of reports submitted in connection with D-Case 343, and the
original reports will be sent to H. M. G. instead of the
duplicates, as formerly.”
“H. M. G.” we learned from the key to special personages for whom the
division was conducting investigations, was von Papen himself. Rule 2
reads:
“In order to accomplish better results in connection with
D-Case 343, and to shorten the stay of the informing agent at
the place of meeting, it has been decided to discontinue the
former practice of dining with this agent prior to receiving
his report. It will also be a rule to refrain from working on
other matters until the informant in this case has been fully
heard, and all data taken down in shorthand.”
The book revealed that in D-Case 343 Koenig’s alias was Woehler, and
his agent’s name Schleindl. In his notes on operatives Koenig had
written that “Friedrich Schleindl ... who was first known as Operative
#51, and later as Agent C. O., beginning with October 21st will be
called Agent B. I.” This enabled us to interpret a further regulation
of the division, to this effect.
“Agent B. I. has been requested not to call again at the
Central Office, this ruling to take effect immediately. Other
arrangements will be made to meet him elsewhere. Whether or not
the stenographer of the Central Office will continue to write
reports covering D-Case 343 will be determined later.”
Rule 4 read:
“Supplementing Rule 2, it has been decided that I refrain from
drinking beer or liquor with my supper prior to receiving Agent
B. I., for the reason that I wish to be perfectly fresh and
well prepared to receive his reports.”
And Rule 3 contained this passage:
“... great care is to be taken that operatives and agents of
the Secret Service Division remain entirely unknown to members
of the Central Office and other divisions. These regulations
do not apply to D-Case 343, which has been handled since the
beginning of July (1915) with the knowledge of employees not
belonging to the Secret Service Division. Until more favorable
arrangements can be made this practice may be continued.”
Here clearly was an unusually important case. The notes indicated
that Koenig was receiving frequent reports of great value from this
Schleindl, had been receiving them for at least five months, was
reporting them to von Papen, and intended to safeguard his obtaining
further information. When a German voluntarily forswears his beer,
something serious is on foot.
Lieut. Barnitz, with Detectives Walsh and Fenelly, arrested Schleindl
the same day we closed in on Koenig. In his pocket was a cablegram
referring to Russian munitions. He was a German reservist, born in
Bavaria. At the outbreak of war he was a clerk in the National City
Bank of New York, and lived away up in the Bronx, and in the first
reaction to war he reported at the German Consulate for duty. Months
passed, and he had not been called upon, when one night he met a German
who told him to report at the Hotel Manhattan to meet another German
named Wagoner. “You’ll find him in the bar,” added his informant.
“Wagoner,” who was Paul Koenig himself, met the youth, and playing
on his patriotism drew from him the information that he had access
to many cablegrams to and from the Allied governments through the
bank concerning the purchase and shipment of war supplies. Offering
Schleindl a retainer of $25 a week, Koenig told him to steal from the
files all such messages he could lay his hands on, together with
copies of express-bills showing when the goods were delivered to the
piers for shipment, all data relating to the prices paid, detailed
descriptions of the purchases, and any other particulars which would
help the German Government to complete its knowledge of what supplies
America was shipping abroad. Schleindl grew quite enthusiastic in the
work. Starting with light thefts, he gradually grew bolder, until he
was in a position to steal documents night after night, take them
to his appointment with Koenig, have them copied, and arrive at the
Bank early enough the following morning to put them back where they
belonged. Friday night was the regular appointment, but often messages
of big shipments came in and he relayed the news at once to his chief.
The extra $25 a week practically doubled his earning power, and made
devotion to the Fatherland very attractive--so much so that he began
to be afraid that Koenig, who was merely the receiving station for
his reports, and who took no risks himself, would receive more than
his share of credit. If there were any iron crosses to be given out,
or any ribbons for foreign service, Schleindl felt that he had earned
his, so he forwarded to his brother in Austria from time to time
stenographic notes written in the Bavarian dialect which would be
especially difficult of translation. In order to evade the censor he
tore them into scraps and sifted them into the folds of newspapers
which went unmolested through the British mail censors at Kirkwall.
These scraps, pieced together and translated into reports, were
forwarded by his brother to German officials.
[Illustration: Alexander Dietrichens]
[Illustration:
_International Film Service. Inc._
Frederick Schleindl]
[Illustration: Schleindl and Dietrichens at a German party]
Schleindl’s zeal had led him into other channels of German activity.
At college in Germany he had had a friend named Alexander Dietrichens,
later known variously as Willish, Sander, Glass, and Lizius--one of
those Riga Russians of German parentage who have served Bolshevism so
eminently in Russia. In 1915 Dietrichens was in America, and the two
renewed their friendship. He said he was eager to serve the Fatherland,
and that he only wanted to know who was supplying munitions to the
Allies to start a campaign of destruction against them. He suggested
the Du Pont factories at Wilmington, and asked the young bank clerk
to come along. Schleindl, impressionable and emotional, had not the
courage. He confessed to me that he wept at the thought, and that he
asked Dietrichens whether any harm could come to him if the explosion
killed anyone. “Very likely,” Dietrichens answered cheerfully.
Schleindl then declined, but he helped the dynamiter to the extent of
keeping an occasional bomb or a package of dynamite for him during the
day in his locker or under his desk at the bank. The main cache where
Dietrichens stored his explosives was near Tenafly, New Jersey, but
when Schleindl and I visited it, in a deserted spot almost a mile from
the nearest building, the shanty was empty.
Schleindl was tried, convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate term
in the penitentiary, for the theft of documents. Koenig pleaded guilty
to the charge, but sentence was suspended on him owing to the greater
importance of the Welland charges.
The Schleindl and Dietrichens cases are only two examples of many to
which the little black book gave clues. It suggested investigations
into many others, for it was a real storehouse of names, and knowing
Koenig’s close relationship with the highest German authorities in
the United States, it contributed a large number of items to the bill
of complaint against Germany which provoked the President’s Flag Day
warning of 1916. Koenig’s mere mention of the name of “Horn” in D-Case
277 gave evidence of the German sponsorship of the attempt of Werner
Horn to blow up the Vanceboro bridge in February, 1915; the name
“Stahl” in D-Case 328 indicated by Koenig’s own hand that it was he who
paid Gustave Stahl for the false affidavits that the _Lusitania_ had
carried guns; the name “Kienzle” in D-Case 316 was the name of a man
who was involved in trying to blow up vessels sailing for France and
England; the name “Hammond” in D-Case 357 led to the disclosure that
the Bureau of Investigation, although chiefly engaged in spying and
destroying plots, sometimes ran other and more delicate errands for von
Bernstorff.
Posing this time as “W. H. Becker” Koenig called on one J. C. Hammond,
a writer and publicity man who had offices at 34th Street and Broadway.
To Hammond he stated that from the standpoint of the Germans in America
two newspapers were taking irritating and unfriendly attitudes. These
were the _New York World_ and the _Providence Journal_. Both papers had
taken, soon after the outbreak of war, definite stands on the American
issues involved, and both pursued the subject in a typically thorough
fashion, the Providence paper obtaining much of its information from
sympathetic British sources, and the _World_ having an influential
position politically which led it across the trail of what the
newspaper men call “big stories.” The _Providence Journal_ in fact
emerged from comparative obscurity during the early months of war with
startling charges against German agents both here and abroad, supported
by evidence which seemed incredible though of sound origin. These
stories were republished widely through the country. It was undoubtedly
having a powerful effect upon the public, for the country, dazed with
the fact of war, was ready to take sides against the nation which was
apparently guilty of the worst acts. Some of those charges were true,
and although they seemed at that time so fantastic as to be almost
impossible, the members of the German Embassy knew they were true and
squirmed inwardly every time a fresh one burst out. The _World_ had
a habit of not only spreading exciting news articles over its front
page, but lending color to them by publishing photographs of supporting
documents to prove their authenticity. So von Bernstorff and the
attachés, after having tried to bring influence to bear in many subtle
ways to curb the publications, called in Koenig, and he made his little
pilgrimage to Hammond’s office.
He offered the publicity agent a large sum of money to find out what
exposures the two papers had still in the ice-box, ready to release.
Later, he increased this to a blanket offer of any sum which Hammond
should name, provided the latter could induce the papers to turn over
to him the articles and affidavits in their possession. The offer was
not accepted. Hammond did not bite at the offer of a later reward of
$100,000 which Koenig hung up to silence the publication of anti-German
news in certain other large newspapers in the country, nor did he, as
Koenig requested, go to England to visit Rintelen, to find out where
Rintelen had left a trunk full of valuable papers when he fled the
United States.
The name “Lewis” mentioned in the citation of another case in the
little black book revealed a further variation of the services of the
Secret Service Division. The United States owned a large quantity
of Krag-Joergensen rifles for which in that year of peace it had no
use, but which several foreign governments would have been glad to
buy. Commercial bachelors who were looking for war brides all took
turns paying court to the rifles, and all without success. Readers
of the newspapers may recall a small tempest which raged around the
alleged sale of the rifles, and the charges levelled at one after
another German of the attempt to purchase. Each new charge was denied
by its victim, and it finally developed that a Mrs. Selma Lewis had
been involved in the negotiations, and was willing to pose as the
purchaser. The “man behind” was Franz Rintelen, acting for the German
Government, and the name “Lewis” here in Koenig’s notes, amplified by
the full name and address of Mrs. Lewis in a small address book which
we also captured, indicates that Koenig worked for Rintelen as well
as the abler and more authentic members of the embassy of destruction
which Germany kept in America.
I think I have made it clear that when the United States interned
Paul Koenig it made prisoner one of the busiest men of the German
spy system, and one of the strangest. He was physically powerful and
mentally quick with a German sort of quickness. He had the most supreme
self-confidence it has been my pleasure to meet, and that caused his
downfall. If he had administered his bureau in a manner calculated to
breed loyalty in his employees he would have been more successful,
but he conceived his work as a one-man job, and made his subordinates
goose-step to his tune. It is certain that had he not set down with
such care every item which would be useful to the United States in
unearthing his actions, no one can say how long they would have
continued. Napoleon had his Waterloo, however, and Paul Koenig had his
notebook, and with the same scrupulous foresight the indomitable “xxx”
left that notebook where we would be most likely to find it.
[Illustration:
_HEALTH RULES._
#1. I have decide to refrain from chewing tobacco in the
office, as it disagrees with my health, thereby interfering
with my work. (12-1-15)
#2. I shall drink no more whiskey. (12-6)
_HEALTH TABLE #1._
XI.
9-12-14-17-17-21-23-24-25-28-28- 11
XII.
1-3-5-8-9-11-13-16-
Random Pages from “P. K.’s Little Black Book”]
[Illustration:
safeguarding of the Imperial German Embassy at Cedarhurst,
L. I.
Sept. 1. Bureau was entrusted with the safeguarding of the
offices of Commercial Attache Dr. Albert.
Oct. 26. Bureau was entrusted with the safeguarding of the
offices of the Military Attache.
Nov. 12. Began first investigation for Austro-Hungarian
Government.
Dec. 13. As 6.30 P.M. Captain von Papen, German Military
Attache, received me at the German Club to express his
thanks for the services which this Bureau have rendered
to him. At the same time he bid me Good-Bye.
Dec. 15. Bureau was entrusted with the safeguarding of the
offices of the I. & R. Austro-Hungarian Consulate General.
_LIST OF_ _IMPORTANT CASES HANDLED._
- 1913 -
C.#17. Investigation Re: Jersey City Wharfage Graft.
C.#24. Investigation of Baggage Department, Hoboken.
C.#32. Chinese Stowaways on S.S. “PRINZ JOACHIM”, Voy. 77.
C.#40. Investigation Re: Thefts of Cargo on the Atlas Pier, New
York City.
C.#41. S.S. “FRIEDRICH DER GROSSE”, Arrival at New York July 2,
1913.
C.#49. Charges Made Against W. Barbe, Chief Officer, S.S. “CARL
SCHURZ”.
C.#54. Investigation Re: S.S. “PRINZ FRIEDRICH WILHELM”,
Arrived at New York on June 3.
C.#67. Fire on Board S.S. “IMPERATOR” on August 28.
C.#69. Fire Patrol on S.S. “IMPERATOR”, & etc.
C.#70. Max Ludwig Thomsen, Alias Thomspson.
C.#95. Charges Against Paul Koenig.
Random Pages from “P. K.’s Little Black Book”]
It is a rare treat, aside from its now past informative value. And it
contains one real mystery which the Westphalian himself can alone clear
up. The page headed “Health Rules” reads as follows:
“#1. I have decided to refrain from chewing tobacco in the
office as it disagrees with my health thereby interfering with
my work. (12-1-15.)
“#2. I shall drink no more whiskey. (12-6.)”
Which leads one to believe that he saw the practical value of an
exemplary life. But we must wait for him to explain the page headed
“Health Table,” which reads:
“XI
“9-12-14-17-17-21-23-24-28-28.
“XII
“1-3-5-8-9-11-13-16.”
The “XI” is evidently November, of 1915, the “XII” December. What did
he do on those dates so accurately mentioned? Did temptation lead
him twice from the path on the 17th and 28th of November? If so,
what could this temptation have been? Is it possible that the same
conscience which made him typewrite his rules of conduct weakened, and
then remorse turned about and forced him to set down his lapses from
grace? Is it further possible that each of the dates cited means that
Paul Koenig broke his brand new health rules ten times in November and
eight times in December, and _chewed tobacco in office hours_?
We must wait in patience--some day his Westphalian conscience may
answer.
III
PLAYING WITH FIRE
The business of crime prevention and detection depends largely on
the confidence one man has in another. That is one reason why a
“stool-pigeon” is an uncomfortable ally on a case. You can not be
sure that a man who associates with criminals and is giving them away
is not giving the case away at the same time. His gang hates him for
squealing, his evidence is the evidence of a traitor, and he is a good
person not to depend on. I make that point here because I have always
tried to avoid using stool-pigeons, and because the story to follow
will illustrate what can be accomplished by a dependable man.
The story really starts about twenty years ago. In the spring of 1900,
an Italian from Paterson, N. J., Brescia by name, attended a meeting
of anarchists in a house in Elizabeth Street, New York. The group was
composed of two parties, one which we may call the progressives, and
one the inactives. Brescia assailed the inactives, denounced them as
cowards, and stirred up so much dissension that the meeting broke up
for fear of a police raid, and several of the members retaliated at
Brescia by accusing him of being a police spy. He sailed for Italy, and
on July 29, in the little Lombardi town of Monza, murdered King Humbert
the Good. When the news was cabled to America it was hailed with proper
grief by the public and with great joy by the anarchists who had called
Brescia a traitor. His execution, which followed swiftly, made him a
martyr. So to do him honor, the group was named the Brescia Circle.
By 1914 the membership of the circle was nearly 600. A cosmopolitan
lot: Italians, Russians, Russian Jews, Germans, Austrians, Spaniards
and Americans, of both sexes. The leaders were agitators whose speaking
ability had lifted them out of the ranks and who found an easier living
by their wits than by their hands. The Bomb Squad knew something of
their activities and habits, for the past history of anarchist cases
linked up certain names in a pointed way. We knew their fondness for
bombs, and the records of the police department contain many instances
of anarchists inspired to violence by the inflammatory speeches of
such agitators, as their idol, Francisco Ferrer, had preached violence
in Spain. The outbreak of war in Europe, from which so many of the
group had migrated to America, and the promise of social confusion
which it held for them had stirred the Brescia Circle more than a
little. The active members met regularly in the basement of a building
at 301 East 106th Street, a shabby house in a shabby district east of
the New York Central tracks. These meetings, which occurred usually
on a Sunday, as many of the members were working during the week,
were addressed by such notorious anarchists as Emma Goldman, Becky
Edelson, Frank Mandese, Carlo Tresca and Pietro Allegra--names probably
unfamiliar to the general public, but names with which the Police
Department had “auld acquaintance.” Occasionally an editor of an
anarchist newspaper in Lynn, Massachusetts, Gagliani by name, came to
speak in the cellar, and Plunkett, Harry Kelly, and Alexander Berkman
were usually to be found in the group.
The winter of 1913–1914 was one of industrial depression. Many of
the radical labor element rallied to the I. W. W. and the unemployed
readily joined them. The methods of the anarchists and I. W. W.’s
were similar, and the advocates of unrest were enlisted under both
standards. In the late winter demonstrations began and multiplied
until in March a youth named Frank Tannenbaum, to whom Emma Goldman
later took a fancy, led a mob of I. W. W.’s into St. Alphonsus’ Church
demanding food. The police waited until they had passed inside, then
locked the doors, and arrested the whole lot. This was but one instance
of a number which promised more trouble. Whatever nice distinctions of
creed separated the Industrial Workers from the anarchists were paper
distinctions; the performances of both bodies made it fairly plain that
if you scratched an anarchist you found an I. W. W. underneath.
There may have been some intimation from abroad of the impending
war, among the anarchists, for in July certain of them began to
grow demonstrative. On Independence Day Mandese was arrested in
Tarrytown, in uncomfortable proximity to the estate and person of
John D. Rockefeller. Carron, Berg and Hansen, three members of the
Brescia Circle, were engaged on that same day in perfecting a bomb in
their rooms at Lexington Avenue and 104th Street, when the machine
exploded prematurely and killed them. That bomb had been intended for
the Rockefeller family. Naturally everyone with a shred of respect
for order who read of these episodes recoiled from them, but it was
necessary to judge them from the anarchist’s own standpoint to see that
while one of the cases had resulted in death, and the Mandese incident
in arrest, both had been successful in creating a disturbance. The
anarchist likes disturbance as well as he dislikes order, for unrest is
contagious, and means new recruits to the cause. It became our duty,
therefore, to make a careful investigation of these disturbances at
their source, and we insinuated a detective into the Brescia Circle
itself.
He spoke only English--a good language for social intercourse, but
not the key to the affairs of the group in the 106th Street basement.
Whenever the more prominent agitators had a really important matter to
discuss they used the Italian tongue, and it was impossible for our man
to eavesdrop. Perhaps he was over-eager, for twice he was brought to
trial by the Circle charged with spying. Twice he was acquitted. But
when his enemies had him formally charged a third time with treachery,
the anarchists decided that although they had no evidence against him
beyond a powerful suspicion, he would be better outside. Outside he
went.
On October 3, the anarchists gave a grand ball at the Harlem Casino in
honor of Emma Goldman, and at that affair announcement was made that
October 13 would be observed by those of the cause with a celebration
at Forward Hall, in East Broadway, fitting to the anniversary of the
“assassination” of Francisco Ferrer. The orator, Leonard Abbott, also
reminded the gathering that “the Catholic Church had been responsible
for Ferrer’s death.” At five o’clock in the afternoon of October 12
a vicious explosion occurred in the north aisle of St. Patrick’s
Cathedral. It was an anarchist’s bomb. The nave of the church held
numerous worshippers, who were panic-stricken, but who fortunately
escaped injury with the exception of a young man struck in the face by
a flying splinter from one of the altars. Shortly after midnight of
the next day a bomb placed in the front area of the priests’ house of
St. Alphonsus’ exploded with violence enough to break every window in
the house and every window in the house across the street. Ferrer’s
“assassination” had evidently been appropriately observed.
The situation was disturbing. We had to put a stop to bombing before
the anarchists grew bolder and began to kill someone beside themselves.
Of course we wanted all the evidence we could lay hands on, and
yet the evidence we had been able to obtain had not prevented two
outrages. We felt that undoubtedly the best place to look for it was
still the Brescia Circle, as it constituted the chief organization
and headquarters for the element which we believed guilty. And we now
return to the question of the stool-pigeon.
It would have been possible to employ one of the Circle, perhaps. It is
certain that I should have been uneasy with only his evidence to depend
upon, for a bomb does not wait to be investigated. Planting a man in
the Brescia Circle had not been successful, but I felt that it could be
made successful. So out of five or six candidates from the department I
chose Amedeo Polignani for the work.