machine, that suffers, when we complain of disorder. The bodies, causes,
and beings, which this world contains, necessarily act in the manner in
which we see them act, whether we approve or disapprove of their effects.
Earthquakes, volcanoes, inundations, pestilences, and famines are effects
as necessary, or as much in the order of nature, as the fall of heavy
bodies, the courses of rivers, the periodical motions of the seas, the
blowing of the winds, the fruitful rains, and the favourable effects, for
which men praise God, and thank him for his goodness.
To be astonished that a certain order reigns in the world, is to be
surprised that the same causes constantly produce the same effects. To
be shocked at disorder, is to forget, that when things change, or are
interrupted in their actions, the effects can no longer be the same. To
wonder at the order of nature, is to wonder that any thing can exist; it
is to be surprised at any one's own existence. What is order to one being,
is disorder to another. All wicked beings find that every thing is in
order, when they can with impunity put every thing in disorder. They find,
on the contrary, that every thing is in disorder, when they are disturbed
in the exercise of their wickedness.
45.
Upon supposition that God is the author and mover of nature, there could
be no disorder with respect to him. Would not all the causes, that he
should have made, necessarily act according to the properties, essences,
and impulses given them? If God should change the ordinary course of
nature, he would not be immutable. If the order of the universe, in
which man thinks he sees the most convincing proof of the existence,
intelligence, power and goodness of God, should happen to contradict
itself, one might suspect his existence, or, at least, accuse him of
inconstancy, impotence, want of foresight and wisdom in the arrangement of
things; one would have a right to accuse him of an oversight in the choice
of the agents and instruments, which he makes, prepares, and puts in
action. In short, if the order of nature proves the power and intelligence
of the Deity, disorder must prove his weakness, instability, and
irrationality.
You say, that God is omnipresent, that he fills the universe with his
immensity, that nothing is done without him, that matter could not act
without his agency. But in this case, you admit, that your God is the
author of disorder, that it is he who deranges nature, that he is the
father of confusion, that he is in man, and moves him at the moment he
sins. If God is every where, he is in me, he acts with me, he is deceived
with me, he offends God with me, and combats with me the existence of God!
O theologians! you never understand yourselves, when you speak of God.
46.
In order to have what we call intelligence, it is necessary to have ideas,
thoughts, and wishes; to have ideas, thoughts, and wishes, it is necessary
to have organs; to have organs, it is necessary to have a body; to act
upon bodies, it is necessary to have a body; to experience disorder, it is
necessary to be capable of suffering. Whence it evidently follows, that a
pure spirit can neither be intelligent, nor affected by what passes in the
universe.
Divine intelligence, ideas, and views, have, you say, nothing common with
those of men. Very well. How then can men judge, right or wrong, of these
views; reason upon these ideas; or admire this intelligence? This would be
to judge, admire, and adore that, of which we can have no ideas. To adore
the profound views of divine wisdom, is it not to adore that, of which we
cannot possibly judge? To admire these views, is it not to admire without
knowing why? Admiration is always the daughter of ignorance. Men admire
and adore only what they do not comprehend.
47.
All those qualities, ascribed to God, are totally incompatible with a
being, who, by his very essence, is void of all analogy with human beings.
It is true, the divines imagine they extricate themselves from this
difficulty, by exaggerating the human qualities, attributed to the
Divinity; they enlarge them to infinity, where they cease to understand
themselves. What results from this combination of man with God? A mere
chimera, of which, if any thing be affirmed, the phantom, combined with so
much pains, instantly vanishes.
Dante, in his poem upon _Paradise_, relates, that the Deity appeared
to him under the figure of three circles, forming an iris, whose lively
colours generated each other; but that, looking steadily upon the dazzling
light, he saw only his own figure. While adoring God, it is himself, that
man adores.
48.
Ought not the least reflection suffice to prove, that God can have none
of the human qualities, all ties, virtues, or perfections? Our virtues and
perfections are consequences of the modifications of our passions. But
has God passions as we have? Again: our good qualities consist in our
dispositions towards the beings with whom we live in society. God,
according to you, is an insulated being. God has no equals--no
fellow-beings. God does not live in society. He wants the assistance of no
one. He enjoys an unchangeable felicity. Admit then, according to your own
principles, that God cannot have what we call virtues, and that man cannot
be virtuous with respect to him.
49.
Man, wrapped up in his own merit, imagines the human race to be the sole
object of God in creating the universe. Upon what does he found this
flattering opinion? We are told: that man is the only being endued with
intelligence, which enables him to know the Deity, and to render him
homage. We are assured, that God made the world only for his own glory,
and that it was necessary that the human species should come into this
plan, that there might be some one to admire his works, and glorify him
for them. But, according to these suppositions, has not God evidently
missed his object? 1st. Man, according to yourselves, will always labour
under the completest impossibility of knowing his God, and the most
invincible ignorance of his divine essence. 2ndly. A being, who has no
equal, cannot be susceptible of glory; for glory can result only from the
comparison of one's own excellence with that of others. 3rdly. If God be
infinitely happy, if he be self-sufficient, what need has he of the homage
of his feeble creatures? 4thly. God, notwithstanding all his endeavours,
is not glorified; but, on the contrary, all the religions in the world
represent him as perpetually offended; their sole object is to reconcile
sinful, ungrateful, rebellious man with his angry God.
50.
If God be infinite, he has much less relation with man, than man with
ants. Would the ants reason pertinently concerning the intentions,
desires, and projects of the gardener? Could they justly imagine, that a
park was planted for them alone, by an ostentatious monarch, and that the
sole object of his goodness was to furnish them with a superb residence?
But, according to theology, man is, with respect to God, far below what
the vilest insect is to man. Thus, by theology itself, which is wholly
devoted to the attributes and views of the Divinity, theology appears a
complete folly.
51.
We are told, that, in the formation of the universe, God's only object was
the happiness of man. But, in a world made purposely for him, and governed
by an omnipotent God, is man in reality very happy? Are his enjoyments
durable? Are not his pleasures mixed with pains? Are many persons
satisfied with their fate? Is not man continually the victim of physical
and moral evils? Is not the human machine, which is represented as a
master-piece of the Creator's skill, liable to derangement in a thousand
ways? Should we be surprised at the workmanship of a mechanic, who should
shew us a complex machine, ready to stop every moment, and which, in a
short time, would break in pieces of itself?
52.
The generous care, displayed by the Deity in providing for the wants,
and watching over the happiness of his beloved creatures, is called
_Providence_. But, when we open our eyes, we find that God provides
nothing. Providence sleeps over the greater part of the inhabitants of
this world. For a very small number of men who are supposed to be happy,
what an immense multitude groan under oppression, and languish in misery!
Are not nations forced to deprive themselves of bread, to administer to
the extravagances of a few gloomy tyrants, who are no happier than their
oppressed slaves?
At the same time that our divines emphatically expatiate upon the goodness
of Providence, while they exhort us to repose our confidence in her, do
we not hear them, at the sight of unforeseen catastrophes, exclaim, that
_Providence sports with the vain projects of man_, that she frustrates
their designs, that she laughs at their efforts, that profound wisdom
delights to bewilder the minds of mortals? But, shall we put confidence in
a malignant Providence, who laughs at, and sports with mankind? How will
one admire the unknown ways of a hidden wisdom, whose manner of acting is
inexplicable? Judge of it by effects, you will say. We do; and find, that
these effects are sometimes useful, and sometimes hurtful.
Men think they justify Providence, by saying, that, in this world, there
is much more good than evil to every individual of mankind. Supposing the
good, we enjoy from Providence, is to the evil, as a _hundred to ten_;
will it not still follow, that, for a hundred degrees of goodness,
Providence possesses ten of malignity; which is incompatible with the
supposed perfection of the divine nature.
Almost all books are filled with the most flattering praises of
Providence, whose attentive care is highly extolled. It would seem as
if man, to live happily here below, needed not his own exertions. Yet,
without his own labour, man could subsist hardly a day. To live, he is
obliged to sweat, toil, hunt, fish, and labour without intermission.
Without these second causes, the first cause, at least in most countries,
would provide for none of our wants. In all parts of the globe, we see
savage and civilized man in a perpetual struggle with Providence. He is
necessitated to ward off the strokes directed against him by Providence,
in hurricanes, tempests, frosts, hail-storms, inundations, droughts, and
the various accidents, which so often render useless all his labours. In a
word, we see man continually occupied in guarding against the ill offices
of that Providence, which is supposed to be attentive to his happiness.
A bigot admired divine Providence for wisely ordering rivers to pass
through those places, where men have built large cities. Is not this man's
reasoning as rational, as that of many learned men, who incessantly
talk of _final causes_, or who pretend that they clearly perceive the
beneficent views of God in the formation of all things?
53.
Do we see then, that Providence so very sensibly manifests herself in the
preservation of those admirable works, which we attribute to her? If it
is she, who governs the world, we find her as active in destroying, as
in forming; in exterminating, as in producing. Does she not every moment
destroy, by thousands, the very men, to whose preservation and welfare
we suppose her continually attentive? Every moment she loses sight of
her beloved creature. Sometimes she shakes his dwelling, sometimes she
annihilates his harvests, sometimes she inundates his fields, sometimes
she desolates them by a burning drought. She arms all nature against man.
She arms man himself against his own species, and commonly terminates his
existence in anguish. Is this then what is called preserving the universe?
If we could view, without prejudice, the equivocal conduct of Providence
towards the human race and all sensible beings, we should find, that far
from resembling a tender and careful mother, she resembles rather those
unnatural mothers, who instantly forgetting the unfortunates of their
licentious love, abandon their infants, as soon as they are born, and who,
content with having borne them, expose them, helpless, to the caprice of
fortune.
The Hottentots, in this respect are much wiser than other nations, who
treat them as barbarians, and refuse to worship God; because, they
say, _if he often does good, he often does evil_. Is not this manner of
reasoning more just and conformable to experience, than that of many men,
who are determined to see, in their God, nothing but goodness, wisdom, and
foresight, and who refuse to see that the innumerable evils, of which this
world is the theatre, must come from the same hand, which they kiss with
delight?
54.
Common sense teaches, that we cannot, and ought not, to judge of a cause,
but by its effects. A cause can be reputed constantly good, only when it
constantly produces good. A cause, which produces both good and evil, is
sometimes good, and sometimes evil. But the logic of theology destroys all
this. According to that, the phenomena of nature, or the effects we behold
in this world, prove to us the existence of a cause infinitely good; and
this cause is God. Although this world is full of evils; although disorder
often reigns in it; although men incessantly repine at their hard fate;
we must be convinced, that these effects are owing to a beneficent and
immutable cause; and many people believe it, or feign believe.
Every thing that passes in the world, proves to us, in the clearest
manner, that it is not governed by an intelligent being. We can judge of
the intelligence of a being only by the conformity of the means, which he
employs to attain his proposed object. The object of God, is the happiness
of a man. Yet, a like necessity governs the fate of all sensible beings,
who are born only to suffer much, enjoy little, and die. The cup of man
is filled with joy and bitterness; good is every where attended with evil;
order gives place to disorder; generation is followed by destruction.
If you say, that the designs of God are mysterious and that his ways are
impenetrable; I answer, that, in this case, it is impossible to judge
whether God be intelligent.
55.
You pretend, that God is immutable! What then produces a continual
instability in this world, which you make his empire? Is there a state,
subject to more frequent and cruel revolutions, than that of this unknown
monarch? How can we attribute to an immutable God, sufficiently powerful
to give solidity to his works, a government, in which every thing is in
continual vicissitude? If I imagine I see a God of uniform character in
all the effects favourable to my species, what kind of a God can I see in
their continual misfortunes? You tell me, it is our sins, which compel
him to punish. I answer, that God, according to yourselves, is then not
immutable, since the sins of men force him to change his conduct towards
them. Can a being, who is sometimes provoked, and sometimes appeased, be
constantly the same?
56.
The universe can be only what it is; all sensible beings in it enjoy and
suffer; that is, are moved sometimes in an agreeable, and sometimes in a
disagreeable manner. These effects are necessary; they result necessarily
from causes, which act only according to their properties. These effects
necessarily please, or displease, by a consequence of nature. This same
nature compels me to avoid, avert, and resist some things, and to seek,
desire, and procure others. In a world, where every thing is necessary,
a God, who remedies nothing, who leaves things to run in their necessary
course,--is he any thing but destiny, or necessity personified? It is a
deaf and useless God, who can effect no change in general laws, to which
he is himself subject. Of what importance is the infinite power of a
being, who will do but very little in my favour? Where is the infinite
goodness of a being, indifferent to happiness? Of what service is the
favour of a being, who, is able to do an infinite good, does not do even a
finite one?
57.
When we ask, why so many miserable objects appear under the government of
a good God, we are told, by way of consolation, that the present world
is only a passage, designed to conduct man to a happier one. The divines
assure us, that the earth we inhabit, is a state of trial. In short, they
shut our mouths, by saying, that God could communicate to his creatures
neither impossibility nor infinite happiness, which are reserved for
himself alone. Can such answers be satisfactory? 1st. The existence of
another life is guaranteed to us only by the imagination of man, who,
by supposing it, have only realized the desire they have of surviving
themselves, in order to enjoy hereafter a purer and more durable
happiness. 2ndly. How can we conceive that a God, who knows every thing,
and must be fully acquainted with the dispositions of his creatures,
should want so many experiments, in order to be sure of their
dispositions? 3rdly. According to the calculations of their chronologists,
our earth has existed six or seven thousand years. During that time,
nations have experienced calamities. History exhibits the human species
at all times tormented and ravaged by tyrants, conquerors, and heroes; by
wars, inundations, famines, plagues, etc. Are such long trials then likely
to inspire us with very great confidence in the secret views of the Deity?
Do such numerous and constant evils give a very exalted idea of the
future state, his goodness is preparing for us? 4thly. If God is so kindly
disposed, as he is asserted to be, without giving men infinite happiness,
could he not at least have communicated the degree of happiness, of which
finite beings are susceptible here below? To be happy, must we have an
_infinite_ or _divine_ happiness? 5thly. If God could not make men happier
than they are here below, what will become of the hope of a _paradise_,
where it is pretended, that the elect will for ever enjoy ineffable
bliss? If God neither could nor would avert evil from the earth, the only
residence we can know, what reason have we to presume, that he can or
will avert evil from another world, of which we have no idea? Epicurus
observed: "either God would remove evil out of this world, and cannot; or
he can, and will not; or he has neither the power nor will; or, lastly, he
has both the power and will. If he has the will, and not the power, this
shews weakness, which is contrary to the nature of God. If he has the
power, and not the will, it is malignity; and this is no less contrary
to his nature. If he is neither able nor willing, he is both impotent and
malignant, and consequently cannot be God. If he be both willing and able
(which alone is consonant to the nature of God) whence comes evil, or
why does he not prevent it?" Reflecting minds are still waiting for a
reasonable solution of these difficulties; and our divines tell us, that
they will be removed only in a future life.
58.
We are told of a pretended _scale of beings_. It is supposed, that God
has divided his creatures into different classes, in which each enjoys
the degree of happiness, of which it is susceptible. According to this
romantic arrangement, from the oyster to the celestial angels, all
beings enjoy a happiness, which is suitable to their nature. Experience
explicitly contradicts this sublime reverie. In this world, all sensible
beings suffer and live in the midst of dangers. Man cannot walk without
hurting, tormenting, or killing a multitude of sensible beings, which are
in his way; while he himself is exposed, at every step, to a multitude of
evils, foreseen or unforeseen, which may lead him to destruction. During
the whole course of his life, he is exposed to pains; he is not sure, a
moment, of his existence, to which he is so strongly attached, and which
he regards as the greatest gift of the Divinity.
59.
The world, it will be said, has all the perfection, of which it is
susceptible: since it is not God who made it, it must have great qualities
and great defects. But we answer, that, as the world must necessarily have
great defects, it would have been more conformable to the nature of a
good God, not to have created a world, which he could not make completely
happy. If God was supremely happy, before the creation of the world, and
could have continued to be supremely happy, without creating the world,
why did he not remain at rest? Why must man suffer? Why must man exist? Of
what importance is his existence to God? Nothing, or something? If man's
existence is not useful or necessary to God, why did God make man? If
man's existence is necessary to God's glory, he had need of man; he was
deficient in something before man existed. We can pardon an unskilful
workman for making an imperfect work; because he must work, well or ill,
upon penalty of starving. This workman is excusable, but God is not.
According to you, he is self-sufficient; if so, why does he make men? He
has, you say, every thing requisite to make man happy. Why then does he
not do it? Confess, that your God has more malice than goodness, unless
you admit, that God, was necessitated to do what he has done, without
being able to do it otherwise. Yet, you assure us, that God is free. You
say also, that he is immutable, although it was in _Time_ that he began
and ceased to exercise his power, like the inconstant beings of this
world. O theologians! Vain are your efforts to free your God from defects.
This perfect God has always some human imperfections.
60.
"Is not God master of his favours? Can he not give them? Can he not take
them away? It does not belong to his creatures to require reasons for
his conduct. He can dispose of the works of his own hands as he pleases.
Absolute sovereign of mortals, he distributes happiness or misery,
according to his good pleasure." Such are the solutions given by
theologians to console us for the evils which God inflicts upon us.
We reply, that a God, who is infinitely good, cannot be _master of his
favours_, but would by his nature be obliged to bestow them upon his
creatures; that a being, truly beneficent, cannot refrain from doing good;
that a being, truly generous, does not take back what he has given; and
that every man, who does so, dispenses with gratitude, and has no right to
complain of finding ungrateful men.
How can the odd and capricious conduct, which theologians ascribe to
God, be reconciled with religion, which supposes a covenant, or mutual
engagements between God and men? If God owes nothing to his creatures,
they, on their part, can owe nothing to their God. All religion is founded
upon the happiness that men think they have a right to expect from the
Deity, who is supposed to say to them: _Love me, adore me, obey me: and I
will make you happy_. Men, on their part, say to him: _Make us happy, be
faithful to your promises, and we will love you, we will adore you,
and obey your laws_. By neglecting the happiness of his creatures,
distributing his favours according to his caprice, and retracting his
gifts, does not God break the covenant, which serves as the basis of all
religion? Cicero has justly observed, that _if God is not agreeable to
man, he cannot be his God_. Goodness constitutes deity; this goodness can
be manifested to man only by the blessings he enjoys; as soon as he is
unhappy, this goodness disappears, and with it the divinity. An infinite
goodness can be neither limited, partial, nor exclusive. If God be
infinitely good, he owes happiness to all his creatures. The unhappiness
of a single being would suffice to annihilate unbounded goodness. Under an
infinitely good and powerful God, is it possible to conceive that a single
man should suffer? One animal, or mite, that suffers, furnishes invincible
arguments against divine providence and its infinite goodness.
61.