Transcriber’s Note: Italic and some underlined text are indicated by
_underscores_. Boldface text is indicated by =equals signs=.
THROTTLED!
[Illustration: Inspector Thomas J. Tunney]
THROTTLED!
_THE DETECTION OF THE GERMAN
AND ANARCHIST BOMB PLOTTERS_
BY
INSPECTOR THOMAS J. TUNNEY
Head of the Bomb Squad of the New York
Police Department
AS TOLD TO
PAUL MERRICK HOLLISTER
Author, with John Price Jones, of “The German
Secret Service in America”
ILLUSTRATED
FROM PHOTOGRAPHS
[Illustration]
BOSTON
SMALL, MAYNARD & COMPANY
PUBLISHERS
Copyright, 1919
BY SMALL, MAYNARD & COMPANY
(INCORPORATED)
TO
ARTHUR WOODS
Formerly Police Commissioner of the City of New York, now colonel in
the United States Army, whose vision and coöperation made the work of
the Bomb Squad possible, this volume is respectfully dedicated
INTRODUCTION
Inspector Tunney’s Squad was formed early in August, 1914, to
specialize in organized crimes of violence. It did some radically
effective work against Black Handers, and handled several cases
against domestic enemies of law and order, but as time wore on and war
developed, the Squad’s energies became directed solely against the
nefarious activities of Germans among us.
Inspector Tunney is a most skilful detective, resourceful, persistent,
understanding human nature, a good leader. He picked a squad of
fearless, tireless men, who not only worked long and hard, but showed
marked skill and tact. They proved themselves to be Americans all
the way through, aggressive, loyal, bound to put the job through, no
matter what the difficulties might be. They were occupied in hunting
out Germans who were outraging our neutrality; and then--after we
finally started to make war against those who had so long been warring
against us, on the high seas and in our very midst--they set to work to
thwart and capture active German enemies. The results they got went
far toward making it possible to maintain order in New York during
those months and years which were full of such menace to the safety of
the city, when the national danger seemed so plain--so increasingly
plain--and the national military strength was so woefully weak. In
many cases the Inspector worked in coöperation with one or more of the
Federal Secret Service forces. The Federal work was seriously hampered,
however, at first by hopelessly inadequate organization, and, later,
by the existence of several entirely distinct forces, instead of one
powerful, unified body.
Inspector Tunney has written a most interesting book. Much of what
he tells I knew about at the time, from conference with him, or with
Major Scull, Colonel Biddle, or Major Potter, and some of the events
described I had intimate knowledge of because of personal attention
to the cases. Some, however, I personally know nothing about, as they
have taken place since I left the Department on January 1, 1918. And a
vast amount of good work, of real public service, was done by Inspector
Tunney and his men that is not touched upon in this book, that probably
will never be written, since, though of great value to the public
peace, it lacks some of the dramatic features which characterize the
tales that are told.
No one can read the book without seeing how brutally active our
enemies were here in this country, even while we were at peace with
them, how they flouted our neutrality brazenly and contemptuously, how
they busied themselves through their accredited officials and their
many secret agents in trying to paralyze our industrial life. Their
deliberate effort was to prevent the shipment of all vital supplies to
the Allies, and they sought this end by fomenting labor troubles, by
burning factories, by blowing up ships. It mattered not the slightest
to them that in this kind of activity they destroyed the property of
a people at peace with them, nor did they give a deterring thought to
the fact that they were maiming and killing human beings with their
burnings and blastings. It did concern them, however, to keep things
dark, to work under cover, so that they might continue this underhanded
war against us without being found out. It was the warfare of the
savage, who knows not fair play, who is guided by no rules or customs,
who strikes down his enemy in the dark, from behind.
The lessons to America are clear as day. We must not again be caught
napping with no adequate national Intelligence organization. The
several Federal bureaus should be welded into one, and that one should
be eternally and comprehensively vigilant. We must be wary of strange
doctrine, steady in judgment, instinctively repelling those who seek
to poison public opinion. And our laws should be amended so that
while they give free scope to Americans for untrammeled expression of
differences of opinion and theory and belief, they forbid and prevent
the enemy plotter and propagandist.
There was another part of the Squad’s work, which had to do not with
foreign, but with domestic, enemies. The industrial condition of
unemployment, which was so sharp in 1914 and 1915, was exploited by
those who believed in propaganda by violence, hoping to find eager and
bitter listeners in the thousands who could not get work. To ameliorate
the hardships of the situation the police in New York tried several
plans which were at that time rather new as police methods. They found
jobs for people; they afforded relief in cases of distress from funds,
more than half of which were subscribed by policemen. When street
meetings were held and excitement ran high, they held unswervingly to
the line of conduct mapped out for them. They not merely permitted free
assemblage but protected meetings so long as they kept the laws; and
the law was kept if the meeting did not incite to violence or obstruct
the highways. In case of threatened violence, action, prompt and
strong, was taken to prevent it. Order must be maintained. Inspector
Tunney’s Squad were actively engaged here, not in trying to bottle up
the preachers of any particular doctrine, but simply in finding out who
were the plotters of violent deeds and bringing them to justice.
I believe the police methods in these times were wholesome and
effective, and are the right ones to follow in times of public
excitement and industrial disturbances. They make it clear in practice
that leeway will be given to all for the full exercise of their lawful
rights; and equally clear that adequate means will be taken to prevent
recourse to unlawful measures. In many places in this country where
serious disorder and bloodshed have come to pass, the trouble seems to
have been fostered, at least, by the denial to groups of people of some
of their lawful rights.
I hope this book will help to teach another lesson also: the need in
our police forces of brains and high morale; the need of cultivating
the professional spirit in them, that shall dignify the work, shall
banish political influence and all other influences that go to break
the heart of the policeman who tries to do his plain duty; the need of
having the public take an intelligent interest in police methods and
results, doing away with the smoke-screens of mystery and concealment
which are traditionally employed to cover dishonesty or incompetency.
ARTHUR WOODS
February, 1919.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I THE BOMB SQUAD 1
II WESTPHALIAN EFFICIENCY 8
III PLAYING WITH FIRE 39
IV THE HINDU-BOCHE FAILURES 69
V A TRUE PIRATE TALE 108
VI ALONG THE WATERFRONT: SUGAR AND SHIPS AND ROBERT FAY 126
VII ALONG THE WATERFRONT (II): “DAMN HIM, RINTELEN!” 156
VIII MR. HOLT’S FOUR DAYS 183
IX THE NATURE FAKER 217
X THE PRUSSIAN, THE BOLSHEVIK, AND THE ANARCHIST 246
ILLUSTRATIONS
Inspector Thomas J. Tunney _Frontispiece_
PAGE
Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholas Biddle, Military Intelligence 4
Paul Koenig 10
Random Pages from “P. K.’s Little Black Book” 22, 23, 26, 27, 36, 37
Alexander Dietrichens and Frederick Schleindl 30
Carmine and Carbone in Court 46
Pages from the bomb-thrower’s textbook 52
A postcard received by Commissioner Woods after the arrest of the
Anarchists 60
Detectives in Disguise--George D. Barnitz, Patrick Walsh, James
Sterett, Jerome Murphy 64
Threats to Polignani 66
Frank Abarno and Carmine Carbone 66
A Handbill, printed in Hindu, used by the Hindu-Boche Conspirators 72
The Hindu-Boche Conspirators 76
The _Annie Larsen’s_ Cash Account 80
Gupta’s Code Message 80
How the Hindus used Price Collier’s “Germany and the Germans” as
a cryptogram 90
Alexander V. Kircheisen and his application for a certificate as
able seaman 106
Lieutenant George D. Barnitz, U. S. N. 118
Robert Fay and Lieut. George D. Barnitz 130
Fay, Daeche and Scholz arraigned in Court 130
The Fay Bomb Materials 138
Lieutenant Fay’s Motor Boat 150
Rudder Bombs 154
Franz Rintelen 160
Henry Barth, who posed as the German Secret Service Agent 164
Ernest Becker 168
Captain Charles von Kleist and Captain Otto Wolpert 168
Sergeant Thomas Jenkins, U. S. Army, who located part of one of
the bombs in the German Turn Verein in Brooklyn 174
Norman H. White, of Boston, a civilian attached to the Military
Intelligence, who unearthed numerous German intrigues 180
Mrs. Holt’s Mysterious Letter 208
The First Word from Texas 208
Fritz Duquesne prepared for a Lecture Tour as Captain Claude
Stoughton 224
From Fritz Duquesne’s Past 230
Papers found in Fritz Duquesne’s effects 236
Lieutenant Commander Spencer Eddy 248
Major Fuller Potter, Military Intelligence 252
Lieutenant A. R. Fish, Naval Intelligence 260
Captain John B. Trevor, Military Intelligence 268
THROTTLED!
I
THE BOMB SQUAD
For the past twenty-three years I have been a member of the police
department of the City of New York. It is a long time, in any
single job. The department is comparable in size to a manufacturing
establishment of the first magnitude--it employs more than ten thousand
men--and its occupations are varied enough to suit the inclinations and
ambitions of any man. And so I went through the mill, graduating from
one duty to another until in 1914 I was an acting captain, and had been
in charge of various branches of the Detective Bureau in Brooklyn and
Manhattan.
My duty was the detection of crime, my specialty, meaning by that
the special branch of crime with which I had been most often thrown
into contact, was bomb-explosions. As far back as 1904 there were a
number of mysterious explosions in New York which caused considerable
property damage, and there I made the acquaintance of the bomb itself.
It was an interesting subject for study, and a wicked weapon in use.
I managed to pick up information of bomb-manufacture in several ways:
Black-Handers, in prison, told me how they had made their missiles;
at the New York office of the Du Pont explosives company I had an
opportunity to study blasting; the publications of the Bureau of Mines
furnished more information, the practice of the Bureau of Combustibles
of our own department proved interesting and instructive, and I found
myself before long forced to become something of a student of chemistry.
The difference between our work and the work of the laboratory chemist,
however, was that in our case there was no time to make an explosive
mixture and test it--some criminal usually had done that for us, and we
were called to the scene to find out, from such clues as the wreckage
afforded, the name and address of the criminal. The laboratory chemist
mixes ingredients and counts his work done at the moment of explosion;
the detective begins at that moment a stern chase, and a long one, back
to the ingredients and the man who mixed them.
By the early part of 1914 I had seen a good deal of experience in
tracing bomb outrages to certain of the anarchistic and Black Hand
elements in the population of the city. As the year wore on these
occurrences became so numerous as to warrant special attention, and
on August 1, the approximate date of the outbreak of war in Europe,
Police Commissioner Arthur Woods created in the police department the
Bomb Squad. I was in command, and reported direct to the Commissioner.
As the volume of work increased, and more men were taken on, the
Commissioner delegated his supervision of the Bomb Squad to Guy Scull,
who was then Fifth Deputy Police Commissioner, and who is now a major
in the United States Army. That supervision was later passed on to
Nicholas Biddle, a Special Deputy Commissioner, who, as I write this,
is lieutenant-colonel in the United States Army, in charge of the
Military Intelligence Bureau in New York; and following Mr. Biddle,
Fuller Potter, another special Deputy Commissioner, and now a major in
the Military Intelligence, directed the policies of the Squad.
Within a few months the personnel of the Bomb Squad included the
following picked men: George D. Barnitz, Amedeo Polignani, Henry Barth,
George P. Gilbert, Edward Caddell, Patrick J. Walsh, Jerome Murphy,
James J. Coy, Valentine Corell, James Sterett, Henry Senff, Michael
Santaniello, Joseph Fenelly, Joseph Kiley, Charles Wallace, William
Randolph, Thomas Jenkins, and Anthony Terra--all detective sergeants,
and George Busby, a lieutenant. To this list were added the names of
James Murphy, Robert Morris, Thomas J. Ford, Walter Culhane, Vincent E.
Hastings, Thomas J. Cavanagh, Louis B. Snowden, Thomas M. Goss, Daniel
F. Collins, Frederick Mazer, Edward J. Maher, Walter Price, William
McCahill, and Cornelius J. Sullivan. It made a list of fine material
for the work which we were called upon to do, and no one will begrudge
me here a word of tribute to their aptitude, their courage--to all of
the qualities which made them such able and vigilant guardians of the
neutrality of our country during the years preceding our entrance into
the war. Many of the Bomb Squad went to war later: Barnitz became a
junior lieutenant in the United States Navy, in intelligence work of a
high order. Barth, Caddell, Corell, Fenelly, Jenkins, Walsh, Sterett,
Santaniello, Randolph, James Murphy, Morris, Ford, Culhane, Hastings,
Cavanagh, Snowden, Goss, Collins, Price, Mazer, Maher, McCahill and
Sullivan became sergeants in the Corps of Intelligence Police of
the National Army. And after I became connected with the Military
Intelligence Branch of the War Department, I had frequent occasion to
deal during the war in coöperation with the men whom I have mentioned
in service.
[Illustration: Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholas Biddle, Military
Intelligence]
My first desire in taking charge of the Squad was to suppress the
activities of persons using explosives to destroy life and property.
What knowledge of the physics and chemistry of explosives my experience
had accumulated I passed on to the men. These periods of instruction
went into considerable detail. We discussed the kinds of explosives
used, their relative strength, their ingredients, the methods of
detonating them, the containers into which they were loaded, and the
use of clockwork, fuses, acids and gas-pressure to explode them.
Special and explicit instruction was given for the handling of
unexploded bombs--a bomb bearing an electrical attachment should not be
placed in water, for example, as water is a conductor of electricity;
it is wise never to smoke in the presence of explosives, even if you
think you know that certain kinds of explosives “_never_ explode by
fire.” The only thing you can depend on explosives to do one hundred
times out of one hundred, is what you don’t expect them to do. The Bomb
Squad was told never to--and why never to--carry bombs on passenger
trains, cars or ferries, or anywhere near where metals were being
shipped. The Bomb Squad was instructed not to remove a bomb found in a
position where its explosion would not endanger life and property, but
to send for an expert and wait until he arrived on the scene, and was
told which positions were dangerous and which were not. Altogether we
conducted a rather thorough course in explosives.
As the war grew in proportions, and the interest of America in the
conflict became more and more intimate, the activities of the Bomb
Squad became somewhat diverted from the object for which it had been
primarily organized, and its title was changed to the “Bomb and
Neutrality Squad.” We had not expected in August that the German would
try to tip over our neutrality with bombs, but that is what he did, and
that is what kept us grimly busy for three years, until our own nation
had gone to war with those who had so long been waging war upon her.
And that is how the stories which follow come to be told.
Not that the entrance of the United States into the war put a stop to
the activities of the Squad. I have already cited those who entered
the national service. Their presence in the Naval and Military
Intelligence, their close relations with those whom they left behind in
headquarters, with such men as Commander Spencer Eddy and Lieutenant
Albert Fish of the Navy, Colonel Biddle and Major Potter of the Army,
and with the Corps of Intelligence Police, made possible a degree of
coöperation in spy-hunting in New York which would have been impossible
to develop within a short time with any other set of men, and which
went far towards preserving our domestic security.
II
WESTPHALIAN EFFICIENCY
The trend of events in early 1915 made it apparent that the Bomb
Squad would be called upon to handle more and more cases of attempted
violation of neutrality. Anyone who remembers our national mind at that
time will recall that it was not yet made up and very liable to attacks
of brainstorm. Every person was seeing events of unheard of violence
and magnitude pass him pell-mell, giving no warning, and not waiting
for comment, and he was too dazed to watch any single event with any
high degree of balanced judgment or reasoning partisanship. It was a
troubled hour, and one in which it behooved us of the Police Department
to keep our heads cool and our eyes open. The Bomb Squad had to act as
a safety valve.
By the summer of 1915 war orders placed by the Allied governments in
the autumn and winter of 1914 were being filled and shipped overseas
in great quantities. By this time, too, the German navy showed no more
sign of coming out of Kiel in force than it had shown for a year past.
The task of delaying, diverting or destroying those shipments devolved
upon the Germans in America. It took no superhuman amount of reasoning
to combine the abnormal destruction of property in New York with the
strong suspicion of German activity and to arrive at a decision to
check up wherever it was humanly possible the sources and agencies of
destruction.
Late in the autumn, in our work on the waterfront, we found a man who,
we decided, was worth watching. We learned gradually that Paul Koenig
was a pretty well-known figure along both banks of the Hudson, and that
he carried, as chief detective for the Hamburg-American Line, a certain
amount of authority. That steamship line, which within a week of the
outbreak of war had attempted to send ships to sea under false cargo
manifests to supply the German naval raiders, now had more time than
business on its hands as its entire fleet was tied up in Hoboken. And
yet in spite of the dull times which we knew had been thrust upon them,
their man Koenig was curiously busy, and we became busily curious to
find out why.
We were more curious than successful at first. We assigned men to
follow him and observe his habits and haunts. This was not as easy as
it might have been with another man, for the Department of Justice had
already tried it and had come to the conclusion that he was not worth
following.
Now a good shadow is born, not made. The moment the man followed
realizes or even suspects that he is being followed, he becomes a
problem and either gets away or conducts himself in a way which disarms
suspicion and sometimes embarrasses the pursuit. Koenig, a man of keen
animal senses, was unusually quick in discovering his shadower. It used
to confuse certain agents considerably to have him disappear around
a corner, and when the agent quickened his pace and swept around the
same corner after him, to have Koenig pop out of a doorway with a laugh
for his pursuer which meant that the day’s work had gone for nothing.
I have known men who were excellent detectives and poor shadows.
Sometimes they were too large and conspicuous, sometimes they were
over-zealous, sometimes they excited suspicion by being over-cautious;
rare enough was the combination of artlessness and skill which made a
man a good shadow, told him when to saunter away in the opposite
direction, when to pass his man, and how to efface himself. It is,
I think, the instinct of the good fisherman who knows just how much
line to run out, and just when to exert the pressure. For Koenig was a
slippery fish.
[Illustration:
_Copyright, International Film Service_
Paul Koenig, the Hamburg-American employe, who supplied and directed
agents of German violence in America]
By a new method of “tailing” or shadowing, we learned that he
frequented several popular German places in the city, such as Pabst’s
in Columbus Circle, the German Club, in Central Park West, where Dr.
Albert, Boy-Ed and von Papen frequently went, Luchow’s restaurant in
14th Street, as well as the good American hotels Belmont and Manhattan.
Both of the hotels are centrally situated, and have several entrances,
including direct connection from the basement with the Subway--one of
the easiest places to lose oneself in the city. (A murderer not many
months ago avoided arrest for two days by riding back and forth in
Subway trains.) But such places as these were no more than the natural
points towards which any German might gravitate, and we could never
pick up a scrap of conversation to give us a lead in any specific
direction.
The fact remained that he was busy, going and coming, and that
he conducted a good deal of his business from his office in the
Hamburg-American building at 45 Broadway. We might as well have
tried to penetrate to Berlin with a brass band as to have entered the
building for information. But there was one advantage we could take: we
could “listen in” on his telephone wire.
When the men tailing him reported in that he was in the
Hamburg-American Building, and probably in his office, we cut in on
his wire, and posted an officer at our receiver to take down all
conversations which passed. The outgoing calls were disappointing.
Koenig was no fool--or rather was a highly specialized fool--and was
not careless enough to give information of aid and comfort to the
enemy through such a gregarious medium as a public telephone wire. We
listened for a long while, in vain....
Then came a call which offered possibilities. A man’s voice told Paul
Koenig that it thought Paul Koenig was a “bull-headed Westphalian
Dutchman,” and added other more lurid remarks. The conversation was
short, but while it lasted indicated that someone was not pleased with
Mr. Koenig. Within the next few days the same voice called “P. K.”
again and told him several things it had forgotten to mention, all
pointing to the fact that the owner of the unknown voice had been
misused.
We hunted up the number from which the disgruntled calls had been
made. It was a public telephone pay-station in a saloon. Crucial
events can almost always be traced to some trivial circumstances--the
poem “for the want of a nail the battle was lost” is an illustration
of what I mean. We are not dealing here with possibilities but with
facts, yet I cannot sometimes help speculating on the extent to which
German atrocities might have been carried in New York and Canada,
if we had not found a bartender with a good memory in that saloon.
Yes, he remembered a fellow who had come in there at certain times to
telephone. Yes, he came in once in a while. Didn’t know his name, but
thought he lived around the corner at such and such a number. At that
number we found out the man’s name--the bartender’s description had
been accurate. The name was George Fuchs.
So to George Fuchs we mailed a letter, typed on the stationery of a
wireless telegraph company, suggesting that we had a position for which
we believed he was the proper man, and that we would be pleased to have
him call at the office of the company, at an appointed hour, to discuss
the work and wages. Fuchs did not show up at the appointed hour, which
disturbed the plans momentarily, but when he did arrive, he was
greeted cordially by an executive of the “company” who proceeded to get
acquainted with the applicant. The manner of the wireless person was so
disarming, his German was so good, and his certainty that Fuchs was the
man for the job so taken for granted that the two adjourned to a nearby
restaurant. (Detective Corell had a very good working knowledge of
German.)
“Who did you say you were working for?” Corell asked, across the crater
of Fuchs’s glass of beer.
“That bull-headed Westphalian Dutchman,” Fuchs sputtered. “He is some
relative of my mother’s. She was a Prussian, though, _Gott sei dank!_”
Corell laughed at the right time, and in the conversation which ensued
drew out the man’s grievance against Koenig. In September Mr. and
Mrs. Koenig had paid a visit to the Fuchs household in Niagara Falls,
N. Y., where Fuchs lived with his mother in the Lochiel Apartments. The
wonders of the Falls had received proper attention from the strangers,
and Koenig showed some interest in the Welland Canal, the channel
through which shipping circumnavigates the Falls. He said that the
waterway was closely guarded, otherwise he would like to go over and
have a look at it, and suggested, as a convenient substitute, that
Fuchs go over to Canada and take some snapshots of the locks for him.
“Why don’t you go yourself?” Fuchs asked.
“They would probably pick me up if I did,” Koenig replied.
“Well, that’s just why I won’t take any camera over there with me,”
Fuchs rejoined. “But I’ll go if you want a report.”
The bargain was closed. Fuchs, Koenig said, was the very man, as he was
known on the Canadian side as George Fox, was an American by birth, and
would not excite suspicion. So at 7 P. M. of September 30--slightly
more than a year since Horst von der Goltz and Captain von Papen
had made their first abortive attempt to destroy the Canal--“Fox”
registered at the Welland House in Welland, close by the waterway.
There he spent the night. The next morning he went to Port Colborne,
the Lake Erie mouth of the Canal, and during the balance of the day
followed its course northward, making mental notes of the shipping and
the construction and guarding of the locks. By night he had reached
Thorold, where he found a room, jotted down his observations, and spent
the night. The next day he covered the balance of the 27 miles to Lake
Ontario, noting the number of locks, and the fact that there were two
or three armed soldiers on guard at each. With his head full of good
ideas for bad plans he reached Niagara Falls again that night--October
2.
Koenig was enthusiastic over his report, but when Fuchs had written
it down he decided that it would be hazardous to have such a document
found on his person. “Mail it to me at Post Office Box 840 in New York.
Sign it just ‘George’--nobody would know who that was even if they did
find it.” He went back to New York. Fuchs heard nothing from him for a
few days, except that action had been deferred. Then the country cousin
began to importune the city cousin, and Koenig suggested that he come
down to New York to work for him. Which Fuchs did, and on October 8
was placed on the payroll of the “Bureau of Investigation” at eighteen
dollars a week. Koenig arranged that Fuchs was to hire men who would
row a boatload of dynamite across the upper Niagara River to smuggle
it into Canada, and he had meanwhile arranged with two others, Richard
Emil Leyendecker, his chief assistant, and Fred Metzler, his secretary,
to carry out a definite plan to sever the main artery of lake traffic
by blowing it to pieces.
By Sunday, November 7, Fuchs had been occupied in several odd jobs for
Koenig, such as spying on outward-bound cargoes along the waterfront,
doing special guard duty at Dr. Albert’s office, and going over to
Hoboken to frighten a poor German agent named Franz Schulenberg, who
had come on from the west to collect money from von Papen. On that
Sunday he was sick and did not report for duty. He asked for his
regular pay, however, and Koenig refused it, doubting that Fuchs had
really been too ill to report, and holding that illness should never
interfere with service to the Fatherland. This created bad blood
between the two. On November 22 Koenig discharged him for “constant
quarrelling with another operative, drinking, and disorderly habits,”
and announced that he would not be paid for his services of the
previous day, when he had refused to go on duty in a river-launch. That
$2.57 due Fuchs had poisoned his soul against Koenig, and he had grown
so bitter that the result we already know--evidence was at last in our
hands for an arrest.
It was a case for federal prosecution, obviously, so we called in
Captain William Offley and Agent Adams, an able operative of the
Department of Justice. A few hours later Koenig was placed under
arrest. He resented the intrusion, and snapped to Barnitz: “Anyone who
interferes with Germans or the German Government will be punished!”
His house up-town was searched and that search disclosed, among other
matters, an item which is unquestionably one of the richest prizes of
the spy hunt in America.
It was Paul Koenig’s little black memorandum book--a loose-leaf
affair, scrupulously typewritten, and brought down to within a day of
his arrest. A fanatic on office efficiency might have conceived it,
but none but a German would have kept it posted up. For it told the
story of his Bureau of Investigation with a devotion to detail almost
religious.
The Hamburg-American Line probably never thought that when they
assigned a shrewd ruffian named Paul Koenig to investigate an alleged
case of wharfage graft in Jersey City away back in 1912 they had
established a “Bureau of Investigation.” But Paul Koenig knew better.
He surrounded his lightest activities with an air of mystery and
efficiency true to the best of amateur-detective tradition. He called
his first case by a mystic number, he conferred the ominous alias of
“xxx” upon himself, hired a man named Fred Metzler as his secretary,
and convinced himself that he and Metzler were a bureau. In the light
of the all-absorbing importance which his bureau held for him, we are
not surprised (and we must not smile), when we see chronicled neatly
in his little black book that on May 13, 1913, he rented a room at 45
Broadway for “new offices,” on May 24 his first private telephone was
installed, on Nov. 19 a steel cabinet was purchased for the files of
the department, on May 28 of 1914 the adjoining room was added to Room
82, and Room 82 was converted into a _private_ office for the chief,
and on July 14 a new safe was purchased and placed in the office. It
may be that the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand had something
to do with that last item, for it is certain that the Hamburg-American
Line knew that war was coming well in advance of the declaration. At
any rate, we find that on July 31, 1914, before England and Germany
had actually gone to war, and on the same day that the director of the
Hamburg-American in New York received instructions from Berlin that
war was coming and that he was expected to supply German naval vessels
in American waters--on that day Paul Koenig began his war duties by
placing a special guard on all the piers and vessels of the Line in New
York Harbor.
Up to this time the cases Koenig had handled were matters of
shipping--stowaways, fires, steerage rates, charges against ships’
officers. On August 22 he became a German military spy. We find it
entered in his own words:
“Aug. 22. German Government, with consent of Dr. Buenz,
entrusted me with the handling of a certain investigation.
Military attaché von Papen called at my office later and
explained the nature of the work expected. (Beginning of
Bureau’s services for Imperial German Government.)”
The “certain investigation” consisted in sending two men to Canada
to spy on the Valcartier training camp where the first Canadian
Expeditionary Force was being mobilized, and to report to the military
attaché their state of readiness, in order that he might try some means
of keeping them at home if it were not already too late. What von Papen
had in mind was dynamiting the Welland Canal; it failed, but the case
is of momentary interest to us here because it marked the beginning of
a service on Koenig’s part which grew very fast and extended in many
and diverse directions.
The Bureau was divided into three parts, the pier division, the special
detail division, and the secret service division, or “Geheimdienst.”
No one was allowed to forget that P. K. was head of all three. In his
rules and regulations he records, among other gems, these:
“#2. In order to safeguard the secrets and affairs of the
department prior to receiving a caller, hereafter my desk must
be entirely cleared of all papers excepting those pertaining to
the business in hand.
“#9. All persons related to me, however distant, will be barred
from employment with the Bureau of Investigation. This does not
apply to my wife.
“#6. It has been found detrimental to the discipline of the
Office to invite direct employees of the Bureau to my residence
or other place socially, or to accept their invitations,
therefore this practice must cease. This ruling does not
apply to agents of the Secret Service Division nor to direct
employees if engaged with me on an operation which requires
either social entertainment or travelling.”
He had an elaborate and complicated outlay of badges, shields and
photographic identification cards for each operative, for which each
operative stood the expense. His meticulous attention to detail, and
the diligent caution which he observed at all times is indicated in a
list of aliases which he set forth in the memorandum book. In 26 cases
listed he used 26 different names--none of them his own. For example,
in what he called “D-Case 250,” in dealing with an operative named
“Sjurstadt” Koenig was known to Sjurstadt only as “Watson”; in D-Case
316, when he negotiated with his agent von Pilis (a propagandist who
was later interned, by the way) Koenig was “Bode.” He devised a new
name for himself for every new case, and sometimes used two or three
names in dealing with different individuals in the same case. Naturally
a man of as many identities as Koenig had to keep a record of who
he was, and so his list of aliases furnished the government with an
excellent catalogue of the pies in which he had his tough fingers. Each
of his own employees in the Secret Service Division was known to him in
three ways: by his Christian (or rather, his German) name, by a number,
and by a special pair of initials. Thus Richard Emil Leyendecker, the
art-woods dealer associated with him in the Welland Canal affair, was
Secret Agent Number 6, known as “B. P.”; Otto Mottola, a member of the
New York Police Department was Secret Agent Number 4, known as “A. S.
(formerly A. M.).” The connections of the bureaus were mentioned in
his reports by numbers, the Imperial German Embassy being 5000, von
Papen being 7000, Boy-Ed 8000, and Dr. Heinrich Albert, the commercial
attaché of the embassy, 9000.
[Illustration:
_SECRET SERVICE DIVISION._
_List of Aliases Used by XXX._
_D-Cases._
Sjurstadt #250 Watson
Markow #260 von Wegener
Horn #277 Fischer
Portack #279 Westerberg
Berns #306 Werner
Scott #309 Werner
McIntyre #311 Bode
Miller #314 Reinhardt
Harre #315 Kaufmann
Kienzle #316 Wegener
Wiener #316 Wegener
von Pilis #316 Bode
Burns #325 Reinhardt
Stahl #328 Stemmler
Coleman #335 Schuster
Schleindl #343 Wöhler (Paul)
Leyendecker #344 Heyne
Feldheim #357 Winters
Warburg #362 Blohm
Van de Bund #358 Taylor
Lewis #366 Burg
Hammond #357 Decker (W.P.)
Uffelmann #370 Schwartz
Hirschland #371 Günther
Neuhaus #371 Günther
Ornstein #371 Günther
Witzel #371 Wöhler
Plochmann #375 Breitung
Archer #289 Mendez
Bettes ---- Goebels
Reith #382 Brandt
_SECRET SERVICE DIVISION._
_Ciphers Used In_
_Confidential Reports_
(Oct. 1914-Sept. 1915)
---oOo---
5000 I. G. Embassy
7000 ” ” Military Attache
8000 ” ” Naval Attache
9000 ” ” Commercial Attache
-------
7354 von Knorr
7371 Tomaseck
7379 Tokio
7381 Copenhagen
7600 Burns Agency
9001 Herbert Boas
Random Pages from “P. K.’s Little Black Book”]
[Illustration:
_SECRET SERVICE DIVISION._
_SAFETY BLOCK SYSTEM_
Operatives of the S. S. Division, when receiving instructions from me
or through the medium of my secretary as to designating meeting places,
will understand that such instructions must be translated as follows:
_For week Nov. 28 to Dec. 4 (midnight)_
A street number in Manhattan named over the telephone means that
the meeting will take place 5 blocks further uptown than the street
mentioned.
Pennsylvania R. R. Station means Grand Central Depot.
Kaiserhof means General Post Office, in front of P. O. Box 840.
Hotel Ansonia means Cafe in Hotel Manhattan (basement).
Hotel Belmont means at the Bar in Pabst’ Columbus Circle.
Brooklyn Bridge means Bar in Unter den Linden.
_For week Dec. 5 to Dec. 12 (midnight)_
Code to remain the same as previous week.
_For week Dec. 12 to Dec. 19 (midnight)_
A street number in Manhattan named over the telephone means that the
meeting will take place 5 blocks further downtown than the street
mentioned.
_SECRET SERVICE DIVISION._
(Geheimdienst)
_Rules and Regulations._
--1915--
#1. Beginning with November 6th, no blue copies are to be
made of reports submitted in connection with D-Case #343, and
the original reports will be sent to H.M.G. instead of the
duplicates, as formerly.
#2. In order to accomplish better results in connection with
D-Case #343, and to shorten the stay of the informing agent at
the place of meeting, it has been decided to discontinue the
former practice of dining with this agent prior to receiving
his report. It will also be made a rule to refrain from working
on other matters until the informant in this case has been
fully heard; and all data taken down in shorthand. (11-11-15)
#3. Beginning with November 28th, 1915, all operations
designated as D-Cases will be handled exclusively by the Secret
Service Division, the Headquarters of which will not be at
the Central Office, as heretofore. This change will result in
discontinuing utilizing operatives or employees attached to the
Central Office, Division for Special Detail and Pier Division.
On the other hand, great
Random Pages from “P. K.’s Little Black Book”]
In the same way he disguised his meeting places. In his instructions to
the Secret Service Division we find this:
“Operatives of the S. S. Division when receiving instructions
from me or through the medium of my secretary as to designating
meeting places will understand that such instructions must be
translated as follows:
“_For week Nov. 28 to Dec. 4 (midnight)._
“A street number in Manhattan named over the telephone means
that the meeting will take place 5 blocks further uptown than
the street mentioned.
“Pennsylvania R. R. Station means Grand Central Depot.
“Kaiserhof means General Post Office, in front of P. O. Box 840.
“Hotel Ansonia means café in Hotel Manhattan (basement).
“Hotel Belmont means at the bar in Pabst’s Columbus Circle.
“Brooklyn Bridge means bar in Unter den Linden.”
Each week he rearranged this code, so that anyone who thought that
cutting in on a telephone call meant knowing where Koenig was bound
was not likely to find him there. The man knew his German New York,
and had numerous convenient meeting places where he could meet an
agent and converse undisturbed, such as a German hotel at Third Avenue
and 42d Street, or a German bar at Broadway and 110th Street, or a
lodging house at South and Whitehall Streets, near the lower tip of
the island, or a saloon connected with a Turkish bath in Harlem. He
not only made it almost impossible to trace him by tapping his own
wire, but his operatives were instructed to call him from pay-station
telephones in locations where there was not one chance in a million
of identifying the person who had called. Fuchs, of course, was the
one-millionth chance, but Fuchs was no longer obeying Koenig’s orders,
was persistent, and careless. Altogether Koenig had built up a system
of caution on paper which almost beat the game, and which enabled him
to conduct a large volume of business.
The functions of his departments were clearly defined. The pier
division guarded the piers and vessels of the Line, and furnished him
information of sailings from the New York waterfront, which he in turn
passed on to the naval attaché, Boy-Ed. Through this division he was
able to keep in touch with the waterfront element for whatever service
of violence might be necessary, and to keep a fairly complete record of
shipping. The special detail division was assigned to the guarding of
von Bernstorff’s summer place at Cedarhurst, Long Island, Dr. Albert’s
office in the Hamburg-American building, von Papen’s office at 60 Wall
Street, and the Austrian consulate in New York. This division conducted
every week a test to determine whether or not Dr. Albert was being
shadowed. We find entered in his notes on his operatives this:
“_H. J. Wilkens_ is commended by me for good service rendered
thus far as attendant on Dr. Albert. This commendation is based
on a note received from the latter under date of November 12,
reading as follows:
“‘Dear Mr. Koenig:
“‘The service rendered by your bureau’s operative, H. J.
Wilkens, have proven entirely satisfactory.
“‘Yours truly,
(Signed) H. T. ALBERT.’”
Apparently Koenig’s performance of his duty to the German cause
encouraged the high officials of the German government in the United
States to rely upon him, for these posts were gradually placed under
his direction during the summer of 1915, the Embassy at Cedarhurst on
July 3, Dr. Albert’s office on Sept. 1, von Papen’s office on Oct.
26, and the Austrian Consulate on December 15--three days previous to
Koenig’s arrest, and less than a week after Captain von Papen, who was
returning to his own country by the request of our country, had called
P. K. to the German Club to “express his thanks for the services this
Bureau have rendered to him.” “At the same time,” the little notebook
confides, “he bid me Good-Bye.” We find these functions mentioned with
a suggestion of reverence.
But the autobiography of Paul Koenig resumes its dark shroud of mystery
when it turns to the functions of the division of secret service. There
he is the dominating figure, a sort of cross between a Dr. Moriarity
and a gorilla, a slippery conniver one minute and a pugnacious bully
the next, convicted by his own complimentary reports. It was in
handling the “D-cases” already mentioned that he employed his many
false names, his secret numbers, his elusive places of appointment, and
his essentially Teutonic discipline. The nature of the work of this
division may best be suggested by citing a case which appears rather
often in his records--Case D-343.
[Illustration:
may not be in my interest. The stenographer of the Central
Office, however, will continue to write out checks as
heretofore, but the check-book itself, will always be kept
under lock and key. (11-23-15)
#11. Operatives of the Pier Division in future will carry as
their means of identification only the Bureau’s identification
card, on the reverse side of which a photograph of the bearer
will be pasted, with my signature written above and below the
photo. The front side of the card will also bear my signature.
These men will not carry any more shields, as in the past.
Any changes in the personnel of the Pier Division, such as
attachments and detachments, will be brought to the attention
of the Marine Superintendent or other Superintends at whose
piers they are stationed. There will be special operatives
selected to check up operatives of the Pier Division and
employees of the piers, who will not be named to anyone in
advance, but who will, at Intervals, make their inspections,
carrying with them as their means of identification, a
commission consisting of a letter on Company’s stationery,
setting forth their authority, which will be duly signed by
me and counter-signed by one of the Company’s Vice Directors.
These special operatives are to be known as Central Office men,
and do not come under the jurisdiction of the Pier Division.
(11-23-15)
#12. Beginning with today, specific plans have been decided
upon as to the best manner in which to keep newspapers and
clippings dealing with the war and political subjects.
Clippings that refer to D-Cases of this Bureau will continue to
be placed in the private files, together with their respective
reports. An exception to this particular rule may be made in
the event that there are too many clippings at hand, in which
case they may be bound together and kept separate, as is being
done in the case of operation D-#332. Other clippings are to be
mounted on cardboard, and the name of the newspaper and date
typewritten thereon. Articles of interest that cover an entire
page or more will not be clipped, but will be kept whole in
a temporary folder in view of binding same later. This, also
applies to copies which deal with matters on which reports have
been rendered. (12-7-15)
Random Pages from “P. K.’s Little Black Book”]
[Illustration:
covering G. G. Station #3 on Sunday, November 21st, from 10
A.M. until 5 P. M. Contrary to the list of assignments for the
Pier Division he did not do guard duty at the Hoboken Piers
during the night of November 20th to 21st. In order to be at
his new post, G. G. Station #3, he was given this night off
with pay, to be charged to Case #242. Wages while on duty at
G. G. Station #3 will be the same as heretofore.
_H. v.Staden_ on November 22d, at 10 A. M., reported to Central
Office duty as instructed. He will work jointly with Opt.
W.H.M., his salary to remain unchanged.
_H. Pearsall_, on Saturday, November 20th upon being instructed
by Opt. H.J.W. that he was to be assigned to the Pier Division,
declared that he refused to accept this post, and tendered
his resignation. According to a written report submitted
by Opt. H.J.W., H. P. acted insolently, and belittled this
Bureau’s service. As H. P. did not tender his resignation
to me personally or by mail, I did not take cognizance of
what he told Opt. H.J.W. regarding leaving the department,
but discharged him at once upon hearing of his conduct. His
services ended on November 21st at 10 A.M. While he has been an
alert watchman, he has often proven to be a cranky, quarrelsome
employee, who was the cause of a great deal of trouble while on
the piers.
I congratulate myself on having ridden this Bureau of an
ignorant, stubborn and hot-headed man of the caliber of
Pearsall, whose last words to stenographer F. Metzler were that
he would not trust me for a dollar. While it is understood that
this former employee is disbarred from reinstatement, he will
never be given any sort of a recommendation, nor will I receive
him. He is to be kept out of the office entirely.
_George Fuchs_ was dismissed from the Bureau’s services
on November 22d at 4.30 P.M. The reason for his discharge
is general conduct displayed on Company’s piers, constant
quarreling with another operative, drinking and disorderly
habits. He will receive no pay for the night of November 21st
to 22d, during which he refused to join Opt. J.P.C. in his
duties on Company’s Launch #4.
_William McCulley_, on November 16th at 3 A.M., was appointed
Chief of the Secret Service Division, his duties to commence
on Sunday, November 28th, at 9 A.M. Salary $28. per week. Upon
his word he promised to remain in this capacity for at least
six months and to be at my disposal at all hours. He is to take
a residence in New York City, and will be known as “William
MacIntyre” at the Headquarters of the Secret Service Division
to be established on December 1st, 1915.
_R. E. Leyendecker_, on November 23d, at 11 P.M., was appointed
Assistant to the
Random Pages from “P. K.’s Little Black Book”]
Rule number 1 of the division stated: