BELGIAN CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE ARABS (_Concluded_)
[Sidenote: An Arab Traitor.]
While the events described in the preceding chapter were being
enacted, M. Tobback, Resident for the Congo Free State at Stanley
Falls, with his second in command, Lieutenant Van Lindt, and a
small force, occupied a position of imminent danger. Rashid, a
nephew of Tippo Tip and cousin to Sefu, was installed there. This
arch-traitor, while professing the utmost friendship for the State
authorities, and accepting favours at the hands of Belgian officers,
was really a confederate of the Arabs. His character, which had long
been suspected, appeared unmistakably from evidence discovered by
Lieutenant Dhanis at Kassongo, when that place was captured by the
State troops. On May 13th, immediately after he had been informed of
the fall of Kassongo, Rashid openly attacked the State garrison. A
fierce fight ensued, in which three of Tobback’s men were killed and
seven wounded. Nearly a hundred of Rashid’s men were placed _hors de
combat_; but he was better able to stand the loss than Tobback was
his. Four days the struggle continued with varying fortune, but on
the fifth day it became evident to Tobback that it was impossible
for him, with the handful of men at his disposal, to successfully
resist the large force operating against him. He was perfecting his
plans for the evacuation of the station, and had prepared six large
canoes, when the whole situation changed by the opportune arrival
of Commandant Chaltin. The presence of this officer, and the State
troops that accompanied him, justified the experiment of an attack
upon the Arabs, which proved entirely successful. The State troops
captured all the Arab positions, and took fifteen hundred prisoners,
Rashid himself escaping capture in ignominious flight.
At this juncture the Congo State officers came to the conclusion that
the Arab power was effectually broken, and they did not anticipate
further trouble with the slave-traders beyond, possibly, an
occasional skirmish. The State’s progress in its campaign against the
Arabs had, on the whole, been extremely successful, and its Sovereign
had good reason to be satisfied with the work accomplished. When, in
June, 1893, Captain Ponthier came up the Congo with reinforcements
for Dhanis, that event seemed to give emphasis to this optimistic
view. Certainly it so alarmed Sefu that he abandoned the struggle and
fled to German territory.
[Illustration: An Avenue at Boma.]
[Sidenote: A Fatal Blunder.]
Immediately after the flight of Sefu a painful incident occurred
which greatly embarrassed the Congo State authorities. A Belgian
officer, having come to the groundless opinion that Gongo Lutete was
a traitor, ordered him to be court-martialled and shot. It was a
disastrous event, not only wrong in itself, but alienating from
the State the affection of Gongo’s men, and affording its enemies
in Europe an opportunity of reviling the Congo Administration; a
libel which, though it has been many times refuted, they still
industriously disseminate.
[Sidenote: A New Enemy Appears.]
It soon became evident that May, 1893, was not to be recorded in
history as the month in which slave-trading Arabs had been finally
repressed. A chief belonging to Ujiji, named Rumeliza, with a
considerable force of Arabs, now appeared east of Tanganyika. Having
penetrated as far as Kabambari, midway between Kassongo and the
lake, he encamped there, and explained his presence by avowing his
intention to reconquer Manyema.
Rumeliza’s following was so numerous and so well equipped that
October had arrived before Captain (for such he had recently become)
Dhanis thought it expedient to move against him. When he did take the
field, his force consisted of five officers (of whom Ponthier was
one), about four hundred regulars, and three hundred auxiliaries; and
they had with them the Krupp gun which had served them so well in
many a battle. Unfortunately, ammunition for it was all but exhausted.
On reaching the Arabs’ camp at Mwana Mkwanga, they were found to be
very advantageously placed in two large, well-built bomas.[18] The
first efforts to dislodge them met with no success. The Krupp gun
proved of very little service. Of the scanty supply of ammunition, a
large portion was wasted by the native troops through lack of skill
in manipulating the gun, and finally they abandoned it, after which
it was worked by European officers who could be ill spared for the
duty. When one of his officers, De Lange, fell wounded, Captain
Dhanis decided to retire, and a position was taken up scarcely
inferior to that held by the Arabs.
[Illustration: Post Office on River Bank, Boma.]
[Illustration: Office of Secretary-General, Boma.]
Emboldened by what they erroneously regarded as a great victory,
the Arabs lost no time in attacking the State camp. But this time
the tables were turned, and they were repulsed with heavy loss.
The arrival of reinforcements from Kassongo contributed to this
result; but in consequence of some error, Kassongo was left without
sufficient guard. This fact coming to the knowledge of the Arabs,
they hastened to take advantage of it. To avert this calamity, De
Wouters, by order of Captain Dhanis, marched night and day, through
a violent storm, and effectually intercepted them. Not a day passed
without a fight, victory inclining first to one and then to the other
belligerent. On the whole, the Congo State troops continued to hold
their own fairly well against great odds. Wearying of the protracted
struggle, the Arabs decided to make a desperate attack in full force
upon the State camp. They selected a foggy day on which to make their
assault, and were greatly aided thereby. At first they succeeded so
well that they actually entered the State camp and engaged the Congo
troops in a hand-to-hand combat. The struggle lasted five hours. The
State troops lost fifty men, including the brave Captain Ponthier,
notwithstanding which they succeeded in completely repulsing the
Arabs, whom they chased right up to Rumaliza’s boma. The Arab losses
were far heavier than the State’s. Captain Dhanis had every reason to
be satisfied. Leaving De Wouters in active command, he now returned
to Kassongo to reorganise.
After the departure of Dhanis, De Wouters continued the aggressive
policy of his chief. In attacking the boma of Lubukine, Lieutenant
De Heusch was killed, and so hot was the fight that his men fled. De
Wouters lost five men killed (including De Heusch) and ten wounded;
but the Arab loss was far heavier, and included Sefu, the son of
Tippo Tip, who had returned from German territory and was pursuing
his old courses.
It was not until nearly the end of December that Dhanis was again
strong enough to take the offensive. By that time his troops had
been rested and reinforced. They were none too early in taking the
field, for information now came to hand that Rashid had rallied his
forces after their defeat at Stanley Falls and was hastening to join
Rumeliza.
To deal with this combination, Dhanis despatched Commandant Gillain
with one hundred and eighty soldiers and two hundred auxiliaries to
cut off Rumeliza’s retreat, while De Wouters attacked Rumeliza’s
great boma at Bena Kalunga, Dhanis, with two Krupp guns, personally
commanding the reserve. Rumeliza’s boma proved impregnable, the Krupp
guns failing to injure it, and news arrived that fresh forces were on
their way from Tanganyika to aid Rumeliza.
Matters stood badly for the State when the opportune arrival of
Commandant Lothaire, with three hundred men, changed the outlook
entirely. This occurred on January 9, 1894, a day marked by another
singular piece of good fortune. The boma which had so long defied the
best efforts of the besiegers was set on fire and destroyed, a shot
from one of the Krupp guns having blown up the Arab magazine. In
their haste to abandon it, many Arabs were shot, while others were
drowned in a desperate attempt to cross the river. By cutting off
their water supply, the other garrisons were compelled to surrender,
so that within three days over two thousand Arabs were taken
prisoners by the State troops.
The Arab power was now effectually broken. To break it was an
arduous task, expensive both in blood and money, but on the whole
it was conducted as humanely as it is possible to conduct military
operations. The sufferings of the Europeans were fully as great as,
if not greater than, the sufferings of their enemies. Proportionate
to their numbers, their mortality was higher. More succumbed to
disease and the hardships of the campaign than were killed by the
enemy’s bullets, among them the gallant De Wouters, who passed away
in the very hour of his triumph.
[Sidenote: Honours for Dhanis.]
The chief honours of the Belgian campaigns against the Arabs
undoubtedly rest upon Dhanis, who had exhibited foresight, patience,
and skill in his every act. His ability and success were recognised
by King Leopold, who conferred upon him the title of Baron. In his
final report to King Leopold of the Arab campaign, dated December 20,
1894, Baron Dhanis thus tersely sums up the results of that memorable
struggle:
The annihilation of the Arab power has brought about the complete
suppression of the devastating bands which, in order to procure
slaves, had been ravaging the country with fire and sword, from
the Uelle in the north down to the Sankura in the south. With
them the slave trade disappears from the regions they exploited,
and very soon, we may hope, it will no longer exist in the Congo
State. The native chiefs who have submitted have been reinstated
in authority; others who have disappeared have been replaced by
intelligent soldiers of the State; and some of the Arabs, who made
their submission, have been left in enjoyment of their possessions.
All have been disarmed and warned that their authority must be
exercised under the direction of the State’s agents, who are
charged with the pacific settlement of any differences that may
arise.... Large camps will be formed at Kassongo and Kabambari,
and the numerous soldiers instructed there will form the nucleus
of the national army. From this point of view the Arab campaign
has forcibly shown that the natives of the various districts of
the Congo are in no way inferior as soldiers to the blacks of
the coast, who are most famous for their bravery. The Baluba and
others trained and led by Lieut. Doorme, the Bangala under Captain
Lothaire, etc., have been admirable. In the near future we may
expect that it will no longer be necessary to recruit soldiers
abroad at great expense. The country will mainly supply its own
requirements, and the Manyema will be of great importance, alike
from the number of men they can furnish and from the special
aptitude of these men to the profession of arms.
[Illustration: Office of Director of Transport, Boma.]
[Illustration: Bishop’s Palace, Mission of Our Lady of M’ Pala
(Tanganyika).]
FOOTNOTES:
[18] The following description of a boma is from the pen of Dr. Hinde:
“An Arab force on the march employs a large number of its slaves in
cutting down and carrying with them trees and saplings, from about
twelve to fifteen feet in length and up to six feet in diameter. As
soon as a halting place has been fixed on, the slaves plant this
timber in a circle of about fifty yards in diameter, inside which the
chiefs and officers establish themselves. A trench is then dug, and
the earth thrown up against the palisades, in which banana stalks,
pointing in different directions, are laid. Round the centre, and
following the inequalities of the ground, a second line of stakes
is planted, this second circle being perhaps three or four hundred
yards in diameter. Another trench is then dug in the same way, with
bananas planted as before in the earthwork. The interval between the
two lines of fortifications is occupied by the troops. If the boma
is only to be occupied for two or three days, this is all that is
usually done to it; but if it is intended for a longer stay, a trench
is dug outside the palisades. The object of using banana stalks in
this way is ingenious. Within four or five hours they shrink, and
on being withdrawn from the earth leave loopholes, through which
the defenders can fire without exposing themselves. Little huts are
built all over the interior of the fort, and these huts are also very
ingeniously devised, and are, furthermore, bombproof. They consist of
a hole dug a yard and a half deep and covered with wood. This wood
forms a ceiling, over which the earth from the interior is placed
to the depth of a couple of feet, and a thatched roof placed over
all to keep off the rain. In many of the bomas we found that the
defenders had dug holes from the main trenches outwards, in which
they lived, having lined them with straw. The whole fort is often
divided into four or more sections by a palisade and trenches, so
that, if one part of it is stormed, the storming party finds itself
in a cross fire—a worse position than when actually trying to effect
an entrance. We found that the shells from the 7·5 Krupps did little
or no damage to these forts.”