely destitute.
Sulphur came from France. Saltpetre I found everywhere.
“During the peace, the French sea-coast towns supplied me with lead;
Morocco yielded me a considerable quantity; and I worked a lead mine in
the Ouarsenis. But all this was very costly; so I was very sparing in my
distribution of the stores of the Beylik amongst the Arabs, who squander
away their powder without reflection, in their festivities and games. I
only deviated from this principle in favour of those who were employed
in blockading the French garrisons, or when, on the field of battle, the
ammunition ran short. I then distributed cartridges on the spot.
“At the seat of government of each of my Khalifas, I had placed tailors,
armourers, and saddlers, to make the clothing of my troops, repair their
arms, and keep up their horse-equipments. I had also distributed many
such workmen amongst the tribe, so as to make them also ready and
efficient at a moment’s call. To meet the expenses of my administration,
where everything had to be created, and though confining myself to what
was strictly necessary, heavy imposts were indispensable.
“I ordered my Khalifas to watch, personally, over everything connected
with such an important matter. They made their tours twice a-year; once
in the spring to collect the _zekka_, and during the harvest to gather
the _ashur_. During these tours, they were expected to inspect and
regulate the administration of the Aghas, to report to me any complaints
made against them, and to superintend the working of the properties of
the Beylik.
“My Khalifas were followed by a regular battalion, their Spahis, and
their irregular cavalry. The Arab people are so constituted, that if
they had not seen a display of force, they would have refused to pay the
impost. After a temporary defeat, what difficulty have I not often
experienced to raise again the proper return of contributions! ‘The
Sultan,’ they would say, ‘is occupied with the Christians; he cannot
compel us. Do not let us pay; let us see what will happen.’ What
invariably happened was, that they had eventually to pay up everything,
with arrears; but nothing corrected them. The Arabs only look to the
present moment.
“At the same time that I demanded from the tribes what was necessary to
support the Beylik, I endeavoured, as much as possible, to reconcile
their interests with those of the State. My Khalifas were instructed to
accept, in lieu of the impost or of fines, articles for consumption,
mules, camels, and especially horses. With the horses I remounted my
cavalry; the mules and camels gave me means of transport; with the
provisions, I supplied my troops, or filled my magazines.
“My resources were also augmented by _razzias_, which I made whenever
the tribes appealed to arms to fight out their differences. I was
resolved to be the sole arbiter of these differences, and I had laid it
down as a rule, that not a shot should be fired without my permission.
The horses, mules, or camels which I did not immediately require were
distributed amongst the tribes, under the charge of agents, who, while
they were liberally paid, were so checked, as to be unable to defraud.
“It was well I looked to the future; for the number of horses I had to
replace in my regular cavalry was immense. There is not a man amongst
these troops who had not had seven or eight horses killed under him, or
rendered unserviceable. Indeed, it was not uncommon to find men who had
lost from twelve to sixteen. Ibn Yahia—that noble soldier who, rather
than survive my misfortunes, threw himself on certain death, in my last
battle with the Maroccians (Dec., 1847)—had had eighteen horses killed
under him. The emulation in this point was such, that any horseman who
passed a year without being wounded or having a horse killed under him,
was looked on with contempt.
“As far as lay in my power, I also replaced the horses which my _goums_,
or irregular cavalry contingents, lost in battle. They have had from me
more than six thousand. But latterly, when I could no longer give them
horses, I allowed them, in lieu of a horse, two camels, or thirty sheep,
or a good mule. They sold those animals, and then with the price
remounted themselves at their leisure. But, at last, I became so
straitened as not even to be able to give them this indemnity.
“To form an idea of the consumption of horses—in one year alone I gave
500 to the Gharabas of Oran, and nearly as many to the Hagouts in the
plains of Algiers. At the same time, there were many which I never
attempted to replace, either because their proprietors were rich, or
because I had no longer the means.
“The flocks and cattle which came from the _zekka_ were entrusted to the
tribe, under the superintendence of their Kaids. It was the duty of
these officials to take account of them and appoint them shepherds, as
well as to feed and take care of them. These animals, in the government
of each Khalifa, served to defray the cost of guests, to support the
poor, to assist the _tholbas_ (men of letters), and to supply my army,
who had meat twice a-week. By these means, I had begun to establish
complete order in the administration of the revenues of each Beylik. But
when the war broke out again, I was often defrauded, and the Arabs on
every side took advantage of my preoccupations. The only two Khalifas
who maintained order to the last were Abou Hamadi and Ibn Hallal; they
were dreaded from their severity.
“The precautions which I have mentioned did not always suffice for the
nourishment of my army, at all the points on which it was called on by
the necessities of war to act. Therefore, as I did not wish to burden
the population with extra expenses, that might have indisposed them
towards me, I ordered _silos_ (underground vaults for corn) to be made
in the territory of each Beylik. These _silos_, placed under the
responsibility of the Kaid of each tribe, and so disposed as to escape
the researches of the enemy, contained the grain of the _ashur_, or of
the state lands, which were cultivated partly by forced, partly by paid,
labour.
I thus proved to the Arabs, who, from their nature, were always
suspicious, that I took nothing for my personal wants from the imposts.
I obliged them to pay for the general welfare, and they rendered me
justice for it. The _silos_, in fact, postponed my fall. Their discovery
and destruction by the French columns decided it. When once deprived of
my stores of provisions, I was obliged to exhaust the resources of the
tribe. When they felt the pressure from both sides fall heavy upon them,
their ardour for the holy war relaxed.
“As to me, what occasion was there for me to resort to the public
treasury to defray my expenses? Never, up to the moment when my private
property fell into the hands of the French, did I touch the smallest
fraction of what the Arabs gave me for the public expenses; and since
that, I have only taken what was absolutely necessary. My clothes were
made by the women of my household; my little income sufficed for the
wants of my family. Even the small surplus which was left me, I spent in
assisting the poor, the traveller, and more especially the needy among
my brave companions-in-arms who had been wounded in the holy war.
“By acting thus, I could consistently call on the Arabs to make great
sacrifices; for I showed them that the _zekka_, the _ashur_, fines,
contributions—all my resources, in fact—were scrupulously devoted to the
maintenance of the public welfare. In 1839, when the war recommenced, I
called upon the Arabs for an extraordinary loan; but they contributed
very slowly. I immediately sold all my family jewels by auction in the
bazaars of Mascara, proclaiming publicly that the proceeds were to be
sent to the public treasury. The loan was then very soon advanced; and
it seemed only to be a question who should pay first.”
As soon as Abdel Kader began to form a regular army, he drew up and
published a military code, containing the most minute regulations for
the discipline, pay, and clothing of his troops. This code was read out
to the different regiments twice a month. It was interspersed with
injunctions, and promises of reward for good behaviour, of which the
following may be taken as an example:—
“It is indispensably necessary that a chief should be personally brave
and courageous; that he should be of a good family, irreproachable in
his morals, strictly religious, patient, enduring, prudent, prompt, and
intelligent in the hour of difficulty and danger; for the officer is to
his men what the heart is to the body; if the heart is not sound, the
body is worthless.
“A soldier who throws himself dashingly on the enemy’s ranks, disables
and disarms his foe, or, by rallying the men when on the point of
retreating, prevents a panic by his example and presence of mind, shall
be decorated by the Sultan himself before the whole army; and his
heroism shall be proclaimed by beat of drum.”
The decoration thus conferred varied in appearance, according to the
bearer’s merits. It consisted of a silver or silver-gilt hand with
extended fingers. The number of fingers extended notified the number of
acts of bravery performed. Each finger extended entitled the bearer to
extra pay, amounting to a shilling a month. In the centre of the
decoration was inscribed the words _Nusr-ed-deen_, or “the triumph of
religion.” It was worn, not on the breast, but affixed to one side of
the hood of the burnous. It was sometimes also given to civilians who
had rendered great administrative services.
The uniform of the foot soldier was dark blue, with scarlet pantaloons,
a brown capote, and a small cap and turban. His pay amounted to nine
francs a month. On the right sleeve of each commanding officer were
embroidered the words, “Patience and perseverance are the key to
victory;” on the left, “There is no god but God, and Mohammed is his
Prophet.” Embroidered on his right shoulder of the Aga, in place of an
epaulette, were marked the words, “Nothing profits like piety and
courage;” on the left, “Nothing is so injurious as discussion and want
of obedience.”
All the officers throughout the army had inscriptions of a like tendency
embroidered on their uniforms. The spahis, or regular cavalry, were
clothed in scarlet exclusively. Their colonels wore the device, “Trust
in God and the Prophet—charge and conquer;” those of the artillery, “I
can effect nothing: it is God who directs the shot.” Thus was religion,
its duties and its efficacy, placed ever prominently forward by Abdel
Kader, not only in his army, but in his whole administration, as the
indispensable foundation and support of human exertion.
The following allusion to himself, with which his military code closes,
placed him before his officers and men as a model to be copied and
emulated. Nor was there any exaggeration in its expressions.
“Il Hadj Abdel Kader cares not for this world, and withdraws from it as
much as his avocations will permit. He despises wealth and riches. He
lives with the greatest plainness and sobriety. He is always simply
clad. He rises in the middle of the night to recommend his own soul and
the souls of his followers to God. His chief pleasure is in praying to
God with fasting, that his sins may be forgiven.
“He is incorruptible. He never takes anything out of the public funds
for himself. All the presents which are brought to him he sends to the
public treasury; for he serves the State, not himself. He neither eats,
nor drinks, nor dresses, but as religion ordains. When he administers
justice, he hears complaints with the greatest patience. A smile is
always on his face for the encouragement of those who approach him. His
decisions are conformable to the words of the sacred book. He hates the
man who does not act uprightly; but honours him who strictly observes
the precepts and practises the duties of religion.
“From his boyhood he learned to mount the most fiery horse without a
teacher. He never turns before an enemy; but awaits him firmly. In a
retreat he fights like a common soldier, rallying his men by his words
and example, and sharing in all their dangers. Thus, brave,
disinterested, and pious, when he preaches, his words bring tears into
all eyes, and melt the hardest hearts. All who hear him become good
Mussulmans.
“He explains the most difficult passages of the Koran and of the Hadeeth
(Traditions) without referring to books or Ulemahs. The most learned
Arabs and the greatest Talebs acknowledge him as their master and
teacher. May God increase his nobleness of character, his wisdom, his
learning, his understanding, his honour, glory, and success, a
thousandfold!”