Upon examining the proofs which seem to establish, and the arguments which
combat, the existence of God, some persons have doubted and withheld their
assent. But this uncertainty arises from not having sufficiently examined.
Is it possible to doubt any thing evident? Sensible people ridicule an
absolute scepticism, and think it even impossible. A man, who doubted his
own existence, or that of the sun, would appear ridiculous. Is this more
extravagant than to doubt the non-existence of an evidently impossible
being? Is it more absurd to doubt one's own existence, than to hesitate
upon the impossibility of a being, whose qualities reciprocally destroy
one another? Do we find greater probability for believing the existence of
a spiritual being, than the existence of a stick without two ends? Is the
notion of an infinitely good and powerful being, who causes or permits
an infinity of evils, less absurd or impossible, than that of a square
triangle? Let us conclude then, that religious scepticism can result only
from a superficial examination of theological principles, which are in
perpetual contradiction with the most clear and demonstrative principles.
To doubt, is to deliberate. Scepticism is only a state of indetermination,
resulting from an insufficient examination of things. Is it possible for
any one to be sceptical in matters of religion, who will deign to revert
to its principles, and closely examine the notion of God, who serves
as its basis? Doubt generally arises either from indolence, weakness,
indifference, or incapacity. With many people, to doubt is to fear the
trouble of examining things, which are thought uninteresting. But religion
being presented to men as their most important concern in this and the
future world, skepticism and doubt on this subject must occasion perpetual
anxiety and must really constitute a bed of thorns. Every man who has not
courage to contemplate, without prejudice, the God upon whom all religion
is founded, can never know for what religion to decide: he knows not what
he should believe or not believe, admit or reject, hope or fear.
Indifference upon religion must not be confounded with scepticism. This
indifference is founded upon the absolute assurance, or at any rate upon
the probable belief, that religion is not interesting. A persuasion that
a thing which is pretended to be important is not so, or is only
indifferent, supposes a sufficient examination of the thing, without which
it would be impossible to have this persuasion. Those who call themselves
sceptics in the fundamental points of religion, are commonly either
indolent or incapable of examining.
124.
In every country, we are assured, that a God has revealed himself. What
has he taught men? Has he proved evidently that he exists? Has he informed
them where he resides? Has he taught them what he is, or in what his
essence consists? Has he clearly explained to them his intentions and
plan? Does what he says of this plan correspond with the effects, which
we see? No. He informs them solely, that _he is what he is_; that he is
a _hidden God_; that his ways are unspeakable; that he is exasperated
against all who have the temerity to fathom his decrees, or to consult
reason in judging him or his works.
Does the revealed conduct of God answer the magnificent ideas which
theologians would give us of his wisdom, goodness, justice, and
omnipotence? By no means. In every revelation, this conduct announces a
partial and capricious being, the protector of favourite people, and the
enemy of all others. If he deigns to appear to some men, he takes care to
keep all others in an invincible ignorance of his divine intentions. Every
private revelation evidently announces in God, injustice, partiality and
malignity.
Do the commands, revealed by any God, astonish us by their sublime reason
or wisdom? Do they evidently tend to promote the happiness of the people,
to whom the Divinity discloses them? Upon examining the divine commands,
one sees in every country, nothing but strange ordinances, ridiculous
precepts, impertinent ceremonies, puerile customs, oblations, sacrifices,
and expiations, useful indeed to the ministers of God, but very
burthensome to the rest of the citizens. I see likewise, that these laws
often tend to make men unsociable, disdainful, intolerant, quarrelsome,
unjust, and inhuman, to those who have not received the same revelations,
the same ordinances, or the same favours from heaven.
125.
Are the precepts of morality, announced by the Deity, really divine,
or superior to those which every reasonable man might imagine? They are
divine solely because it is impossible for the human mind to discover
their utility. They make virtue consist in a total renunciation of nature,
in a voluntary forgetfulness of reason, a holy hatred of ourselves.
Finally, these sublime precepts often exhibit perfection in a conduct,
cruel to ourselves, and perfectly useless to others.
Has a God appeared? Has he himself promulgated his laws? Has he spoken to
men with his own mouth? I am told, that God has not appeared to a whole
people; but that he has always manifested himself through the medium
of some favourite personages, who have been intrusted with the care of
announcing and explaining his intentions. The people have never been
permitted to enter the sanctuary; the ministers of the gods have alone had
the right to relate what passes there.
126.
If in every system of divine revelation, I complain of not seeing either
the wisdom, goodness, or equity of God; if I suspect knavery, ambition, or
interest; it is replied, that God has confirmed by miracles the mission of
those, who speak in his name. But was it not more simple for him to appear
in person, to explain his nature and will? Again, if I have the curiosity
to examine these miracles, I find, that they are improbable tales, related
by suspected people, who had the greatest interest in giving out that they
were the messengers of the Most High.
What witnesses are appealed to in order to induce us to believe incredible
miracles? Weak people, who existed thousands of years ago, and who, even
though they could attest these miracles, may be suspected of being duped
by their own imagination, and imposed upon by the tricks of dexterous
impostors. But, you will say, these miracles are written in books,
which by tradition have been transmitted to us. By whom were these books
written? Who are the men who have transmitted them? They are either the
founders of religions themselves, or their adherents and assigns. Thus,
in religion, the evidence of interested parties becomes irrefragable and
incontestable.
127.
God has spoken differently to every people. The Indian believes not a word
of what He has revealed to the Chinese; the Mahometan considers as fables
what He has said to the Christian; the Jew regards both the Mahometan and
Christian as sacrilegious corrupters of the sacred law, which his God had
given to his fathers. The Christian, proud of his more modern revelation,
indiscriminately damns the Indian, Chinese, Mahometan, and even the
Jew, from whom he receives his sacred books. Who is wrong or right? Each
exclaims, _I am in the right!_ Each adduces the same proofs: each mentions
his miracles, diviners, prophets, and martyrs. The man of sense tells
them, they are all delirious; that God has not spoken, if it is true
that he is a spirit, and can have neither mouth nor tongue; that without
borrowing the organ of mortals, God could inspire his creatures with what
he would have them learn; and that, as they are all equally ignorant what
to think of God, it is evident that it has not been the will of God to
inform them on the subject.
The followers of different forms of worship which are established, accuse
one another of superstition and impiety. Christians look with abhorrence
upon the Pagan, Chinese, and Mahometan superstition. Roman Catholics
treat, as impious, Protestant Christians; and the latter incessantly
declaim against the superstition of the Catholics. They are all right.
To be impious, is to have opinions offensive to the God adored; to be
superstitious, is to have of him false ideas. In accusing one another of
superstition, the different religionists resemble humpbacks, who reproach
one another with their deformity.
128.
Are the oracles, which the Divinity has revealed by his different
messengers, remarkable for clearness? Alas! no two men interpret them
alike. Those who explain them to others are not agreed among themselves.
To elucidate them, they have recourse to interpretations, to commentaries,
to allegories, to explanations: they discover _mystical sense_ very
different from the _literal sense_. Men are every where wanted to explain
the commands of a God, who could not, or would not, announce himself
clearly to those, whom he wished to enlighten.
129.
The founders of religion, have generally proved their missions by
miracles. But what is a miracle? It is an operation directly opposite to
the laws of nature. But who, according to you, made those laws? God. Thus,
your God, who, according to you, foresaw every thing, counteracts
the laws, which his wisdom prescribed to nature! These laws were then
defective, or at least in certain circumstances they did not accord with
the views of the same God, since you inform us that he judged it necessary
to suspend or counteract them.
It is said, that a few men, favoured by the Most High, have received power
to perform miracles. But to perform a miracle, it is necessary to have
ability to create new causes capable of producing effects contrary to
those of common causes. Is it easy to conceive, that God can give men the
inconceivable power of creating causes out of nothing? Is it credible,
that an immutable God can communicate to men power to change or rectify
his plan, a power, which by his essence an immutable being cannot save
himself? Miracles, far from doing much honour to God, far from proving
the divinity of a religion, evidently annihilate the God idea. How can
a theologian tell us, that God, who must have embraced the whole of his
plan, who could have made none but perfect laws, and who cannot alter
them, is forced to employ miracles to accomplish his projects, or can
grant his creatures the power of working prodigies to execute his divine
will? An omnipotent being, whose will is always fulfilled, who holds in
his hand his creatures, has only to _will_, to make them believe whatever
he desires.
130.
What shall we say of religions that prove their divinity by miracles? How
can we credit miracles recorded in the sacred books of the Christians,
where God boasts of hardening the hearts and blinding those whom he wishes
to destroy; where he permits malicious spirits and magicians to work
miracles as great as those of his servants; where it is predicted, that
_Antichrist_ shall have power to perform prodigies capable of shaking the
faith even of the elect? In this case, by what signs shall we know whether
God means to instruct or ensnare us? How shall we distinguish whether
the wonders, we behold, come from God or devil? To remove our perplexity,
Pascal gravely tells us, that _it is necessary to judge the doctrine by
the miracles, and the miracles by the doctrine; that the doctrine proves
the miracles, and the miracles the doctrine_. If there exist a vicious and
ridiculous circle, it is undoubtedly in this splendid reasoning of one of
the greatest defenders of Christianity. Where is the religion, that does
not boast of the most admirable doctrine, and which does not produce
numerous miracles for its support?
Is a miracle capable of annihilating the evidence of a demonstrated truth?
Although a man should have the secret of healing all the sick, of making
all the lame to walk, of raising in all the dead of a city, of ascending
into the air, of stopping the course of the sun and moon, can he thereby
convince me, that two and two do not make four, that one makes three, and
that three make only one; that a God, whose immensity fills the universe,
could have been contained in the body of a Jew; that the ETERNAL can
die like a man; that a God, who is said to be immutable, provident, and
sensible, could have changed his mind upon his religion, and reformed his
own work by a new revelation?
131.
According to the very principles either of natural or revealed theology,
every new revelation should be regarded as false; every change in
a religion emanated from the Deity should be reputed an impiety and
blasphemy. Does not all reform suppose, that, in his first effort, God
could not give his religion the solidity and perfection required? To say,
that God, in giving a first law, conformed to the rude ideas of the people
whom he wished to enlighten, is to pretend that God was neither able nor
willing to render the people, whom he was enlightening, so reasonable as
was necessary in order to please him.
Christianity is an impiety, if it is true that Judaism is a religion which
has really emanated from a holy, immutable, omnipotent, and foreseeing
God. The religion of Christ supposes either defects in the law which God
himself had given by Moses, or impotence or malice in the same God, who
was either unable or unwilling to render the Jews such as they ought to
have been in order to please him. Every new religion, or reform of
ancient religions, is evidently founded upon the impotence, inconstancy,
imprudence, or malice of the Divinity.
132.
If history informs me, that the first apostles, the founders or reformers
of religions, wrought great miracles; history also informs me, that these
reformers and their adherents were commonly buffeted, persecuted, and put
to death, as disturbers of the peace of nations. I am therefore tempted to
believe, that they did not perform the miracles ascribed to them;
indeed, such miracles must have gained them numerous partisans among the
eye-witnesses, who ought to have protected the operators from abuse. My
incredulity redoubles, when I am told, that the workers of miracles
were cruelly tormented, or ignominiously executed. How is it possible to
believe, that missionaries, protected by God, invested with his divine
power, and enjoying the gift of miracles, could not have wrought such a
simple miracle, as to escape the cruelty of their persecutors?
Priests have the art of drawing from the persecutions themselves, a
convincing proof in favour of the religion of the persecuted. But a
religion, which boasts of having cost the lives of many martyrs, and
informs us, that its founders, in order to extend it, have suffered
punishments, cannot be the religion of a beneficent, equitable and
omnipotent God. A good God would not permit men, intrusted with announcing
his commands, to be ill-treated. An all-powerful God, wishing to found a
religion, would proceed in a manner more simple and less fatal to the most
faithful of his servants. To say that God would have his religion sealed
with blood, is to say that he is weak, unjust, ungrateful, and sanguinary;
and that he is cruel enough to sacrifice his messengers to the views of
his ambition.
133.
To die for religion proves not that the religion is true, or divine; it
proves, at most, that it is supposed to be such. An enthusiast proves
nothing by his death, unless that religious fanaticism is often stronger
than the love of life. An impostor may sometimes die with courage; he then
makes, in the language of the proverb, _a virtue of necessity_.
People are often surprised and affected at sight of the generous courage
and disinterested zeal, which has prompted missionaries to preach their
doctrine, even at the risk of suffering the most rigorous treatment. From
this ardour for the salvation of men, are drawn inferences favourable to
the religion they have announced. But in reality, this disinterestedness
is only apparent. He, who ventures nothing should gain nothing. A
missionary seeks to make his fortune by his doctrine. He knows that, if he
is fortunate enough to sell his commodity, he will become absolute master
of those who receive him for their guide; he is sure of becoming the
object of their attention, respect, and veneration. Such are the true
motives, which kindle the zeal and charity of so many preachers and
missionaries.
To die for an opinion, proves the truth or goodness of that opinion
no more than to die in battle proves the justice of a cause, in which
thousands have the folly to devote their lives. The courage of a martyr,
elated with the idea of paradise, is not more supernatural, than the
courage of a soldier, intoxicated with the idea of glory, or impelled
by the fear of disgrace. What is the difference between an Iroquois, who
sings while he is burning by inches, and the martyr ST. LAURENCE, who upon
the gridiron insults his tyrant?
The preachers of a new doctrine fail, because they are the weakest;
apostles generally practise a perilous trade. Their courageous death
proves neither the truth of their principles nor their own sincerity,
any more than the violent death of the ambitious man, or of the robber,
proves, that they were right in disturbing society, or that they thought
themselves authorised in so doing. The trade of a missionary was always
flattering to ambition, and formed a convenient method of living at the
expense of the vulgar. These advantages have often been enough to efface
every idea of danger.
134.
You tell us, theologians! that _what is folly in the eyes of men, is
wisdom before God, who delights to confound the wisdom of the wise_. But
do you not say, that human wisdom is a gift of heaven? In saying this
wisdom displeases God, is but folly in his sight, and that he is pleased
to confound it, you declare that your God is the friend only of ignorant
people, and that he makes sensible people a fatal present for which this
perfidious tyrant promises to punish them cruelly at some future day. Is
it not strange, that one can be the friend of your God, only by declaring
one's self the enemy of reason and good sense?
135.
According to the divines, _faith is an assent without evidence_. Whence it
follows, that religion requires us firmly to believe inevident things, and
propositions often improbable or contrary to reason. But when we reject
reason as a judge of faith, do we not confess, that reason is incompatible
with faith? As the ministers of religion have resolved to banish reason,
they must have felt the impossibility of reconciling it with faith, which
is visibly only a blind submission to priests, whose authority seems to
many persons more weighty than evidence itself, and preferable to the
testimony of the senses.
"Sacrifice your reason; renounce experience; mistrust the testimony of
your senses; submit without enquiry to what we announce to you in the name
of heaven." Such is the uniform language of priests throughout the world;
they agree upon no point, except upon the necessity of never reasoning
upon the principles which they present to us as most important to our
felicity!
I will _not_ sacrifice my reason; because this reason alone enables me
to distinguish good from evil, truth from falsehood. If, as you say, my
reason comes from God, I shall never believe that a God, whom you call
good, has given me reason, as a snare, to lead me to perdition. Priests!
do you not see, that, by decrying reason, you calumniate your God, from
whom you declare it to be a gift.
I will _not_ renounce experience; because it is a guide much more sure
than the imagination or authority of spiritual guides. Experience
teaches me, that enthusiasm and interest may blind and lead them astray
themselves; and that the authority of experience ought to have much more
influence upon my mind, than the suspicious testimony of many men, who I
know are either very liable to be deceived themselves, or otherwise are
very much interested in deceiving others.
I _will_ mistrust my senses; because I am sensible they sometimes mislead
me. But, on the other hand, I know that they will not always deceive me.
I well know, that the eye shews me the sun much smaller than it really
is; but experience, which is only the repeated application of the senses,
informs me, that objects always appear to diminish, as their distance
increases; thus I attain to a certainty, that the sun is much larger than
the earth; thus my senses suffice to rectify the hasty judgments, which
they themselves had caused.
In warning us to mistrust the testimony of our senses, the priests
annihilate the proofs of all religion. If men may be dupes of their
imagination; if their senses are deceitful, how shall we believe the
miracles, which struck the treacherous senses of our ancestors? If my
senses are unfaithful guides, I ought not to credit even the miracles
wrought before my eyes.
136.
You incessantly repeat that _the truths of religion are above reason_. If
so, do you not perceive, that these truths are not adapted to reasonable
beings? To pretend that reason can deceive us, is to say, that truth
can be false; that the useful can be hurtful. Is reason any thing but a
knowledge of the useful and true? Besides, as our reason and senses are
our only guides in this life, to say they are unfaithful, is to say, that
our errors are necessary, our ignorance invincible, and that, without the
extreme of injustice, God cannot punish us for following the only guides
it was his supreme will to give.
To say, we are obliged to believe things above our reason, is ridiculous.
To assure us, that upon some objects we are not allowed to consult reason,
is to say, that, in the most interesting matter, we must consult only
imagination, or act only at random. Our divines say, we must sacrifice our
reason to God. But what motives can we have to sacrifice our reason to a
being, who makes us only useless presents, which he does not intend us to
use? What confidence can we put in a God, who, according to our divines
themselves, is malicious enough to harden the heart, to strike with
blindness, to lay snares for us, to _lead us into temptation?_ In fine,
what confidence can we put in the ministers of this God, who, to guide us
more conveniently, commands us to shut our eyes?
137.
Men are persuaded, that religion is to them of all things the most
serious, while it is precisely what they least examine for themselves. In
pursuit of an office, a piece of land, a house, a place of profit; in any
transaction or contract whatever, every one carefully examines all,
takes the greatest precaution, weighs every word of a writing, is guarded
against every surprise. Not so in religion; every one receives it at a
venture, and believes it upon the word of others, without ever taking the
trouble to examine.
Two causes concur to foster the negligence and carelessness of men, with
regard to their religious opinions. The first is the despair of overcoming
the obscurity, in which all religion is necessarily enveloped. Their first
principles are only adapted to disgust lazy minds, who regard them as a
chaos impossible to be understood. The second cause is, that every one
is averse to being too much bound by severe precepts, which all admire in
theory, but very few care to practice with rigour. The religion of many
people is like old family ties, which they have never taken pains to
examine, but which they deposit in their archives to have recourse to them
occasionally.
138.
The disciples of Pythagoras paid implicit faith to the doctrine of their
master; _he has said it_, was to them the solution of every problem. The
generality of men are not more rational. In matters of religion, a curate,
a priest, an ignorant monk becomes master of the thoughts. Faith relieves
the weakness of the human mind, to which application is commonly painful;
it is much more convenient to depend upon others, than to examine for
one's self. Inquiry, being slow and difficult, equally, displeases the
stupidity of the ignorant, and the ardour of the enlightened. Such is
undoubtedly the reason why Faith has so many partisans.