1837.
Nothing more loudly testifies to the immense superiority enjoyed by
Abdel Kader, at this period, than the fact of his being in a position to
advance such pretensions, and make such demands. Their real and evident
meaning was, that he should be acknowledged Sultan of Algeria, whilst
the French lived, as it were, under sufferance, on the outskirts of his
empire, simply enjoying the advantage of trading with his subjects.
It must be borne in mind, at the same time, that Abdel Kader was
perfectly aware of the state of public opinion in France. He subscribed
regularly to the French journals. The debates in the Chambers, and the
leading articles on Algerian affairs, were interpreted to him. He saw
the liberal party cordially approving and supporting the principle laid
down by their chief orator, M. Dupin, who denounced Algiers as a fatal
legacy, bequeathed by the Restoration, which ought to be abandoned,
“if,” as he exclaimed, “we would not see our last man, and our last
sons, swallowed up.”
He gathered, from the general tenor of the passages which were read to
him, that many of the principal politicians in France looked upon
colonisation in Africa as a dream; that they considered all warlike
operations there carried on as so much blood and treasure thrown away;
and that they maintained the true policy of France to be, merely to hold
a few places along the coast for the purpose of preventing piracy, and
cultivating peaceable and honourable relations with the natives.
When, in addition to this, Abdel Kader saw the French Chambers making a
practical comment on such sentiments, by refusing to vote more than
30,000 men for the colony, and learned, that after the disastrous
retreat from Constantine, the opinion in favour of an immediate
evacuation of the country began to prevail more than ever, it is not to
be wondered at if he thought that, by a little pertinacity, and a little
more perseverance, he should succeed in obtaining such terms as would
enable him to realise his cherished idea of founding an independent Arab
kingdom.
The propositions sent in by Abdel Kader seemed, to Bugeaud, so utterly
incompatible with French interests, that he determined to carry out the
second part of his programme,—an appeal to arms. In the beginning of
May, 1837, he assembled his whole force, consisting of 12,000 men, in
the camp of the Tafna, preparatory to offensive operations. When he came
to review his resources, he found the transport service so utterly
inadequate to the occasion, that he was obliged to suspend his march.
To procure animals from the interior was impossible. A supply from
France was not expected. The summer heats, so fatal to soldiers in the
field, were fast approaching. The time fixed for the second siege of
Constantine was at hand, and he had engaged that a large portion of his
little army should be sent round to take part in it. The home government
had made its arrangements in full reliance on the fulfilment of this
pledge. Peace with Abdel Kader, however humiliating, became a necessity.
The latter was informed that the door was still open for negotiation. He
asked leave for a few days’ consideration.
Various reasons conspired to make Abdel Kader anxious to base his
action, in a measure of such importance as that of again making peace
with the French, on an appeal to the wishes of the tribes at large. The
fanatical party accused him of personal ambition, and of sacrificing the
uncompromising principles of the Faith to his own selfish views of
aggrandisement. The restless, the lawless—all, in fact, who preferred
unbridled liberty to the solid advantages springing from a well-
established central power, and who felt that the return of peace would
hand them over unreservedly, and without the power of resistance, to the
master-hand which would soon reduce them to implicit obedience—only
wanted a pretext to assume the cloak of religion, and join the fanatics
in their senseless cry.
With well-timed skill and foresight, Abdel Kader now resolved to cut the
ground from under the feet of both these parties. The demand for peace,
or, rather, the willingness to accept it, ought, he opined, to be looked
on as a national act. A general assembly was summoned to meet on the
banks of the Habra, May 25, 1837; and thither, according to invitation,
came all the great Sheiks, the leaders of cavalry contingents, the
venerable Marabouts, and the most distinguished warriors of the province
of Oran.
The Sultan opened the deliberations in the following words:—“Let no one
amongst you ever accuse me of wanting to make peace with the Christians.
It is for you to decide the question of peace or war.” He then proceeded
to explain the nature of the correspondence, which had taken place
between himself and Bugeaud; the propositions and overtures which had
been made to him, and those he had made in return. In conclusion, he
commented carefully on each of the articles of his own ultimatum, sent
in to the French general on the 12th May.
A long and stormy discussion ensued. The fanatics, and those secretly
indisposed towards the Sultan, were violent in their cries for war. The
Marabouts silenced them by the nicely-drawn discrimination between peace
accepted and peace demanded. The Koran, they said, nowhere inculcated a
useless shedding of blood, when the infidel had submitted, and craved
that the sword might be sheathed. The French had submitted. They begged
for peace. The Sultan had dictated his own terms.
This reasoning prevailed. It was decided by a large majority that the
benefits which would accrue to the commonalty from a state of peace,
justified the giving up of Blidah, and the plain of Algiers, to the
French. A slight extension of the limits to which the Sultan originally
intended to confine them would be no inconvenience to the Arabs,
inasmuch as every Mussulman would be free to emigrate from the French
possessions to the Sultan’s territory. The demand, however, of the
French Government for tribute, was declared to be inadmissible.
Sidi Sekkal was shortly afterwards sent to the French head-quarters on
the Tafna, with the following concessions:—
“1. Blidah abandoned.
“2. Renunciation of all authority over Mussulmans residing on French
territory.
“3. A certain extension of the French boundaries.”
Sidi Sekkal was commissioned, at the same time, to enter into the nature
of the limits proposed, and to give other necessary explanations.
Bugeaud, convinced that further delay would not procure him better
conditions, agreed to everything. Thereupon the following treaty,
celebrated as the “Treaty of the Tafna,” was drawn up and signed by both
parties, May 20th, 1837.
“THE FOLLOWING TREATY HAS BEEN AGREED UPON, BETWEEN LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
BUGEAUD, COMMANDING THE FRENCH TROOPS IN THE PROVINCE OF ORAN, AND THE
EMIR ABDEL KADER.
“Art. 1. The Emir Abdel Kader acknowledges the sovereignty of France.
“Art. 2. France reserves to herself, in the province of Oran,
Mostaganem, Mazagnan, and their territories, Oran, Arzew, and a
territory limited in the following manner:—On the east, by the river
Macta, and the marsh from whence it flows; on the south, by a line
starting from the said marsh, passing by the shore on the south of the
lake, and continuing its prolongation up the Wady Maleh, in the
direction of Sidi Said; and from this river down to the sea, shall
belong to the French. In the province of Algiers, Algiers, the Sahel,
the plain of the Metija, bounded on the east by the Wady Khuddra,
onwards; on the south, by the crest of the first chain of the lesser
Atlas, as far as the Chiffa, including Blidah and its territory; on the
west, by the Chiffa as far as the Mount of Mazagnan, and from thence, in
a direct line to the sea, enclosing Coleah and its territory, shall be
French territory.
“Art. 3. The Emir shall have the administration of the province of Oran,
that of Tittery, and that part of the province of Algiers which is not
comprised on the east, within the limits indicated by Article 2. He
cannot enter any other part of the Regency.
“Art. 4. The Emir shall have no authority over Mussulmans who wish to
reside on the territory reserved to France; but these shall be at
liberty to go and reside on the territory under the Emir’s
administration; in the same manner the inhabitants living under the
Emir’s administration may establish themselves on French territory.
“Art. 5. The Arabs dwelling on French territory shall enjoy the free
exercise of their religion. They may build mosques, and follow their
religious discipline in every particular, under the authority of their
spiritual chiefs.
“Art. 6. The Emir will give to the French army 30,000 measures of corn;
30,000 measures of barley; 5,000 head of oxen. The delivery of these
provisions will be made at Oran, in three instalments; the first, on the
15th September, 1837, and the two others every successive two months.
“Art. 7. The Emir shall be empowered to buy in France, powder, sulphur,
and the arms he requires.
“Art. 8. The Kolouglis who wish to remain in Tlemsen, or elsewhere,
shall have free possession of their properties there, and shall be
treated as citizens. Those who wish to withdraw to French territory, may
sell or rent their properties freely.
“Art. 9. France cedes to the Emir, Rachgoun, Tlemsen, its citadel, and
all the cannons which were anciently in it. The Emir engages to convey
to Oran all the effects, as well as munitions of war, belonging to the
garrison of Tlemsen.
“Art. 10. Commerce shall be free between the Arabs and the French. They
may establish themselves reciprocally, on each other’s territory.
“Art. 11. The French shall be respected amongst the Arabs, as the Arabs
amongst the French. The farms and properties which the French have
acquired, or may acquire, on the Arab territory, shall be guaranteed
them: they shall enjoy them freely, and the Emir engages to indemnify
them for any damages the Arabs may cause them.
“Art. 12. The criminals on both territories shall be reciprocally given
up.
“Art. 13. The Emir engages not to give up any part of the coast to any
foreign power whatever, without the authorisation of France.
“Art. 14. The commerce of the Regency shall only be carried on in French
ports.
“Art. 15. France shall maintain agents near the Emir, and in the towns
under his jurisdiction, to act as intermediaries for French subjects, in
any commercial disputes they may have with the Arabs.
“The Emir will have the same privilege in French towns and seaports.
“Tafna, May 30, 1837.
“The Lieutenant-General commanding at Oran.”
(The Emir’s seal under the Arab text.)
(Bugeaud the General’s seal under the French text.)
Bugeaud had been strictly enjoined by his Government to confine Abdel
Kader to the province of Oran; on no account to cede him the province of
Tittery, and to insist on his paying tribute.
In a letter to the Minister of War, he thus excused himself for having
signed a treaty which violated such orders:—
“You may well suppose that it pained me greatly to be obliged to make up
my mind not to follow your instructions, as regards the limits to be
assigned to the Emir. But that was impossible. Be assured that the peace
I have concluded is better, and is likely to be more durable than any I
could have made by confining Abdel Kader between the Cheliff and
Morocco.”
By this treaty, nevertheless, the French were substantially confined to
a few towns on the sea-coast, with very circumscribed adjacent
territories; whilst all the fortresses and strongholds in the interior
were left in the hands of their triumphant and victorious adversary. In
a word, Abdel Kader thereby possessed two-thirds of Algeria; and in
addition to the immense accession which this splendid triumph had added
to his influence and power, he now earned along with him the advantage
of appearing before the world as the friend and ally of France.
The French generals, who had hitherto followed each other in rapid
succession through the various phases of the war, had sought in vain for
an interview with the illustrious Arab chief, who, whilst he sorely
taxed their military talents, had excited in their breasts feelings of
soldierly admiration. This favour was now vouchsafed to General Bugeaud.
On the 31st of May, 1837, the General, followed by six battalions, with
all his artillery and cavalry, reached the appointed place of
rendezvous. Abdel Kader had not yet arrived. Five hours were passed in
expectation; still nobody appeared. At last, about two o’clock, several
Arabs came up, one after another, bearing various kinds of excuses. The
Sultan had been indisposed. He had set out late. He was thinking of
asking to have the interview postponed till next day. He was not far
off. He was close at hand.
A horseman now came up and begged the General to move on a little; he
would soon meet the Sultan. It was getting late, and the General, who
wished to get his troops back to their camp before dark, advanced. After
marching for more than an hour, he at length came upon the Arab army,
consisting of more than 15,000 cavalry, drawn up in tolerable order, on
an undulating plain. At this moment, Bou Hamedi rode up to him, and
pointed to the spot where the Sultan was surrounded by a large escort,
on a hillock not far off.
In a few minutes more, Abdel Kader and his escort were seen advancing
towards the General. It was an imposing sight. Nearly two hundred Arab
chiefs, on prancing steeds, closed around their Sultan, whose simple
apparel offered a striking contrast to their splendid appointments,
glittering with highly-burnished arms, which flashed and sparkled in the
noon-day sun. Abdel Kader rode a few paces in front, mounted on a
magnificent black charger, which he handled with extraordinary
dexterity, sometimes making it spring with all fours in the air,
sometimes making it walk for several yards on its hind legs, and
evidently seeking to make an impression by his superior horsemanship.
Several Arabs ran by his side, holding his stirrups, and the ends of his
burnous.
General Bugeaud now dashed forward at full gallop, and on reaching the
Emir, shook hands with him. Both alighted, and seating themselves on the
grass, entered into the following conversation.
_Bugeaud._—“Do you know that there are very few generals who would have
dared to make the treaty I have concluded with you? But I have not been
afraid of aggrandising you, and adding to your power, because I felt
assured that you would only employ the great existence which we give you
in ameliorating the condition of the Arab nation, and in maintaining
peace and a good understanding with France.”
_Abdel Kader._—“I thank you for your good sentiments towards me. Please
God, I will make the Arabs happy; and if the peace is ever broken, it
will be no fault of mine.”
_B._—“On this point, I am your security with the King of the French.”
_A._—“You risk nothing in so doing: we have a religion which obliges us
to keep our word. I have never been faithless to mine.”
_B._—“I count on it; and it is in this conviction I offer you my
personal friendship.”
_A._—“I accept your friendship, but let the French beware of listening
to intriguers.”
_B._—“The French are never led by individuals, and it is not the acts of
individuals which can break the peace: it is only the non-execution of
the treaty, or some great act of hostility. As to the culpable acts of
individuals, we will be on our guard against them, or punish them
reciprocally.”
_A._—“Very good. You have only to give me notice, and the guilty shall
be punished.”
_B._—“I recommend to your good offices the Kolouglis who may remain at
Tlemsen.”
_A._—“Be easy on that score; they shall be treated like citizens.”
_B._—“You have promised me that you will locate the Douairs amongst the
Hafras: the country will, perhaps, not be sufficient for them.”
_A._—“They shall be located in such a manner as not to endanger the
maintenance of peace.”
_B._—“Have you ordered commercial relations at Algiers, and around the
towns, to be resumed?”
_A._—“Not yet; but I mean to do so, when you have put me in possession
of Tlemsen.”
_B._—“You must know, I cannot do so until the treaty has been approved
of by the King.”
_A._—“What, then, have not you the power to treat?”
_B._—“Yes; but the treaty must be approved. That is necessary for you,
as a guarantee; for if it was only made by me, any general who might
replace me would be able to undo it; whereas, once approved by the King,
my successor would be obliged to abide by it.”
_A._—“If you do not give me back Tlemsen, in accordance with the
stipulation in the treaty, I do not see the necessity of making peace:
we shall only have a truce.”
_B._—“That is true. But it is you who will be the gainer by the truce;
for, while it lasts, I shall not destroy the crops.”
_A._—“Destroy them, if you like: it will be all the same to me. I will
give you my full permission, in writing, to destroy all you can. It will
only be a very small quantity you can get at, and the Arabs will still
have abundance of grain.”
_B._—“I don’t think the Arabs are of the same opinion.”
Abdel Kadir now asked how long it would be before the confirmation of
the treaty arrived from France.
_B._—“About three weeks.”
_A._—“That is rather long. At all events, we cannot reestablish our
commercial relations until after the King’s approbation shall have
arrived. Then the peace will be definitive.”
_B._—“It is only your co-religionists who will be the sufferers; for you
will be depriving them of a commerce of which they stand in need. As for
us, we can get all we want by sea.”
The General, not wishing to prolong the interview, as it was getting
late, rose to take leave. Abdel Kader remained sitting, and affected to
be engaged with his interpreter, who was standing beside him. Bugeaud,
suspecting his motive, took him familiarly by the hand, and pulled him
up, saying at the same time, “_Parbleu_, when a French General rises,
you may as well rise too—you!”
Thus ended this singular meeting, at which the French General had merely
gratified an idle, though pardonable, curiosity; but which, from the
premeditated delays and misunderstandings that immediately preceded it,
gave Abdel Kader the immense advantage of appearing in the eyes of his
countrymen as a grand personage, who kept even the leaders of the
infidels awaiting his good pleasure and convenience. Abdel Kader, after
shaking the General again by the hands, now vaulted into his saddle; and
both armies moved off the ground to the strains of martial music, the
Arabs shouting enthusiastically—“Long live our Sultan, Abdel Kader! may
God ever make him victorious!”