You say, that presumption alone makes Atheists. Inform them then what your

God is; teach them his essence; speak of him intelligibly; say something

about him, which is reasonable, and not contradictory or impossible. If

you are unable to satisfy them, if hitherto none of you have been able to

demonstrate the existence of a God in a clear and convincing manner; if

by your own confession, his essence is completely veiled from you, as from

the rest of mortals, forgive those, who cannot admit what they can neither

understand nor make consistent with itself; do not tax with presumption

and vanity those who are sincere enough to confess their ignorance; do

not accuse of folly those who find themselves incapable of believing

contradictions; and for once, blush at exciting the hatred and fury of

sovereigns and people against men, who think not like you concerning a

being, of whom you have no idea. Is any thing more rash and extravagant,

than to reason concerning an object, known to be inconceivable? You say,

that the corruption of the heart produces Atheism, that men shake off the

yoke of the Deity only because they fear his formidable judgments.

But, why do you paint your God in colours so shocking, that he becomes

insupportable? Why does so powerful a God permit men to be so corrupt? How

can we help endeavouring to shake off the yoke of a tyrant, who, able to

do as he pleases with men, consents to their perversion, who hardens, and

blinds them, and refuses them his grace, that he may have the satisfaction

to punish them eternally, for having been hardened, and blinded, and for

not having the grace which he refused? Theologians and priests must be

very confident of the grace of heaven and a happy futurity, to refrain

from detesting a master so capricious as the God they announce. A God,

who damns eternally, is the most odious of beings that the human mind can

invent.

189.

No man upon earth is truly interested in the support of error, which is

forced sooner or later to yield to truth. The general good must at length

open the eyes of mortals: the passions themselves sometimes contribute

to break the chains of prejudices. Did not the passions of sovereigns,

centuries ago, annihilate in some countries of Europe the tyrannical

power, which a too haughty pontiff once exercised over all princes of his

sect? In consequence of the progress of political science, the clergy

were then stripped of immense riches, which credulity had accumulated

upon them. Ought not this memorable example to convince priests, that

prejudices triumph but for a time, and that truth alone can insure solid

happiness?

By caressing sovereigns, by fabricating divine rights for them, by

deifying them, and by abandoning the people, bound hand and foot, to their

will, the ministers of the Most High must see, that they are labouring to

make them tyrants. Have they not reason to apprehend, that the gigantic

idols, which they raised to the clouds, will one day crush them by

their enormous weight? Do not a thousand examples remind them that these

tyrants, after preying upon the people, may prey upon them in their turn.

We will respect priests, when they become sensible men. Let them, if they

please, use the authority of heaven to frighten those princes who are

continually desolating the earth; but let them no more adjudge to them the

horrid right of being unjust with impunity. Let them acknowledge, that no

man is interested in living under tyranny; and let them teach sovereigns,

that they themselves are not interested in exercising a despotism, which,

by rendering them odious, exposes them to danger, and detracts from

their power and greatness. Finally, let priests and kings become so

far enlightened as to acknowledge, that no power is secure which is not

founded upon truth, reason, and equity.

190.

By waging war against Reason, which they ought to have protected and

developed, the ministers of the gods evidently act against their own

interest. What power, influence, and respect might they not have gained

among the wisest of men, what gratitude would they not have excited in the

people, if, instead of wasting their time about their vain disputes, they

had applied themselves to really useful science, and investigated the

true principles of philosophy, government, and morals! Who would dare to

reproach a body with its opulence or influence, if the members dedicating

themselves to the public good, employed their leisure in study, and

exercised their authority in enlightening the minds both of sovereigns and

subjects?

Priests! Forsake your chimeras, your unintelligible dogmas, your

contemptible quarrels! Banish those phantoms which could be useful only in

the infancy of nations. Assume, at length, the language of reason. Instead

of exciting persecution; instead of entertaining the people with silly

disputes; instead of preaching useless and fanatical dogmas, preach human

and social morality; preach virtues really useful to the world; become the

apostles of reason, the defenders of liberty, and the reformers of abuses.

191.

Philosophers have every where taken upon themselves a part, which seemed

destined to the ministers of Religion. The hatred of the latter for

philosophy was only a jealousy of trade. But, instead of endeavouring

to injure and decry each other, all men of good sense should unite their

efforts to combat error, seek truth, and especially to put to flight the

prejudices, that are equally injurious to sovereigns and subjects, and of

which the abettors themselves sooner or later become the victims.

In the hands of an enlightened government, the priests would become the

most useful of the citizens. Already richly paid by the state, and free

from the care of providing for their own subsistence, how could they

be better employed than in qualifying themselves for the instruction

of others? Would not their minds be better satisfied with discovering

luminous truths, than in wandering through the thick darkness of error?

Would it be more difficult to discern the clear principles of Morality,

than the imaginary principles of a divine and theological Morality? Would

men of ordinary capacities find it as difficult to fix in their heads the

simple notions of their duties, as to load their memories with mysteries,

unintelligible words and obscure definitions, of which they can never

form a clear idea? What time and pains are lost in learning and teaching

things, which are not of the least real utility! What resources for the

encouragement of the sciences, the advancement of knowledge, and the

education of youth, well disposed sovereigns might find in the many

monasteries, which in several countries live upon the people without in

the slightest degree profiting them! But superstition, jealous of its

exclusive empire, seems resolved to form only useless beings. To what

advantage might we not turn a multitude of cenobites of both sexes,

who, in many countries, are amply endowed for doing nothing? Instead

of overwhelming them with fasting and austerities; instead of barren

contemplations, mechanical prayers, and trifling ceremonies; why should

we not excite in them a salutary emulation, which may incline them to seek

the means, not of being _dead_ to the world, but of being _useful_ to it?

Instead of filling the youthful minds of their pupils with fables, sterile

dogmas, and puerilities, why are not priests obliged, or invited to teach

them truths, and to render them useful citizens of their country? Under

the present system, men are only useful to the clergy who blind them, and

to the tyrants who fleece them.

192.

The partisans of credulity often accuse unbelievers of insincerity,

because they sometimes waver in their principles, alter their minds in

sickness, and retract at death. When the body is disordered, the faculty

of reasoning is commonly disordered with it. At the approach of death,

man, weak and decayed, is sometimes himself sensible that Reason abandons

him, and that Prejudice returns. There are some diseases, which tend to

weaken the brain; to create despondency and pusillanimity; and there are

others, which destroy the body, but do not disturb the reason. At any

rate, an unbeliever who recants in sickness is not more extraordinary,

than a devotee who neglects in health the duties which his religion

explicitly enjoins.

Ministers of Religion openly contradict in their daily conduct the

rigorous principles, they teach to others; in consequence of which,

unbelievers, in their turn, may justly accuse them of insincerity. Is it

easy to find many prelates humble, generous, void of ambition, enemies

of pomp and grandeur, and friends of poverty? In short, is the conduct of

Christian ministers conformable to the austere morality of Christ, their

God, and their model?

193.

_Atheism_, it is said, _breaks all the ties of society. Without the belief

of a God, what will become of the sacredness of oaths? How shall we oblige

a man to speak the truth, who cannot seriously call the Deity to witness

what he says?_ But, does an oath strengthen our obligation to fulfil the

engagements contracted? Will he, who is not fearful of lying, be less

fearful of perjury? He, who is base enough to break his word, or unjust

enough to violate his engagements, in contempt of the esteem of men, will

not be more faithful therein for having called all the gods to witness his

oaths. Those, who disregard the judgments of men, will soon disregard the

judgments of God. Are not princes, of all men, the most ready to swear,

and the most ready to violate their oaths?

194.

_The vulgar_, it is repeatedly said, _must have a Religion. If enlightened

persons have no need of the restraint of opinion, it is at least necessary

to rude men, whose reason is uncultivated by education_. But, is it indeed

a fact, that religion is a restraint upon the vulgar? Do we see, that

this religion preserves them from intemperance, drunkenness, brutality,

violence, fraud, and every kind of excess? Could a people who have no idea

of the Deity conduct themselves in a more detestable manner, than these

believing people, among whom we find dissipation and vices, the most

unworthy of reasonable beings? Upon going out of the churches, do not the

working classes, and the populace, plunge without fear into their ordinary

irregularities, under the idea, that the periodical homage, which they

render to their God, authorizes them to follow, without remorse, their

vicious habits and pernicious propensities? Finally, if the people are

so low-minded and unreasonable, is not their stupidity chargeable to

the negligence of their princes, who are wholly regardless of public

education, or who even oppose the instruction of their subjects? Is not

the want of reason in the people evidently the work of the priests, who,

instead of instructing men in a rational morality, entertain them with

fables, reveries, ceremonies, fallacies, and false virtues which they

think of the greatest importance?

To the people, Religion is but a vain display of ceremonies, to which

they are attached by habit, which entertains their eyes, and produces

a transient emotion in their torpid understandings, without influencing

their conduct or reforming their morals. Even by the confession of the

ministers of the altars, nothing is more rare than that _internal_ and

_spiritual_ Religion, which alone is capable of regulating the life of

man and of triumphing over his evil propensities. In the most numerous

and devout nation, are there many persons, who are really capable of

understanding the principles of their religious system, and who find them

powerful enough to stifle their perverse inclinations?

Many persons will say, that _any restraint whatever is better than none._

They will maintain, that _if religion awes not the greater part, it serves

at least to restrain some individuals, who would otherwise without remorse

abandon themselves to crime_. Men ought undoubtedly to have a restraint,

but not an imaginary one. Religion only frightens those whose imbecility

of character has already prevented them from being formidable to their

fellow-citizens. An equitable government, severe laws, and sound morality

have an equal power over all; at least, every person must believe in them,

and perceive the danger of not conforming to them.

195.

Perhaps it will be asked, _whether Atheism can be proper for the

multitude?_ I answer, that any system, which requires discussion, is

not made for the multitude. _What purpose then can it serve to preach

Atheism?_ It may at least serve to convince all those who reason, that

nothing is more extravagant than to fret one's self, and nothing more

unjust than to vex others, for mere groundless conjectures. As for the

vulgar who never reason, the arguments of an Atheist are no more fit for

them than the systems of a natural philosopher, the observations of

an astronomer, the experiments of a chemist, the calculations of a

geometrician, the researches of a physician, the plans of an architect,

or the pleadings of a lawyer, who all labour for the people without their

knowledge.

Are the metaphysical reasonings and religious disputes, which have so

long engrossed the time and attention of so many profound thinkers, better

adapted to the generality of men than the reasoning of an Atheist? Nay,

as the principles of Atheism are founded upon plain common sense, are they

not more intelligible, than those of a theology, beset with difficulties,

which even the persons of the greatest genius cannot explain? In every

country, the people have a religion, the principles of which they

are totally ignorant, and which they follow from habit without any

examination: their priests alone are engaged in theology, which is too

dense for vulgar heads. If the people should chance to lose this unknown

theology, they mighty easily console themselves for the loss of a thing,

not only perfectly useless, but also productive of dangerous commotions.

It would be madness to write for the vulgar, or to attempt to cure their

prejudices all at once. We write for those only, who read and reason;

the multitude read but little, and reason still less. Calm and rational

persons will require new ideas, and knowledge will be gradually diffused.

196.

If theology is a branch of commerce profitable to theologians, it is

evidently not only superfluous, but injurious to the rest of society.

Self-interest will sooner or later open the eyes of men. Sovereigns

and subjects will one day adopt the profound indifference and contempt,

merited by a futile system, which serves only to make men miserable.

All persons will be sensible of the inutility of the many expensive

ceremonies, which contribute nothing to public felicity. Contemptible

quarrels will cease to disturb the tranquility of states, when we blush at

having considered them important.

Instead of Parliament meddling with the senseless combats of your clergy;

instead of foolishly espousing their impertinent quarrels, and attempting

to make your subjects adopt uniform opinions--strive to make them happy

in this world. Respect their liberty and property, watch over their

education, encourage them in their labours, reward their talents and

virtues, repress licentiousness; and do not concern yourselves with their

manner of thinking. Theological fables are useful only to tyrants and the

ignorant.

197.

Does it then require an extraordinary effort of genius to comprehend,

that what is above the capacity of man, is not made for him; that things

supernatural are not made for natural beings; that impenetrable mysteries

are not made for limited minds? If theologians are foolish enough to

dispute upon objects, which they acknowledge to be unintelligible even to

themselves, ought society to take any part in their silly quarrels? Must

the blood of nations flow to enhance the conjectures of a few infatuated

dreamers? If it is difficult to cure theologians of their madness and

the people of their prejudices, it is at least easy to prevent the

extravagancies of one party, and the silliness of the other from producing

pernicious effects. Let every one be permitted to think as he pleases; but

never let him be permitted to injure others for their manner of thinking.

Were the rulers of nations more just and rational, theological opinions

would not affect the public tranquillity, more than the disputes of

natural philosophers, physicians, grammarians, and critics. It is

tyranny which causes theological quarrels to be attended with serious

consequences.

Those, who extol the importance and utility of Religion, ought to shew

us its happy effects, the advantages for instance, which the disputes

and abstract speculations of theology can be to porters, artisans, and

labourers, and to the multitude of unfortunate women and corrupt servants

with which great cities abound. All these beings are religious; they have

what is called _an implicit faith_. Their parsons believe for them; and

they stupidly adhere to the unknown belief of their guides. They go to

hear sermons, and would think it a great crime to transgress any of the

ordinances, to which, in childhood, they are taught to conform. But of

what service to morals is all this? None at all. They have not the least

idea of Morality, and are even guilty of all the roguery, fraud, rapine,

and excess, that is out of the reach of law.

The populace have no idea of their Religion; what they call Religion

is nothing but a blind attachment to unknown opinions and mysterious

practices. In fact, to deprive people of Religion is to deprive them

of nothing. By overthrowing their prejudices, we should only lessen or

annihilate the dangerous confidence they put in interested guides, and

should teach them to mistrust those, who, under the pretext of Religion,

often lead them into fatal excesses.

198.

While pretending to instruct and enlighten men, Religion in reality keeps

them in ignorance, and stifles the desire of knowing the most interesting

objects. The people have no other rule of conduct, than what their priests

are pleased to prescribe. Religion supplies the place of every thing else:

but being in itself essentially obscure, it is more proper to lead mortals

astray than to guide them in the path of science and happiness. Religion

renders enigmatical all Natural Philosophy, Morality, Legislation and

Politics. A man blinded by religious prejudices, fears truth, whenever

it clashes with his opinions: he cannot know his own nature he cannot

cultivate his reason, he cannot perform experiments.

Everything concurs to render the people devout; but every thing tends to

prevent them from being humane, reasonable and virtuous. Religion seems to

have no other object, than to stupefy the mind.

Priests have been ever at war with genius and talent, because

well-informed men perceive, that superstition shackles the human mind, and

would keep it in eternal infancy, occupied solely by fables and

frightened by phantoms. Incapable of improvement itself, Theology opposed

insurmountable barriers to the progress of true knowledge; its sole object

is to keep nations and their rulers in the most profound ignorance of

their duties, and of the real motives, that should incline them to do

good. It obscures Morality, renders its principles arbitrary, and subjects

it to the caprice of the gods or of their ministers. It converts the

art of governing men into a mysterious tyranny, which is the scourge

of nations. It changes princes into unjust, licentious despots, and the

people into ignorant slaves, who become corrupt in order to merit the

favour of their masters.

199.

By tracing the history of the human mind, we shall be easily convinced,

that Theology has cautiously guarded against its progress. It began by

giving out fables as sacred truth: it produced poetry, which filled the

imagination of men with its puerile fictions: it entertained them with its

gods and their incredible deeds. In a word, Religion has always treated

men, like children, whom it lulled to sleep with tales, which its

ministers would have us still regard as incontestable truths.

If the ministers of the gods have sometimes made useful discoveries, they

have always been careful to give them a dogmatical tone, and envelope them

in the shades of mystery. Pythagoras and Plato, in order to acquire some

trifling knowledge, were obliged to court the favour of priests, to be

initiated in their mysteries, and to undergo whatever trials they were

pleased to impose. At this price, they were permitted to imbibe those

exalted notions, still so bewitching to all those who admire only what

is perfectly unintelligible. It was from Egyptian, Indian, and Chaldean

priests, from the schools of these visionaries, professionally interested

in bewildering human reason, that philosophy was obliged to borrow its

first rudiments. Obscure and false in its principles, mixed with fictions

and fables, and made only to dazzle the imagination, the progress of this

philosophy was precarious, and its theories unintelligible; instead of

enlightening, it blighted the mind, and diverted it from objects truly

useful.

The theological speculations and mystical reveries of the ancients are

still law in a great part of the philosophic world; and being adopted by

modern theology, it is heresy to abandon them. They tell us "of aerial

beings, of spirits, angels, demons, genii," and other phantoms, which are

the object of their meditations, and serve as the basis of _metaphysics_,

an abstract and futile science, which for thousands of years the greatest

geniuses have vainly studied. Hypothesis, imagined by a few visionaries

of Memphis and Babylon, constitute even now the foundations of a science,

whose obscurity makes it revered as marvellous and divine.

The first legislators were priests; the first mythologists, poets, learned

men, and physicians were priests. In their hands science became sacred

and was withheld from the profane. They spoke only in allegories, emblems,

enigmas, and ambiguous oracles--means well calculated to excite curiosity,

and above all to inspire the astonished vulgar with a holy respect for

men, who when they were thought to be instructed by the gods, and capable

of reading in the heavens the fate of the earth, boldly proclaimed

themselves the oracles of the Deity.

200.

The religions of ancient priests have only changed form. Although our

modern theologians regard their predecessors as impostors, yet they have

collected many scattered fragments of their religious systems. In modern

Religions we find, not only their metaphysical dogmas, which theology has

merely clothed in a new dress, but also some remarkable remains of their

superstitious practices, their magic, and their enchantments. Christians

are still commanded to respect the remaining monuments of the legislators,

priests, and prophets of the Hebrew Religion, which had borrowed its

strange practices from Egypt. Thus extravagancies, imagined by knaves or

idolatrous visionaries, are still sacred among Christians!

If we examine history, we shall find a striking resemblance among all

Religions. In all parts of the earth, we see, that religious notions,

periodically depress and elevate the people. The attention of man is

every where engrossed, by rites often abominable, and by mysteries always

formidable, which become the sole objects of meditation. The different

superstitions borrow, from one another, their abstract reveries and

ceremonies. Religions are in general mere unintelligible rhapsodies,

combined by new teachers, who use the materials of their predecessors,

reserving the right of adding or retrenching whatever is not conformable

to the present age. The religion of Egypt was evidently the basis of the

religion of Moses, who banished the worship of idols: Moses was merely a

schismatic Egyptian. Christianism is only reformed Judaism. Mahometanism

is composed of Judaism, Christianity, and the ancient religion of Arabia,

etc.

201.

Theology, from the remotest antiquity to the present time, has had the

exclusive privilege of directing philosophy. What assistance has been

derived from its labours? It changed philosophy into an unintelligible

jargon, calculated to render uncertain the clearest truths; it has

converted the art of reasoning into a jargon of words; it has carried the

human mind into the airy regions of metaphysics, and there employed it in

vainly fathoming an obscure abyss. Instead of physical and simple causes,

this transformed philosophy has substituted supernatural, or rather,

_occult_ causes; it has explained phenomena difficult to be conceived by

agents still more inconceivable. It has filled language with words, void

of sense, incapable of accounting for things, better calculated to obscure

than enlighten, and which seems invented expressly to discourage man,

to guard him against the powers of his mind, to make him mistrust the

principles of reason and evidence, and to raise an insurmountable barrier

between him and truth.

202.

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