Whether What Belongs to the Human Nature Can Be Predicated of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature
cannot be said of God. For contrary things cannot be said of the
same. Now, what belongs to human nature is contrary to what is proper
to God, since God is uncreated, immutable, and eternal, and it
belongs to the human nature to be created temporal and mutable.
Therefore what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God.
Obj. 2: Further, to attribute to God what is defective seems to be
derogatory to the Divine honor, and to be a blasphemy. Now what
pertains to the human nature contains a kind of defect, as to suffer,
to die, and the like. Hence it seems that what pertains to the human
nature can nowise be said of God.
Obj. 3: Further, to be assumed pertains to the human nature; yet it
does not pertain to God. Therefore what belongs to the human nature
cannot be said of God.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "God
assumed the idioms," i.e. the properties, "of flesh, since God is
said to be passible, and the God of glory was crucified."
_I answer that,_ On this question there was a difference of opinion
between Nestorians and Catholics. The Nestorians wished to divide
words predicated of Christ, in this way, viz. that such as pertained
to human nature should not be predicated of God, and that such as
pertained to the Divine Nature should not be predicated of the Man.
Hence Nestorius said: "If anyone attempt to attribute sufferings to
the Word, let him be anathema" [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 29].
But if there are any words applicable to both natures, of them they
predicated what pertained to both natures, as "Christ" or "Lord."
Hence they granted that Christ was born of a Virgin, and that He was
from eternity; but they did not say that God was born of a virgin, or
that the Man was from eternity. Catholics on the other hand
maintained that words which are said of Christ either in His Divine
or in His human nature may be said either of God or of man. Hence
Cyril says [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 26]: "If anyone ascribes
to two persons or substances," i.e. hypostases, "such words as are in
the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ
by the Saints, or by Himself of Himself, and believes that some are
to be applied to the Man, and apportions some to the Word alone--let
him be anathema." And the reason of this is that, since there is one
hypostasis of both natures, the same hypostasis is signified by the
name of either nature. Thus whether we say "man" or "God," the
hypostasis of Divine and human nature is signified. And hence, of the
Man may be said what belongs to the Divine Nature, as of a hypostasis
of the Divine Nature; and of God may be said what belongs to the
human nature, as of a hypostasis of human nature.
Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that in a proposition in which
something is predicated of another, we must not merely consider what
the predicate is predicated of, but also the reason of its being
predicated. Thus, although we do not distinguish things predicated of
Christ, yet we distinguish that by reason of which they are
predicated, since those things that belong to the Divine Nature are
predicated of Christ in His Divine Nature, and those that belong to
the human nature are predicated of Christ in His human nature. Hence
Augustine says (De Trin. i, 11): "We must distinguish what is said by
Scripture in reference to the form of God, wherein He is equal to the
Father, and what in reference to the form of a servant, wherein He is
less than the Father": and further on he says (De Trin. i, 13): "The
prudent, careful, and devout reader will discern the reason and point
of view of what is said."
Reply Obj. 1: It is impossible for contraries to be predicated of the
same in the same respects, but nothing prevents their being
predicated of the same in different aspects. And thus contraries are
predicated of Christ, not in the same, but in different natures.
Reply Obj. 2: If the things pertaining to defect were attributed to
God in His Divine Nature, it would be a blasphemy, since it would be
derogatory to His honor. But there is no kind of wrong done to God if
they are attributed to Him in His assumed nature. Hence in a
discourse of the Council of Ephesus [*Part III, ch. 10] it is said:
"God accounts nothing a wrong which is the occasion of man's
salvation. For no lowliness that He assumed for us injures that
Nature which can be subject to no injury, yet makes lower things Its
own, to save our nature. Therefore, since these lowly and worthless
things do no harm to the Divine Nature, but bring about our
salvation, how dost thou maintain that what was the cause of our
salvation was the occasion of harm to God?"
Reply Obj. 3: To be assumed pertains to human nature, not in its
suppositum, but in itself; and thus it does not belong to God.
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