CHAPTER IX

THE ECONOMIC RÉGIME OF THE BERLIN ACT

[Sidenote: Early Colonial Policy.]

THE Berlin Act and the economic, that is, domestic, _régime_ which it

sought to establish in the Congo Basin occupied by Germany, France,

Great Britain, Portugal, and the Free State, were, with various

inadequacies and experimental defects, the logical expression of the

drift that political science as applied to the law of nations had

assumed in Europe as early as 1874. Under the operation of the old

_Pacte Colonial_, the policy which prevailed in the colonies of the

European Powers discriminated greatly against the subjects of all

save the mother country. The commercial policy of such colonies was

that of the Power which governed the colonial territory, whether that

was an extension of the home territory or merely a dependency.

[Illustration: Market, near Boma.]

Some marked theoretics freighted the course of international life

as the time approached when exploration had revealed all the

colonising areas which the known earth contained. Europeans and

their descendants already occupied, under different forms of law, as

states, colonies, protectorates, leaseholds, spheres of influence,

over 82 per cent. of the lands of this planet. Those who followed

the evolution of the law of nations were impressed by an African

situation in 1884 which offered opportunity for experimentation with

new, and perhaps more elastic, economic principles for the regulation

of colonial interests in regions where the character of the country,

its natural features, such as waterways and coastal advantages,

and the juxtaposition of several governments, tended to a conflict

detrimental generally to the civilisation of such possessions and

their contributions to the markets of the world.

In the _Annales de l’Institut de Droit International_, vols. iii. and

vii., are to be found the various resolutions of Prof. Égide Arntz

relative to practical and co-operative jurisdiction in the Congo

Basin. These were offered on September 7, 1883, at the Munich meeting

of the Institute. But long before, namely, in 1878, M. Gustave

Moynier had raised the question of a concerted civilising movement

and the adoption of a scheme of political regulation in the region

of the Congo. M. Emile Laveleye and the late Sir Travers Twiss had,

thereafter, also discussed the question before the Institute. The

essays of Professor Arntz and Sir Travers Twiss, which embody their

respective views on what to them at that time appeared to be a signal

opportunity for applying principles of colonial government as yet

unestablished by tests of practice, are fully set forth in the Report

of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

[Sidenote: Experiments of the Berlin Act.]

The Berlin Conference of November 15, 1884, may be regarded as the

crystallised result of the interest manifested in respect of the

Mid-African situation by the learned bodies and the eminent legal

authorities indicated, and also as the outcome of Germany’s tactful

method of superseding the then imminent treaty between Great Britain

and Portugal signed on February 26, 1884, but thereafter abrogated.

As pointed out in another chapter, the British-Portuguese treaty met

with active opposition in Germany and in England.

[Sidenote: German Astuteness.]

[Sidenote: The Act Praised and Condemned.]

It was during the agitation of this feeling that the Conference

was summoned at the instance of Germany. If one could analyse _in

extenso_ all the essentials which so aptly informed Prince Bismarck

of Germany’s masked advantages in such a Conference, the Iron

Chancellor would stand revealed as an early monument to the German

astuteness of to-day. In creating an Areopagus of the fourteen Powers

assembled at Berlin and referring to it the questions which, if

unsettled, would have led to conflicts, combinations, and confusion

prejudicial to German East Africa, Prince Bismarck’s workmanship

surpassed the materials which his skill employed. As the Prince

said at the final session of the Conference, the lofty aims and

political idealities proclaimed during its earlier sessions would,

when translated into facts, offer opportunity for improvement.

Indeed, time and the practical application of its precepts, so

enthusiastically proclaimed, have revealed the theorist where the

man of practical political sense would better have written certain

clauses of the General Act. As it stood in 1885, it cannot be

regarded with that awe which certain persons manifest when they

misinterpret its inconclusive preachments. Some praise it as “the

inauguration of a truly new era in colonial affairs.” Others,

condemning it without reserve, speak of it as “the work of theorisers

without experimental basis.” A fair estimate of this unique political

palaver, as embodied in its General Act, probably lies somewhere

between the extravagant praise and the untempered condemnation

frequently bestowed upon it. If, from a legal and political point

of view, it can be regarded as only a tissue of the substance it

aimed at, the fact remains that the Berlin Conference has more than

justified itself by guiding, often dispelling commercial rivalries

which, in their unchecked development, might have nullified the

great sacrifices of Belgian blood and money in the cause of

African civilisation. The Conference entered the forum when many

complications, arising from competing expeditions, conflicting

explorations, unregulated trading operations, the advent of evil

adventurers, the devastating slave trade, and a combination of other

causes—commercial and political—had provoked the distrust and avarice

frequently observed when several European peoples occupy in common a

vast and fertile territory inhabited by savage tribes. At a meeting

of a Committee of the Conference held on December 10, 1884, Mr.

Kasson, the Plenipotentiary of the United States, gave utterance, in

retrospect of early American colonisation, to expressions of historic

fact which graphically portray Mid-African conditions twenty years

ago:

The first colonies founded in America [said Mr. Kasson] have been

the work of different nationalities. Even there, where at first

emigration was of a free and peaceful nature, foreign Governments

were soon installed, with military forces to support them. Wars

immediately broke out in Europe. The belligerents had colonies,

and soon the field of battle spread to America. In the heat of

the struggle, each of the belligerents sought allies amongst the

native tribes, where they thus excited their natural inclination

for violence and plunder. Horrible acts of cruelty ensued, and

massacres where neither age nor sex were spared. The knife, the

lance, and the torch transformed peaceful and happy colonies into

deserts.

The present condition of Central Africa reminds one much of that

of America when that continent was first opened up to the European

world. How are we to avoid a repetition of the unfortunate events,

to which I have just alluded, amongst the numerous African tribes?

How are we to guard against exposing our merchants, our colonies,

and their goods to these dangers? How shall we defend the lives of

our missionaries and religion itself against the outburst of savage

customs and barbarous passions?

Finding ourselves in the presence of those whom we are urging

to undertake the work of civilisation in Africa, it is our duty

to save them from such regrettable experiences as marked the

corresponding phase in America.

[Sidenote: The Real Value of the Act.]

[Sidenote: Belgian Dominance.]

Whatever defective novelty may still reside in the Berlin Act, the

Conference which begot it gave an immense impetus to the great work

of African civilisation. It eliminated movements by the various

Powers which were accomplishing little or nothing for lack of

definition and unity. It organised a scramble, so to speak, into an

orderly and intelligently directed set of enterprises, chief among

which were those urged forward by the King of the Belgians and his

diligent subjects. In that amplitude of pledges, which when applied

to them the other Signatory Powers found it convenient to forget,

little Belgium strove mightily not only to discharge her obligations

under the Berlin Act, but to demonstrate her own innate genius for

the work of colony-building and civilisation. It is perhaps in the

inevitable result of this spirit that we find the explanation of

Belgian dominance and Belgian progress far excelling that of its

African neighbours.

[Sidenote: Freedom of Commerce.]

In the United States the Berlin Act has not met with the universal

respect of competent legal authorities. It provided no means for its

own enforcement, and left the national committees, which were to

carry out certain of its provisions, without machinery and without

that central authority essential to its life. It also appears that

the national committees never acted. Each of the Powers, supreme

within the border of its own African territory, pursued a course

which it believed was best calculated to develop the resources and

the civilisation of that region of the Congo Basin in which it ruled.

Nevertheless, the General Act had delimited the territory comprised

in the Conventional Basin of the Congo; defined the domain occupied

therein respectively by Germany, France, Great Britain, Portugal, and

the Free State; applied to the entire Congo Basin the principle of

freedom of commerce and of navigation, and concerted the aims of all

the Powers to the suppression of the iniquitous slave trade and the

horrible practice of cannibalism. It did not deal specifically with

questions of territorial sovereignty, nor with the internal public

and private land system, nor, in fact, with any act or principle of

the civil or military government of a State. It did, however, seek to

restrict the duties upon the Congo and its affluents, and stipulated

that upon these highways there should be open to all nations the

freedom to trade and to navigate. As Baron Descamps aptly says in his

essay on _Government Civilisation in New Countries_:

The broad-minded measures of the Berlin Conference did away with

many of the existing anomalies. Doubtless, the general application

of those measures to all colonies would have been a step in the

right direction; but while their general adoption could have been

justified on the same grounds as their special application to

the Congo, the Conference would not have been able to accomplish

such a gigantic reform of distributive equity. The Conference,

however, did what it could in this direction. It felt that the

impracticability of the complete scheme did not prevent its partial

application; that it was not easy to reform the whole world at

once, especially the colonial world; that the field of experience

on which it could operate was large enough; and that, last but not

least, the nature of the country, where the Government was as yet

more or less insecure, was calculated to induce those concerned to

make exceptional sacrifices.

[Illustration: Government Park, Boma, 1904.]

The Conference therefore made the following regulations for the

Congo Basin:

Art. 1. The trade of all nations shall enjoy complete freedom.

Art. 2. All flags, without distinction of nationality, shall have

free access.

Art. 3, § 2. All differential dues on vessels as well as on

merchandise are forbidden.

Art. 5. No Power which exercises or shall exercise sovereign rights

in the above-mentioned regions shall be allowed to grant therein

a monopoly or favour of any kind in matters of trade.

[Sidenote: Freedom of Commerce Defined.]

The five Powers occupying and governing the Congo Basin have here

assumed certain obligations in reference to the commercial _régime_

which should prevail in their territory. There shall be freedom to

trade, and to navigate in pursuit of commerce; there shall be no

differential duties imposed; there shall be no monopoly _in matters

of trade_. In the fourth protocol of the Berlin Conference, Baron

Lambermont’s report includes a definition of what the Conference

meant by monopoly “in matters of trade.” This statesman declared that:

No doubt whatever exists as to the _strict and literal sense_

which should be assigned to the term _in commercial matters_. It

refers _exclusively to traffic_, to the unlimited power of every

one to sell and to buy, to import and to export, products and

manufactured articles. No privileged situation can be created under

this head, the way remains open without any restrictions to free

competition _in the domain of commerce_, but the obligations of

local Governments do not go beyond that point.

[Sidenote: The Theory of Congo Government.]

Notwithstanding the explicit nature of this definition, those who,

for reasons which it is not the purpose of this volume to expose in

detail, condemn the governmental _system_ of the Congo Free State,

and declare that the General Act of the Berlin Conference aimed at

much more than insuring the common right (freedom) of all nations

to pursue _legitimate_ trade in the Basin of the Congo. How much

more, and precisely what the Act aims at, according to hostile

commentators, varies with the capacity for exaggeration, or the

speciousness in argument, of the critic. Some declare that freedom

in matters of trade means that anybody may invade the Congo Basin

and barter with natives for the produce of the soil and the chase,

laws respecting private property and providing regulations to govern

traffic notwithstanding. In his essay on _Principles of Government

in the Congo Free State_[8] the author briefly indicates the _motif_

of King Leopold’s rule in Central Africa and the cogent reasons for

the system which has made that rule the envy of persons whose faculty

of perception is not as dormant to-day as it was in 1885, when it

was lazily assumed that the salvation of a territory, not worth much

materially, was being imposed upon an enthusiastic and impractical

kingly philanthropist. Amongst other things, this essay contains the

following exposition of the system of internal government by which

the Congo Free State and its people have morally and materially

prospered. It is, in substance, the definition of Congolese policy

stated by his Majesty, King Leopold:

[Sidenote: Respect for Property.]

... The principles of the Congolese system of internal government

appear to be in entire conformity with the General Act of Berlin,

wherein freedom of trade is assured to the subjects of all nations.

This signifies the liberty to sell and to buy in a legitimate way,

not in a way peculiar to the theories of Congo despoilers. It is

repugnant to law, and disturbing to civil order and progress, to

permit the product of the land to be purchased from any person

but its legitimate owner. Congo law represses theft, the insidious

encouragement of which would appear to be the aim of those who

so grossly misinterpret the principle of Freedom of Commerce. A

respect for property is essential to all governments which hope to

endure, and the law of this attitude is universal in all civilised

communities. Trade, whether free or restricted, could not exist on

any other basis. The forces of civilisation are paralysed without

it, and untamed natives are left to savage internecine strife.

[Sidenote: Labour the Great Civiliser.]

The principles of the Congo Government are that the soil shall

maintain those who develop its resources for the betterment of the

sower and the reaper. The civilisation of the native by industry

and other forms of instruction in the attributes of order, civic

life, and all that he may be capable of absorbing of enlightened

freedom. For the privilege of residing within the sphere of a State

so governed, the white man is the most taxed member of society

in the world. Shall savages alone be exempt from labour and just

contribution to organised government? Shall the white man’s rule

teach the black that idleness, craft, animal instincts, predatory

habits in gaining his irregular subsistence, are the foundations of

civilisation? Or shall the white man by precept and example, and by

humane but positive insistence, train the savage in the ways of law

and order, industry and thrift?

[Sidenote: Taxation of the Native.]

Reverting for a moment to the assertion that the Government of the

Congo Free State is primarily responsible for what its detractors

allege to be the enslavement of the native, I fail to find

conviction in unfounded statements often repeated, and arguments

upon wrong premises, varied only in form, not substance. Ignorance

of the _motif_ impelling Congo State method and movement has misled

those who have brought prejudice to a subject worth the attention

only of the broadest minds. The _system_, which is the object of

attack when new stories of atrocities are scarce, is briefly stated

to be to devote the revenue derived from the State’s property as

much as possible to cover the State’s expenses; that is to say,

to the moral and material organisation and regeneration of the

country and its inhabitants; to resort to the imposition of a tax

in _specie_ as rarely as possible; and to exact a few hours’ labour

monthly from the natives, in order to give them the habit of work,

which is the greatest of civilising precepts. In this connection

the Congo Government goes beyond its duty, and pays the natives

for this work, teaching them the relation between labour and its

reward. The habit of work, when formed, will elevate the natives

from the savage instincts which tend to debase them in idleness.

The exaction of, and payment for, forty-odd hours’ work each month

from an able-bodied native, for whose redemption from savagery

millions of money and many lives have been, and are being, spent,

is a lesser tax than the white man pays on his meagre income from

daily toil in the cities of London, New York, Paris, and Berlin.

The county road tax alone, levied upon the farmer in the United

States, is a greater imposition than this. Those who have the

hardihood to argue that the enforced practice of habits of industry

upon savages in an African colony, less than twenty years in the

making, is an unjust and iniquitous burden, can have no conception

of the condition of the white slaves of the Midland counties of

England, no understanding of life and its burdens in the centres of

the world’s highest civilisation.

[Sidenote: The State Lands.]

The Congo Free State, like all other States, acquired possession

of ownerless lands, not by bloody wars which have characterised

the acquisitive and “civilising” methods of its principal mentor

in morals, but only after treaty with the natives who happened to

occupy those lands in their savagery. All lands which the natives

occupy with at least the rudiments of peaceful industry are

guaranteed to them. What for ages had been unused and undeveloped

for the good of mankind, native or foreign, is now being

successfully exploited by the State. Before this industrial, civil,

and moral era, the vast Congo forests were not even traversed

by the indolent native, so long as he could acquire his food

in the sluggard idleness which to this day prevails throughout

neighbouring African colonies.

The Congo Free State is pursuing a policy for the preservation, of

its forests, far in advance of other colonies, by enforcing the

replanting of rubber trees and vines as fast as the old growth has

been sapped, thus ensuring to future generations the results of

Belgian foresight and wisdom.

The Congo Free State does not trade as a State. Like other

governments it is interested in the development of the Government

domain by its inhabitants. The United States first occupied the

wild lands of North America by conquest of, and treaty with, the

Indians. It then threw the land open to the pre-emption of its

citizens under certain restrictions and impositions; for instance,

to improve the land within a certain time, to maintain its yield,

to pay taxes, build roads, and in other ways contribute to the cost

of administering and improving the State.

[Sidenote: The State Develops the Land.]

[Sidenote: The _Concessionaire_ Companies.]

After vainly waiting seven years for the influx of foreign capital

and enterprise to freely enter upon its public lands, and assume

the burdens and enjoy the gain of developing the forests for the

wealth they contained, the Congo Free State proceeded to cause

a part of its lands (one-fourth) to be developed _en régie_ (by

trustees), in order that the land might at least contribute to the

creation and support of the public works to be established within

the State for the benefit and betterment of its native population.

Another part (one-fourth) of the forests have been conceded to

private companies, in harmony with the system followed by France,

England, Germany, and Portugal, whose territories are contiguous

to the Congo Free State. But here again we have an exhibition of

far-seeing statesmanship, almost unparalleled in colonial history.

Instead of doling out the State lands absolutely to favoured

_concessionaires_, which has been the invariable practice in other

colonies, the Belgians have exacted a tremendous guarantee and

a growing revenue from those who exploit the natural resources

of its forests, by retaining in some cases a half interest in

the capital of the concessionary companies. As an example of

practical politics, this admirable system alone constitutes a

material heritage to the future of the Congo. The revenue thus

annually accruing to the support of the Congo budget must play

materially in the development and welfare of the State. Moreover,

while the State has such large influence in the internal affairs

of its concessionary companies, it has a practical power within

the companies in addition to the State law. This dual control

should ensure a commercial policy in harmony with the spirit and

the letter of the underlying principles of the State’s government.

Under this system, the Congo Free State now exports to European

markets 5000 tons of rubber annually, where a few years ago this

great asset lay hidden in a forest upon which none of the Powers

Signatory to the General Act of Berlin desired to spend its means

or its labour.

[Sidenote: Spoliation and Plunder.]

One of the counts in the complaint by certain perfervid

pamphleteers in Great Britain against King Leopold is that there is

no freedom of commerce in that part of the Congo Basin occupied by

the Free State. Freedom of Commerce under the definition of such

persons is the indiscriminate right of traders and adventurers,

and purveyors of arms and spirituous liquors, to swoop down on

the State and private lands of the Congo, incite the native to

invade the forest, steal rubber product and sell it to the trader

at the latter’s price. One need not dwell upon the preposterous

nature of that transparent scheme of commercial freedom. Private

property is nowhere open to unlawful invasion. Public property is

not open to the spoliation of adventurers and vandals. The 5000

tons of rubber gathered by the several industrial forces at work

in the Congo can be purchased by traders as well at Matadi as at

Stanley Pool, at Boma as well as at Antwerp, at a proper price.

If the freedom of commerce defined by Congophobes were permitted

to prevail in any civilised or uncivilised country in the world,

anarchy and tribal wars would ensue, all rights of property would

be violated, and the larcenous proclivities of the African Negro

would be encouraged. In the case of the Congo, a reign of terror

would decimate the native population, and denude the forests which

the wise laws of the State endeavour to preserve. Upon their ruins

the “savagery” of the white man would have succeeded that of the

black.

As already indicated, Congo law very properly forbids invaders of

the State from buying the product of private property from any one

except the owner. In that respect it does not depart from the law

of every other country. The desire of adventurers to buy rubber

and ivory direct from the natives is not sufficient reason for

permitting the latter to trespass upon private property for the

purpose of stealing its product. Once establish a traffic on these

lines, and you put a premium on the crime of theft, and pit the

spear of every native against his brother in their rubber-hunting

areas.

The difference between the Congo system of colonisation and those

of its principal critic is the difference between a definite State

policy which, having the land and its resources for its material

basis, applies humane measures for enforcing its development for

the benefit and civilisation of the native, and the permanent

constitution of the State, and a policy the baneful influence

and unprogressive operation of which can be observed in the

protectorates and colonies of one of its neighbours, where the

budgets are to a large degree sustained by the importation of

alcohol as a beverage—a “civilising influence” which, to the honour

of the Belgians, is almost entirely excluded from the Congo Free

State....

The foregoing exposition of internal policy may be regarded as a

brief statement of the principles which underlie the system of

government in the Congo Free State.

[Sidenote: Treaty between Congo State and United States.]

That the United States did not construe an illogical meaning into

the phrase “freedom of commerce,” and warp it out of all semblance

to its natural character, is evidenced by the terms of its treaty

with the Free State made seven years after the promulgation of the

General Act of the Berlin Conference, during all of which time the

Congo State authorities had acted upon the interpretation of the

phrase indicated in Baron Lambermont’s definition, and in the learned

opinions of Maîtres Barboux, Nys, Van Berchem, and Picard.

Article I. of the treaty of April 2, 1892, between the United States

and the Independent State of the Congo reads:

The citizens and inhabitants of the Independent State of the

Congo in the United States of America and those of the United

States of America in the Independent State of the Congo shall have

reciprocally the right, _on conforming to the laws of the country_,

to enter, travel, and reside in all parts of their respective

territory; to carry on business there; and they shall enjoy in this

respect for the protection of their persons and their property the

same treatment and the same rights as the natives, or the citizens

and inhabitants of the most favoured nation.

[Illustration: Students of the State Technical School, New Antwerp

(Bangala).]

[Illustration: Hospital, Boma.]

In this connection Sir Edward Malet, the British Plenipotentiary

at the Conference, clearly pointed out that “freedom of commerce

unchecked by reasonable control would degenerate into licence.”

Reasonable control is only another name for State law and police

regulation. The Congo Government maintains that, subject to its

internal laws and regulations which affect its own and foreign

subjects alike, the subjects of every nation are free to enter its

territory in pursuit of legitimate trade. _Apropos_ of this phase of

the subject Baron Descamps says:

The power of the State in this connection is incontestable. That

power is derived directly from the primary right and duty to

maintain public order everywhere and under all circumstances.

Nobody can deny the State the right of taking steps, for example,

for the preservation of public safety. Government cannot be carried

on without a judicial and administrative police system, and a State

could not renounce that prerogative without laying itself open to a

charge of incapacity in its primary and essential functions. Hence,

such a renunciation could not be argued from mere presumptions or

inductions.[9]

[Sidenote: The Free-Trade Policy.]

Amongst the innovations attempted by the Berlin Act was that

which sought, by Article IV., to abolish all import and transit

dues. Little serious account appears to have been taken—so far

as the Act reveals—of the practical necessity for erecting and

sustaining works of public utility to commerce, and the equity of

imposing proper charges on the wares upon which the benefits of

such works were bestowed. The absolute prohibition of import duties

created great difficulties for the Free State which, but for the

personal munificence of its Sovereign, would have wrecked a liberal

undertaking, handicapped and fettered by the fanciful legislation

of the Berlin Conference,—“Merchandise imported into those regions

shall remain free from import and transit dues.” Fortunately the

legislators of the Berlin Conference were not to become the practical

governors of the Congo Free

[Sidenote: A Temporary Experiment.]

State, else they might have realised that the gravest body may enact

farce and commit folly. It was the experiment of a new principle in

colonial administrative economy which they aimed at, but there is a

vast difference in substance between a mirage and a mountain. That

there were misgivings in the mind of some members of the Conference

as to the logic of driving traders into the Congo, on the one hand,

utterly untaxed for the support of the Government and the security it

afforded, while on the other the State was charged with the creation

of public works and the maintenance of law and order without revenue,

is manifested by that final clause of Article IV., which provides

that “the Powers reserve to themselves to determine, after the lapse

of twenty years, whether this freedom of import shall be retained or

not.” In this case the Powers did not wait twenty years to revise

their principle of free trade. Five years were sufficient to reveal

its inapplicability to a new country, and the Second Brussels

Conference, assembled in 1890, made of the free-trade clause of 1885

a clause allowing on merchandise other than spirituous liquors an

impost not exceeding ten per cent. “It would never do,” said Baron

de Courcel, at the Conference, “to renew the colonial experience

gained in the sixteenth century, when colonies were brought to ruin

by those who pretended to fix in Europe, from a purely metropolitan

point of view, their financial and administrative system.” The

experiment of prohibiting import duties proved, as already indicated,

a serious hindrance to the economic life of the new State. That

the experiment would not, however, be persisted in by the Powers,

had been foreshadowed by the suggestion of Baron Lambermont at the

Conference when he said: “It is experience which will then inspire

the interested Powers with the most favourable resolutions for the

development and commercial progress in their possessions.” There

were, therefore, after all, men of practical political foresight at

the Conference, whose assent to so radical a policy of free trade

was accorded for the purpose of the moment only, and while the

great question of civilising Central African tribes dominated their

early aims even to the disadvantage of the correlated questions

of commerce. Article III. of the General Act, therefore, provided

that: “Wares of whatever origin, imported into these regions, under

whatsoever flag, by sea or river, or overland, shall be subject to

no other taxes than such as may be levied as fair compensation for

expenditure in the interest of trade, and which for this reason must

be equally borne by the subjects themselves and by foreigners of

all nationalities.” The reasons actuating the Berlin Conference not

to fix the rate of such taxation as it provided for at the Brussels

Conference, are clearly indicated on page 85 of the protocols to the

General Act, from which the following declaration is quoted:

The rate of the taxes of compensation is not fixed in any definite

manner. The support of foreign capital ought to be placed, with

commercial freedom, amongst the most useful aids to the spirit of

enterprise, whether it has reference to the execution of works

of public interest or whether it has in view the development

of the cultivation of the natural products of the African soil.

But capital only goes, in general, to places where the risks are

sufficiently covered by the chances of profit. The Commission

has therefore thought that there would result more disadvantages

than advantages from binding too strictly, by restrictions

arranged in advance, the liberty of action of public powers or of

concessions. If abuses should arise, if the taxes threatened to

attain an excessive rate, the cure would be found in the interest

of the authorities or of the contractors, seeing that commerce,

as experience has more than once proved, would turn away from

establishments the access to, or use of which, had been rendered

too burdensome.

That contribution by traders to the maintenance of the State under

a system of taxation and police regulation is not incompatible with

commercial freedom was forcibly reiterated at the Conference by Count

de Launay and, of course, by other members who at all dwelt upon

a principle so well established. Treating this question with much

erudition, Baron Descamps cites the French law of March 2, 1791,

relating to patents, which, he says, “gave the most emphatic assent

of modern times to the principle of commercial freedom. The very

clause proclaiming freedom of commerce provided for licence dues!

Thus: ‘Everybody shall be free to carry on any business he chooses;

[_sic_] but he must first obtain, and pay for, a licence, and submit

to any regulations of police that may be made.’”[10]

[Sidenote: The Open Door and Chaos.]

Obviously the “freedom of commerce” intended by the General Act

of the Berlin Conference is not the open door with the key thrown

away and chaos prevailing behind it. The State is mistress of her

domain. She is alone responsible for its civil order and the just

regulation of its life, whether social, commercial, or political. Her

attitude upon all fundamental rules of civilised government has two

facets: the one toward her subjects, the other toward the society

of nations which surrounds her. She must conduct her affairs with

due regard for those broad principles of national morality which

civilised communities recognise as a lofty standard of social and

political life. Until she prove herself incompetent in this respect,

her territory cannot become the subject of international partition

or regulation on pretexts of humanitarianism or on any other, nor is

it in the justice of nations or of men to undermine the force of her

authority or to enfeeble the integrity of her Statehood by any agency

whatsoever.

[Sidenote: Conditions in 1895.]

From the latest report of the Vice-Governor-General of the Congo Free

State are quoted below statements which shed light upon the belief

held by the Belgians concerning their own fiscal policy, and the

attitude they offer to the criticisms of its burly neighbour, Great

Britain, in its rule of the Soudan and its other colonial possessions:

In the region of commerce the Congo State, which was the first

to inscribe in its international conventions the principles of

liberty, has not failed, no matter what any one says to the

contrary, in the programme which was drawn up in 1884, and of

which, as has recently been recalled, Stanley was made the

spokesman. The _régime_ of the “open door,” which has just been

claimed by the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, at the very moment,

too, when purely philanthropic declarations were being heard in the

House of Commons, is that also of the Congo State; and there cannot

be discovered in our territory the existence of monopolies such as

those of ivory and rubber which the Government of the Soudan has

created for its own profit in some parts of the Soudan.[11]

The traders of all nations may sell on the Congo the objects of

their commerce, and buy the natural produce from the proprietors

of the soil; no limit, no hindrance is placed on this traffic,

and that is really freedom of trade. That this freedom may remain

complete notwithstanding the existence of the domain rights, and

the granting of concessions, has been proved up to the hilt, and

to declare, as has been done in the House of Commons, that trade

does not exist on the Congo is to put oneself in contradiction with

the law and the facts. These statements, by repetition, end by

being considered as axioms, and it is not realised that they still

await proof. The _régime_ of concessions, besides, has not been

established for the exclusive advantage or benefit of the Belgians;

the opening was given to foreign initiative and capital without

distinction to become interested in the development of the country,

and if, by a want of confidence that the event has not justified,

English capital was withdrawn from some Congolese undertakings,

the prosperous condition of which is now made a grievance, it does

not follow therefrom that those who did run the risk inherent in

enterprises in new countries should see to-day the results of their

efforts and their perseverance assailed.

It is to the astonishment, not to say to the general indignation,

of the handful of Europeans who are working, and undergoing

hardships on the spot, that these attempts are made abroad to

represent them all, from the highest place to the most obscure of

the assistants, as associated in an odious work of destruction

and inhumanity. The duty of protesting against this legend is

imposed on whoever has seen with his own eyes these territories,

once disinherited, being opened to civilisation, evangelisation,

and progress; populations, formerly troops of slaves, reborn

to confidence and freedom; the rapid economic equipment, the

railways under exploitation or construction, a flotilla which

covers the river and its affluents, routes which open up the most

distant regions, telegraphic and telephonic lines to the Upper

River, cultivation and plantation gradually extending, cattle

introduced into every district, mission establishments opened

in all parts, vaccine institutions, and services of medical,

sanitary, and hygienic orders. Such are some of the results of

what has been called the _system_ of the State, a system which was

inspired before everything by the vows of the Berlin and Brussels

Conferences, and it could not be explained how it has been possible

for the State’s adversaries to cry it down if it were not known

that their customary tactics are to lay stress on the inevitable

imperfections of a work of that extent still, after all, in the

stage of its beginning....

As concerns cotton, which before the Mahdist invasion was seemingly

cultivated in a sufficiently considerable degree, I hold it on good

authority that in Cairo and Lower Egypt some little disquietude

is being shown on the subject of the activity displayed by the

Belgians on the Upper Nile, and that some apprehension is felt

there of a cotton competition in the near future.

FOOTNOTES:

[8] September, 1904.

[9] _New Africa_, p. 68.

[10] _New Africa_, p. 67.

[11] _Soudan Gazette_, published by authority of the Soudan

Government, No. 47, Khartoum, 1st May, 1903: “It is notified for

information that the following articles are governmental monopolies

in the following districts: Rubber and gutta percha, in the whole

of the Soudan, excepting Kordofan. Ivory, in the Bahr-el-Ghazal and

Fashoda.... (Signed) Reginald Wingate, Governor-General.”

The story of the Congo Free State · 第 9 / 40 章