Whether What Belongs to the Human Nature Can Be Predicated of the
Divine Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature can
be said of the Divine Nature. For what belongs to the human nature is
predicated of the Son of God, and of God. But God is His own Nature.
Therefore, what belongs to the human nature may be predicated of the
Divine Nature.
Obj. 2: Further, the flesh pertains to human nature. But as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6), "we say, after the blessed Athanasius
and Cyril, that the Nature of the Word was incarnate." Therefore it
would seem with equal reason that what belongs to the human nature
may be said of the Divine Nature.
Obj. 3: Further, what belongs to the Divine Nature belongs to
Christ's human nature; such as to know future things and to possess
saving power. Therefore it would seem with equal reason that what
belongs to the human may be said of the Divine Nature.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4): "When we
mention the Godhead we do not predicate of it the idioms," i.e. the
properties, "of the humanity; for we do not say that the Godhead is
passible or creatable." Now the Godhead is the Divine Nature.
Therefore what is proper to the human nature cannot be said of the
Divine Nature.
_I answer that,_ What belongs to one cannot be said of another,
unless they are both the same; thus "risible" can be predicated only
of man. Now in the mystery of the Incarnation the Divine and human
natures are not the same; but the hypostasis of the two natures is
the same. And hence what belongs to one nature cannot be predicated
of the other if they are taken in the abstract. Now concrete words
stand for the hypostasis of the nature; and hence of concrete words
we may predicate indifferently what belongs to either nature--whether
the word of which they are predicated refers to one nature, as the
word "Christ," by which is signified "both the Godhead anointing and
the manhood anointed"; or to the Divine Nature alone, as this word
"God" or "the Son of God"; or to the manhood alone, as this word
"Man" or "Jesus." Hence Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Palaest. cxxiv): "It is
of no consequence from what substance we name Christ; because since
the unity of person remains inseparably, one and the same is
altogether Son of Man by His flesh, and altogether Son of God by the
Godhead which He has with the Father."
Reply Obj. 1: In God, Person and Nature are really the same; and by
reason of this identity the Divine Nature is predicated of the Son of
God. Nevertheless, its mode of predication is different; and hence
certain things are said of the Son of God which are not said of the
Divine Nature; thus we say that the Son of God is born, yet we do not
say that the Divine Nature is born; as was said in the First Part (Q.
39, A. 5). So, too, in the mystery of the Incarnation we say that the
Son of God suffered, yet we do not say that the Divine Nature
suffered.
Reply Obj. 2: Incarnation implies union with flesh, rather than any
property of flesh. Now in Christ each nature is united to the other
in person; and by reason of this union the Divine Nature is said to
be incarnate and the human nature deified, as stated above (Q. 2, A.
1, ad 3).
Reply Obj. 3: What belongs to the Divine Nature is predicated of the
human nature--not, indeed, as it belongs essentially to the Divine
Nature, but as it is participated by the human nature. Hence,
whatever cannot be participated by the human nature (as to be
uncreated and omnipotent), is nowise predicated of the human nature.
But the Divine Nature received nothing by participation from the
human nature; and hence what belongs to the human nature can nowise
be predicated of the Divine Nature.
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