happy and unhappy. Nothing is more difficult than to become worthy of the
abode of felicity; nothing more easy than to obtain a place in the abode
of torment, which God is preparing for the unfortunate victims of
eternal fury. Have those then, who think the other life so pleasant and
flattering, forgotten, that according to them, that life is to be attended
with torments to the greater part of mortals? Is not the idea of total
annihilation infinitely preferable to the idea of an eternal existence,
attended with anguish and _gnashing of teeth_? Is the fear of an end more
afflicting, than that of having had a beginning! The fear of ceasing to
exist is a real evil only to the imagination, which alone begat the dogma
of another life.
Christian ministers say that the idea of a happier life is joyous.
Admitted. Every person would desire a more agreeable existence than that
he enjoys here. But, if paradise is inviting, you will grant, that hell is
frightful. Heaven is very difficult, and hell very easy to be merited. Do
you not say, that a _narrow_ way leads to the happy regions, and a _broad_
way to the regions of misery? Do you not often say, that _the number of
the elect is very small, and that of the reprobate very large_? Is not
Grace, which your God grants but to a very few, necessary to salvation?
Now, I assure you, that these ideas are by no means consoling; that I had
rather be annihilated, once for all, than to burn for ever; that the
fate of beasts is to me more desirable than that of the damned; that the
opinion which relieves me from afflicting fears in this world, appears to
me more joyous, than the uncertainty arising from the opinion of a God,
who, master of his grace, grants it to none but his favourites, and
permits all others to become worthy of eternal torment. Nothing but
enthusiasm or folly can induce a man to prefer improbable conjectures,
attended with uncertainty and insupportable fears.
109.
All religious principles are the work of pure imagination, in which
experience and reason have no share. It is extremely difficult to combat
them, because the imagination, once prepossessed by chimeras, which
astonish or disturb it, is incapable of reasoning. To combat religion and
its phantoms with the arms of reason, is like using a sword to kill gnats;
as soon as the blow is struck, the gnats and chimeras come hovering round
again, and resume in the mind the place, from which they were thought to
have been for ever banished.
When we reject, as too weak, the proofs given of the existence of a God,
they instantly oppose to the arguments, which destroy that existence,
an _inward sense_, a deep persuasion, an invincible inclination, born in
every man, which holds up to his mind, in spite of himself, the idea of an
almighty being, whom he cannot entirely expel from his mind, and whom he
is compelled to acknowledge, in spite of the strongest reasons that can
be urged. But whoever will analyse this _inward sense_, upon which such
stress is laid, will perceive, that it is only the effect of a rooted
habit, which, shutting their eyes against the most demonstrative proofs,
subjects the greater part of men, and often even the most enlightened, to
the prejudices of childhood. What avails this inward sense, or this deep
persuasion, against the evidence, which demonstrates, that _whatever
implies a contradiction cannot exist_?
We are gravely assured, that the non-existence of God is not demonstrated.
Yet, by all that men have hitherto said of him, nothing is better
demonstrated, than that this God is a chimera, whose existence is totally
impossible; since nothing is more evident, than that a being cannot
possess qualities so unlike, so contradictory, so irreconcilable, as
those, which every religion upon earth attributes to the Divinity. Is not
the theologian's God, as well as that of the deist, a cause incompatible
with the effects attributed to it? Let them do what they will, it is
necessary either to invent another God, or to grant, that he, who, for so
many ages, has been held up to the terror of mortals, is at the same time
very good and very bad, very powerful and very weak, unchangeable and
fickle, perfectly intelligent and perfectly void of reason, of order
and permitting disorder, very just and most unjust, very skilful and
unskilful. In short, are we not forced to confess, that it is impossible
to reconcile the discordant attributes, heaped upon a being, of whom
we cannot speak without the most palpable contradictions? Let any
one attribute a single quality to the Divinity, and it is universally
contradicted by the effects, ascribed to this cause.
110.
Theology might justly be defined the _science of contradictions_. Every
religion is only a system, invented to reconcile irreconcilable notions.
By the aid of habit and terror, man becomes obstinate in the greatest
absurdities, even after they are exposed in the clearest manner. All
religions are easily combated, but with difficulty extirpated. Reason
avails nothing against custom, which becomes, says the proverb, _a second
nature_. Many persons, in other respects sensible, even after having
examined the rotten foundation of their belief, adhere to it in contempt
of the most striking arguments. Whenever we complain of religion, its
shocking absurdities, and impossibilities, we are told that we are not
made to understand the truths of religion; that reason goes astray, and is
capable of leading us to perdition; and moreover, that _what is folly
in the eyes of man, is wisdom in the eyes of God_, to whom nothing
is impossible. In short, to surmount, by a single word, the most
insurmountable difficulties, presented on all sides by theology, they get
rid of them by saying, these are _mysteries_!
111.
What is a mystery? By examining the thing closely, I soon perceive, that
a mystery is nothing but a contradiction, a palpable absurdity, a manifest
impossibility, over which theologians would oblige men humbly to shut
their eyes. In a word, a mystery is whatever our spiritual guides cannot
explain.
It is profitable to the ministers of religion, that people understand
nothing of what they teach. It is impossible to examine what we do not
comprehend; when we do not see, we must suffer ourselves to be led. If
religion were clear, priests would find less business.
Without mysteries there can be no religion; mystery is essential to it;
a religion void of mysteries, would be a contradiction in terms. The God,
who serves as the foundation of _natural religion_, or _deism_, is himself
the greatest of mysteries.
112.
Every revealed religion is filled with mysterious dogmas, unintelligible
principles, incredible wonders, astonishing recitals, which appear to have
been invented solely to confound reason. Every religion announces a hidden
God, whose essence is a mystery; consequently, the conduct, ascribed to
him, is no less inconceivable than his essence. The Deity has never spoken
only in an enigmatical and mysterious manner, in the various religions,
which have been founded in different regions of our globe; he has
everywhere revealed himself only to announce mysteries; that is, to
inform mortals, that he intended they should believe contradictions,
impossibilities, and things to which they were incapable of affixing any
clear ideas.
The more mysterious and incredible a religion is, the more power it has
to please the imagination of men. The darker a religion is, the more it
appears divine, that is, conformable to the nature of a hidden being, of
whom they have no ideas. Ignorance prefers the unknown, the hidden, the
fabulous, the marvellous, the incredible, or even the terrible, to what is
clear, simple, and true. Truth does not operate upon the imagination in so
lively a manner as fiction, which, in other respects, everyone is able to
arrange in his own way. The vulgar like to listen to fables. Priests and
legislators, by inventing religions and forging mysteries have served the
vulgar people well. They have thereby gained enthusiasts, women and fools.
Beings of this stamp are easily satisfied with things, which they are
incapable of examining. The love of simplicity and truth is to be
found only among the few, whose imagination is regulated by study and
reflection.
The inhabitants of a village are never better pleased with their parson,
than when he introduces Latin into his sermon. The ignorant always
imagine, that he, who speaks to them of things they do not understand, is
a learned man. Such is the true principle of the credulity of the people,
and of the authority of those, who pretend to guide nations.
113.
To announce mysteries to men, is to give and withhold; it is to talk in
order not to be understood. He, who speaks only obscurely, either seeks to
amuse himself by the embarrassment, which he causes, or finds his interest
in not explaining himself too clearly. All secrecy indicates distrust,
impotence, and fear. Princes and their ministers make a mystery of their
projects, for fear their enemies should discover and render them abortive.
Can a good God amuse himself by perplexing his creatures? What interest
then could he have in commanding his ministers to announce riddles and
mysteries?
It is said, that man, by the weakness of his nature, is totally incapable
of understanding the divine dispensations, which can be to him only a
series of mysteries; God cannot disclose to him secrets, necessarily above
his reach. If so, I answer again, that man is not made to attend to the
divine dispensations; that these dispensations are to him by no means
interesting; that he has no need of mysteries, which he cannot understand;
and consequently, that a mysterious religion is no more fit for him, than
an eloquent discourse is for a flock of sheep.
114.
The Deity has revealed himself with so little uniformity in the different
countries of our globe, that in point of religion, men regard one another
with hatred and contempt. The partisans of the different sects think
each other very ridiculous and foolish. Mysteries, most revered in one
religion, are objects of derision to another. God, in revealing himself
to mankind, ought at least, to have spoken the same language to all, and
saved their feeble minds the perplexity of inquiring which religion really
emanated from him, or what form of worship is most acceptable in his
sight.
A universal God ought to have revealed a universal religion. By what
fatality then are there so many different religions upon earth? Which is
really right, among the great number of those, each of which exclusively
pretends to be the true one? There is great reason to believe, that no
religion enjoys this advantage. Division and disputes upon opinions are
indubitable signs of the uncertainty and obscurity of the principles, upon
which they build.
115.
If religion were necessary at all, it ought to be intelligible to all. If
this religion were the most important concern of men, the goodness of God
would seem to demand, that it should be to them of all things the most
clear, evident, and demonstrative. Is it not then astonishing, that this
thing so essential to the happiness of mortals, is precisely that, which
they understand least, and about which, for so many ages, their teachers
have most disputed? Priests have never agreed upon the manner of
understanding the will of a God, who has revealed himself.
The world, may be compared to a public fair, in which are several
empirics, each of whom endeavours to attract the passengers by decrying
the remedies sold by his brothers. Each shop has its customers, who
are persuaded, that their quacks possess the only true remedies; and
notwithstanding a continual use of them, they perceive not the inefficacy
of these remedies, or that they are as infirm as those, who run after the
quacks of a different shop.
Devotion is a disorder of the imagination contracted in infancy. The
devout man is a hypochondriac, who only augments his malady by the
application of remedies. The wise man abstains from them entirely; he pays
attention to his diet, and in other respects leaves nature to her course.
116.
To a man of sense, nothing appears more ridiculous, than the opinions,
which the partisans of the different religions with equal folly entertain
of each other. A Christian regards the _Koran_, that is, the divine
revelation announced by Mahomet, as nothing but a tissue of impertinent
reveries, and impostures insulting to the divinity. The Mahometan, on the
other hand, treats the Christian as an _idolater_ and a _dog_. He sees
nothing but absurdities in his religion. He imagines he has a right to
subdue the Christian, and to force him, sword in hand, to receive the
religion of his divine prophet. Finally, he believes, that nothing is
more impious and unreasonable, than to worship a man, or to believe in the
Trinity. The _protestant_ Christian who without scruple worships a man,
and firmly believes the inconceivable mystery of the _trinity_,
ridicules the _catholic_ Christian for believing in the mystery of
_transubstantiation_; he considers him mad, impious, and idolatrous,
because he kneels to worship some bread, in which he thinks he sees God.
Christians of every sect regard, as silly stories, the incarnations
of _Vishnu_, the God of the Indies; they maintain, that the only true
_incarnation_ is that of _Jesus_, son of a carpenter. The deist, who
calls himself the follower of a religion, which he supposes to be that of
nature, content with admitting a God, of whom he has no idea, makes a jest
of all the mysteries, taught by the various religions in the world.
117.
Is there any thing more contradictory, impossible, or mysterious, than the
creation of matter by an immaterial being, who, though immutable, operates
continual changes in the world? Is any thing more incompatible with every
notion of common sense, than to believe, that a supremely good, wise,
equitable and powerful being presides over nature, and by himself directs
the movements of a world, full of folly, misery, crimes and disorders,
which by a single word, he could have prevented or removed? In fine,
whenever we admit a being as contradictory as the God of theology, how can
we reject the most improbable fables, astonishing miracles, and profound
mysteries.
118.
The Deist exclaims: "Abstain from worshipping the cruel and capricious God
of theology; mine is a being infinitely wise and good; he is the father of
men, the mildest of sovereigns; it is he who fills the universe with his
benefits." But do you not see that every thing in this world contradicts
the good qualities, which you ascribe to your God? In the numerous family
of this tender father, almost all are unhappy. Under the government of
this just sovereign, vice is triumphant, and virtue in distress. Among
those blessings you extol, and which only enthusiasm can see, I behold a
multitude of evils, against which you obstinately shut your eyes. Forced
to acknowledge, that your beneficent God, in contradiction with himself,
distributes good and evil with the same hand, for his justification you
must, like the priest, refer me to the regions of another life. Invent,
therefore, another God; for yours is no less contradictory than that of
theologians.
A good God, who does evil, or consents to the commission of evil; a
God full of equity, and in whose empire innocence is often oppressed; a
perfect God, who produces none but imperfect and miserable works; are not
such a God and his conduct as great mysteries, as that of the incarnation?
You blush for your fellow-citizens, who allow themselves to be persuaded,
that the God of the universe could change himself into a man, and die upon
a cross in a corner of Asia. The mystery of the incarnation appears to you
very absurd. You think nothing more ridiculous, than a God, who transforms
himself into bread, and causes himself daily to be eaten in a thousand
different places. But are all these mysteries more contradictory to
reason than a God, the avenger and rewarder of the actions of men? Is man,
according to you, free, or not free? In either case, your God, if he has
the shadow of equity, can neither punish nor reward him. If man is free,
it is God, who has made him free; therefore God is the primitive cause of
all his actions; in punishing him for his faults, he would punish him for
having executed what he had given him liberty to do. If man is not free to
act otherwise than he does, would not God be most unjust, in punishing man
for faults, which he could not help committing.
The minor, or secondary, absurdities, with which all religions abound, are
to many people truly striking; but they have not the courage to trace
the source of these absurdities. They see not, that a God full of
contradictions, caprices and inconsistent qualities, has only served
to disorder men's imaginations, and to produce an endless succession of
chimeras.
119.
The theologian would shut the mouths of those who deny the existence of
God, by saying, that all men, in all ages and countries, have acknowledged
some divinity or other; that every people have believed in an invisible
and powerful being, who has been the object of their worship and
veneration; in short, that there is no nation, however savage, who are not
persuaded of the existence of some intelligence superior to human nature.
But, can an error be changed into truth by the belief of all men? The
great philosopher Bayle has justly observed, that "general tradition, or
the unanimous consent of mankind, is no criterion of truth."
There was a time, when all men believed that the sun moved round the
earth, but this error was detected. There was a time, when nobody believed
the existence of the antipodes, and when every one was persecuted, who
had temerity enough to maintain it. At present, every informed man firmly
believes it. All nations, with the exception of a few men who are less
credulous than the rest, still believe in ghosts and spirits. No sensible
man now adopts such nonsense. But the most sensible people consider it
their duty to believe in a universal spirit!
120.
All the gods, adored by men, are of savage origin. They have evidently
been imagined by stupid people, or presented, by ambitious and crafty
legislators, to ignorant and uncivilized nations, who had neither capacity
nor courage to examine the objects, which through terror they were made to
worship.
By closely examining God, we are forced to acknowledge, that he evidently
bears marks of a savage nature. To be savage is to acknowledge no right
but force; it is to be cruel beyond measure; to follow only one's own
caprice; to want foresight, prudence, and reason. Ye nations, who call
yourselves civilized! Do you not discern, in this hideous character, the
God, on whom you lavish your incense? Are not the descriptions given
you of the divinity, visibly borrowed from the implacable, jealous,
revengeful, sanguinary, capricious inconsiderate humour of man, who has
not cultivated his reason? O men! You adore only a great savage, whom
you regard, however, as a model to imitate, as an amiable master, as a
sovereign full of perfection.
Religious opinions are ancient monuments of ignorance, credulity,
cowardice, and barbarism of their ancestors. Every savage is a child
fond of the marvellous, who believes every thing, and examines nothing.
Ignorant of nature, he attributes to spirits, enchantments, and to
magic, whatever appears to him extraordinary. His priests appear to him
sorcerers, in whom he supposes a power purely divine, before whom his
confounded reason humbles itself, whose oracles are to him infallible
decrees which it would be dangerous to contradict.
In religion, men have, for the most part, remained in their primitive
barbarity. Modern religions are only ancient follies revived, or presented
under some new form. If the savages of antiquity adored mountains, rivers,
serpents, trees, and idols of every kind; if the EGYPTIANS paid homage to
crocodiles, rats, and onions, do we not see nations, who think themselves
wiser than they, worship bread, into which they imagine, that through
the enchantments of their priests, the divinity has descended. Is not the
Bread-God the idol of many Christian nations, who, in this respect, are as
irrational, as the most savage?
121.
The ferocity, stupidity, and folly of uncivilized man have ever disclosed
themselves in religious practices, either cruel or extravagant. A spirit
of barbarity still survives, and penetrates the religions even of the
most polished nations. Do we not still see human victims offered to
the divinity? To appease the anger of a God, who is always supposed as
ferocious, jealous and vindictive, as a savage, do not those, whose manner
of thinking is supposed to displease him, expire under studied torments,
by the command of sanguinary laws? Modern nations, at the instigation of
their priests, have perhaps improved upon the atrocious folly of barbarous
nations; at least, we find, that it has ever entered the heads of savages
to torment for opinions, to search the thoughts, to molest men for the
invisible movements of their brains?
When we see learned nations, such as the English, French, German, etc.,
continue, notwithstanding their knowledge, to kneel before the barbarous
God of the Jews; when we see these enlightened nations divide into
sects, defame, hate, and despise one another for their equally ridiculous
opinions concerning the conduct and intentions of this unreasonable God;
when we see men of ability foolishly devote their time to meditate the
will of this God, who is full of caprice and folly, we are tempted to cry
out: O men, you are still savage!!!
122.
Whoever has formed true ideas of the ignorance, credulity, negligence, and
stupidity of the vulgar, will suspect opinions the more, as he finds
them generally established. Men, for the most part, examine nothing: they
blindly submit to custom and authority. Their religious opinions, above
all others, are those which they have the least courage and capacity to
examine: as they comprehend nothing about them, they are forced to be
silent, or at least are soon destitute of arguments. Ask any man, whether
he believes in a God? He will be much surprised that you can doubt it. Ask
him again, what he understands by the word _God_. You throw him into
the greatest embarrassment; you will perceive immediately, that he is
incapable of affixing any real idea to this word, he incessantly repeats.
He will tell you, that God is God. He knows neither what he thinks of it,
nor his motives for believing in it.
All nations speak of a God; but do they agree upon this God? By no means.
But division upon an opinion proves not its evidence; it is rather a sign
of uncertainty and obscurity. Does the same man always agree with himself
in the notions he forms of his God? No. His idea varies with the changes,
which he experiences;--another sign of uncertainty. Men always agree in
demonstrative truths. In any situation, except that of insanity, every one
knows that two and two make four, that the sun shines, that the whole
is greater than its part; that benevolence is necessary to merit the
affection of men; that injustice and cruelty are incompatible with
goodness. Are they thus agreed when they speak of God? Whatever they
think, or say of him, is immediately destroyed by the effects they
attribute to him.
Ask several painters to represent a chimera, and each will paint it in a
different manner. You will find no resemblance between the features, each
has given it a portrait, that has no original. All theologians, in giving
us a picture of God, give us one of a great chimera, in whose features
they never agree, whom each arranges in his own way, and who exists only
in their imaginations. There are not two individuals, who have, or can
have, the same ideas of their God.
123.
It might be said with more truth, that men are either skeptics or
atheists, than that they are convinced of the existence of God. How can we
be assured of the existence of a being, whom we could never examine,
and of whom it is impossible to conceive any permanent idea? How can
we convince ourselves of the existence of a being, to whom we are
every moment forced to attribute conduct, opposed to the ideas, we had
endeavoured to form of him? Is it then possible to believe what we cannot
conceive? Is not such a belief the opinions of others without having
any of our own? Priests govern by faith; but do not priests themselves
acknowledge that God is to them incomprehensible? Confess then, that a
full and entire conviction of the existence of God is not so general, as
is imagined.