Such, then, was the state of affairs when in 1585 war began between
Spain and England. English adventurers infested Spanish territory on the
main land in the northern part of the vast region which the Spanish
still called Florida. They planned an English colony at the Bay of Santa
Maria and renamed that place "Roanoke" and they also renamed that part
of Florida after the Queen of England; calling it "Virginia." The news
of this invasion appears to have been known in Cuba, by the way of
Southern Florida, before it was known in Spain, and a fleet vessel was
accordingly sent from Havana to bear the tidings to the King and to ask
for further protection from Cuba.
There was a period of hesitancy and uncertainty, and then the storm
broke. On January 10th, 1586, Sir Francis Drake landed in Hispaniola and
occupied the City of Santo Domingo, the nominal capital of all the
Spanish West Indies. Some of the judges of the Supreme Court at that
place escaped and fled to Cuba, where they arrived a week later with the
startling news. Luzan, as already related, was then at Bayamo, and it
was there that he received the news. He was startled and alarmed, but
appears not to have been panic stricken. Indeed he acted with coolness
and judgment and in a manner which must be regarded as going far toward
redeeming his reputation from the reproaches which he had formerly
incurred. Discreetly assuming that Drake's attack upon Cuba, whenever it
was made, would be not at Bayamo but at the Capital and metropolis
itself, his first thought was for Havana. Immediately upon receiving the
news from Santo Domingo he dispatched horsemen across country from
Bayamo to Havana to bear the tidings to Quinones, bidding them also to
spread the news through all the country as they went and to command all
towns to marshal all available men and send them on to Havana for the
reinforcement of that place. As soon as possible he also sent two
vessels from Bayamo to Havana laden with men and supplies. Ignoring
their former quarrels in the face of the common danger he wrote to
Quinones outlining his plans for a defense of the Island and urging that
an appeal should be sent to Mexico for aid, from which country it could
be procured much more quickly than from Spain. Then he hastened to
Santiago and from that port sent two vessels to Spain to tell the King
what had happened at Santo Domingo and what was being done to avert, if
possible, a like calamity at Havana.
The Governor's appeals to the various municipalities were not without
effect. The people of Cuba seemed to be aroused by the imminence of
danger to a better degree of public spirit than they had ever before
manifested. Bayamo, Sancti Spiritus, Puerto Principe, and even poor
little Trinidad, the smallest and weakest town of the Island,
contributed men and arms to their full ability, and when at the
beginning of May these levies were mustered in Havana they numbered more
than 225 efficient men, tolerably well armed. Luzan himself remained at
Bayamo, in the absence of orders or even permission to return to Havana,
professing readiness and eagerness to serve the King there or elsewhere,
wherever he could be of most use. At Havana Quinones was in command,
loyally supported by the Town Council, the royal officials and the
entire community. Even the austere and censorious Rojas, the Royal
Treasurer, who had been the bitter critic and opponent of Quinones,
forgot his animosity and hastened to offer his services in any capacity
in which they might be utilized. It is related that Rojas, despite his
years, his wealth and his social dignity, worked as a common laborer
with pick-axe and shovel in digging trenches and throwing up breastworks
for the fortification of the town, thus setting an example which left no
other citizen any excuse for shirking duty and indeed went far toward
inspiring the whole community with patriotic fervor. A proclamation was
also issued by the Mayor, Pedro de la Vega, addressed to all citizens
who, because of debts, quarrels, crimes, or other causes, had sought
sanctuary in the church or gone into hiding in the jungle, asking them
to come forward and aid in the defense of Havana, and promising them
immunity from arrest or prosecution and a period of a fortnight's grace
in which to return to their asylums or their hiding places after the
need of their services was ended. This extraordinary call was responded
to by scores of fugitives.
There was no neglect, either, in preparation for the defense of the
suburbs of Havana. Chorrera was generally regarded not only as a
possible but as a very probable landing point for the invaders, from
which a march could be made by land against Havana. It was not
practicable to fortify the place strongly enough to prevent the landing
of any considerable force, but a small camp was established there,
occupied by a company of horsemen, who were to keep watch day and night
for the approach of the enemy, and upon his first appearance were to
ride post-haste to Havana with the news. The first horseman was to set
out the moment the enemy was sighted in the distance. A second was to
follow as soon as the fleet was near enough for the number of vessels
and their approximate strength and men and guns to be determined. A
third would set out the moment the enemy's intention, either of landing
there or of proceeding on to Havana, was ascertained. A fourth would
wait until the enemy was actually landing and his numbers could be
determined, and would then hasten after the others with the news.
Nearer the city there were several other possible landing places at
inlets of the coast and some of these were fortified with earth-works
and artillery. Chief among these was the inlet of San Lazaro, where in
addition to earth works an enclosed fort of timber, stone and earth was
constructed with several cannons mounted on a platform. At the entrance
to the harbor of Havana itself the strongest preparations were made. At
Punta a dozen guns were in readiness to make that the chief point of
defense outside of La Fuerza itself. Much attention was given to all
roads leading into the city for several miles around; particularly
toward the west from which direction the attack was chiefly expected.
Some of the roads were blocked altogether, others were mined and
provided with pitfalls. Still others were screened and hidden with trees
and brushwood so as to serve as secret means of passage for the
Spaniards in advancing against or retreating from the enemy, and these
were so mined that after having served their purpose to the Spaniards
they could be readily destroyed. Elsewhere trees, underbrush and jungle
were cleared away so that there would be no cover nor concealment for
the invading force. Trenches and earth-works were constructed between La
Fuerza and Punta, and the former fortress was provisioned and prepared
for a siege. Special parapets of timber, stone and earth were
constructed upon the top of the fort, and numerous houses and other
buildings near it were destroyed in order that there might be no shelter
for an attacking force.
Nor was the possibility of an attack from the eastward overlooked. On
the Morro headland at the important entrance a battery of three guns was
placed, well protected by breast-works of timber, stone and earth, and
the coast from Morro to Matanzas was continually patrolled by horsemen
on the lookout for the coming of strange vessels, and under orders
similar to those which had been given to the watchmen at Chorrera. As
for the harbor itself, a great chain was stretched across its entrance
buoyed with logs and fastened with a huge padlock at the foot of the
Morro headland.
Finally the few swift sailing vessels which could be mustered into the
service were kept cruising off the shore to espy the approaching
squadron. They were not sufficiently strong to give battle, but they
could give warning to the city. Also they could bear to Spain or to
Mexico tidings of what occurred. Thus one vessel lay in the estuary of
the Puercos River, ready to flee to Mexico, while another cruised around
Ycacos Point, to hasten to Spain to tell if Havana should fall into the
hands of the foe.
Meanwhile in Havana itself all possible forces were mustered for
defense. The volunteers from the other towns were drilled into an
efficient state of discipline. Such was their zeal that they gladly
served without pay while a considerable number of them in addition
provided their own rations at their own cost. For the necessary expenses
of their maintenance Rojas, the Royal Treasurer, used what royal funds
were in hand regardless of the purpose for which they had been designed,
and when these were insufficient he collected taxes without authority,
on the principle that the safety of the city and Island was the supreme
law. At the beginning of April some welcome aid arrived from Mexico,
which even Quinones was now glad to have. The Viceroy sent four vessels,
bearing about 300 fighting men, with six months' supplies of food and
with pay for eight months in advance. These increased the force under
Quinones to more than 900 well-trained soldiers. During the month of
April Luzan arrived from Bayamo with nearly 100 more men, thus
increasing the garrison of Havana to about 1,000. This was a force which
the Captain-General confidently believed would be able to resist and to
repulse any force which Drake might be able to land.
Luzan had meantime, in February, received from Spain orders to resume
the governorship of the Island with full power, to return to Havana, and
to consider his term of office indefinitely prolonged. He had been
appointed in 1579 for a term of four years and had assumed office in
1580, so that his original term was by this time long since expired.
Reckoning the four years from his actual assumption of office in the
summer of 1580 his term had ended in 1584. If his return to Havana was
not altogether agreeable to Quinones, and it is quite probable that it
was not, at least a semblance of harmony was preserved between them, and
there was certainly efficient if not cordial co-operation. To this
auspicious state of affairs the Royal Treasurer contributed in no small
degree.
In fact, in the face of the great peril which confronted it, all Cuba
arose to the occasion with a unity of public spirit never before known
in its history, and wholly admirable. All the officials, civil and
military, insular and royal, were in accord, and all classes of the
population, Spaniards, Indians and negro slaves were loyal and devoted
in their support. In these circumstances it is of fascinating interest
to speculate upon what might have happened had Drake made the expected
descent upon Havana. It is well within the limit not only of possibility
but of probability that he would have been decisively defeated. It is
even possible that in the conflict with more than a thousand well-armed,
well trained and resolute Spaniards, than whom there were then no braver
or better fighting men in all the world, he would himself have been
captured or slain. And such a disposition of Francis Drake in the summer
of 1586, only two years before the descent of the Invincible Armada upon
the shores of England, might well have changed the history of the world.
But this was not to be. Some say that Drake did not intend to attack
Havana at that time, preferring to raid Carthagena, as he did. Some say
that by means of spies he ascertained the strength of Havana's defenses
and deemed it, therefore, prudent not to meddle with that place. Some
say that there was an interposition of Providence to dissuade him from
what might have been a disastrous fiasco. We have also, as we shall
presently see, the testimony of some Spanish fugitives, which is
entirely plausible, though not certainly correct. Conjecture is
inconclusive. Only the fact remains that Drake passed by and left Cuba
unassailed.
From the latter part of February until the beginning of May no word of
his doings came to Havana; anxiety meanwhile prevailing and preparations
for his anticipated arrival being unabated. At last word came, most
ominous. A vessel from Spain, a heavily armed frigate, had been
searching for Drake. It had tracked him from Santo Domingo to
Carthagena, and had found him in full possession of the latter place.
There apparently, after two months' occupancy, he was preparing for some
fresh adventure. This information convinced the Cuban authorities that
the great struggle was at hand, and that the approach of the enemy would
be from the westward by way of Cape San Antonio. After despoiling
Carthagena Drake's logical course would be to raid Havana, and
preparations for defense were therefore redoubled. Nor were these
anticipations soon to be dispelled. A few weeks later, on May 27th, a
courier arrived from Cape San Antonio, the western extremity of the
Island, with the news that five days before a powerful British armada,
doubtless Drake's, had touched at that point for fresh water and other
supplies. It was no mere raiding flotilla of privateers, such as those
with which the French had long been troubling the Cuban coasts, but it
was a fleet of thirty-sail, probably with two or three thousand soldiers
aboard, and with artillery far superior both in number and range to all
the defenses of Havana. The courier could not tell what the intentions
of the fleet were or what was its destination. Possibly it was simply
seeking to anticipate and capture the treasure ships of Spain coming
from Mexico or from Darien with the silver, gold and gems of Peru and
Golden Castile. More probably it was planning the conquest of Havana, as
Santo Domingo and Carthagena had been conquered. This latter supposition
seemed to be confirmed two days later, when another messenger arrived
from the west, telling that it was indeed Drake's fleet and that it had
sailed from Cape San Antonio eastward toward Havana.
In a minor measure Havana and all Cuba now anticipated the feelings
which England had two years later upon the approach of the Invincible
Armada. Every man was summoned to his appointed place in the scheme of
defense and insistent vigilance was maintained night and day. For this
there was full need. Within an hour of the arrival of this second
messenger from the west a Spanish ship from Mexico came flying into the
port of Havana with half a dozen English ships in hot pursuit. She
passed Punta and gained safety before they came up, the big chain being
slackened to let her pass within and then tightened again to shut out
her pursuers. They did not, however, attempt to enter the harbor. One
came so near as to draw a few shots from the guns of the Morro Fort and
then withdrew without returning fire. But an hour later eight more
English sails appeared, making fourteen in all.
Evidently the crisis was at hand. Every available man in Havana was in
his place. Every available cannon was double-shotted and trained upon
the spot at which the English vessels would first come within range.
There was, however, no panic, no confusion. All men were resolute,
confident and in high spirits. All night long sentinels watched the
English fleet expecting to see it send boat loads of men ashore; ready
to signal the news with beacon fires and torches. But all night long the
English fleet lay dark and silent in the offing.
The morning of May 30 dawned. It was clear and bright, the sea was
smooth, the wind just sufficient to fill the sails. There could be no
fitter day for a landing or for an approach to the harbor to bombard the
forts and city. The sentinels on Morro counted all thirty of Drake's
vessels, drawn up in line. Now and then one swept out in pursuit of some
incautious or uninformed coasting vessel, but did not go far. The whole
fleet maintained order as if in preparation for some great concerted
operation.
Hours passed and nothing was done. At mid-afternoon some boats were sent
toward the shore near Chorrera, and the watchers on Morro signaled to La
Fuerza that a landing was being made; only a little later to recall the
tidings as those of a false alarm. Night came on, and again under cover
of darkness it was imagined that Drake's men were seen approaching
Chorrera. Every man in Havana remained awake with arms in hand, but the
night waned and daylight showed the fleet still motionless and the shore
at Chorrera still untouched. Thus for three days and nights the tension
was maintained. The thirty English vessels lay off Havana, firing not a
shot, sending not a man ashore, and making no sign of their commander's
purpose.
Then the suspense was ended, to the relief of many but to the
disappointment of some. On June 4th the English fleet spread all its
canvas and sailed away, heading north and east, and vanished forever
from the sight of the watchers at Havana. Not the Cuban capital but the
chief city of Florida was to be its prey, and presently word came back
that Drake had attacked and captured the town and fortress of St.
Augustine, which Menendez had built and in the building of which he had
drawn so sorely upon the scanty resources of Cuba. Quinones regretted
that Havana had not been attacked, confident that the result would have
been disastrous to the assailants. He took, however, all possible
precautions against a surprise by a possible return of the English
fleet. The coast patrols to Matanzas and beyond were maintained and
vessels were sent out as scouts to follow in Drake's track and watch for
his turning.
But no more was seen of Drake or heard of him until the end of June.
Then word came of his destruction of St. Augustine and of his departure
thence to the northward, on some unknown errand. It was supposed that
he had gone straight home. In fact, he went first to Virginia to visit
the English colony at Roanoke and to take back to England its few
discouraged survivors. Thus relieved from fear of invasion Havana
rejoiced and gave a most practical turn to its thanksgiving by sending a
vessel or two richly laden with supplies to the relief of the hapless
people of St. Augustine, many of whom had been former residents of Cuba.
Meantime some explanation, as we have already seen, came to Havana of
the reason for Drake's failure to take that place. Several Spaniards
whom Drake had captured at Carthagena, had contrived to make their
escape from him when he touched at Cape San Antonio, and after much
wandering found their way to Havana. They reported that on the way from
Carthagena to Cuba the English fleet had been sorely afflicted with
disease including scurvy and possibly also yellow fever, so that many
persons died and many more were incapacitated. Moreover his vessels were
crowded with captives and with plunder. In these circumstances he was
obviously in no condition to attack so strong a place as Havana, and in
a conference with his captains he practically decided to pass by that
place and to seek cooler northern latitudes where his sick men might
more speedily recover.
Havana's deliverance was Santiago's disaster. The preparations for the
defense of the former city had drawn thither the fighting strength of
the entire Island. Men, munitions, even artillery, had been stripped
from all other places for Havana's sake. Even after the departure of
Drake, and after it was known that he had at least for the time
abandoned his designs against Havana, the forces were still retained at
the capital. This, of course, was known to the foes of Cuba and of
Spain, as well as to Havana itself, and there were those who were not
slow to take advantage of it. French privateers were still hostile and
were raiding Spanish ports wherever opportunity afforded, and the
stripping of Santiago for Havana's defense gave such opportunity.
So at the very time when Havana learned that Drake had taken Carthagena
and was on his way to the Cuban capital, two French vessels appeared off
Santiago with hostile intent. A demand was made for food, which the town
authorities refused. Probably the demand was a mere pretext. At any rate
the refusal of it was the signal for immediate attack. From noon to
night of May 2nd the battle raged, the Spaniards, only a handful of men,
displaying invincible valor in circumstances of desperate difficulty.
The leader of the defense was a parish priest who was badly wounded by
one of his own men. One other Spaniard was killed by the explosion of a
wretched little cannon which had been pressed into service, all good
guns having been taken to Havana. But these were the only Spanish
losses. On the other hand, one of the French ships, going aground, was
almost destroyed by the Spanish fire before her consort could pull her
off. And the two riddled with shot were at last glad to make their
escape in flight, throwing overboard as they sailed away more than a
score of bodies of men killed by the Spanish musketeers. It was too much
to hope, however, that this repulse of the French would prove final. It
would almost certainly be followed with a stronger attack for vengeance,
and Santiago made what scanty preparations it could to meet the coming
storm.
Gomez de Rojas, a member of the illustrious family whose members played
so great a part in early Cuban history, was at that time the deputy of
the Governor in that part of the Island, making his headquarters at
Bayamo. A few days before this attack on Santiago he and his men had
killed seven Frenchmen and captured ten more under the lead of a
notorious freebooter. The heads of the seven he displayed on pikes at
Bayamo, and on the very day when the two French vessels reached Santiago
he hanged eight of the ten prisoners. It is recorded that the trial of
these men was not yet concluded. But Rojas grimly observed that the
trial could be finished after the hanging just as well as before, as
there could be no doubt as to what the verdict and the sentence would
be. For this ruthless proceeding the Bishop, Salcedo, reprimanded and
indeed excommunicated Rojas, and there was danger that thus disastrous
dissension would arise among the Spaniards. But Rojas, who seems to have
been a diplomat as well as a soldier and administrator, contrived to
make peace with the Bishop, and all was well.
Of such unity there was sore need. For a few days later a squadron of
seven French ships, carrying 800 soldiers, appeared off Santiago. To
meet them Santiago, with all possible aid from Bayamo and the country
around could number less than 100 men, some say not more than 70,
indifferently armed and with only a few pounds of gunpowder. For several
days the French vessels lay off Santiago, frequently firing upon the
town at a range at which their own cannon were effective but at which
the Spaniards, with far inferior guns and little ammunition, were quite
helpless. However, the French made no attempt at landing, a circumstance
which for a time puzzled the Spaniards. Then came the explanation. While
their fleet lay directly before Santiago the French had put 150 men
ashore at Zuragua, and these were advancing upon Santiago over land. As
soon as this was known a little force of 20 Spaniards and 10 Indians was
sent out to meet them, with only two or three rounds of ammunition to
each man. They met in unequal battle and the Spaniards lost five men.
But they killed twenty Frenchmen before they were completely exhausted
and were compelled to surrender. Another detachment of thirty Spaniards
kept up a good fight at the landing place in Santiago until their
ammunition was exhausted and then they retreated to the hills. The
French fire from the ships destroyed more than half the town, and the
troops who were then landed demolished most of the remaining buildings.
Then a hasty retreat was made, presumably through fear of the rumored
approach of the powerful Spanish fleet, which unfortunately did not
materialize.
Gomez de Rojas had been at Bayamo when this attack began. As soon as he
heard of it he hastened on horseback to Santiago, but arrived in time
only to see the last French sail vanish in the distance. Had he been
there it is not certain that he could have saved the town. Indeed it is
probable that he could not have done so. But it is certain that he saved
it after the event. So completely had Santiago been demolished by the
French that many of the people were determined not to attempt to rebuild
but to abandon the place and go elsewhere. A council of war was held on
May 25, at a country house a league inland from the ruined city, at
which all the officials and most of the citizens of Santiago were
present. Rojas was, fortunately, the presiding officer. The military
commander, Captain Camacho, told of what had happened and what the
condition of the place was. It had no military strength. There was not a
pound of powder or shot left. The few pieces of artillery which had not
been captured or destroyed were concealed in the woods, but were of
course useless without ammunition. Fewer than a score of houses were
standing. The cathedral and the monastery had been destroyed, though the
hospital and a church had received little damage. There was, he
believed, nothing left to serve as the nucleus of a rebuilt town.
Much discussion followed his report. Some were resolute for rebuilding
the place, which they regarded rightly as the birthplace of the Spanish
settlement of Cuba. Others were equally bent on abandoning it altogether
and migrating to Havana or elsewhere. Opinions were so evenly divided
that it was finally agreed to suspend decision until one other leading
citizen, who was absent from the meeting, could be heard from, with the
understanding that his vote should be decisive.
Then it was that Gomez de Rojas rose to the height of the occasion. He
ascertained secretly that this missing citizen was in favor of
abandoning Santiago and would so declare himself. Determined to
forestall and to prevent such a decision and thus to save the town,
Rojas immediately ordered the clergy to celebrate mass next morning. He
ordered the town authorities to put all the remaining buildings in order
for occupancy and to repair those which had been damaged. He ordered
every man in town to appear at the church that morning, ready for any
action which might be needed. He ordered the Town Council to meet as
usual the next day. He ordered the market to be opened at once, and
artisans to get to work and the Indians to burn the bodies of the
Frenchmen who had been killed in battle, and in brief he ordered
everybody in Santiago to get to work to rehabilitate the town. The sheer
energy of this one strong man carried the day, and Santiago arose from
its ruins larger and more important than ever before, though it was
never again to be the capital of all Cuba. Havana had already for
several years been practically, though without full authority, the
capital of the Island. The formal and authoritative change was made a
few years later, in 1589.
During the administration of Governor Luzan there was some renewed
interest in copper mining in Cuba, although the wealth of the island in
that metal was not yet appreciated. In 1580 what was supposed to be an
immensely rich mine was discovered, but it proved to be a mere "pocket"
of limited extent. That disappointment, together with the cost of
transportation from the neighborhood of Santiago to Havana for shipment,
discouraged further efforts for a time. But in May, 1587, after
inspection of the Cobre mine, near Santiago, the Governor reported to
the Spanish government: "There is so much metal, and the mines are so
numerous, that they could supply the world with copper." Comparatively
little was done, however, until 1599, when effective work was begun at
El Cobre. The ore was conveyed to Havana for smelting and casting, and
on the site of the present Maestranza Building there was established a
foundry where copper was cast into both cannon and kettles.