LETTER I.

When I some time since addressed you, I expressed an anxious wish that

you would submit to the consideration of your friends, your scheme of

religion, in such a form as would enable them to examine it with

deliberation; because I did believe that on this momentous subject, too

much care could not be exercised. My wish has been gratified, not by

your immediate agency, but by the zeal of your followers, who have

caused a number of your discourses to be printed and published to the

world.

When I sat down to read them, I did not expect to find a regularly

concocted system, because I did not believe you had a mind capable of

very extensive combination; but I did imagine you had given to your plan

some semblance of consistency, and that if there was no adhesion, there

would be no striking incongruity in its parts. In this I have been

disappointed; for in it, nothing can be discovered but disjointed

effusions, and attempts to give to different passages of Scripture novel

constructions; to amuse the fancy, and engage the mind in useless

enquiries after hidden things; to withdraw it from its proper business;

to entangle it in the web which the vanity and restlessness of man has

woven; and to substitute for that pure and simple worship which consists

in prostration of spirit before the throne of grace, a grateful

acknowledgment of his goodness, and humble thankfulness for the measure

of light received; lofty speculations on subjects more curious than

beneficial; which can have no tendency to mend the heart, and which

often lead into unprofitable controversies and perplexity of mind; for

it will ever remain a truth that "the judgments of the Lord are

unsearchable and his ways past finding out."

The christian religion is of so much importance, and has so long engaged

the attention of men; it has occasioned so much research and so many

controversies; so many sermons have been preached, and so many books

written, upon every part of it, that nothing new can be said upon the

subject: yet such is the nature of man, that he is always requiring some

novelty to rouse his attention and amuse his mind. This may perhaps

furnish some apology for the preacher of a sect whose form of worship

requires sermons at stated times, if he sometimes indulges in

metaphorical allusion, or contrives to expand his discourse by ingenious

digression. With the genuine quaker this plea must be unavailing:

impressed with the sublime idea that it is by silence and abstraction

from all outward things, that the mind is best fitted for true and

acceptable worship, it must follow, that when a minister imbued with

this spirit feels himself called upon to offer advice or instruction, he

will be careful "not to multiply words without knowledge, by which

counsel is darkened." But prolixity is the vice of oratory; it infects

the pulpit, the senate, and the bar. There is something so gratifying to

the pride and vanity of man in the display of this talent, or so

fascinating is the music of his own voice, that it is almost always

carried to excess; and we often see the orator pursuing his course with

undiminished vigour, long after his exhausted auditors have withdrawn

their attention from him.

You possess some of the qualities essential to the orator; you are

voluble of speech and impressive in your delivery, and you have that

confidence in the powers of your own mind, which secures you from

hesitation and embarrassment: but you are deficient in others, without

which all is unavailing; your perception is obscure, and your

ratiocination singularly defective; and you are peculiarly unfortunate

in the belief that you excel in that faculty in which you are most

deficient. Hence we find you plunging into the fathomless depths of

metaphysics with fearless confidence; stating propositions and assuming

inferences in direct opposition to them, and such is your fondness for

amplification, that even when the truth of your proposition is

self-evident, you contrive to involve it in obscurity by the redundancy

of your expletives, and the profusion of your attempts at illustration.

You contemn all human science, for you are ignorant; yet from the whole

body of ministers of that society of which you are still a member, you

cannot select an individual who makes such a lofty display of technical

terms, or more frequently endeavours to elucidate his observations by

reference to it. You believe in the doctrine of inspiration, and you

seem to claim the possession of it to a degree with which few are

favoured: you say it is an unerring director, and plainly to be

understood, and yet declare that all its dictates must be governed by

the fallible reason of man.

Having given to reason this unlimited dictatorship, it was natural to

expect that you would recommend the most assiduous cultivation of it;

but you have interdicted the only means by which it is improved, and

denounced by a curse those who are engaged in extending it.[3]

Footnote 3:

See discourses delivered in Philadelphia, page 53. "Oh that men of

science might be aware what a curse they are to the inhabitants of the

earth; what a great curse." There is no novelty in this opinion, for

we find a poet more than two hundred years ago making Jack Cade

exclaim, "thou hast most traitorously corrupted the youth of the

realm, in erecting a grammar school: and whereas before, our

forefathers had no other books but the score and tally, thou hast

caused printing to be used; and contrary to the king, his crown and

dignity, thou hast built a paper mill. It will be proved to thy face,

that thou hast men about thee that usually talk of a noun and a verb,

and such abominable words as no christian can endure to hear."

All this confusion arises from your not having formed any precise idea

of the terms you apply. With the words _reason_ and _rational_

continually in your mouth, you have never enquired into the nature and

operation of that distinguishing faculty of man, nor of the manner in

which alone it can be properly applied to the truths of our religion.

You appear to consider it as of physical organization; an instinct of

our nature which is perfected without care or cultivation, and that like

one of our natural senses, it may be summoned to our aid without fear of

error in its perceptions. You cannot be ignorant of the great

inferiority of the reasoning powers of man in his savage state, and a

little enquiry would have taught you, that observation and experience

are the foundation of all knowledge, and that as we can only reason from

the ideas existing in our own minds, it is by their increase alone that

our reasoning faculty is extended. Hence it must follow, that as it is

the noblest gift of the Almighty to man; a germ which without

cultivation can never flourish, it is our duty to promote its growth and

expansion by every means in our power.

I am not insensible of the evils which have arisen from the presumption

with which some learned men have endeavoured to destroy that religion

which is the foundation of our hope; but we ought to recollect that such

is the perversity of man, that if the abuse of the blessings of

Providence can be adduced as an argument against their enjoyment, there

are few indeed in which we can innocently indulge. Nor is ignorance any

security against this presumption; on the contrary its decisions are

always more bold and dogmatic; and if they are less injurious, it is

only because they are more foolish.

That we could never have arrived at a knowledge of our spiritual duties,

or of many gospel truths by the deductions of human reason, is evident;

were it otherwise, the revelations under the christian dispensation

would have been unnecessary; but we are not to infer from this, that our

reason is to be silent on this all important object; for if it is the

subject of our cogitations, it is of course under the examination of our

reasoning powers, and hence arises the importance of endeavouring so to

improve this talent, as to enable us to unravel the subtilty of the

sophist, and separate the gold, from the dross of the enthusiast. Were

we all well instructed in the right use of our reason, we should be able

to distinguish between that which is above, and that which is contrary

to it; and we should confine it to its proper place, which is, _not to

judge of things revealed, but of the reality of revelation._ To attempt

to test the truth of the things revealed, by our reason, is inconsistent

with it: they are given to us in a supernatural way, which of itself,

discovers the impossibility of examining them by deductions from our own

ideas; but the reality of the revelations themselves, stands on very

different ground. Admirable as is the instruction to be drawn from them,

the Almighty in mercy to man, did not leave them on their intrinsic

merits alone; they were accompanied by signs and wonders, the evidence

of the divine power by which they were sent. The life of our blessed

Saviour, his doctrines, and the miracles which he wrought, have been

recorded in the Scriptures, and handed down for our instruction and

government; and as no man can be a christian who does not believe in

them, I am fully persuaded that every candid and diligent enquirer, will

find sufficient evidence of their authenticity to satisfy his mind; and

that being satisfied, his faith in the things revealed will be

established.

Now although I agree with you, that the inspirations of man in our day,

are to be examined by the rule of right reason, I fear we shall not

concur in our manner of conducting the enquiry. We have no extraordinary

signs accompanying them, and we all know, how easy it is to mistake the

suggestions of the imagination for the operations of the spirit of truth

on the mind; and the strange visions which enthusiasm often produces,

and as it is sometimes difficult to discover the source from which they

spring, it is a satisfaction to know that we have a standard by which

error itself may be rendered innoxious.

"I am far (says Locke,) from denying that God can, or doth sometimes,

enlighten men's minds in the apprehending of certain truths, or excite

them to good actions, by the immediate influence and assistance of the

Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary signs accompanying it. But in

such cases we have reason and Scripture, unerring rules, to know whether

it be from God or no. Where the truth embraced is consonant to the

revelation in the written word of God, or the action conformable to the

dictates of right reason, or Holy Writ, we may be assured that we run no

risk in entertaining it as such; because, though it be not an immediate

revelation from God, extraordinarily operating on our minds, yet we are

sure it is warranted by that revelation which he has given us of truth.

But it is not the strength of our private persuasion within ourselves,

that can warrant it to be a light or motion from Heaven; nothing can do

that but the written word of God without us, or that standard of reason

which is common to us with all men. Where reason or Scripture is express

for any opinion or action, we may receive it as of divine authority; but

it is not the strength of our own persuasions which can by itself give

it that stamp. The bent of our own minds may favour it as much as we

please; that may show it a fondling of our own, but will by no means

prove it to be an offspring of Heaven, and of divine original."

Here is a great coincidence between the opinions of the christian

philosopher and the quaker apologist; and although they refer to right

reason as well as the Scriptures, as our guide, they meant not to use

them in contradistinction to each other. When we refer to either of two

rules to solve a proposition, it is because both will produce the same

result; and they introduced the word reason, as applicable only to those

opinions and actions, respecting which, the Scriptures are silent.

If, says the philosopher, the doctrine is consonant to reason or

Scripture, it may be received without risk, although it may not proceed

from an immediate revelation of God. Divine revelation, says the

apologist, can never contradict the outward testimony of the Scriptures

or right reason; and whatever any do, pretending to the spirit, which is

contrary to the Scriptures, must be accounted and reckoned a delusion of

the devil.

By this test no genuine quaker can object to being tried,[4] "for he

preaches no new gospel, but that which is confirmed by all the miracles

of Christ and his apostles; and he offers nothing but that which he is

able and ready to confirm by the authority of the Scriptures, which all

protestants acknowledge to be true." It is indeed the only criterion by

which we can judge of the faith of man, and by that criterion, how few

of your sermons would escape condemnation.

Footnote 4:

Barclay.

Observations on the Sermons of Elias Hicks In Several Letters to Him; With Some Introductory Remarks, Addressed to the Junior Members of the Society of Friends. · 第 14 / 33 题