GERMANIA MENDAX
I
The truth about the choosing, beginning, and forcing of this abominable
war has never been told by official Germandom.
Now and then an independent German like Maximilian Harden is brave
enough to blurt it out: "Of what use are weak excuses? We willed this
war, ... willed it because we were sure we could win it." (Zukunft,
August, 1914.) But in general the official spokesmen of Germany keep up
the claim that their country was attacked and forced to fly to arms to
protect herself.
"Gentlemen," said the Imperial Chancellor to the members of the
Reichstag on August 4,1914, "we are now acting in self-defense.
Necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxembourg and have
possibly already entered on Belgian soil. [A little earlier in the
speech he confessed that they had also invaded France.] Gentlemen, that
is a breach of international law. The French Government has notified
Brussels that it would respect Belgian neutrality as long as the
adversary respected it. But we know that France stood ready for an
invasion. France could wait. We could not .... The injustice we
commit--I speak openly--we will try to make good as soon as our military
aims have been attained. He who is menaced as we are, and is fighting
for his all, can only consider the one and best way to strike."
[Footnote 1] (The word which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg actually used
was "durchhauen", which means "to hew, or hack, a way through.")
[Footnote 1: Out of several translations of this speech I have chosen as
the fairest the one printed by the American Association for
International Conciliation, November, 1914, No. 84.]
It was against such weak excuses as this, against the vain pretext that
the German war-lords were the attacked instead of the attackers, that
Herr Harden made the frank protest which I have quoted above.
Meantime the falsehood of the tales of French preparation for invasion
and of actual violations of German territory has been exposed by the
evidence of Germans themselves. General Freytag-Loringhoven, in his
essay on "The First Victories in the West," has shown that the French
high command was taken off its guard by the swift stab through
Luxembourg and Belgium, and could not get the Fifth Army Corps to the
Douai-Charleroi line until August 22. The municipal authorities of
Nuremburg have declared that they have no knowledge of the dropping of
bombs on that city by French aviators.
The falsehood of the Chancellor's promise that Germany would "make good
her injustice" to Belgium after attaining her military aims is
foreshadowed to-day. (September 27.) The newspapers of this morning
contain a semi-official press statement in regard to a note verbale
handed by the Foreign Secretary to the Papal Nuncio at Berlin. Germany,
if this statement is correct, now proposes to spoil the future of
Belgium by splitting the nation into two administrative districts,
Flemish and Walloon, thus injecting the poison-germ of disunion into the
body politic. She also demands "the right to develop her economic
interests freely in Belgium, especially in Antwerp," and a guarantee
that "any such menace as that which threatened Germany [from Belgium!]
in 1914 shall be excluded." This is the German idea of making good an
injustice by committing a fresh injury. It is in the style of a
highwayman who says to his victim: "I will reward you by letting you go.
But I must keep the big pearl, and you must permit me to break both your
arms." [Footnote 2]
[Footnote 2: For further confirmation of these ideas see the Memoir of
the late General von Bissing, former Governor-General of Belgium,
published by the Bergisch-Markische Zeitung, May 18, 1917, and by Das
Grossere Deutschland, May 19, 1917.
"History now shows us that, neither prior to, nor at the outset of
hostilities, were people able to rely to any great extent on a neutral
Belgium, and, should we attach a certain importance to these historic
truths, we shall not, however, on the conclusion of peace, suffer
ourselves to allow of the revival of Belgium as a neutral state and
country. An independent or neutral Belgium, or a Belgium whose status
would be fixed by treaties of another kind, will be, as before the war,
under the inauspicious influence of England and France, as well as the
prey of America, who is seeking to utilize Belgian securities. There is
only one way to prevent this, viz.: by the policy of force, and it is
force that should achieve the result that the population, at present
still hostile, should become used to German rule and submit to it.
Moreover, it will be necessary, through a peace assuring us the
annexation of Belgium, that we should be able to protect, as we are now
compelled to do, the German subjects who have settled in this country,
and the protection we shall be enabled to afford them will be of special
service to us in the struggle about to take place in the world's market.
It is only by reigning over Belgium that we shall be able to utilize
(verwerten), with a view to German interests, Belgian capital in savings
and the numerous Belgian joint-stock companies already existing in enemy
countries. We ought to have control over the important enterprises that
Belgian capital has founded in Turkey, the Balkans, and China. . . ."]
[End Footnote 2]
Somewhere I have read a Latin line--the name of whose author has slipped
my memory--which seems to fit the case perfectly: "Quidquid non audet in
historia Germania mendax!" [Footnote 3]
[Footnote 3: I have taken the references which follow, as far as
possible, from Official Diplomatic Documents, edited by E. von Mach, The
Macmillan Co., New York, 1916. The comments and footnotes in this volume
are untrustworthy, but the texts are presumably correct, and it is
polite to judge the Germans from their own mouths. The book is quoted as
Off. Dip. Doc.]
II
THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA
In the latter part of 1916 the New York Times published an admirable
series of articles, signed "Cosmos," on The Basis of Durable
Peace.[Footnote 4] With almost every statement of this learned and able
writer I found myself in thorough accord. But the fourth sentence of the
first article I could not accept.
[Footnote 4: These articles are now published in book form by the
Scribners.]
"The question as to who or what power," writes Cosmos, "is chiefly
responsible for the last events that immediately preceded the war has
become for the moment one of merely historical interest."
On the contrary, it seems to me a question of immediate, vital, decisive
interest. It certainly determined the national action of France, Great
Britain, and Italy. They did not believe that Germany and Austria were
acting in self-defense. If that had been the case, Italy at least would
have been bound by treaty to come to the aid of her partners in the
Triple Alliance, which was purely a defensive league. But she formally
declined to do so, on the ground that "the war undertaken by Austria,
and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German
Ambassador himself, a directly aggressive object." (Off. Dip. Doc., p.
431.) The same ground was taken in the message of the President of the
French Republic to the Parliament on August 4, 1914 (Off. Dip. Doc., p.
444), and in the speech of the British Prime Minister, August 6, the day
on which the Parliament passed the first appropriation for expenses
arising out of the existence of a state of war (British Blue Book).
The conviction that the ruling militaristic party in Germany, abetted by
Austria, bears the moral guilt of thrusting this war upon the world as
the method of settling international difficulties which could have been
better settled by arbitration or conference, is a very real thing at the
present moment. It is shared by the Entente Allies and the United
States. It is one of those "imponderables" which, as Bismarck said long
ago, must never be left out of account in estimating national forces. It
will hold the Allies and the United States together. It will help them
to win the war for peace under conditions for Germany which may not be
"punitive," but which certainly must be "reformatory".
Understand, I do not imagine or maintain that the primary or efficient
causes of this war are to be found in any things that happened in 1914
or 1913. They are inherent in false methods of government, in false
systems of so-called national policy, in false dealing with simple human
rights and interests, in false attempts to settle natural problems on an
artificial basis.
All nations have a share in them. They go back to Austria's annexation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908; to the Congress of Berlin in 1878; to
the Franco-Prussian War in 1870; to the Prusso-Austrian War in 1866; to
the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453. Yes, they go back
further still, if you like, to the time when Cain killed Abel! That was
the first assertion of the doctrine that "might makes right."
But the "occasional cause" of this war, the ground on which it was
brought to a head and let loose by Germany, was the Austrian ultimatum
to Servia, presented on July 23, 1914, at 6 P. M.
This remarkable state-paper, so harsh in its tone, so imperious in its
demands, that it called forth the disapproval even of a few bold German
critics, was apparently meant to be impossible of acceptance by Servia,
and thus to serve either as the instrument for crushing the little
country which stood in the way of the "Berlin-Baghdad-Bahn," or as a
torch to kindle the great war in Europe. I do not propose to trace its
history and consequences in detail. I propose only to show, by fuller
proofs than have hitherto been available, that Germany must share the
responsibility for this flagitious and incendiary document.
On July 25, 1914, the German Ambassador at Petrograd handed an official
"note verbale" to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs which stated
that "The German Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian
note before it was presented, and exercised no influence upon its
contents." (Off. Dip. Doc., p. 173.) Similar communications were
presented in France and England.
This barefaced denial that the German Government knew what would be in
the Austrian ultimatum, or had anything to do with the framing of it,
was a palpable falsehood. It was discredited at the time. The antecedent
incredibility of the statement has been well set forth by Mr. James N.
Beck, in his vigorous book, The Evidence in the Case.[Footnote 5] New
evidence has come in. I intend here to present briefly and arrange in a
new order the facts which prove to a moral certainty that the German
Government knew beforehand what the content and intent of the Austrian
ultimatum would be, and what consequences it would probably entail.
[Footnote 5: The Evidence in the Case. Putnams. New York, 1914, pp. 31-46.]
(1) Austria was the most intimate ally of Germany, admittedly dependent
upon her big friend for backing in all international affairs. The German
Ambassador in Vienna, Herr von Tschirsky, and the Austrian Ambassador in
Berlin, Count Szogyeny, were in close consultation with the Governments
to which they were accredited during the weeks that followed the crime
of Serajevo, June 28-July 23. It is absolutely incredible that Austria
should not have consulted her big friend in regard to the momentous step
against Servia, altogether impossible that Germany should not have
insisted upon knowing what her smaller friend was doing in a matter of
such importance to them both. You might as well imagine that the board
of managers of a subsidiary railway would block out a new policy without
consulting the directors of the main line.
(2) On July 5, 1914, it appears that a secret conference was held at
Potsdam at which high officials of the German and Austrian Governments
were present. It is not possible to give their names with certainty--not
yet, perhaps never--because these gentlemen come and go in the dark. But
the fact of the meeting was brought out publicly in the speech of Deputy
Haase in the Reichstag, July 19, 1917, and not contradicted. Whatever
may have been the ostensible object of this conference, it is impossible
to believe that the most important affairs in the world for Austria and
Germany at that moment, namely the nature of the ultimatum to Servia and
the possible eventuality of a European war, were not discussed, and
perhaps decided.
(3) On July 15, 1914, the Italian Ambassador to Turkey, Signor Garroni,
had an interview with the German Ambassador to Turkey, Baron Wangenheim,
who had just come back from a visit to Berlin. The German diplomat said
that he had been present at a conference where it had been decided that
the ultimatum to Servia was to be made of such a nature that it could
not be accepted, and that this would be the provocation of the war which
would probably ensue. Shortly afterward these statements were narrated
by Signor Garroni to Mr. Lewis Einstein, attache of the American Embassy
at Constantinople, who carefully noted them in his diary.
(4) On July 22, 1914, the British Ambassador in Berlin sent a despatch
to his Government which indicated for the first time clearly the
attitude which the German Government had decided to take. I therefore
quote it in full.
"Last night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the
forthcoming Austrian demarche at Belgrade was alluded to by his
Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently
of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere
this. He insisted that the question at issue was one for settlement
between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no
interference from outside in the discussions between those two
countries. He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the Austro-
Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Government on
the matter. He had, however, on several occasions, in conversation with
the Servian Minister, emphasized the extreme importance that
Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing.
"Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the
attitude adopted toward Servia by Austria had, in his opinion, been one
of great forbearance." (Off. Dip. Doc., p. 56.)
This shows that Germany knew what Austria was doing, approved her plan,
and had resolved that there "should be no interference from outside in
the discussion"--in other words, Germany would allow no other nation to
prevent Austria from doing what she liked to Servia. Could Germany have
taken this absolutely "committal" position if she had been ignorant of
what Austria intended to do?
(5) On July 23, 1914, the crushing Austrian ultimatum, having been
prepared in the dark, was sent to Servia and delivered in Belgrade at 6
P. M. On the same day, and almost certainly at an earlier hour, the
German Chancellor prepared a circular confidential telegram to the
Ambassadors at Paris, London, and Petrograd, instructing them to tell
the Governments to which they were accredited that "the action as well
as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as
justifiable. . . . [If the demands were refused] nothing would remain
for it, but to enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in
regard to which the choice of means must be left to it." (Off. Dip.
Doc., p. 60.)
Is it credible that the German Government would have pronounced a
judgment so important, so far-reaching in its foreseen consequences, if
it had had no previous knowledge of the "action and demands" of Austria?
(6) On July 23, 1914, the French Minister at Munich telegraphed his
Government as follows: "The President of the Council said to me to-day
that the Austrian ultimatum, the contents of which were known to him,
seemed to him couched in terms which Servia could accept, but that,
nevertheless, the actual situation appeared to him serious." (Off. Dip.
Doc., p. 59.)
How did this gentleman in Munich come to know about the ultimatum, while
the gentlemen in Berlin professed ignorance?
(7) On July 25, 1914, the Russian Government was officially informed
that: "Germany as the ally of Austria naturally supports the claims made
by the Vienna Cabinet against Servia, which she considers justified."
(Off. Dip. Doc., p. 173.)
This was a very grave declaration, in view of the public announcement
which the Russian Government had made on the same day: "Recent events
and the despatch of an ultimatum to Servia by Austria-Hungary are
causing the Russian Government the greatest anxiety. The Government are
closely following the course of the dispute between the two countries,
to which Russia cannot remain indifferent." (Off. Dip. Doc., p. 170.)
Certainly Germany would not have come to the serious decision of giving
unqualified support to the claims of Austria as against the expressed
interests of Russia, unless she had long known and had full time to
consider those claims and what they would involve.
(8) On July 30, 1914, the British Ambassador in Vienna telegraphed to
his Government: "I have private information that the German Ambassador
knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was
despatched, and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the
German Ambassador himself that he indorses every line of it." (Off. Dip.
Doc., p. 330.)
(9) Count Bernstorff, German Ambassador at Washington, published an
article in The Independent, New York, September 7, 1914. In this article
he answered, officially, several questions. The first question was: Did
Germany approve in advance the Austrian ultimatum to Servia? The answer
was: "Yes. Germany's reasons for doing so are the following, &c."
(10) The German Government has itself acknowledged that it was consulted
by Austria in regard to the attitude to be taken toward Servia, and the
possibility of ensuing war if Russia intervened to protect the life of
her little sister state. Germany accepted the responsibility and pledged
support. "With all our heart we were able to agree with our ally's
estimate of the situation, and assure him that any action considered
necessary to end the movement directed against the conservation of the
monarchy would meet with our approval." (German Official White Book, p.
4; Off. Dip. Doc., p. 551.)
This is a carte blanche of a kind which no great government could possibly
give to another without a definite understanding of what it involved.
Here the summary of the evidence that Austria was not playing "a lone
hand" ends--at least until further confidential documents and
information about secret meetings are dug up.
Meantime the Imperial German Government maintains its plea of "not
guilty." It still denies all previous knowledge of, and all part in, the
nefarious Austrian ultimatum to Servia which precipitated the world war.
The denial is both impudent and mendacious.
"Credat Judaeus Apella!"
III
THE RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION
It has been loudly asserted and persistently maintained by the Potsdam
gang that the cause of this abominable war was the mobilization of
Russia in preparation to maintain the sovereignty of her little sister
state Servia if necessary. "Germany," it is said, "earnestly desired,
from the purest of motives, to 'localize the conflict'"--which means
in plain words to let Austria deal with Servia as she liked, without
interference--rather a one-sided proposition, considering the relative
size of the two parties in the benevolently urged single combat. "But
Russia rashly interfered with this beautiful design by declaring that
she could not remain indifferent to the fate of a small nation of
kindred blood, and by calling up troops to prevent any wiping out of
Servia by Austria, to whom Germany had already given carte blanche and
promised full support. This was a wicked threat against the life and
liberty of Germany. This was an action which rendered the great war
inevitable." So say the German authorities.
The subtitle of the official German White Book reads: "How Russia and Her
Ruler Betrayed Germany's Confidence and Thereby Made the European War."
[Footnote 6]
[Footnote 6: I quote from a copy of the original pamphlet, given to me
with the compliments of Herr von Muller, German Minister at The Hague.
Professor von Mach in his Off. Dip. Doc. does not reproduce this
title-page.]
This is the Potsdam contention in regard to the cause of the war. The
documents indicate that it is a false contention, based upon
suppressions of the truth. This is what I intend to show.
I hold no brief for the late Imperial Russian Government. Doubtless it
was shady in its morals and tricky in its ways.
The telegrams recently discovered by an excellent American journalist,
Mr. Herman Bernstein, and published in the "New York Herald," show that
the late Czar Nicolas and the still Kaiser Wilhelm were plotting
together, a very few years ago, to make a secret "combine" which should
control the world. When that plan failed, no doubt the vast power and
resources of Russia, under an absolute imperial Government, were
regarded by the equally autocratic Government of Germany with jealousy
and distrust, not to say fear. No doubt Russia was an actual and
formidable obstacle to the Pan-German purpose of getting Servia out of
the path of the "Berlin-Baghdad-Bahn".
Grant all this. Pass over, also, the interminable and inextricable
dispute about the precise meaning and application of the terms
"mobilization," "partial mobilization," "complete mobilization,"
"precautionary measures," "Kriegsgefahr," an so on. That is an
unfathomable morass wherein many deceptions hide. In that controversy
each opponent always charges the other with lying, and a wise neutral
doubts both. It seems to be true--mark you, I only say it seems--that
the first great European Power to order partial mobilization was
Austria, July 26, 1914. (Off. Dip. Doc., p. 197.) On July 28 the order
for complete mobilization was signed, war was declared against Servia
(pp. 272, 273), and on July 29 Belgrade was bombarded (p. 354).
On July 29 Russia ordered partial mobilization in the districts of
Odessa, Kief, Moscow, and Kasan, and declared that she had no aggressive
intention against Germany. (Off. Dip. Doc., p. 294.) The Russian
preparations obviously had relation only to Austria's war on Servia
which was already under way.
On July 30 Germany had effected her "covering dispositions" of troops
along the French border, from Luxembourg to the Vosges, part of which by
chance I saw in June (see p. 36 ff.), and on the same day the Berlin
semi-official press announced that a complete mobilization had been
ordered. (Off. Dip. Doc., pp. 324, 342.) This announcement was
contradicted and withdrawn later on the same day by government orders.
On July 31, at 1 a.m., the Austrian order of complete mobilization,
which was signed on the 28th, was issued. (Off. Dip. Doc., p. 356.)
Later in the same day the Russian Government ordered complete
mobilization and the German Government proclaimed a state of
Kriegsgefahr, "wardanger." (Off. Dip. Doc., pp. 356-357.) At seven
o'clock in the evening of the same day Germany sent an ultimatum to
France, and at midnight an ultimatum to Russia.
On August 1 she declared war on Russia, and on August 3 she declared war
on France, having previously invaded French territory and sent her army
through neutral Luxembourg.
Now in all this the German Government tries to make it appear that it
was simply acting on the defensive, taking necessary steps to guard
against the peril threatened by the military measures of Russia.
The falsity of this pretense is easily shown from two facts: First, the
Russian Government was all the time pleading for a peaceful settlement
of the Austro-Servian dispute, by arbitration, or by a four-power
conference. Second, definite offers were made to halt the Russian
military measures at once on conditions most favorable to Austria, if
Austria and Germany would agree to an examination by the Great Powers of
Austria's just claims on Servia.
On the first point, I do not propose to retell the long story of the
efforts supported by France, England, Italy, and Russia herself, to get
Germany to consent to some plan, any plan, which might avert war by an
appeal to reason and justice. To these efforts Germany answered in
effect that she could not "coerce" her ally Austria.
But one document in this line seems to me particularly interesting--even
pathetic. It is a telegram sent by the late Czar Nicolas to his Imperial
Cousin, Kaiser Wilhelm. It is dated July 29, 1914, and reads as follows:
"Thanks for your telegram which is conciliatory and friendly, whereas
the official message presented to-day by your Ambassador to my Minister
was conveyed in a very different tone. I beg you to explain this
divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro-Servian problem to
The Hague Tribunal. I trust in your wisdom and friendship."
"NICOLAS."
This telegram is not contained in the "German White Book." But Professor
von Mach gives it in his "Official Diplomatic Documents" (p. 596).
I have been unable to find in any book, pamphlet, or collection of
papers a trace of the Kaiser's answer. Probably he did not send one.
On the second point I propose to quote only the three definite proposals
which were before the German Government on July 31, 1914.
Sir Edward Grey, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had been
trying with the cordial help of the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonof,
and the President of the Council of France, M. Viviani, to formulate a
plan of averting general hostilities which would meet the approval of
Germany.
(1) On July 29 Sir E. Grey had an official conversation with the German
Ambassador in London and laid before him a proposal in regard to the
halting of military measures, described in the following words:
"It was of course too late for all military operations against Servia to
be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be
in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian territory. But even then
it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence if Austria,
while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had
complete satisfaction from Servia, stated that she would not advance
further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and
Russia." (Off. Dip. Doc., p. 307.) This proposal was telegraphed to
Berlin on the same day, and from there to Vienna. So far as I know no
answer to it has ever been received, though King George V warmly
supported the proposal in a personal telegram (July 30) to Prince Henry
of Prussia, and begged him to urge it upon the Kaiser.
(2) On July 30 Sazonof in the name of the Czar presented to the German
Ambassador at Petrograd, and telegraphed for delivery to the Foreign
Offices at Berlin and Vienna, the following proposal:
"If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Servian question has assumed
the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready
to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the sovereign
rights of Servia, Russia undertakes to stop her military preparations."
(Off. Dip. Doc., p. 341.)
The German Foreign Minister von Jagow, without waiting to consult
Vienna, replied "that he considered it impossible for Austria to accept
the proposal." (Ibid., p. 342.) Austria said nothing at all!
(3) On July 31 practically the same proposal, modified on the suggestion
of Sir E. Grey and M. Viviani, was renewed by Russia. As presented to
Berlin and Vienna it read as follows:
"If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian
territory; and if, recognizing that the Austro-Servian conflict has
assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits
that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can
accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her rights
as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain
her expectant attitude." (Off. Dip. Doc., p. 370.)
No answer from Austria, who had ordered a general mobilization at one
o'clock in the morning of that day!
No answer from Germany, except the prompt proclamation of Kriegsgefahr,
and the declaration of war on Russia on August 1!
Thus three successive opportunities of putting a stop to further
military preparations of Russia on the simple condition that Austria
would go no further, but be content with what she already had occupied
as a guarantee for reparation from Servia--three golden occasions of
preserving the peace of Europe--were brushed aside by Germany
practically without consideration.
Yet the marvellous people at Potsdam go on saying that it was the
Russian military preparation that brought this war down on the
world!--that Germany always wanted peace, and worked for it!
Why then did she not accept the proffered chance of staying the progress
of Russian preparations when it lay within her power to do so by lifting
a finger?
Because she did not wish the chance. Because she wished Austria to go on
with the subjugation of Servia. Because she wished Russia to be forced
to go on with her measures to intervene for the rescue of Servia from
extinction. Because she wished herself to go on with her design of
putting her own incomparable military machine at work to force her will
on Europe. Because she wished to have a false excuse to cover her own
guilt in making the war by saying: "Russia did it."
The Potsdam gang forgot one thing. Most liars forget something.
They forgot that by refusing the opportunity for peaceful settlement
which would have removed their excuse for making war, they would furnish
the proof that their excuse was false.