chastisements, which guilty men incur from the hand of God. But why are
men guilty? If God is omnipotent, does it cost him more to say: "Let every
thing in the world be in order; let all my subjects be good, innocent, and
fortunate," than to say: "Let every thing exist"? Was it more difficult
for this God to do his work well, than badly? Religion tells us of a
hell; that is, a frightful abode, where, notwithstanding his goodness,
God reserves infinite torments for the majority of men. Thus after having
rendered mortals very unhappy in this world, religion tells them, that God
can render them still more unhappy in another! The theologian gets over
this, by saying, that the goodness of God will then give place to his
justice. But a goodness, which gives place to the most terrible cruelty,
is not an infinite goodness. Besides, can a God, who, after having been
infinitely good, becomes infinitely bad, be regarded as an immutable
being? Can we discern the shadow of clemency or goodness, in a God filled
with implacable fury?
62.
Divine justice, as stated by our divines, is undoubtedly a quality very
proper to cherish in us the love of the Divinity. According to the ideas
of modern theology, it is evident, that God has created the majority of
men, with the sole view of putting them in a fair way to incur eternal
punishment. Would it not have been more conformable to goodness, reason,
and equity, to have created only stones or plants, and not to have created
sensible beings; than to have formed men, whose conduct in this world
might subject them to endless punishment in the other? A God perfidious
and malicious enough to create a single man, and then to abandon him to
the danger of being damned, cannot be regarded as a perfect being; but
as an unreasonable, unjust, and ill-natured. Very far from composing
a perfect God, theologians have formed the most imperfect of beings.
According to theological notions, God would resemble a tyrant, who, having
put out the eyes of the greater part of his slaves, should shut them up
in a dungeon, where, for his amusement, he would, incognito, observe their
conduct through a trap-door, in order to punish with rigour all those,
who, while walking about, should hit against each other; but who would
magnificently reward the few whom he had not deprived of sight, in
avoiding to run against their comrades. Such are the ideas, which the
dogma of gratuitous predestination gives us of the divinity!
Although men are continually repeating that their God is infinitely good;
yet it is evident, that in reality, they can believe nothing of the
kind. How can we love what we do not know? How can we love a being, whose
character is only fit to throw us into inquietude and trouble? How can we
love a being, of whom all that is said tends to render him an object of
utter detestation?
63.
Many people make a subtle distinction between true religion and
superstition. They say, that the latter is only a base and inordinate fear
of the Deity; but that the truly religious man has confidence in his God,
and loves him sincerely; whereas, the superstitious man sees in him only
an enemy, has no confidence in him, and represents him to himself as
a distrustful, cruel tyrant, sparing of his benefits, lavish of his
chastisements. But, in reality, does not all religion give us the same
ideas of God? At the same time that we are told, that God is infinitely
good, are we not also told, that he is very easily provoked, that he
grants his favours to a few people only, and that he furiously chastises
those, to whom he has not been pleased to grant favours?
64.
If we take our ideas of God from the nature of things, where we find a
mixture of good and evil, this God, just like the good and evil of which
we experience, must naturally appear capricious, inconstant, sometimes
good, and sometimes malevolent; and therefore, instead of exciting our
love, must generate distrust, fear, and uncertainty. There is then no
real difference between natural religion, and the most gloomy and servile
superstition. If the theist sees God only in a favourable light; the bigot
views him in the most hideous light. The folly of the one is cheerful,
that of the other is melancholy; but both are equally delirious.
65.
If I draw my ideas of God from theology, he appears to inspire aversion.
Devotees, who tell us, that they sincerely love their God, are either
liars or fools, who see their God only in profile. It is impossible to
love a being, the very idea of whom strikes us with terror, and whose
judgments make us tremble. How can we, without being alarmed, look upon
a God, who is reputed to be barbarous enough to damn us? Let not divines
talk to us of a filial, or respectful fear, mixed with love, which men
ought to have for their God. A son can by no means love his father, when
he knows him to be cruel enough to inflict upon him studied torments for
the least faults he may commit. No man upon earth can have the least spark
of love for a God, who reserves chastisements, infinite in duration and
violence, for ninety-nine hundredths of his children.
66.
The inventors of the dogma of eternal hell-torments have made of that God,
whom they call so good, the most detestable of beings. Cruelty in men is
the last act of wickedness. Every sensible mind must revolt at the bare
recital of the torments, inflicted on the greatest criminal; but cruelty
is much more apt to excite indignation, when void of motives. The most
sanguinary tyrants, the Caligulas, the Neros, the Domitians, had, at
least, some motives for tormenting their victims. These motives were,
either their own safety, or the fury of revenge, or the design of
frightening by terrible examples, or perhaps the vanity of making
a display of their power, and the desire of satisfying a barbarous
curiosity. Can a God have any of these motives? In tormenting the victims
of his wrath, he would punish beings, who could neither endanger his
immoveable power, nor disturb his unchangeable felicity. On the other
hand, the punishments of the other life would be useless to the living,
who cannot be witnesses of them. These punishments would be useless to the
damned, since in hell there is no longer room for conversion, and the
time of mercy is past. Whence it follows, that God, in the exercise of
his eternal vengeance, could have no other end than to amuse himself,
and insult the weakness of his creatures. I appeal to the whole human
race;--is there a man who feels cruel enough coolly to torment, I do
not say his fellow-creature, but any sensible being whatever, without
emolument, without profit, without curiosity, without having any thing
to fear? Confess then, O theologians, that, even according to your own
principles, your God is infinitely more malevolent than the worst of men.
Perhaps you will say, that infinite offences deserve infinite punishments.
I answer, that we cannot offend a God, whose happiness is infinite; that
the offences of finite beings cannot be infinite; that a God, who
is unwilling to be offended, cannot consent that the offences of his
creatures should be eternal; that a God, infinitely good, can neither be
infinitely cruel, nor grant his creatures an infinite duration, solely for
the pleasure of eternal torments.
Nothing but the most savage barbarity, the most egregious roguery, or the
blindest ambition could have imagined the doctrine of eternal punishments.
If there is a God, whom we can offend or blaspheme, there are not upon
earth greater blasphemers than those, who dare to say, that this same God
is a tyrant, perverse enough to delight, during eternity, in the useless
torments of his feeble creatures.
67.
To pretend, that God can be offended at the actions of men, is to
annihilate all the ideas, which divines endeavour to give us, in other
respects, of this being. To say, that man can trouble the order of the
universe; that he can kindle the thunder in the hands of his God; that
he can defeat his projects, is to say, that man is stronger than his God,
that he is the arbiter of his will, that it depends upon him to change
his goodness into cruelty. Theology continually pulls down, with one hand,
what it erects with the other. If all religion is founded upon a God,
who is provoked and appeased, all religion is founded on a palpable
contradiction.
All religions agree in exalting the wisdom and infinite power of the
Deity. But no sooner do they display his conduct, than we see nothing
but imprudence, want of foresight, weakness and folly. God, it is said,
created the world for himself; and yet, hitherto, he has never been able
to make himself suitably honoured by it. God created men in order to have,
in his dominions, subjects to render him their homage; and yet, we see men
in continual revolt against him.
68.
They incessantly extol the divine perfections; and when we demand
proofs of them, they point to his works, in which, they assure us, these
perfections are written in indelible characters. All these works are,
however, imperfect and perishable. Man, who is ever regarded as the
most marvellous work, as the master-piece of the Deity, is full of
imperfections, which render him disagreeable to the eyes of the almighty
Being, who formed him. This surprising work often becomes so revolting and
odious to its author, that he is obliged to throw it into the fire. But,
if the fairest of God's works is imperfect, how can we judge of the
divine perfections? Can a work, with which the author himself is so little
pleased, induce us to admire the ability of its Maker? Man, considered
in a physical sense, is subject to a thousand infirmities, to numberless
evils, and to death. Man, considered in a moral sense, is full of faults;
yet we are unceasingly told, that he is the most beautiful work of the
most perfect of beings.
69.
In creating beings more perfect than men, it appears, that heretofore God
has not better succeeded, nor given stronger proofs of his perfection.
Do we not see, in many religions, that angels, have even attempted to
dethrone him? God proposed the happiness of angels and men; yet, he has
never been able to render happy either angels or men;--the pride, malice,
sins, and imperfections of the creatures have always opposed the will of
the perfect Creator.
70.
All religion is obviously founded upon this principle, that _God does what
he can, and man what he will_. Every system of religion presents to us
an unequal combat between the Deity on one part, and his creatures on the
other, in which the former never comes off to his honour. Notwithstanding
his omnipotence, he cannot succeed in rendering the works of his hands
such as he would have them. To complete the absurdity, there is a
religion, which pretends, that God himself has died to redeem mankind; and
yet, men are not farther from any thing, than they are from what God would
have them.
71.
Nothing is more extravagant, than the part, theology makes the Divinity
act in every country. Did he really exist, we should see in him the most
capricious, and senseless being. We should be compelled to believe, that
God made the world only to be the theatre of his disgraceful wars with
his creatures; that he created angels, men, and demons, only to make
adversaries, against whom he might exercise his power. He renders men free
to offend him, malicious enough to defeat his projects, too obstinate to
submit; and all this merely for the pleasure of being angry, appeased,
reconciled, and of repairing the disorder they have made. Had the Deity at
once formed his creatures such as he would have them, what pains would he
not have spared himself, or, at least, from what embarrassments would he
not have relieved his theologians!
Every religion represents God as busy only in doing himself evil. He
resembles those empirics, who inflict upon themselves wounds, to have an
opportunity of exhibiting to the public the efficacy of their ointment.
But we see not, that the Deity has hitherto been able radically to cure
himself of the evil, which he suffers from man.
72.
God is the author of all; and yet, we are assured that evil does not come
from God. Whence then does it come? From man. But, who made man? God. Evil
then comes from God. If he had not made man as he is, moral evil or sin
would not have existed in the world. The perversity of man is therefore
chargeable to God. If man has power to do evil, or to offend God, we are
forced to infer, that God chooses to be offended; that God, who made man,
has resolved that man shall do evil; otherwise man would be an effect
contrary to the cause, from which he derives his being.
73.
Man ascribes to God the faculty of foreseeing, or knowing beforehand
whatever will happen; but this prescience seldom turns to his glory,
nor protects him from the lawful reproaches of man. If God foreknows
the future, must he not have foreseen the fall of his creatures? If he
resolved in his decrees to permit this fall, it is undoubtedly because it
was his will that this fall should take place, otherwise it could not have
happened. If God's foreknowledge of the sins of his creatures had been
necessary or forced, one might suppose, that he has been constrained by
his justice to punish the guilty; but, enjoying the faculty of foreseeing,
and the power of predetermining every thing, did it not depend upon God
not to impose upon himself cruel laws, or, at least, could he not dispense
with creating beings, whom he might be under the necessity of punishing,
and rendering unhappy by a subsequent decree? Of what consequence is it,
whether God has destined men to happiness or misery by an anterior decree,
an effect of his prescience, or by a posterior decree, an effect of
his justice? Does the arrangement of his decrees alter the fate of the
unhappy? Would they not have the same right to complain of a God, who,
being able to omit their creation, has notwithstanding created them,
although he plainly foresaw that his justice would oblige him, sooner or
later, to punish them?
74.
"Man," you say, "when he came from the hand of God, was pure, innocent,
and good; but his nature has been corrupted, as a punishment for sin."
If man, when just out of the hands of his God, could sin, his nature was
imperfect. Why did God suffer him to sin, and his nature to be corrupted?
Why did God permit him to be seduced, well knowing that he was too feeble
to resist temptation? Why did God create _satan_, an evil spirit, a
tempter? Why did not God, who wishes so much good to the human race,
annihilate once for all so many evil genii, who are naturally enemies of
our happiness; or rather, why did God create evil spirits, whose victories
and fatal influence over mankind, he must have foreseen? In fine, by what
strange fatality in all religions of the world, has the evil principle
such a decided advantage over the good principle, or the divinity?
75.
There is related an instance of simplicity, which does honour to the heart
of an Italian monk. One day, while preaching, this pious man thought
he must announce to his audience, that he had, thank heaven, at last
discovered, by dint of meditation, a sure way of rendering all men happy.
"The devil," said he, "tempts men only to have in hell companions of his
misery. Let us therefore apply to the Pope, who has the keys of heaven
and hell; let us prevail upon him to pray to God, at the head of the whole
church, to consent to a reconciliation with the devil, to restore him to
favour, to reinstate him in his former rank, which cannot fail to put an
end to his malicious projects against mankind." Perhaps the honest monk
did not see, that the devil is at least as useful as God to the ministers
of religion. They have too much interest in their dissensions, to be
instrumental in an accommodation between two enemies, upon whose combats
their own existence and revenues depend. Let men cease to be tempted
and to sin, and the ministry of priests will be useless. Manicheism is
evidently the hinge of every religion; but unhappily, the devil, invented
to clear the deity from the suspicion of malice, proves to us, every
moment, the impotence or unskilfulness of his celestial adversary.
76.
The nature of man, it is said, was necessarily liable to corruption. God
could not communicate to him _impeccability_, which is an inalienable
attribute of his divine perfection. But if God could not make man
impeccable, why did he give himself the pains to make man, whose nature
must necessarily be corrupted, and who must consequently offend God? On
the other hand, if God himself could not make human nature impeccable, by
what right does he punish men for not being impeccable? It can be only
by the right of the strongest; but the right of the strongest is called
violence, and violence cannot be compatible with the justest of beings.
God would be supremely unjust, should he punish men for not sharing with
him his divine perfections, or for not being able to be gods like him.
Could not God, at least, have communicated to all men that kind of
perfection, of which their nature is susceptible? If some men are good,
or render themselves agreeable to their God, why has not that God done the
same favour, or given the same dispositions to all beings of our species?
Why does the number of the wicked so much exceed the number of the good?
Why, for one friend, has God ten thousand enemies, in a world, which it
depended entirely upon him to people with honest men? If it be true, that,
in heaven, God designs to form a court of saints, of elect, or of men who
shall have lived upon earth conformably to his views, would he not have
had a more numerous, brilliant, and honourable assembly, had he composed
it of all men, to whom, in creating them, he could grant the degree of
goodness, necessary to attain eternal happiness? Finally, would it not
have been shorter not to have made man, than to have created him a being
full of faults, rebellious to his creator, perpetually exposed to cause
his own destruction by a fatal abuse of his liberty?
Instead of creating men, a perfect God ought to have created only angels
very docile and submissive. Angels, it is said, are free; some have
sinned; but, at any rate, all have not abused their liberty by revolting
against their master. Could not God have created only angels of the good
kind? If God has created angels, who have not sinned, could he not have
created impeccable men, or men who should never abuse their liberty? If
the elect are incapable of sinning in heaven, could not God have made
impeccable men upon earth?
77.
Divines never fail to persuade us, that the enormous distance which
separates God and man, necessarily renders the conduct of God a mystery
to us, and that we have no right to interrogate our master. Is this answer
satisfactory? Since my eternal happiness is at stake, have I not a right
to examine the conduct of God himself? It is only in hope of happiness
that men submit to the authority of a God. A despot, to whom men submit
only through fear, a master, whom they cannot interrogate, a sovereign
totally inaccessible, can never merit the homage of intelligent beings.
If the conduct of God is a mystery, it is not made for us. Man can neither
adore, admire, respect, nor imitate conduct, in which every thing is
inconceivable, or, of which he can often form only revolting ideas; unless
it is pretended, that we ought to adore every thing of which we are forced
to be ignorant, and that every thing, which we do not know, becomes for
that reason an object of admiration. Divines! You never cease telling us,
that the designs of God are impenetrable; that _his ways are not our
ways, nor his thoughts our thoughts_; that it is absurd to complain of
his administration, of the motives and springs of which we are totally
ignorant; that it is presumption to tax his judgments with injustice,
because we cannot comprehend them. But when you speak in this strain, do
you not perceive, that you destroy with your own hands all your profound
systems, whose only end is to explain to us the ways of the divinity,
which, you say, are impenetrable? Have you penetrated his judgments, his
ways, his designs? You dare not assert it, and though you reason about
them without end, you do not comprehend them any more than we do. If, by
chance, you know the plan of God, which you wish us to admire, while
most people find it so little worthy of a just, good, intelligent, and
reasonable being, no longer say, this plan is impenetrable. If you are as
ignorant of it as we are, have some indulgence for those who ingenuously
confess, they comprehend nothing in it, or that they see in it nothing
divine. Cease to persecute for opinions, of which you understand nothing
yourselves; cease to defame each other for dreams and conjectures, which
every thing seems to contradict. Talk to us of things intelligible and
really useful to men; and no longer talk to us of the impenetrable ways of
God, about which you only stammer and contradict yourselves.
By continually speaking of the immense depths of divine wisdom, forbidding
us to sound them, saying it is insolence to cite God before the tribunal
of our feeble reason, making it a crime to judge our master, divines
teach us nothing but the embarrassment they are in, when it is required to
account for the conduct of a God, whose conduct they think marvellous only
because they are utterly incapable of comprehending it themselves.
78.
Physical evil is commonly regarded as a punishment for sin. Diseases,
famines, wars, earthquakes, are means which God uses to chastise wicked
men. Thus, they make no scruple of attributing these evils to the severity
of a just and good God. But, do not these scourges fall indiscriminately
upon the good and bad, upon the impious and devout, upon the innocent and
guilty? How, in this proceeding, would they have us admire the justice
and goodness of a being, the idea of whom seems comforting to so many
wretches, whose brain must undoubtedly be disordered by their misfortunes,
since they forget, that their God is the arbiter, the sole disposer of the
events of this world. This being the case, ought they not to impute their
sufferings to him, into whose arms they fly for comfort? Unfortunate
father! Thou consolest thyself in the bosom of Providence, for the loss of
a dear child, or beloved wife, who made thy happiness. Alas! Dost thou not
see, that thy God has killed them? Thy God has rendered thee miserable,
and thou desirest thy God to comfort thee for the dreadful afflictions he
has sent thee!
The chimerical or supernatural notions of theology have so succeeded in
destroying, in the minds of men, the most simple, dear, and natural ideas,
that the devout, unable to accuse God of malice, accustom themselves to
regard the several strokes of fate as indubitable proofs of celestial
goodness. When in affliction, they are ordered to believe that God loves
them, that God visits them, that God wishes to try them. Thus religion has
attained the art of converting evil into good! A profane person said with
reason--_If God Almighty thus treats those whom he loves, I earnestly
beseech him never to think of me_.
Men must have received very gloomy and cruel ideas of their God, who is
called so good, to believe that the most dreadful calamities and piercing
afflictions are marks of his favour! Would an evil genius, a demon,
be more ingenious in tormenting his enemies, than the God of goodness
sometimes is, who so often exercises his severity upon his dearest
friends?
79.