Whether There Was Contrariety of Wills in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was contrariety of wills in
Christ. For contrariety of wills regards contrariety of objects, as
contrariety of movements springs from contrariety of termini, as is
plain from the Philosopher (Phys. v, text. 49, seq.). Now Christ in
His different wills wished contrary things. For in His Divine will He
wished for death, from which He shrank in His human will, hence
Athanasius says [*De Incarnat. et Cont. Arianos, written against
Apollinarius]: "When Christ says 'Father, if it be possible, let this
chalice pass from Me; yet not My will, but Thine be done,' and again,
'The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh weak,' He denotes two
wills--the human, which through the weakness of the flesh shrank from
the passion--and His Divine will eager for the passion." Hence there
was contrariety of wills in Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Gal. 5:17) that "the flesh lusteth
against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." Now when the
spirit desires one thing, and the flesh another, there is contrariety
of wills. But this was in Christ; for by the will of charity which
the Holy Spirit was causing in His mind, He willed the passion,
according to Isa. 53:7: "He was offered because it was His own will,"
yet in His flesh He shrank from the passion. Therefore there was
contrariety of wills in Him.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Luke 22:43) that "being in an agony,
He prayed the longer." Now agony seems to imply a certain struggle
[*Greek, _agonia_] in a soul drawn to contrary things. Hence it seems
that there was contrariety of will in Christ.
_On the contrary,_ In the decisions of the Sixth Council [*Third
Council of Constantinople, Act. 18] it is said: "We confess two
natural wills, not in opposition, as evil-minded heretics assert, but
following His human will, and neither withstanding nor striving
against, but rather being subject to, His Divine and omnipotent will."
_I answer that,_ Contrariety can exist only where there is opposition
in the same and as regards the same. For if the diversity exists as
regards diverse things, and in diverse subjects, this would not
suffice for the nature of contrariety, nor even for the nature of
contradiction, e.g. if a man were well formed or healthy as regards
his hand, but not as regards his foot. Hence for there to be
contrariety of wills in anyone it is necessary, first, that the
diversity of wills should regard the same. For if the will of one
regards the doing of something with reference to some universal
reason, and the will of another regards the not doing the same with
reference to some particular reason, there is not complete
contrariety of will, e.g. when a judge wishes a brigand to be hanged
for the good of the commonwealth, and one of the latter's kindred
wishes him not to be hanged on account of a private love, there is no
contrariety of wills; unless, indeed, the desire of the private good
went so far as to wish to hinder the public good for the private
good--in that case the opposition of wills would regard the same.
Secondly, for contrariety of wills it is necessary that it should be
in the same will. For if a man wishes one thing with his rational
appetite, and wishes another thing with his sensitive appetite, there
is no contrariety, unless the sensitive appetite so far prevailed as
to change or at least keep back the rational appetite; for in this
case something of the contrary movement of the sensitive appetite
would reach the rational will.
And hence it must be said that although the natural and the sensitive
will in Christ wished what the Divine will did not wish, yet there
was no contrariety of wills in Him. First, because neither the
natural will nor the will of sensuality rejected the reason for which
the Divine will and the will of the human reason in Christ wished the
passion. For the absolute will of Christ wished the salvation of the
human race, although it did not pertain to it to will this for the
sake of something further; but the movement of sensuality could
nowise extend so far. Secondly, because neither the Divine will nor
the will of reason in Christ was impeded or retarded by the natural
will or the appetite of sensuality. So, too, on the other hand,
neither the Divine will nor the will of reason in Christ shrank from
or retarded the movement of the natural human will and the movement
of the sensuality in Christ. For it pleased Christ, in His Divine
will, and in His will of reason, that His natural will and will of
sensuality should be moved according to the order of their nature.
Hence it is clear that in Christ there was no opposition or
contrariety of wills.
Reply Obj. 1: The fact of any will in Christ willing something else
than did the Divine will, proceeded from the Divine will, by whose
permission the human nature in Christ was moved by its proper
movements, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15, 18, 19).
Reply Obj. 2: In us the desires of the spirit are impeded or retarded
by the desires of the flesh: this did not occur in Christ. Hence in
Christ there was no contrariety of flesh and spirit, as in us.
Reply Obj. 3: The agony in Christ was not in the rational soul, in as
far as it implies a struggle in the will arising from a diversity of
motives, as when anyone, on his reason considering one, wishes one
thing, and on its considering another, wishes the contrary. For this
springs from the weakness of the reason, which is unable to judge
which is the best simply. Now this did not occur in Christ, since by
His reason He judged it best that the Divine will regarding the
salvation of the human race should be fulfilled by His passion.
Nevertheless, there was an agony in Christ as regards the sensitive
part, inasmuch as it implied a dread of coming trial, as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15; iii, 18, 23).
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