Memory has also this peculiarity attached to it, that a slight state of

intoxication very often enhances the remembrance of past times and

scenes, whereby all the circumstances connected with them are recalled

more distinctly than they could be in a state of sobriety; on the other

hand, the recollection of what one said or did while in a state of

intoxication is less clear than usual, nay, one does not recollect at

all if one has been very drunk. Therefore, intoxication enhances one's

recollection of the past, while, on the other hand, one remembers little

of the present, while in that state.

* * * * *

That arithmetic is the basest of all mental activities is proved by the

fact that it is the only one that can be accomplished by means of a

machine. Take, for instance, the reckoning machines that are so commonly

used in England at the present time, and solely for the sake of

convenience. But all _analysis finitorum et infinitorum_ is

fundamentally based on calculation. Therefore we may gauge the "profound

sense of the mathematician," of whom Lichtenberg has made fun, in that

he says: "These so-called professors of mathematics have taken advantage

of the ingenuousness of other people, have attained the credit of

possessing profound sense, which strongly resembles the theologians'

profound sense of their own holiness."

* * * * *

As a rule, people of very great capacities will get on better with a man

of extremely limited intelligence than with a man of ordinary

intelligence; and it is for the same reason that the despot and the

plebeians, the grandparents and the grandchildren, are natural allies.

* * * * *

I am not surprised that people are bored when they are alone; they

cannot laugh when they are alone, for such a thing seems foolish to

them. Is laughter, then, to be regarded as merely a signal for others, a

mere sign, like a word? It is a want of imagination and dulness of mind

generally (ἀναισθησια και βραδυτης ψυχης), as Theophrastus puts it, that

prevents people from laughing when they are alone. The lower animals

neither laugh when they are alone nor in company.

Nyson, the misanthropist, was surprised as he was laughing to himself by

one of these people, who asked him why he laughed when he was alone.

"That is just why I was laughing," was the answer.

* * * * *

People who do not go to the theatre are like those who make their toilet

without a looking-glass;--but it is still worse to come to a decision

without seeking the advice of a friend. For a man may have the most

correct and excellent judgment in everything else but in his own

affairs; because here the will at once deranges the intellect. Therefore

a man should seek counsel. A doctor can cure every one but himself; this

is why he calls in a colleague when he is ill.

* * * * *

The natural gesticulation of everyday life, such as accompanies any kind

of lively conversation, is a language of its own, and, moreover, is much

more universal than the language of words; so far as it is independent

of words, and the same in all nations; although each nation makes use of

gesticulation in proportion to its vivacity, and in individual nations,

the Italian, for instance, it is supplemented by some few gesticulations

which are merely conventional, and have therefore only local value.

Its universal use is analogous to logic and grammar, since it expresses

the form and not the matter of conversation. However, it is to be

distinguished from them since it has not only an intellectual relation

but also a moral--that is, it defines the movements of the will. And so

it accompanies conversation, just as a correctly progressive bass

accompanies a melody, and serves in the same way to enhance the effect.

The most interesting fact about gesticulation is that as soon as

conversation assumes the same _form_ there is a repetition of the same

gesture. This is the case, however varied the _matter_, that is to say,

the subject-matter, may be. So that I am able to understand quite well

the general nature of a conversation--in other words, the mere form and

type of it, while looking out of a window--without hearing a word

spoken. It is unmistakably evident that the speaker is arguing,

advancing his reasons, then modifying them, then urging them, and

drawing his conclusion in triumph; or it may be he is relating some

wrong that he has suffered, plainly depicting in strong and condemnatory

language the stupidity and stubbornness of his opponents; or he is

speaking of the splendid plan he has thought out and put in execution,

explaining how it became a success, or perhaps failed because fate was

unfavourable; or perhaps he is confessing that he was powerless to act

in the matter in question; or recounting that he noticed and saw

through, in good time, the evil schemes that had been organised against

him, and by asserting his rights or using force frustrated them and

punished their author; and a hundred other things of a similar kind. But

what gesticulation alone really conveys to me is the essential

matter--be it of a moral or intellectual nature--of the whole

conversation _in abstracto_. That is to say the quintessence, the true

substance of the conversation, remains identical whatever has brought

about the conversation, and consequently whatever the subject-matter of

it may be.

The most interesting and amusing part of the matter, as has been said,

is the complete identity of the gestures for denoting the same kind of

circumstances, even if they are used by most diverse people; just as the

words of a language are alike for every one and liable to such

modifications as are brought about by a slight difference in accent or

education. And yet these standing forms of gesticulation which are

universally observed are certainly the outcome of no convention; they

are natural and original, a true language of nature, which may have been

strengthened by imitation and custom. It is incumbent on an actor, as is

well known, and on a public speaker, to a less extent, to make a careful

study of gesture--a study which must principally consist in the

observation and imitation of others, for the matter cannot very well be

based on abstract rules; with the exception of some quite general

leading principles--as, for instance, that the gesture must not follow

the word, but rather immediately precede it, in order to announce it and

thereby rouse attention.

The English have a peculiar contempt for gesticulation, and regard it as

something undignified and common; this seems to me to be only one of

those silly prejudices of English fastidiousness. For it is a language

which nature has given to every one and which every one understands;

therefore to abolish and forbid it for no other reason than to gratify

that so much extolled, gentlemanly feeling, is a very dubious thing to

do.

* * * * *

The state of human happiness, for the most part, is like certain groups

of trees, which seen from a distance look wonderfully fine; but if we go

up to them and among them, their beauty disappears; we do not know

wherein it lay, for it is only trees that surround us. And so it happens

that we often envy the position of others.

FOOTNOTES:

[14] _Grundpr. der Ethik_, p. 48; _Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, vol.

i. p. 338.

[15] _Vierfache Wurzel_, § 21.

[16] _Pererga_, vol. ii. § 311.

METAPHYSICS OF LOVE.

We are accustomed to see poets principally occupied with describing the

love of the sexes. This, as a rule, is the leading idea of every

dramatic work, be it tragic or comic, romantic or classic, Indian or

European. It in no less degree constitutes the greater part of both

lyric and epic poetry, especially if in these we include the host of

romances which have been produced every year for centuries in every

civilised country in Europe as regularly as the fruits of the earth. All

these works are nothing more than many-sided, short, or long

descriptions of the passion in question. Moreover, the most successful

delineations of love, such, for example, as _Romeo and Juliet, La

Nouvelle Héloise_, and _Werther_, have attained immortal fame.

Rochefoucauld says that love may be compared to a ghost since it is

something we talk about but have never seen, and Lichtenberg, in his

essay _Ueber die Macht der Liebe_, disputes and denies its reality and

naturalness--but both are in the wrong. For if it were foreign to and

contradicted human nature--in other words, if it were merely an

imaginary caricature, it would not have been depicted with such zeal by

the poets of all ages, or accepted by mankind with an unaltered

interest; for anything artistically beautiful cannot exist without

truth.

"_Rien n'est beau que le vrai; le vrai seul est aimable_."--BOIL.

Experience, although not that of everyday, verifies that that which as a

rule begins only as a strong and yet controllable inclination, may

develop, under certain conditions, into a passion, the ardour of which

surpasses that of every other. It will ignore all considerations,

overcome all kinds of obstacles with incredible strength and

persistence. A man, in order to have his love gratified, will

unhesitatingly risk his life; in fact, if his love is absolutely

rejected, he will sacrifice his life into the bargain. The Werthers and

Jacopo Ortis do not only exist in romances; Europe produces every year

at least half-a-dozen like them: _sed ignotis perierunt mortibus illi_:

for their sufferings are chronicled by the writer of official registers

or by the reporters of newspapers. Indeed, readers of the police news in

English and French newspapers will confirm what I have said.

Love drives a still greater number of people into the lunatic asylum.

There is a case of some sort every year of two lovers committing suicide

together because material circumstances happen to be unfavourable to

their union. By the way, I cannot understand how it is that such people,

who are confident of each other's love, and expect to find their

greatest happiness in the enjoyment of it, do not avoid taking extreme

steps, and prefer suffering every discomfort to sacrificing with their

lives a happiness which is greater than any other they can conceive. As

far as lesser phases and passages of love are concerned, all of us have

them daily before our eyes, and, if we are not old, the most of us in

our hearts.

After what has been brought to mind, one cannot doubt either the reality

or importance of love. Instead, therefore, of wondering why a

philosopher for once in a way writes on this subject, which has been

constantly the theme of poets, rather should one be surprised that love,

which always plays such an important _rôle_ in a man's life, has

scarcely ever been considered at all by philosophers, and that it still

stands as material for them to make use of.

Plato has devoted himself more than any one else to the subject of love,

especially in the _Symposium_ and the _Phaedrus_; what he has said about

it, however, comes within the sphere of myth, fable, and raillery, and

only applies for the most part to the love of a Greek youth. The little

that Rousseau says in his _Discours sur l'inégalité_ is neither true nor

satisfactory. Kant's disquisition on love in the third part of his

treatise, _Ueber das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen_, is very

superficial; it shows that he has not thoroughly gone into the subject,

and therefore it is somewhat untrue. Finally, Platner's treatment of it

in his _Anthropology_ will be found by every one to be insipid and

shallow.

To amuse the reader, on the other hand, Spinoza's definition deserves to

be quoted because of its exuberant naïveté: _Amor est titillatio,

concomitante idea causae externae_ (_Eth._ iv., prop. 44). It is not my

intention to be either influenced or to contradict what has been written

by my predecessors; the subject has forced itself upon me objectively,

and has of itself become inseparable from my consideration of the world.

Moreover, I shall expect least approval from those people who are for

the moment enchained by this passion, and in consequence try to express

their exuberant feelings in the most sublime and ethereal images. My

view will seem to them too physical, too material, however metaphysical,

nay, transcendent it is fundamentally.

First of all let them take into consideration that the creature whom

they are idealising to-day in madrigals and sonnets would have been

ignored almost entirely by them if she had been born eighteen years

previously.

Every kind of love, however ethereal it may seem to be, springs entirely

from the instinct of sex; indeed, it is absolutely this instinct, only

in a more definite, specialised, and perhaps, strictly speaking, more

individualised form. If, bearing this in mind, one considers the

important _rôle_ which love plays in all its phases and degrees, not

only in dramas and novels, but also in the real world, where next to

one's love of life it shows itself as the strongest and most active of

all motives; if one considers that it constantly occupies half the

capacities and thoughts of the younger part of humanity, and is the

final goal of almost every human effort; that it influences adversely

the most important affairs; that it hourly disturbs the most earnest

occupations; that it sometimes deranges even the greatest intellects for

a time; that it is not afraid of interrupting the transactions of

statesmen or the investigations of men of learning; that it knows how to

leave its love-letters and locks of hair in ministerial portfolios and

philosophical manuscripts; that it knows equally well how to plan the

most complicated and wicked affairs, to dissolve the most important

relations, to break the strongest ties; that life, health, riches, rank,

and happiness are sometimes sacrificed for its sake; that it makes the

otherwise honest, perfidious, and a man who has been hitherto faithful a

betrayer, and, altogether, appears as a hostile demon whose object is to

overthrow, confuse, and upset everything it comes across: if all this is

taken into consideration one will have reason to ask--"Why is there all

this noise? Why all this crowding, blustering, anguish, and want? Why

should such a trifle play so important a part and create disturbance and

confusion in the well-regulated life of mankind?" But to the earnest

investigator the spirit of truth gradually unfolds the answer: it is not

a trifle one is dealing with; the importance of love is absolutely in

keeping with the seriousness and zeal with which it is prosecuted. The

ultimate aim of all love-affairs, whether they be of a tragic or comic

nature, is really more important than all other aims in human life, and

therefore is perfectly deserving of that profound seriousness with which

it is pursued.

As a matter of fact, love determines nothing less than the

_establishment of the next generation_. The existence and nature of the

_dramatis personae_ who come on to the scene when we have made our exit

have been determined by some frivolous love-affair. As the being, the

_existentia_ of these future people is conditioned by our instinct of

sex in general, so is the nature, the _essentia_, of these same people

conditioned by the selection that the individual makes for his

satisfaction, that is to say, by love, and is thereby in every respect

irrevocably established. This is the key of the problem. In applying it,

we shall understand it more fully if we analyse the various degrees of

love, from the most fleeting sensation to the most ardent passion; we

shall then see that the difference arises from the degree of

individualisation of the choice. All the love-affairs of the present

generation taken altogether are accordingly the _meditatio compositionis

generationis futurae, e qua iterum pendent innumerae generationes_ of

mankind. Love is of such high import, because it has nothing to do with

the weal or woe of the present individual, as every other matter has; it

has to secure the existence and special nature of the human race in

future times; hence the will of the individual appears in a higher

aspect as the will of the species; and this it is that gives a pathetic

and sublime import to love-affairs, and makes their raptures and

troubles transcendent, emotions which poets for centuries have not tired

of depicting in a variety of ways. There is no subject that can rouse

the same interest as love, since it concerns both the weal and woe of

the species, and is related to every other which only concerns the

welfare of the individual as body to surface.

This is why it is so difficult to make a drama interesting if it

possesses no love motive; on the other hand, the subject is never

exhausted, although it is constantly being utilised.

What manifests itself in the individual consciousness as instinct of sex

in general, without being concentrated on any particular individual, is

very plainly in itself, in its generalised form, the will to live. On

the other hand, that which appears as instinct of sex directed to a

certain individual, is in itself the will to live as a definitely

determined individual. In this case the instinct of sex very cleverly

wears the mask of objective admiration, although in itself it is a

subjective necessity, and is, thereby, deceptive. Nature needs these

stratagems in order to accomplish her ends. The purpose of every man in

love, however objective and sublime his admiration may appear to be, is

to beget a being of a definite nature, and that this is so, is verified

by the fact that it is not mutual love but possession that is the

essential. Without possession it is no consolation to a man to know that

his love is requited. In fact, many a man has shot himself on finding

himself in such a position. On the other hand, take a man who is very

much in love; if he cannot have his love returned he is content simply

with possession. Compulsory marriages and cases of seduction corroborate

this, for a man whose love is not returned frequently finds consolation

in giving handsome presents to a woman, in spite of her dislike, or

making other sacrifices, so that he may buy her favour.

The real aim of the whole of love's romance, although the persons

concerned are unconscious of the fact, is that a particular being may

come into the world; and the way and manner in which it is accomplished

is a secondary consideration. However much those of lofty sentiments,

and especially of those in love, may refute the gross realism of my

argument, they are nevertheless in the wrong. For is not the aim of

definitely determining the individualities of the next generation a much

higher and nobler aim than that other, with its exuberant sensations and

transcendental soap-bubbles? Among all earthly aims is there one that is

either more important or greater? It alone is in keeping with that

deep-rooted feeling inseparable from passionate love, with that

earnestness with which it appears, and the importance which it attaches

to the trifles that come within its sphere. It is only in so far as we

regard _this_ end as the real one that the difficulties encountered, the

endless troubles and vexations endured, in order to attain the object we

love, appear to be in keeping with the matter. For it is the future

generation in its entire individual determination which forces itself

into existence through the medium of all this strife and trouble.

Indeed, the future generation itself is already stirring in the careful,

definite, and apparently capricious selection for the satisfaction of

the instinct of sex which we call love. That growing affection of two

lovers for each other is in reality the will to live of the new being,

of which they shall become the parents; indeed, in the meeting of their

yearning glances the life of a new being is kindled, and manifests

itself as a well-organised individuality of the future. The lovers have

a longing to be really united and made one being, and to live as such

for the rest of their lives; and this longing is fulfilled in the

children born to them, in whom the qualities inherited from both, but

combined and united in one being, are perpetuated. Contrarily, if a man

and woman mutually, persistently, and decidedly dislike each other, it

indicates that they could only bring into the world a badly organised,

discordant, and unhappy being. Therefore much must be attached to

Calderon's words, when he calls the horrible Semiramis a daughter of the

air, yet introduces her as a daughter of seduction, after which follows

the murder of the husband.

Finally, it is the will to live presenting itself in the whole species,

which so forcibly and exclusively attracts two individuals of different

sex towards each other. This will anticipates in the being, of which

they shall become the parents, an objectivation of its nature

corresponding to its aims. This individual will inherit the father's

will and character, the mother's intellect, and the constitution of

both. As a rule, however, an individual takes more after the father in

shape and the mother in stature, corresponding to the law which applies

to the offspring of animals.... It is impossible to explain the

individuality of each man, which is quite exceptional and peculiar to

him alone; and it is just as impossible to explain the passion of two

people for each other, for it is equally individual and uncommon in

character; indeed, fundamentally both are one and the same. The former

is _explicite_ what the latter was _implicite_.

We must consider as the origin of a new individual and true _punctum

saliens_ of its life the moment when the parents begin to love each

other--_to fancy each other_, as the English appropriately express it.

And, as has been said, in the meeting of their longing glances

originates the first germ of a new being, which, indeed, like all germs,

is generally crushed out. This new individual is to a certain extent a

new (Platonic) Idea; now, as all Ideas strive with the greatest

vehemence to enter the phenomenal sphere, and to do this, ardently seize

upon the matter which the law of causality distributes among them all,

so this particular Idea of a human individuality struggles with the

greatest eagerness and vehemence for its realisation in the phenomenal.

It is precisely this vehement desire which is the passion of the future

parents for one another. Love has countless degrees, and its two

extremes may be indicated as Ἀφροδιτη πανδημος and οὐρανια;

nevertheless, in essentials it is the same everywhere.

Essays of Schopenhauer · 第 13 / 17 段