BELGIAN CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE ARABS
[Sidenote: A Fight to the Death.]
IT had long been foreseen, as an inevitable result of the advent of
the Belgians in Central Africa, that a direct conflict between them
and the Arabs, continued to the extinction of one or other of the
belligerents, must sooner or later take place. The chief cause of
the presence of the Belgians in the country being the suppression
of slavery was in itself sufficient to assure this. As shown in
the chapter dealing with that subject, the Belgian pioneers in
establishing posts throughout the country were guided chiefly in
their selection of sites by a desire to obstruct the natural routes
of the slave-traders; and this, as we have seen, had the effect of
frequently bringing Belgians and Arabs into collision.
After the Belgian operations on the Uelle and Lualaba, the Arabs
became seriously alarmed. They perceived not only their nefarious
method of livelihood at stake, but their very existence as a coherent
fighting force was also threatened. In dread at this prospect, the
Arabs resolved to precipitate matters, and took the offensive. It is
not easy to see what other conclusion they could have reached, for
the Belgians had now concerted practical measures which rendered
their raids upon Negro villages no longer possible, while such Negro
chiefs as had hitherto been amenable to Arab influence had been
either alienated or killed off in fair fight. A tax on ivory, too,
imposed by the Congo Government in 1891, though moderate in amount
and perfectly just in its incidence, was bitterly resented by them.
It was clear, therefore, that the only hope for the Arabs lay in
recovering the country which the Belgians had wrested from them; and
as with every day that passed their chances of doing this became more
remote, they resolved to stake all that was left to them upon one
desperate effort.
[Illustration: Camp of Bangalas, Stanleyville.]
The first practical proof of this intention came upon the Belgians
somewhat as a surprise. M. Hodister, acting on behalf of the Belgian
Society of the Upper Congo, a company of merchant adventurers, had
founded two stations on the river Lomami. In this act, M. Hodister
was held by the Congo Administration to have exceeded the range
permitted him, Lieutenant Le Marinel, the Belgian officer commanding
that region, having foreseen danger in pressing so closely upon
the Arabs, a contingency with which he was not as yet prepared to
deal. But the opportunity of striking a blow afforded by Hodister’s
precipitate act was too inviting to be neglected, and the Arabs
promptly seized it. The blow fell March 15, 1892, near Riba Riba, on
the Congo, the Arabs murdering Hodister and his ten white companions.
It was not a fight; it was a massacre. Elated by their success, the
Arabs next proceeded to burn the factories belonging to the Belgian
Society of the Upper Congo, and to kill their inmates; so that,
for the moment, the collapse of Belgian power in that section of the
country was complete.
Another event that occurred about this time served to emphasise the
determination of the Arabs. Rashid,[16] the Arab governor of Stanley
Falls, on being invited by the Belgians to assist in obtaining
the punishment of the murderers of Hodister and his companions,
absolutely refused to have anything to do with the matter, and with
difficulty concealed the satisfaction he felt at that tragic event.
Sefu, a son of Tippo Tip, began now to realise his father’s property,
an ominously significant act. On all sides it was felt that a crisis
was at hand, and Lieut. Le Marinel prepared to meet it by appointing
to the command of the camp at Lusambo Lieut. Francis Dhanis, an
officer who had distinguished himself by founding the camp at Bosoko,
on the Aruwimi, and in many other ways exhibited uncommon energy and
resource.
Immediately upon the arrival of Lieut. Dhanis at Lusambo,
intelligence reached him that Gongo Lutete was on the war-path,
seeking to pass the Sankuru. This Gongo Lutete was a Negro chief who
had allied himself with the Arabs and assisted them in enslaving his
own race. The following is a description of him from the pen of Dr.
Sidney Hinde:
Gongo Lutete was by blood a Bakussu. He had himself been a slave,
having as a child fallen into the hands of the Arabs. While still
a youth, as a reward for his distinguished conduct and pluck on
raiding expeditions, he was given his freedom. Starting with one
gun at eighteen years of age, he gradually collected a band of
brigands round him, whom he ruled with a rod of iron, and before
long became Tippo Tip’s chief slave and ivory hunter. At the time
of his adhesion to the State, Gongo was perhaps thirty years of
age. He was a well-built, intelligent-looking man of about five
feet nine inches in height, with a brown skin, large brown eyes
with very long lashes, a small mouth with thin lips, and a straight
comparatively narrow nose. His hands were his most remarkable
characteristic; they were curiously supple, with long narrow
fingers, which when outstretched had always the top joint slightly
turned back. One or both hands were in constant movement, opening
and shutting restlessly, especially when he was under any strong
influence. His features meanwhile remained absolutely immovable.
One had to see this man on the war-path to realise the different
aspects of his character. The calm, haughty chief, or the genial
and friendly companion, became on the battle-field an enthusiastic
individual with a highly nervous organisation, who hissed out his
orders one after another without a moment’s hesitation. He was
capable of sustaining intense fatigue, and would lead his warriors
through the country at a run for hours together.
[Illustration: Types of Lokélés, Jafungas (Oriental Province).]
With such a redoubtable fighter as Gongo Lutete to contend with, it
was clear to Lieut. Dhanis that no time must be lost. Believing, with
von Moltke, that the best defence against your enemy is to attack
him, Dhanis moved against Lutete without delay, and brought him to
battle on the 23d of April, and again on the 5th and 9th of May. The
first two engagements were undecisive. The third proved a hard fight.
At first the fortunes of the day were all in favour of the Arabs; and
when his native auxiliaries turned and fled it seemed impossible
for Lieut. Dhanis to gain the victory. But that very circumstance, so
disconcerting in itself, saved the Belgians. As the Arabs advanced,
they shouted: “Do not fire! These are natives; make them prisoners.”
It was a fatal command. The Belgians rallied, and received their foes
with such a tremendous fusillade that they were thrown into confusion
and took refuge in flight. Gongo Lutete surrendered unconditionally
to Lieut. Dhanis, and professed himself henceforth a faithful vassal
of the Congo State. He was an able man, probably the most intelligent
of the Negro race in the country, and certainly the best acquainted
with the wily Arab and his ways; so, after some hesitation, his
overtures of friendship were accepted. The force which Gongo Lutete
had commanded being now at the disposal of the Belgians, its first
employment under its new masters was the establishment of a new post
on the Lomami, at Gandu, on the route to Nyangwe and Kassongo.
[Sidenote: Arab Treachery.]
Meanwhile Sefu, son of Tippo Tip, had not been inactive. With cunning
worthy of his father, he had no sooner returned from Stanley Falls
to Kassongo than he made war upon the station there and seized it.
Two Belgian officers, Lieutenants Lippens and De Bruyn, were also
captured by him, to whom he confided the comforting assurance that
he only refrained from putting them to death because he hoped to
find them useful as hostages in his negotiations with the Congo
Government. Sefu had for his ally Munie Moharra, chief of Manyema,
a powerful Arab leader. Between them they raised a formidable force,
which they hastened to employ against the Belgians. Before doing so,
however, they stated the terms upon which they would make peace. As
these terms included, among other provisions, handing over to them
Gongo Lutete and the establishment of a new frontier to be indicated
by them, there was really nothing for the Belgians to consider. Their
terms being, of course, refused, the Arabs marched from Nyangwe and
Kassongo in the direction of the Lomami. Their exact numbers are not
known; but notwithstanding the defection of Gongo Lutete and his
following, it is certain that they were very numerous.
The force at the disposal of Lieut. Dhanis, though not so great as
that of the Arabs, was yet a considerable one. His staff consisted of
seven Europeans, and he had three hundred and fifty regular troops
and one 7-5 Krupp gun. The command of the troops acquired by Gongo
Lutete’s defection from the Arabs, numbering several thousands, was
entrusted to Captain Michaux, with Lieut. Duchesne second in command.
The Arabs having crossed the Lomami at a lower point than where they
had been expected, were met by Captain Michaux and Gongo Lutete at
Chige, and a battle ensued. The Arabs numbered sixteen thousand
men, not more than half of whom were armed with muskets, the rest
carrying bows and spears. Lutete having complained that his men could
not fight because their guns had become wet with the rain, Michaux,
knowing that the Arabs must be labouring under a like difficulty,
ordered a general attack. His men responded nobly and a fierce fight
ensued, but it was of brief duration. Perceiving that they were
out-generalled, the Arabs became confused and rushed madly into the
river which they had recently been at so much pains to cross, only
to find that retreat was impossible. In that situation they were
shot down in great numbers. Twelve hundred Arabs were drowned, more
than half that number lay dead upon the battle-field, and nearly a
thousand prisoners were captured, together with a large quantity of
war material. Thus opened the Arab campaign on November 23, 1892,
with the battle of Chige.
Having re-formed his forces, Lieut. Dhanis now crossed the Lomami,
determined to carry the war into the enemy’s stronghold. His army,
which had been reinforced, was now quite a large one, numbering six
Belgian officers, four hundred regulars, and twenty-five thousand
natives, the latter being commanded in detail by their own chiefs.
Lieut. Scherlink and Dr. Hinde commanded the advance guard. Michaux
and Gongo Lutete marched together, and joined forces with Scherlink
and Hinde at Lusana. On the route, several Negro chiefs made their
submission and strengthened the force with men and provisions.
[Sidenote: A Triple Tragedy.]
On reaching Lusana, the Belgian leaders learned with deep regret
that Sefu, son of Tippo Tip, had put to death their brave comrades,
De Bruyn and Lippens, and that he had also executed a native who had
endeavoured to save them, in circumstances at once pathetic and
heroic. Sefu, it now appeared, accompanied by Munie Moharra, was
hurrying to attack Dhanis, and the latter instructed Lieutenants
Delcommune and Francqui, then just returned from Katanga, to
intercept him if possible.
But the second battle of the campaign was to be fought by Dhanis’
force. It took place on December 30th, and opened inauspiciously
for the Belgians, Gongo Lutete’s men being defeated and dispersed.
Fortunately they formed only the advanced guard, and on Dhanis and
Michaux coming up the fortune of the day changed. Dhanis confined
his energies to a frontal attack, while Michaux assailed the Arabs’
flank. What Lutete’s irregulars had been unable to do, the Belgians
accomplished—but not easily. Part of the battle was fought in a swamp.
The Belgians displayed great courage under extraordinary
difficulties, and continued the fight until the Arabs broke and
fled. The honours of the day rested with the Krupp gun, which killed
many and frightened more. The Arabs left two hundred men dead on the
field, the Congo State only eighty, in which number is included the
wounded. When the Belgians captured their enemies’ camp, it was found
that they had slain their own women, that being the barbarous custom
of the Arabs to which they resort whenever there is danger of their
women being made prisoners of war.
[Illustration: Review of Troops by Governor-General at New Antwerp.]
Immediately after this battle, the Congo State force crossed the
Mwadi to a plateau known as the Gois Kapopa, and, having set up
a camp there, rested for a week. At the end of that period
intelligence reached Lieutenant Dhanis that Sefu had gathered about
him a vast following and was again threatening trouble. Slightly
counteracting the danger this implied, the same messenger also
announced that, by order of Lieutenant Delcommune, Lieutenant
Cassart, with a numerous body of men, was then on his way to join
Dhanis.
Cassart came, as announced, but met with a desperate adventure by
the way. He had been entrusted to bring to Dhanis fifty thousand
cartridges, and was provided with an escort of thirty European
soldiers and about two hundred and fifty of Gongo Lutete’s men.
All went well with him until dawn of January 9, 1893, when he was
suddenly attacked by Moharra. A short, sharp fight ensued, as a
result of which Cassart contrived to reach Dhanis’ camp with a loss
of only seven men; he also saved his cartridges, all but the five
thousand or so that he had used during the fight.
The conflict between Moharra and Cassart occurred not far from the
Belgian camp and was heard there, whereupon Dhanis sent a detachment
of his men under Lieutenant De Wouters to join Cassart. De Wouters
failed to effect his object; but he came upon a portion of Moharra’s
men, who mistook his force for a contingent from Sefu coming to their
aid. When within twenty yards of the Arabs, De Wouters undeceived
them by opening a terrific fire upon them. At the first volley
Moharra fell dead. He had been wounded in his fight with Cassart, and
was being carried by his wives when he met his fate.
[Sidenote: A Cannibal Feast.]
The manner in which the news of Moharra’s death was conveyed to Sefu
is a sufficiently striking proof of the debased savagery with which
the Belgian civilisers have had to contend. They “broke the news
gently” to him, thus: “We ate Moharra a few days ago.”
The death of Moharra and defeat of his troops so upset Sefu’s
calculations that he immediately abandoned his strong camp on the
Kipango, and betook himself and his followers behind the Lualaba,
on Nyangwe. But for the unfortunate breaking of a bridge, Dhanis
would have attacked him in his retreat. In consequence of that
accident, Sefu was enabled to cross the river without molestation.
Dhanis, having no canoes, could not come up with him; so the two
forces settled down on either side of the river for five weeks and
occasionally exchanged harmless shots.
[Illustration: Soldiers’ Mess, Suruango, 1903 (Uelle).]
[Illustration: Soldiers’ Wives, Bumba.]
The canoes in which the Arabs had crossed the river belonged to the
Wagenia, a tribe who made their home hereabouts and who lived chiefly
by fishing. Nearly all their canoes were now in the possession of
the Arabs, who evinced no disposition to part from them. Dhanis
exerted all his wit to induce the Wagenia to provide him with canoes,
but they either could not or would not. Professing friendship for
both belligerents, and ready at all times to take bribes from each,
they proved useful go-betweens. One day the Wagenia reported that
the store of provisions in Nyangwe was almost exhausted. “Here,”
said Dhanis to his informant, “take these six fowls to Sefu and
present them to him from me. Tell him that at present I have
plenty, but when my supply runs out I will cross the river.” This
message deceived Sefu, as it was intended to do. As a matter of
fact, the six fowls were the only ones Dhanis had in his camp. The
effect of this strategem was perceived before many days, the Arabs
coming over to the western side of the river, where they began to
build forts, or “bomas,” as they call them, a short distance below
the Belgian camp. Dhanis resolved to attack them at once, and with
this object divided his force into two columns. The engagement that
ensued proved a complete triumph for the State troops. The Arabs
lost nearly a thousand men, many being drowned in an attempt to swim
across the river. The Wagenia, anxious to ally themselves with the
winning side, hastened to produce canoes in abundance. Dhanis was
now able to transport his troops across the Upper Congo, and, that
object achieved, he captured Nyangwe almost without an effort, Sefu
retreating to Kassongo without firing a shot. This event occurred on
4th March, 1893.
Though Dhanis was now master of Nyangwe, his difficulties were not
all surmounted. He had not been installed there many days before it
became necessary to burn down a large part of the town in order to
frustrate an attempt by the Arabs to surprise it. Then other and
worse dangers threatened. Influenza and smallpox broke out among his
men and decimated them. No active prosecution of the campaign was
possible until April, when these plagues abated and reinforcements,
five hundred strong, under Commandant Gillain and Lieutenant Doorme,
arrived.
[Sidenote: Civilisation Triumphant.]
Leaving De Wouters in command at Nyangwe, Dhanis now marched on
Kassongo. It was a bold venture, for while the Arabs had sixty
thousand men, and held four “bomas,” Dhanis disposed of only three
hundred regular troops and two thousand auxiliaries. On April 22,
Doorme had the good fortune, at the beginning of the fight, to rush
an important fort which commanded the Arab rear. The Arabs were
greatly perturbed by this circumstance, and fought with less than
their usual valour. Before two hours had passed, Kassongo was in the
hands of the Congo State troops, with vast quantities of valuable
spoil. The triumph of civilisation over savagery was complete, the
only jarring note in Belgian ears being confirmation of the murder of
Emin Pasha a month before.[17]
[Illustration: Hospital, New Antwerp.]
[Illustration: The White Man’s Cemetery, Stanleyville.]
FOOTNOTES:
[16] A nephew of Hamed-ben-Mohamed, better known as Tippo Tip,—_i.
e._, “winking the eye,”—an Arab slave merchant, invested with the
government of Stanley Falls by King Leopold, at the instance of
Stanley, he having, in consideration of a monthly salary, bound
himself to repress all slave-hunting and slave-dealing below the
Falls.
[17] For amplified accounts of the Arab wars, see _The Congo State_,
by D. C. Boulger; _Le mouvement géographique_, by A. J. Wauters,
1884-1898; _Rapport de Baron Dhanis sur la campagne arabe dans le
Manyéma_, 1895; _The Fall of the Congo Arabs_, by Dr. Sidney L. Hinde.