1836.
Notwithstanding Clausel’s temporary occupation of Mascara, Abdel Kader
had already regained his ascendancy. Everywhere he was in possession of
the field. Several tribes who had shown an inclination to accept the
rule of the French were punished, either by money levied, or cattle
distrained. Moreover Clausel sued for peace.
To the proposition that he should acknowledge the sovereignty of France,
Abdel Kader replied, that before acknowledging a suzerain he should like
to know precisely the extent of power and territory which he was to
hold, as well as the obligations he should be called on to fulfil.
Miloud ibn Arasch was invited to come to Oran to discuss the
negotiation. Clausel was, at this time, meditating an expedition against
Tlemsen.
The presence of the French in the interim had encouraged their
partisans. Mustapha ibn Ismail had promised Clausel the co-operation of
more than one Arab tribe, if he advanced upon Tlemsen. The Beni Engad
declared themselves his friends, and they were already drawing near the
town in large force with the view of assisting him, and aiding the
escape of the Kolouglis from the citadel, in which the latter were still
blockaded.
Abdel Kader hearing of this combination, made a rapid descent on both
parties. He caught Mustapha and the Kolouglis in the very act of making
a sortie, and drove them back. Turning round on the Beni Engad, he
completely routed them. The action was scarcely over, when Clausel and
his column, 8,000 strong, were seen marching on the town. Abdel Kader
had barely time to complete its evacuation. He withdrew with the whole
population, unmolested, to Ouchda, on the frontiers of Morocco. Clausel
entered Tlemsen January 13th, 1836.
Mustapha and the Kolouglis, followed by a miserable crowd of Jews,
presented themselves before the Governor-General and his staff,
overwhelming him with exuberant professions of loyalty and submission,
and calling him their saviour and benefactor. He demanded from them
100,000 francs as a proof of their sincerity. In vain the astonished
dupes pleaded their utter inability to raise such a sum, Clausel was
inexorable. The screw was mercilessly applied. Threats and blows, and
even torture, were used, and the contribution was finally paid, partly
in coin, partly in diamonds and articles of jewellery.
This mode of treatment pursued by the French was as great an advantage
to the cause of Abdel Kader as any victory would have been.
“If that is the way,” he exclaimed, “the French treat their friends,
what are their enemies to expect?”
It was diligently spread abroad that a Jew had presided at the tying up
and castigation of the Kolouglis. The Arabs were furious. Such an
indignity put upon Mussulmans had never been heard of. The Beni Engad
opened a correspondence with Abdel Kader. The Kolouglis sent him word
privately that they only awaited the departure of the French to give him
up the citadel.
It was the intention of Clausel, however, to occupy the town, as he was
extremely anxious to establish a direct communication between Tlemsen
and the sea-coast. The mouth of the Tafna was the nearest available
point for this purpose, but the intervening ground was mountainous. He
set out to accomplish his object, January 23rd. He soon found himself in
presence of Abdel Kader, with his whole army.
For ten successive days the battle raged between them. The Arabs,
burning to avenge their late defeat, were obstinately tenacious. Abdel
Kader, moreover, had not attempted a regular formation. Hills, ravines,
rocks, and rivers were seized and defended, according to the exigencies
of the moment. Against such tactics, and in an unknown country, French
courage and discipline were at fault. Clausel was defeated and driven
back to Tlemsen with considerable loss. After placing a garrison in the
citadel under the command of Captain Cavaignac, he returned with his
column to Oran, harassed by Abdel Kader to its very gates.
On his arrival at Algiers, he consoled himself for all his futile
expeditions by issuing a proclamation declaring the war to be finished.
“Abdel Kader,” it stated, “utterly beaten and discomfited, has fled to
the Sahara, there to conceal his treason and revolt.” In April, the
Marshal embarked for France, leaving instructions to General d’Arlanges
at Oran, to make a fortified camp on the Tafna, with the view of opening
from thence the desired line of communication with Tlemsen.
General Perregaux about this time made an incursion on the tribes
located in the valley of the Cheliff. Influenced by their chiefs, the
sons of Sidi il Aribi, these tribes had continued, despite their
repeated corrections, to waver in their obedience to the Sultan. They
had not paid the tribute without considerable reluctance and complaints,
and they had furnished their contingent of cavalry to his army with
manifest repugnance. They now, under pretence of superior pressure,
again entered into an alliance with the French.
Abdel Kader was too much occupied, for the moment, with the blockade of
Tlemsen and the proceedings of D’Arlanges on the Tafna, to interrupt the
military promenade of Perregaux. But the recreant Arabs, who had
welcomed the French general, were soon made to feel the weight of the
Sultan’s indignation. No sooner had the French withdrawn than he came
down on them like an avalanche. Eighteen tribes were heavily fined, and
their cattle distrained. The Borgia tribe, singled out to serve as a
terrible example, was decimated, and then driven out of the district to
find shelter where it could.
D’Arlanges had reached the Tafna, with great difficulty, on the 16th of
April, with 3,000 infantry and eight pieces of artillery. Having
completed an entrenched camp on the banks of the river, he marched out
on the 21st, in conformity with his instructions, to open the road to
Tlemsen. Abdel Kader, who from the central position of Nedroma, which
commanded equally the road from the Tafna to Tlemsen and to Oran, was
able to watch his enemy’s movements in either direction, rapidly
descended to the encounter, enveloped the French column with masses of
Kabyles and Arabs, and obliged it to retrace its steps.
He owed this success to his own unwearied exertions and commanding
influence. So long as he could keep each separate French garrison in a
state of isolation, the game was his own. But to effect so comprehensive
a plan, he was obliged to keep the whole country constantly on the
alert. With this view he had for weeks past been traversing the
mountains of the Kabyles which spread around the Tafna. Through toilsome
days and sleepless nights he had been summoning, preaching, and
haranguing. His fiery eloquence had raised the enthusiasm of those
fierce and ungovernable mountaineers to a pitch of frenzy. When the time
for action came, and Abdel Kader once more led them in person against
the foe, they rushed to the combat more like wild beasts than men, came
at once to close quarters with the French infantry, grappled with them
in single combat, swept through their ranks, and rushed up to the
cannon’s mouth.
The French government, irritated by such prolonged and unexpected
resistance, continued to pour in reinforcements. On the 6th of June,
1836, General Bugeaud landed at the mouth of the Tafna with three fresh
regiments. The attempt to force a passage to Tlemsen was immediately
renewed, and, at last, the point was carried with success. Abdel Kader
fought a long and desperate battle with the invading force on the banks
of the Sikkak, but on this occasion he was completely defeated.
This reverse had its usual effect on the tribes. Many of the cavalry
contingents rode off and returned to their homes. The sudden abandonment
to which Abdel Kader was sometimes exposed, after a defeat, would have
prostrated the energies of a weaker mind, and paralysed a less iron-
moulded will. But such oscillations had long ceased to affect him. He
well knew that whenever Fortune smiled, a wave of his sword would at any
hour bring both waverers and rebels crouching to his feet.
But when he was informed that a certain Sidi Ibrahim had so far
calculated on his present emergency as to excite a revolt against him,
and even to assume the title of sultan, he drew his sword from its
scabbard, hung it to his saddle bow, and vowed never to sheathe it or
descend from his horse till he had the traitor’s head. Appearing almost
singly in the midst of the tribe Beni Amers, among whom he knew the
traitor to be, he demanded his instant delivery. The tribe, startled and
subdued by this act of bold decision, and dreading the charge of
complicity, gave up the rebel Sidi Ibrahim. His head was at once taken
off.
Abdel Kader, by the ceaseless activity of his movements in all
directions, and by the untiring vigilance with which he superintended
his system of blockade, had again reduced the French to the greatest
extremities. They had established posts in the interior, but they could
neither reach them nor communicate with them. Their letters were
intercepted. The bearers of them, when seized, were invariably
decapitated. No friendly tribes brought the French provisions.
Whether at Oran, or at the Tafna, they could only move out in large
bodies, and on such occasions large supplies, beasts of burden, and
means of transport were required. The Douairs and Zmelas, seeking
shelter under the walls of Oran, lived upon the rations scantily doled
out to them by their protectors. At Tlemsen, Cavaignac was buying cats
for his table at 40 francs a head.
In the month of November, 1836, Clausel, who had returned to his post,
undertook the siege of Constantine, the stronghold of Achmet Bey, the
last representative of the Turkish power in Algeria. Abdel Kader
abstained from taking any steps which might thwart the complete
development of that design. Whether the French were successful in their
design or not, he flattered himself that he should be the gainer in the
end. He felt that if the Bey were vanquished, he should be delivered,
without cost or trouble to himself, from a dangerous rival, and that the
Arab tribes of the province of Constantine would then be free to join
his standard. If he were triumphant, the French, wearied out by the
difficulties of their general position in the country, might abandon it;
in which case, a struggle between himself and the Bey for the mastery
would neither be doubtful as to its issue, nor of long duration.
But when the expedition failed, he felt his hour was come. From his
head-quarters at Medea, he issued orders for a simultaneous advance
against all the French possessions between the Atlas and the sea-coast.
In the province of Oran little remained to be effected. But the plain of
the Metija was at his mercy. Thousands of Arabs and Kabyles, supported
by the tribes of Tittery, descended like a torrent from the mountains,
sacking and burning the French colonial establishments, slaying and
capturing the colonists, and carrying terror and dismay into Algiers
itself.
The state to which the French garrisons were now reduced was pitiable.
The utmost ingenuity of their commissariat was daily and hourly taxed to
avert the horrors of famine. Fortunately for the French, they were
relieved from their painful predicament by the speculative genius of a
Jew.
Durand, the Sultan’s wily and influential agent at Algiers, had long
been feasting his imagination with the splendid harvest he should
gather, could he only be constituted sole conductor of commercial
transactions between the contending parties. To this end he had for
months been labouring to convince Abdel Kader that the advantages, even
in a military point of view, to be gained by feeding the French would
far outweigh the value of any glory which might be gained by starving
them.
Authorised to drive the best bargain he could, Durand hurried off to
Oran, and opened a negotiation with General Broussard, who, at that
period, was in command of the garrison.
“The French,” he said, “have need of corn and meat. The Sultan wants
iron, lead, and sulphur. Let each party sell the other what it wants,
and all will be satisfied. You need not fear that you will be in any
degree compromised with the Sultan by such an arrangement. He will not
appear in the matter at all. I will sell you corn and cattle; and you
will sell me iron and sulphur. The Sultan will merely know, indirectly,
that the former articles are for you, and the latter for him. The Sultan
will even go so far as to allow you to re-victual Tlemsen; but as such a
concession would undoubtedly exasperate and disgust the Arabs, to whom
the presence of the French in that town is hateful, he can only take on
himself the odium and responsibility of granting it, on the condition
that all the prisoners taken at the battle of the Sikkak are set free
and sent back to him.”
Broussard at once accepted the proposal. The French again enjoyed the
long unaccustomed luxury of abundance. Abdel Kader, on his side quietly
obtained from his enemies, reduced to assume the garb of friends, the
materials of war, which were hereafter to be wielded against them.
Not only did this singular contract, as it turned out, give him the
means of increasing his aggressive power, but, at the same time, it also
raised his _prestige_. To the sneers of fanatics, who reproached him
with his defeats, and the complaints of whole families, constantly
demanding their lost ones, languishing in the prisons of the infidel, he
could now reply by triumphantly pointing to prisoners arrested from the
victor’s hands, restored to their homes, and able again to take part in
the holy war. Such was the state of affairs when General Bugeaud arrived
from France at Oran, with instructions either to make peace with Abdel
Kader, or to conquer him.
Wishing to try, in the first place, to effect a negotiation, he sent him
the following propositions as a basis of accommodation:—
1. Acknowledgment of the sovereignty of France.
2. Limitation of his territory to the river Cheliff.
3. Payment of tribute.
4. Delivery of hostages, as guarantee for, and the due execution of, any
future treaty which might be agreed on.
Abdel Kader replied, through his agent Durand, that having never
experienced any fatal check, and having amply compensated himself for
any disasters which had temporarily befallen him, he could never consent
to be placed in a position inferior to that which he enjoyed by the
treaty of Desmichels; that Arabs would never hear of living under even
the nominal dominion of Christians; and that if France endeavoured to
place them under it by force she would be embarking in an endless war.
He declared, moreover, that he had not entered the province of Tittery
from any design of his own, but had been summoned thither by the voice
of its inhabitants, and that neither his honour nor his religion would
allow him to abandon those who had thrown themselves on his protection.
He added, that in his opinion the real interest of France was not to
seek an extension of sway over populations irreconcilably hostile to
her, but rather to confine herself to commercial enterprise in the towns
on the sea-coast.
By the voice of his agent, Abdel Kader admitted, however, that he would
consent to allow the French to occupy the Metija, or Plain of Algiers,
with the exception of Blidah, which belonged properly to the mountains,
and that he was willing to yield them all the territory near Oran,
comprised between the Bridia and the Macta. He was ready, moreover, as
he declared, to renounce the monopoly granted him by Desmichels, to
allow complete freedom of commerce, and to guarantee the security, and
repair the losses, if any occurred, of all Frenchmen who chose to settle
in the interior. He would pledge himself, finally, never to give up any
sea-port which was ceded to him to a foreign power.
Bold and dictatorial as such language appeared to the General, he
preferred, under all circumstances, to continue in the path of
concession, rather than to make any resistance which might have
precipitated hostilities. His Government had expressly warned him
against granting Abdel Kader any further extension of territory. The
latter had firmly stated that he would not give up an inch of what he
held. The General yielded, and on his own responsibility, offered to
give up to Abdel Kader the province of Tittery, with the stipulation,
however, that he should consent to be the vassal of France.
The following ultimatum, embodying the terms of this important
compromise, was now drawn up, and forwarded to Abdel Kader. The
circumscribed limits, within which the military representative of the
French Government therein offered to confine his countrymen in Algeria,
constituted a point which was in itself a glorious testimony to the
successful prowess of the great leader who had hitherto rendered barren
all the expeditions which the French had directed against him, and
thwarted all their schemes of conquest.
1. The Emir will recognise the sovereignty of France.
2. France reserves, in the province of Oran, a belt, from ten to twelve
leagues in breadth, beginning at the Rio Salado, and terminating at the
Cheliff. In the province of Algiers, he reserves Algiers, and all the
province of that name. She cedes to the Emir the province of Tittery and
that of Oran, excepting the belt afore-mentioned.
3. The Emir will pay an annual tribute in corn and cattle.
4. There shall be perfect freedom of commerce.
5. All the goods which the French have acquired, or may acquire, in the
country will be guaranteed.
This ultimatum reached Abdel Kader at Medea, where he had already opened
negotiations with General Damremont, the new Governor-General of
Algeria, not without sanguine hopes of a satisfactory result. He now
found himself engaged with two negotiators, both willing to treat with
him on terms highly favourable to his views and expectations. Their zeal
to conclude with him, indeed, amounted to rivalry.
Bugeaud had requested, as a particular favour from his Government, that
to him alone should be reserved the glory of dealing with Abdel Kader.
When, therefore, he learned that Damremont had entered into diplomatic
relations with the Arab Sultan, his jealousy was aroused. He taxed his
superior with exercising an unauthorised and unwarrantable intervention
in a complication, the adjustment of which depended entirely on himself.
A recriminating correspondence took place. Reference was made to the
Minister of War, who decided that Bugeaud was to be left full liberty of
action, without interference or supervision.
As soon as Abdel Kader heard of this decision, he returned to the
province of Oran, and on the 12th of May sent the following propositions
in reply to Bugeaud’s ultimatum:—
1. The Emir acknowledges the sovereignty of France.
2. All the Mussulmans who live outside the towns shall be under his
jurisdiction.
3. The territory of the French to the west of Oran shall be confined to
the country between Bridia and the sea, and extend as far as the Macta.
On the side of Algiers, they will be allowed to hold the country between
that town and the river Beni-Azza.
4. The Emir will give, for this year only, 20,000 measures of corn,
20,000 measures of barley, and 3,000 head of cattle.
5. The Emir shall be empowered to buy, in France, powder, sulphur, and
arms.
6. The Kolouglis who choose to remain in Tlemsen, shall keep their
properties, be under our power, and conform themselves to our land.
7. Those who leave the French territory, or the territory of the Emir,
shall be reciprocally given up on the requisition of the one or the
other party.
8. France cedes to the Emir, Rachgoun, Tlemsen, its citadel, and the
mortars and cannons which anciently belonged to it. The Emir undertakes
to transport the effects of the French garrison to Oran.
9. Commerce shall be free between the Arabs and the French.
10. The French shall be respected amongst the Arabs, as the Arabs
amongst the French.
11. The farms and properties which the French may have acquired in the
Metija shall be guaranteed. They shall enjoy them freely.
In the preceding stipulations, Abdel Kader made no allusion to the
cession of Tittery and Oran. He looked on it as a matter of course,
inasmuch as in the former province the French had not even the shadow of
power; whilst in the latter they only traversed as birds of passage,
flitting from town to town. But, bent on the consolidation of his power,
and the strengthening of his lines of communication, he boldly insisted
on the evacuation, by the French, of Tlemsen, and on their yielding up
the port of Rachgoun.
But he went even still further. Feeling well his vantage-ground, and
seeing the straits to which the French were reduced, he did not hesitate
to require that all Mussulman residing on French territory should be
under his exclusive jurisdiction. In this demand he endeavoured to carry
out and enforce a principle which, in his eyes, was paramount to every
earthly consideration, as based on the very essence of the Koran—the
principle, that under no circumstances, if possible, should any
Mussulman voluntarily acknowledge or submit to Christian rule.
At this period, Abdel Kader approached the zenith of his career.