In this very remarkable, but seemingly little-known treatise,[50] Kant

expounds a complete cosmogony, in the shape of a theory of the causes

which have led to the development of the universe from diffused atoms of

matter endowed with simple attractive and repulsive forces.

"Give me matter," says Kant, "and I will build the world;" and he

proceeds to deduce from the simple data from which he starts, a doctrine

in all essential respects similar to the well-known "Nebular Hypothesis"

of Laplace.[51] He accounts for the relation of the masses and the

densities of the planets to their distances from the sun, for the

eccentricities of their orbits, for their rotations, for their

satellites, for the general agreement in the direction of rotation among

the celestial bodies, for Saturn's ring, and for the zodiacal light. He

finds, in each system of worlds, indications that the attractive force

of the central mass will eventually destroy its organization, by

concentrating upon itself the matter of the whole system; but, as the

result of this concentration, he argues for the development of an amount

of heat which will dissipate the mass once more into a molecular chaos

such as that in which it began.

Kant pictures to himself the universe as once an infinite expansion of

formless and diffused matter. At one point of this he supposes a single

centre of attraction set up; and, by strict deductions from admitted

dynamical principles, shows how this must result in the development of a

prodigious central body, surrounded by systems of solar and planetary

worlds in all stages of development. In vivid language he depicts the

great world-mælstrom, widening the margins of its prodigious eddy in the

slow progress of millions of ages, gradually reclaiming more and more of

the molecular waste, and converting chaos into cosmos. But what is

gained at the margin is lost in the centre; the attractions of the

central systems bring their constituents together, which then, by the

heat evolved, are converted once more into molecular chaos. Thus the

worlds that are, lie between the ruins of the worlds that have been and

the chaotic materials of the worlds that shall be; and, in spite of all

waste and destruction, Cosmos is extending his borders at the expense of

Chaos.

Kant's further application of his views to the earth itself is to be

found in his "Treatise on Physical Geography"[52] (a term under which

the then unknown science of geology was included), a subject which he

had studied with very great care and on which he lectured for many

years. The fourth section of the first part of this Treatise is called

"History of the great Changes which the Earth has formerly undergone and

is still undergoing," and is, in fact, a brief and pregnant essay upon

the principles of geology. Kant gives an account first "of the gradual

changes which are now taking place" under the heads of such as are

caused by earthquakes, such as are brought about by rain and rivers,

such as are effected by the sea, such as are produced by winds and

frost; and, finally, such as result from the operations of man.

The second part is devoted to the "Memorials of the Changes which the

Earth has undergone in remote antiquity." These are enumerated as:--A.

Proofs that the sea formerly covered the whole earth. B. Proofs that the

sea has often been changed into dry land and then again into sea. C. A

discussion of the various-theories of the earth put forward by

Scheuchzer, Moro, Bonnet, Woodward, White, Leibnitz, Linnæus, and

Buffon.

The third part contains an "Attempt to give a sound explanation of the

ancient history of the earth."

I suppose that it would be very easy to pick holes in the details of

Kant's speculations, whether cosmological, or specially telluric, in

their application. But, for all that, he seems to me to have been the

first person to frame a complete system of geological speculation by

founding the doctrine of evolution.

With as much truth as Hutton, Kant could say, "I take things just as I

find them at present, and, from these, I reason with regard to that

which must have been." Like Hutton, he is never tired of pointing out

that "in Nature there is wisdom, system, and consistency." And, as in

these great principles, so in believing that the cosmos has a

reproductive operation "by which a ruined constitution may be repaired,"

he forestalls Hutton; while, on the other hand, Kant is true to science.

He knows no bounds to geological speculation but those of the intellect.

He reasons back to a beginning of the present state of things; he admits

the possibility of an end.

I have said that the three schools of geological speculation which I

have termed Catastrophism, Uniformitarianism, and Evolutionism are

commonly supposed to be antagonistic to one another; and I presume it

will have become obvious that, in my belief, the last is destined to

swallow up the other two. But it is proper to remark that each of the

latter has kept alive the tradition of precious truths.

CATASTROPHISM has insisted upon the existence of a practically

unlimited bank of force, on which the theorist might draw; and it has

cherished the idea of the development of the earth from a state in which

its form, and the forces which it exerted, were very different from

those we now know. That such difference of form and power once existed

is a necessary part of the doctrine of evolution.

UNIFORMITARIANISM, on the other hand, has with equal justice

insisted upon a practically unlimited bank of time, ready to discount

any quantity of hypothetical paper. It has kept before our eyes the

power of the infinitely little, time being granted, and has compelled us

to exhaust known causes, before flying to the unknown.

To my mind there appears to be no sort of necessary theoretical

antagonism between Catastrophism and Uniformitarianism. On the contrary,

it is very conceivable that catastrophes may be part and parcel of

uniformity. Let me illustrate my case by analogy. The working of a clock

is a model of uniform action; good time-keeping means uniformity of

action. But the striking of the clock is essentially a catastrophe; the

hammer might be made to blow up a barrel of gunpowder, or turn on a

deluge of water; and, by proper arrangement, the clock, instead of

marking the hours, might strike at all sorts of irregular periods, never

twice alike, in the intervals, force, or number of its blows.

Nevertheless, all these irregular, and apparently lawless, catastrophes

would be the result of an absolutely uniformitarian action; and we might

have two schools of clock-theorists, one studying the hammer and the

other the pendulum.

Still less is there any necessary antagonism between either of these

doctrines and that of Evolution, which embraces all that is sound in

both Catastrophism and Uniformitarianism, while it rejects the arbitrary

assumptions of the one and the, as arbitrary, limitations of the other.

Nor is the value of the doctrine of Evolution to the philosophic thinker

diminished by the fact that it applies the same method to the living and

the not-living world; and embraces, in one stupendous analogy, the

growth of a solar system from molecular chaos, the shaping of the earth

from the nebulous cubhood of its youth, through innumerable changes and

immeasurable ages, to its present form; and the development of a living

being from the shapeless mass of protoplasm we term a germ.

I do not know whether Evolutionism can claim that amount of currency

which would entitle it to be called British popular geology; but, more

or less vaguely, it is assuredly present in the minds of most

geologists.

Such being the three phases of geological speculation, we are now in a

position to inquire which of these it is that Sir William Thomson calls

upon us to reform in the passages which I have cited.

It is obviously Uniformitarianism which the distinguished physicist

takes to be the representative of geological speculation in general. And

thus a first issue is raised, inasmuch as many persons (and those not

the least thoughtful among the younger geologists) do not accept strict

Uniformitarianism as the final form of geological speculation. We should

say, if Hutton and Playfair declare the course of the world to have been

always the same, point out the fallacy by all means; but, in so doing,

do not imagine that you are proving modern geology to be in opposition

to natural philosophy. I do not suppose that, at the present day, any

geologist would be found to maintain absolute Uniformitarianism, to deny

that the rapidity of the rotation of the earth _may_ be diminishing,

that the sun _may_ be waxing dim, or that the earth itself _may_ be

cooling. Most of us, I suspect, are Gallios, "who care for none of these

things," being of opinion that, true or fictitious, they have made no

practical difference to the earth, during the period of which, a record

is preserved in stratified deposits.

The accusation that we have been running counter to the _principles_ of

natural philosophy, therefore, is devoid of foundation. The only

question which can arise is whether we have, or have not, been tacitly

making assumptions which are in opposition to certain conclusions which

may be drawn from those principles. And this question subdivides itself

into two:--the first, are we really contravening such conclusions? the

second, if we are, are those conclusions so firmly based that we may not

contravene them? I reply in the negative to both these questions, and I

will give you my reasons for so doing. Sir William Thomson believes that

he is able to prove, by physical reasonings, "that the existing state of

things on the earth, life on the earth--all geological history showing

continuity of life--must be limited within some such period of time as

one hundred million years" (loc. cit. p. 25).

The first inquiry which arises plainly is, has it ever been denied that

this period _may_ be enough for the purposes of geology?

The discussion of this question is greatly embarrassed by the vagueness

with which the assumed limit is, I will not say defined, but

indicated,--"some such period of past time as one hundred million

years." Now does this mean that it may have been two, or three, or four

hundred million years? Because this really makes all the difference.[53]

I presume that 100,000 feet may be taken as a full allowance for the

total thickness of stratified rocks containing traces of life; 100,000

divided by 100,000,000 = 0.001. Consequently, the deposit of 100,000

feet of stratified rock in 100,000,000 years means that the deposit has

taken place at the rate of 1/1000 of a foot, or, say, 1/83 of an inch,

per annum.

Well, I do not know that any one is prepared to maintain that, even

making all needful allowances, the stratified rocks may not have been

formed, on the average, at the rate of 1/83 of an inch per annum. I

suppose that if such could be shown to be the limit of world-growth, we

could put up with the allowance without feeling that our speculations

had undergone any revolution. And perhaps, after all, the qualifying

phrase "some such period" may not necessitate the assumption of more

than 1/166, or 1/249, or 1/332 of an inch of deposit per year, which, of

course, would give us still more ease and comfort.

But, it may be said, that it is biology, and not geology, which asks for

so much time--that the succession of life demands vast intervals; but

this appears to me to be reasoning in a circle. Biology takes her time

from geology. The only reason we have for believing in the slow rate of

the change in living forms is the fact that they persist through a

series of deposits which, geology informs us, have taken a long while to

make. If the geological clock is wrong, all the naturalist will have to

do is to modify his notions of the rapidity of change accordingly. And I

venture to point out that, when we are told that the limitation of the

period during which living beings have inhabited this planet to one,

two, or three hundred million years requires a complete revolution in

geological speculation, the _onus probandi_ rests on the maker of the

assertion, who brings forward not a shadow of evidence in its support.

Thus, if we accept the limitation of time placed before us by Sir W.

Thomson, it is not obvious, on the face of the matter, that we shall

have to alter, or reform, our ways in any appreciable degree; and we may

therefore proceed with much calmness, and indeed much indifference, as

to the result, to inquire whether that limitation is justified by the

arguments employed in its support.

These arguments are three in number:--

I. The first is based upon the undoubted fact that the tides tend to

retard the rate of the earth's rotation upon its axis. That this must be

so is obvious, if one considers, roughly, that the tides result from the

pull which the sun and the moon exert upon the sea, causing it to act as

a sort of break upon the rotating solid earth.

Kant, who was by no means a mere "abstract philosopher," but a good

mathematician and well versed in the physical science of his time, not

only proved this in an essay of exquisite clearness and intelligibility,

now more than a century old,[54] but deduced from it some of its more

important consequences, such as the constant turning of one face of the

moon towards the earth.

But there is a long step from the demonstration of a tendency to the

estimation of the practical value of that tendency, which is all with

which we are at present concerned. The facts bearing on this point

appear to stand as follow:--

It is a matter of observation that the moon's mean motion is (and has

for the last 3,000 years been) undergoing an acceleration, relatively to

the rotation of the earth. Of course this may result from one of two

causes: the moon may really have been moving more swiftly in its orbit;

or the earth may have been rotating more slowly on its axis.

Laplace believed he had accounted for this phænomenon by the fact that

the eccentricity of the earth's orbit has been diminishing throughout

these 3,000 years. This would produce a diminution of the mean

attraction of the sun on the moon; or, in other words, an increase in

the attraction of the earth on the moon: and, consequently, an increase

in the rapidity of the orbital motion of the latter body. Laplace,

therefore, laid the responsibility of the acceleration upon the moon;

and if his views were correct, the tidal retardation must either be

insignificant in amount, or be counteracted by some other agency.

Our great astronomer, Adams, however, appears to have found a flaw in

Laplace's calculation, and to have shown that only half the observed

retardation could be accounted for in the way he had suggested. There

remains, therefore, the other half to be accounted for; and here, in the

absence of all positive knowledge, three sets of hypotheses have been

suggested.

(a) M. Delaunay suggests that the earth is at fault, in consequence

of the tidal retardation. Messrs. Adams, Thomson, and Tait work out this

suggestion, and, "on a certain assumption as to the proportion of

retardations due to the sun and the moon," find the earth may lose

twenty-two seconds of time in a century from this cause.[55]

(b) But M. Dufour suggests that the retardation of the earth (which

is hypothetically assumed to exist) may be due in part, or wholly, to

the increase of the moment of inertia of the earth by meteors falling

upon its surface. This suggestion also meets with the entire approval of

Sir W. Thomson, who shows that meteor-dust, accumulating at the rate of

one foot in 4,000 years, would account for the remainder of

retardation.[56]

(c) Thirdly, Sir W. Thomson brings forward an hypothesis of his own

with respect to the cause of the hypothetical retardation of the earth's

rotation:--

"Let us suppose ice to melt from the polar regions (20° round each pole,

we may say) to the extent of something more than a foot thick, enough to

give 1.1 foot of water over those areas, or 0.006 of a foot of water if

spread over the whole globe, which would, in reality, raise the

sea-level by only some such undiscoverable difference as three-fourths

of an inch or an inch. This, or the reverse, which we believe might

happen any year, and could certainly not be detected without far more

accurate observations and calculations for the mean sea-level than any

hitherto made, would slacken or quicken the earth's rate as a timekeeper

by one-tenth of a second per year."[57]

I do not presume to throw the slightest doubt upon the accuracy of any

of the calculations made by such distinguished mathematicians as those

who have made the suggestions I have cited. On the contrary, it is

necessary to my argument to assume that they are all correct. But I

desire to point out that this seems to be one of the many cases in which

the admitted accuracy of mathematical processes is allowed to throw a

wholly inadmissible appearance of authority over the results obtained by

them. Mathematics may be compared to a mill of exquisite workmanship,

which grinds you stuff of any degree of fineness; but, nevertheless,

what you get out depends on what you put in; and as the grandest mill in

the world will not extract wheat-flour from peascods, so pages of

formulæ will not get a definite result out of loose data.

In the present instance it appears to be admitted:--

1. That it is not absolutely certain, after all, whether the moon's mean

motion is undergoing acceleration, or the earth's rotation

retardation.[58] And yet this is the key of the whole position.

2. If the rapidity of the earth's rotation is diminishing, it is not

certain how much of that retardation is due to tidal friction,--how much

to meteors,--how much to possible excess of melting over accumulation of

polar ice, during the period covered by observation, which amounts, at

the outside, to not more than 2,600 years.

3. The effect of a different distribution of land and water in modifying

the retardation caused by tidal friction, and of reducing it, under some

circumstances, to a minimum, does not appear to be taken into account.

4. During the Miocene epoch the polar ice was certainly many feet

thinner than it has been during, or since, the Glacial epoch. Sir W.

Thomson tells us that the accumulation of something more than a foot of

ice around the poles (which implies the withdrawal of, say, an inch of

water from the general surface of the sea) will cause the earth to

rotate quicker by one-tenth of a second per annum. It would appear,

therefore, that the earth may have been rotating, throughout the whole

period which has elapsed from the commencement of the Glacial epoch down

to the present time, one, or more, seconds per annum quicker than it

rotated during the Miocene epoch.

But, according to Sir W. Thomson's calculation, tidal retardation will

only account for a retardation of 22" in a century, or 22/100 (say 1/5)

of a second per annum.

Thus, assuming that the accumulation of polar ice since the Miocene

epoch has only been sufficient to produce ten times the effect of a coat

of ice one foot thick, we shall have an accelerating cause which covers

all the loss from tidal action, and leaves a balance of 4/5 a second per

annum in the way of acceleration.

If tidal retardation can be thus checked and overthrown by other

temporary conditions, what becomes of the confident assertion, based

upon the assumed uniformity of tidal retardation, that ten thousand

million years ago the earth must have been rotating more than twice as

fast as at present, and, therefore, that we geologists are "in direct

opposition to the principles of Natural Philosophy" if we spread

geological history over that time?

II. The second argument is thus stated by Sir W. Thomson:--"An article,

by myself, published in 'Macmillan's Magazine' for March 1862, on the

age of the sun's heat, explains results of investigation into various

questions as to possibilities regarding the amount of heat that the sun

could have, dealing with it as you would with a stone, or a piece of

matter, only taking into account the sun's dimensions, which showed it

to be possible that the sun may have already illuminated the earth for

as many as one hundred million years, but at the same time rendered it

almost certain that he had not illuminated the earth for five hundred

millions of years. The estimates here are necessarily very vague; but

yet, vague as they are, I do not know that it is possible, upon any

reasonable estimate founded on known properties of matter, to say that

we can believe the sun has really illuminated the earth for five hundred

million years."[59]

I do not wish to "Hansardize" Sir William Thomson by laying much stress

on the fact that, only fifteen years ago, he entertained a totally

different view of the origin of the sun's heat, and believed that the

energy radiated from year to year was supplied from year to year--a

doctrine which would have suited Hutton perfectly. But the fact that so

eminent a physical philosopher has, thus recently, held views opposite

to those which he now entertains, and that he confesses his own

estimates to be "very vague," justly entitles us to disregard those

estimates, if any distinct facts on our side go against them. However, I

am not aware that such facts exist. As I have already said, for anything

I know, one, two, or three hundred millions of years may serve the needs

of geologists perfectly well.

III. The third line of argument is based upon the temperature of the

interior of the earth. Sir W. Thomson refers to certain investigations

which prove that the present thermal condition of the interior of the

earth implies either a heating of the earth within the last 20,000 years

of as much as 100° F., or a greater heating all over the surface at some

time further back than 20,000 years, and then proceeds thus:--

"Now, are geologists prepared to admit that, at some time within the

last 20,000 years, there has been all over the earth so high a

temperature as that? I presume not; no geologist--no _modern_

geologist--would for a moment admit the hypothesis that the present

state of underground heat is due to a heating of the surface at so late

a period as 20,000 years ago. If that is not admitted, we are driven to

a greater heat at some time more than 20,000 years ago. A greater

heating all over the surface than 100° Fahrenheit would kill nearly all

existing plants and animals, I may safely say. Are modern geologists

prepared to say that all life was killed off the earth 50,000, 100,000,

or 200,000 years ago? For the uniformity theory, the further back the

time of high surface-temperature is put the better; but the further back

the time of heating, the hotter it must have been. The best for those

who draw most largely on time is that which puts it furthest back; and

that is the theory that the heating was enough to melt the whole. But

even if it was enough to melt the whole, we must still admit some limit,

such as fifty million years, one hundred million years, or two or three

hundred million years ago. Beyond that we cannot go."[60]

It will be observed that the "limit" is once again of the vaguest,

ranging from 50,000,000 years to 300,000,000. And the reply is, once

more, that, for anything that can be proved to the contrary, one or two

hundred million years might serve the purpose, even of a thorough-going

Huttonian uniformitarian, very well.

But if, on the other hand, the 100,000,000 or 200,000,000 years appear

to be insufficient for geological purposes, we must closely criticise

the method by which the limit is reached. The argument is simple enough.

_Assuming_ the earth to be nothing but a cooling mass, the quantity of

heat lost per year, _supposing_ the rate of cooling to have been

uniform, multiplied by any given number of years, will be given the

minimum temperature that number of years ago.

But is the earth nothing but a cooling mass, "like a hot-water jar such

as is used in carriages," or "a globe of sandstone?" and has its cooling

been uniform? An affirmative answer to both these questions seems to be

necessary to the validity of the calculations on which Sir W. Thomson

lays so much stress.

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