CHAPTER V.

APRIL 20th, INCREASING EXCITEMENT. -- APPROPRIATION OF $500,000

FOR DEFENSE OF THE CITY. -- CORRESPONDENCE WITH PRESIDENT AND

GOVERNOR. -- MEN ENROLLED. -- APPREHENDED ATTACK ON FORT McHENRY.

-- MARSHAL KANE. -- INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT, CABINET AND GENERAL

SCOTT. -- GENERAL BUTLER, WITH THE EIGHTH MASSACHUSETTS, PROCEEDS

TO ANNAPOLIS AND WASHINGTON. -- BALTIMORE IN A STATE OF ARMED

NEUTRALITY.

On Saturday morning, the 20th, the excitement and alarm had greatly

increased. Up to this time no answer had been received from

Washington. The silence became unbearable. Were more troops to be

forced through the city at any cost? If so, how were they to come, by

land or water? Were the guns of Fort McHenry to be turned upon the

inhabitants? Was Baltimore to be compelled at once to determine

whether she would side with the North or with the South? Or was she

temporarily to isolate herself and wait until the frenzy had in some

measure spent its force and reason had begun to resume its sway? In

any case it was plain that the authorities must have the power placed

in their hands of controlling any outbreak which might occur. This was

the general opinion. Union men and disunion men appeared on the

streets with arms in their hands. A time like that predicted in

Scripture seemed to have come, when he who had no sword would sell his

garment to buy one.

About ten A. M. the city council assembled and immediately

appropriated $500,000, to be expended under my direction as mayor,

for the purpose of putting the city in a complete state of defense

against any description of danger arising or which might arise out of

the present crisis. The banks of the city promptly held a meeting, and

a few hours afterward a committee appointed by them, consisting of

three bank presidents, Johns Hopkins, John Clark and Columbus

O'Donnell, all wealthy Union men, placed the whole sum in advance at

my disposal. Mr. Scharf, in his "History of Maryland," Volume 3, page

416, says, in a footnote, that this action of the city authorities was

endorsed by the editors of the _Sun_, _American_, _Exchange_, _German

Correspondent_, _Clipper_, _South_, etc. Other considerable sums were

contributed by individuals and firms without respect to party.

On the same morning I received a dispatch from Messrs. Bond, Dobbin

and Brune, the committee who had gone to Washington, which said: "We

have seen the President and General Scott. We have from the former a

letter to the mayor and Governor declaring that no troops shall be

brought to Baltimore, if, in a military point of view and without

interruption from opposition, they can be marched around Baltimore."

As the Governor had left Baltimore for Annapolis early in the morning,

I telegraphed him as follows:

"BALTIMORE, _April 20, 1861_.

"_To Governor Hicks._

"Letter from President and General Scott. No troops to pass

through Baltimore if as a military force they can march around. I

will answer that every effort will be made to prevent parties

leaving the city to molest them, but cannot guarantee against

acts of individuals not organized. Do you approve?

GEO. WM. BROWN."

This telegram was based on that from Messrs. Bond, Dobbin and Brune.

The letter referred to had not been received when my telegram to

Governor Hicks was dispatched. I was mistaken in supposing that

General Scott had signed the letter as well as the President.

President Lincoln's letter was as follows:

"WASHINGTON, _April 20, 1861_.

"_Governor Hicks and Mayor Brown._

"_Gentlemen_:--Your letter by Messrs. Bond, Dobbin and Brune is

received. I tender you both my sincere thanks for your efforts to

keep the peace in the trying situation in which you are placed.

For the future troops _must_ be brought here, but I make no point

of bringing them _through_ Baltimore.

"Without any military knowledge myself, of course I must leave

details to General Scott. He hastily said this morning, in

presence of these gentlemen, 'March them _around_ Baltimore, and

not through it.'

"I sincerely hope the General, on fuller reflection, will

consider this practical and proper, and that you will not object

to it.

"By this, a collision of the people of Baltimore with the troops

will be avoided unless they go out of their way to seek it. I

hope you will exert your influence to prevent this.

"Now and ever I shall do all in my power for peace consistently

with the maintenance of government.

"Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN."

Governor Hicks replied as follows to my telegram:

"ANNAPOLIS, _April 20, 1861_.

"_To the Mayor of Baltimore._

"Your dispatch received. I hoped they would send no more troops

through Maryland, but as we have no right to demand that, I am

glad no more are to be sent through Baltimore. I know you will do

all in your power to preserve the peace.

THOS. H. HICKS."

I then telegraphed to the President as follows:

"BALTIMORE, MARYLAND, _April 20, 1861_.

"_To President Lincoln._

"Every effort will be made to prevent parties leaving the city to

molest troops marching to Washington. Baltimore seeks only to

protect herself. Governor Hicks has gone to Annapolis, but I have

telegraphed to him.

"GEO. WM. BROWN, _Mayor of Baltimore_."

After the receipt of the dispatch from Messrs. Bond, Dobbin and Brune,

another committee was sent to Washington, consisting of Messrs.

Anthony Kennedy, Senator of the United States, and J. Morrison Harris,

member of the House of Representatives, both Union men, who sent a

dispatch to me saying that they "had seen the President, Secretaries

of State, Treasury and War, and also General Scott. The result is the

transmission of orders that will stop the passage of troops through or

around the city."

Preparations for the defense of the city were nevertheless continued.

With this object I issued a notice in which I said: "All citizens

having arms suitable for the defense of the city, and which they are

willing to contribute for the purpose, are requested to deposit them

at the office of the marshal of police."

The board of police enrolled temporarily a considerable number of men

and placed them under the command of Colonel Isaac R. Trimble. He

informs me that the number amounted to more than fifteen thousand,

about three-fourths armed with muskets, shotguns and pistols.

This gentleman was afterward a Major-General in the Confederate Army,

where he distinguished himself. He lost a leg at Gettysburg.

By this means not only was the inadequate number of the police

supplemented, but many who would otherwise have been the disturbers of

the peace became its defenders. And, indeed, not a few of the men

enrolled, who thought and hoped that their enrollment meant war, were

disappointed to find that the prevention of war was the object of the

city authorities, and afterwards found their way into the Confederacy.

For some days it looked very much as if Baltimore had taken her stand

decisively with the South; at all events, the outward expressions of

Southern feeling were very emphatic, and the Union sentiment

temporarily disappeared.

Early on the morning of Saturday, the 20th, a large Confederate flag

floated from the headquarters of a States Rights club on Fayette

street near Calvert, and on the afternoon of the same day the Minute

Men, a Union club, whose headquarters were on Baltimore street, gave a

most significant indication of the strength of the wave of feeling

which swept over our people by hauling down the National colors and

running up in their stead the State flag of Maryland, amid the cheers

of the crowd.[12] Everywhere on the streets men and boys were wearing

badges which displayed miniature Confederate flags, and were cheering

the Southern cause. Military companies began to arrive from the

counties. On Saturday, first came a company of seventy men from

Frederick, under Captain Bradley T. Johnson, afterward General in the

Southern Army, and next two cavalry companies from Baltimore County,

and one from Anne Arundel County. These last, the Patapsco Dragoons,

some thirty men, a sturdy-looking body of yeomanry, rode straight to

the City Hall and drew up, expecting to be received with a speech of

welcome from the mayor. I made them a very brief address, and informed

them that dispatches received from Washington had postponed the

necessity for their services, whereupon they started homeward amid

cheers, their bugler striking up "Dixie," which was the first time I

heard that tune. A few days after, they came into Baltimore again. On

Sunday came in the Howard County Dragoons, and by steamboat that

morning two companies from Talbot County, and soon it was reported

that from Harford, Cecil, Carroll and Prince George's, companies were

on their way. All the city companies of uniformed militia were, of

course, under arms. Three batteries of light artillery were in the

streets, among them the light field-pieces belonging to the military

school at Catonsville, but these the reverend rector of the school, a

strong Union man, had thoughtfully spiked.

[Footnote 12: Baltimore _American_, April 22.]

The United States arsenal at Pikesville, at the time unoccupied, was

taken possession of by some Baltimore County troops.

From the local columns of the _American_ of the 22d, a paper which was

strongly on the Union side, I take the following paragraph:

"WAR SPIRIT ON SATURDAY.

"The war spirit raged throughout the city and among all classes during

Saturday with an ardor which seemed to gather fresh force each

hour.... All were united in a determination to resist at every hazard

the passage of troops through Baltimore.... Armed men were marching

through the streets, and the military were moving about in every

direction, and it is evident that Baltimore is to be the battlefield

of the Southern revolution."

And from the _American_ of Tuesday, 23d:

"At the works of the Messrs. Winans their entire force is engaged in

the making of pikes, and in casting balls of every description for

cannon, the steam gun,[13] rifles, muskets, etc., which they are

turning out very rapidly."

[Footnote 13: Winans's steam gun, a recently invented, and, it was

supposed, very formidable engine, was much talked about at this time.

It was not very long afterwards seized and confiscated by the military

authorities.]

And a very significant paragraph from the _Sun_ of the same day:

"Yesterday morning between 300 and 400 of our most respectable colored

residents made a tender of their services to the city authorities.

The mayor thanked them for their offer, and informed them that their

services will be called for if they can be made in any way available."

Officers from Maryland in the United States Army were sending in their

resignations. Colonel (afterward General) Huger, of South Carolina,

who had recently resigned, and was in Baltimore at the time, was made

Colonel of the Fifty-third Regiment, composed of the Independent Greys

and the six companies of the Maryland Guard.

On Monday morning, the 22d, I issued an order directing that all the

drinking-saloons should be closed that day, and the order was

enforced.

On Saturday, April 20th, Captain John C. Robinson, now Major-General,

then in command at Fort McHenry, which stands at the entrance of the

harbor, wrote to Colonel L. Thomas, Adjutant-General of the United

States Army, that he would probably be attacked that night, but he

believed he could hold the fort.

In the September number, for the year 1885, of _American History_

there is an article written by General Robinson, entitled "Baltimore

in 1861," in which he speaks of the apprehended attack on the fort,

and of the conduct of the Baltimore authorities.

He says that about nine o'clock on the evening of the 20th, Police

Commissioner Davis called at the fort, bringing a letter, dated eight

o'clock P. M. of the same evening, from Charles Howard, the president

of the board, which he quotes at length, and which states that, from

rumors that had reached the board, they were apprehensive that the

commander of the fort might be annoyed by lawless and disorderly

characters approaching the walls of the fort, and they proposed to

send a guard of perhaps two hundred men to station themselves on

Whetstone Point, of course beyond the outer limits of the fort, with

orders to arrest and hand over to the civil authorities any

evil-disposed and disorderly persons who might approach the fort. The

letter further stated that this duty would have been confided to the

police force, but their services were so imperatively required

elsewhere that it would be impossible to detail a sufficient number,

and this duty had therefore been entrusted to a detachment of the

regular organized militia of the State, then called out pursuant to

law, and actually in the service of the State. It was added that the

commanding officer of the detachment would be ordered to communicate

with Captain Robinson. The letter closed with repeating the assurance

verbally given to Captain Robinson in the morning that no disturbance

at or near the post should be made with the sanction of any of the

constituted authorities of the city of Baltimore; but, on the

contrary, all their powers should be exerted to prevent anything of

the kind by any parties. A postscript stated that there might perhaps

be a troop of volunteer cavalry with the detachment.

General Robinson continues:

"I did not question the good faith of Mr. Howard, but

Commissioner Davis verbally stated that they proposed to send the

Maryland Guards to help protect the fort. Having made the

acquaintance of some of the officers of that organization, and

heard them freely express their opinions, I declined the offered

support, and then the following conversation occurred:

"_Commandant._ I am aware, sir, that we are to be attacked

to-night. I received notice of it before sundown. If you will go

outside with me you will see we are prepared for it. You will

find the guns loaded, and men standing by them. As for the

Maryland Guards, they cannot come here. I am acquainted with some

of those gentlemen, and know what their sentiments are.

"_Commissioner Davis._ Why, Captain, we are anxious to avoid a

collision.

"_Commandant._ So am I, sir. If you wish to avoid a collision,

place your city military anywhere between the city and that

chapel on the road, but if they come this side of it, I shall

fire on them.

"_Commissioner Davis._ Would you fire into the city of Baltimore?

"_Commandant._ I should be sorry to do it, sir, but if it becomes

necessary in order to hold this fort, I shall not hesitate for

one moment.

"_Commissioner Davis_ (excitedly). I assure you, Captain

Robinson, if there is a woman or child killed in that city, there

will not be one of you left alive here, sir.

"_Commandant._ Very well, sir, I will take the chances. Now, I

assure you, Mr. Davis, if your Baltimore mob comes down here

to-night, you will not have another mob in Baltimore for ten

years to come, sir."

Mr. Davis is a well-known and respected citizen of Baltimore, who has

filled various important public offices with credit, and at present

holds a high position in the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company.

According to his recollection, the interview was more courteous and

less dramatic than would be supposed from the account given by General

Robinson. Mr. Davis says that the people of Baltimore were acquainted

with the defenseless condition of the fort, and that in the excited

state of the public mind this fact probably led to the apprehension

and consequent rumor that an attempt would be made to capture it. The

police authorities believed, and, as it turned out, correctly, that

the rumor was without foundation; yet, to avoid the danger of any

disturbance whatever, the precautions were taken which are described

in the letter of Mr. Howard, and Mr. Davis went in person to deliver

it to Captain Robinson.

His interview was not, however, confined to Captain Robinson, but

included also other officers of the fort, and Mr. Davis was hospitably

received. A conversation ensued in regard to the threatened attack,

and, with one exception, was conducted without asperity. A junior

officer threatened, in case of an attack, to direct the fire of a

cannon on the Washington Monument, which stands in the heart of the

city, and to this threat Mr. Davis replied with heat, "If you do

that, and if a woman or child is killed, there will be nothing left of

you but your brass buttons to tell who you were."

The commandant insisted that the military sent by the board should not

approach the fort nearer than the Roman Catholic chapel, a demand to

which Mr. Davis readily assented, as that situation commanded the only

approach from the city to the fort. In the midst of the conversation

the long roll was sounded, and the whole garrison rushed to arms. For

a long time, and until the alarm was over, Mr. Davis was left alone.

General Robinson was mistaken in his conjecture, "when it seemed to

him that for hours of the night mounted men from the country were

crossing the bridges of the Patapsco." There was but one bridge over

the Patapsco, known as the Long Bridge, from which any sound of

passing horsemen or vehicles of any description could possibly have

been heard at the fort. The sounds which did reach the fort from the

Long Bridge during the hours of the night were probably the market

wagons of Anne Arundel County passing to and from the city on their

usual errand, and the one or two companies from that county, which

came to Baltimore during the period of disturbance, no doubt rode in

over the Long Bridge by daylight.

General Robinson, after describing in his paper the riot of the 19th

of April and the unfortunate event of the killing of Mr. Davis, adds:

"It is impossible to describe the intense excitement that now

prevailed. Only those who saw and felt it can understand or conceive

any adequate idea of its extent"; and in this connection he mentions

the fact that Marshal Kane, chief of the police force, on the evening

of the 19th of April, telegraphed to Bradley T. Johnson, at

Frederick, as follows: "Streets red with Maryland blood; send

expresses over the mountains of Maryland and Virginia for the riflemen

to come without delay. Fresh hordes will be down on us to-morrow. We

will fight them and whip them, or die."

The sending of this dispatch was indeed a startling event, creating a

new complication and embarrassing in the highest degree to the city

authorities. The marshal of police, who had gallantly and successfully

protected the national troops on the 18th and 19th, was so carried

away by the frenzy of the hour that he had thus on his own

responsibility summoned volunteers from Virginia and Maryland to

contest the passage of national troops through the city. Different

views were taken by members of the board of police. It was considered,

on the one hand, that the services of Colonel Kane were, in that

crisis, indispensable, because no one could control as he could the

secession element of the city, which was then in the ascendant and

might get control of the city, and, on the other, that his usefulness

had ceased, because not only had the gravest offense been given to the

Union sentiment of the city by this dispatch, but the authorities in

Washington, while he was at the head of the police, could no longer

have any confidence in the police, or perhaps in the board itself. The

former consideration prevailed.

It is due to Marshal Kane to say that subsequently, and while he

remained in office, he performed his duty to the satisfaction of the

Board. Some years after the war was over he was elected sheriff, and

still later mayor of the city, and in both capacities he enjoyed the

respect and regard of the community.

It may with propriety be added that the conservative position and

action of the police board were so unsatisfactory to many of the more

heated Southern partisans, that a scheme was at one time seriously

entertained by them to suppress the board, and transfer the control of

the police force to other hands. Happily for all parties, better

counsels prevailed.

On Sunday, the 21st of April, with three prominent citizens of

Baltimore, I went to Washington, and we there had an interview with

the President and Cabinet and General Scott. This interview was of so

much importance, that a statement of what occurred was prepared on the

same day and was immediately published. It is here given at length:

BALTIMORE, _April 21_.

Mayor Brown received a dispatch from the President of the United

States at three o'clock A. M. (this morning), directed to himself

and Governor Hicks, requesting them to go to Washington by

special train, in order to consult with Mr. Lincoln for the

preservation of the peace of Maryland. The mayor replied that

Governor Hicks was not in the city, and inquired if he should go

alone. Receiving an answer by telegraph in the affirmative, his

Honor, accompanied by George W. Dobbin, John C. Brune and S. T.

Wallis, Esqs., whom he had summoned to attend him, proceeded at

once to the station. After a series of delays they were enabled

to procure a special train about half-past seven o'clock, in

which they arrived at Washington about ten.

They repaired at once to the President's house, where they were

admitted to an immediate interview, to which the Cabinet and

General Scott were summoned. A long conversation and discussion

ensued. The President, upon his part, recognized the good faith

of the city and State authorities, and insisted upon his own. He

admitted the excited state of feeling in Baltimore, and his

desire and duty to avoid the fatal consequences of a collision

with the people. He urged, on the other hand, the absolute,

irresistible necessity of having a transit through the State for

such troops as might be necessary for the protection of the

Federal capital. The protection of Washington, he asserted with

great earnestness, was the sole object of concentrating troops

there, and he protested that none of the troops brought through

Maryland were intended for any purposes hostile to the State, or

aggressive as against the Southern States. Being now unable to

bring them up the Potomac in security, the President must either

bring them through Maryland or abandon the capital.

He called on General Scott for his opinion, which the General

gave at length, to the effect that troops might be brought

through Maryland without going through Baltimore, by either

carrying them from Perryville to Annapolis, and thence by rail to

Washington, or by bringing them to the Relay House on the

Northern Central Railroad [about seven miles north of the city],

and marching them to the Relay House on the Washington Railroad

[about seven miles south-west of the city], and thence by rail to

the capital. If the people would permit them to go by either of

these routes uninterruptedly, the necessity of their passing

through Baltimore would be avoided. If the people would not

permit them a transit thus remote from the city, they must select

their own best route, and, if need be, fight their own way

through Baltimore--a result which the General earnestly

deprecated.

The President expressed his hearty concurrence in the desire to

avoid a collision, and said that no more troops should be ordered

through Baltimore if they were permitted to go uninterrupted by

either of the other routes suggested. In this disposition the

Secretary of War expressed his participation.

Mayor Brown assured the President that the city authorities would

use all lawful means to prevent their citizens from leaving

Baltimore to attack the troops in passing at a distance; but he

urged, at the same time, the impossibility of their being able to

promise anything more than their best efforts in that direction.

The excitement was great, he told the President, the people of

all classes were fully aroused, and it was impossible for any one

to answer for the consequences of the presence of Northern troops

anywhere within our borders. He reminded the President also that

the jurisdiction of the city authorities was confined to their

own population, and that he could give no promises for the people

elsewhere, because he would be unable to keep them if given. The

President frankly acknowledged this difficulty, and said that the

Government would only ask the city authorities to use their best

efforts with respect to those under their jurisdiction.

The interview terminated with the distinct assurance on the part

of the President that no more troops would be sent through

Baltimore, unless obstructed in their transit in other

directions, and with the understanding that the city authorities

should do their best to restrain their own people.

The Mayor and his companions availed themselves of the

President's full discussion of the day to urge upon him

respectfully, but in the most earnest manner, a course of policy

which would give peace to the country, and especially the

withdrawal of all orders contemplating the passage of troops

through any part of Maryland.

On returning to the cars, and when just about to leave, about 2

P. M., the Mayor received a dispatch from Mr. Garrett (the

President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad) announcing the

approach of troops to Cockeysville [about fourteen miles from

Baltimore on the Northern Central Railroad], and the excitement

consequent upon it in the city. Mr. Brown and his companions

returned at once to the President and asked an immediate

audience, which was promptly given. The Mayor exhibited Mr.

Garrett's dispatch, which gave the President great surprise. He

immediately summoned the Secretary of War and General Scott, who

soon appeared with other members of the Cabinet. The dispatch was

submitted. The President at once, in the most decided way, urged

the recall of the troops, saying he had no idea they would be

there. Lest there should be the slightest suspicion of bad faith

on his part in summoning the Mayor to Washington and allowing

troops to march on the city during his absence, he desired that

the troops should, if it were practicable, be sent back at once

to York or Harrisburg. General Scott adopted the President's

views warmly, and an order was accordingly prepared by the

Lieutenant-General to that effect, and forwarded by Major Belger,

of the Army, who also accompanied the Mayor to this city. The

troops at Cockeysville, the Mayor was assured, were not brought

there for transit through the city, but were intended to be

marched to the Relay House on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

They will proceed to Harrisburg, from there to Philadelphia, and

thence by the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal or by Perryville, as

Major-General Patterson may direct.

This statement is made by the authority of the Mayor and Messrs.

George W. Dobbin, John C. Brune and S. T. Wallis, who accompanied

Mr. Brown, and who concurred with him in all particulars in the

course adopted by him in the two interviews with Mr. Lincoln.

GEO. WM. BROWN, _Mayor_.

This statement was written by Mr. Wallis, at the request of his

associates, on the train, and was given to the public immediately on

their return to the city.

In the course of the first conversation Mr. Simon Cameron called my

attention to the fact that an iron bridge on the Northern Central

Railway, which, he remarked, belonged to the city of Baltimore, had

been disabled by a skilled person so as to inflict little injury on

the bridge, and he desired to know by what authority this had been

done. Up to this time nothing had been said about the disabling of the

bridges. In reply I addressed myself to the President, and said, with

much earnestness, that the disabling of this bridge, and of the other

bridges, had been done by authority, as the reader has already been

told, and that it was a measure of protection on a sudden emergency,

designed to prevent bloodshed in the city of Baltimore, and not an act

of hostility towards the General Government; that the people of

Maryland had always been deeply attached to the Union, which had been

shown on all occasions, but that they, including the citizens of

Baltimore, regarded the proclamation calling for 75,000 troops as an

act of war on the South, and a violation of its constitutional rights,

and that it was not surprising that a high-spirited people, holding

such opinions, should resent the passage of Northern troops through

their city for such a purpose.

Mr. Lincoln was greatly moved, and, springing up from his chair,

walked backward and forward through the apartment. He said, with great

feeling, "Mr. Brown, I am not a learned man! I am not a learned man!"

that his proclamation had not been correctly understood; that he had

no intention of bringing on war, but that his purpose was to defend

the capital, which was in danger of being bombarded from the heights

across the Potomac.

I am giving here only a part of a frank and full conversation, in

which others present participated.

The telegram of Mr. Garrett to me referred to in the preceding

statement is in the following words: "Three thousand Northern troops

are reported to be at Cockeysville. Intense excitement prevails.

Churches have been dismissed and the people are arming in mass. To

prevent terrific bloodshed, the result of your interview and

arrangement is awaited."

To this the following reply to Mr. Garrett was made by me: "Your

telegram received on our return from an interview with the President,

Cabinet and General Scott. Be calm and do nothing until you hear from

me again. I return to see the President at once and will telegraph

again. Wallis, Brune and Dobbin are with me."

Accordingly, after the second interview, the following dispatch was

sent by me to Mr. Garrett: "We have again seen the President, General

Scott, Secretary of War and other members of the Cabinet, and the

troops are ordered to return forthwith to Harrisburg. A messenger goes

with us from General Scott. We return immediately."

Mr. Garrett's telegram was not exaggerated. It was a fearful day in

Baltimore. Women and children, and men, too, were wild with

excitement. A certainty of a fight in the streets if Northern troops

should enter was the pressing danger. Those who were arming in hot

haste to resist the passage of Northern troops little recked of the

fearful risk to which they were exposing themselves and all they held

dear. It was well for the city and State that the President had

decided as he did. When the President gave his deliberate decision

that the troops should pass around Baltimore and not through it,

General Scott, stern soldier as he sometimes was, said with emotion,

"Mr. President, I thank you for this, and God will bless you for it."

From the depth of our hearts my colleagues and myself thanked both the

General and the President.

The troops on the line of the Northern Central Railway--some 2400 men,

about half of them armed--did not receive their orders to return to

Pennsylvania until after several days. As they had expected to make

the journey to Washington by rail, they were naturally not well

equipped or supplied for camp life. I take the following from the

_Sun_ of April 23d: "By order of Marshal Kane, several wagon-loads of

bread and meat were sent to the camp of the Pennsylvania troops, it

being understood that a number were sick and suffering for proper food

and nourishment.... One of the Pennsylvanians died on Sunday and was

buried within the encampment. Two more died yesterday and a number of

others were on the sick list. The troops were deficient in food,

having nothing but crackers to feed upon."

The Eighth Massachusetts Regiment, under command of General Butler,

was the next which passed through Maryland. It reached Perryville, on

the Susquehanna, by rail on the 20th, and there embarked on the

steamboat _Maryland_, arriving at Annapolis early on the morning of

the 21st. Governor Hicks addressed the General a note advising that he

should not land his men, on account of the great excitement there, and

stated that he had telegraphed to that effect to the Secretary of War.

The Governor also wrote to the President, advising him to order

elsewhere the troops then off Annapolis, and to send no more through

Maryland, and added the surprising suggestion that Lord Lyons, the

British Minister, be requested to act as mediator between the

contending parties of the country.

The troops, however, were landed without opposition. The railway from

Annapolis leading to the Washington road had, in some places, been

torn up, but it was promptly repaired by the soldiers, and by the 25th

an unobstructed route was opened through Annapolis to Washington.

Horace Greeley, in his book called "The American Conflict," denounces

with characteristic vehemence and severity of language the proceedings

of the city authorities. He scouts "the demands" of the Mayor and his

associates, whom he designates as "Messrs. Brown & Co." He insists

that practically on the morning of the 20th of April Maryland was a

member of the Southern Confederacy, and that her Governor spoke and

acted the bidding of a cabal of the ablest and most envenomed

traitors.

It is true that the city then, and for days afterwards, was in an

anomalous condition, which may be best described as one of "armed

neutrality"; but it is not true that in any sense it was, on the 20th

of April, or at any other time, a member of the Southern Confederacy.

On the contrary, while many, especially among the young and reckless,

were doing their utmost to place it in that position, regardless of

consequences, and would, if they could, have forced the hands of the

city authorities, it was their conduct which prevented such a

catastrophe. Temporizing and delay were necessary. As soon as passions

had time to cool, a strong reaction set in and the people rapidly

divided into two parties--one on the side of the North, and the other

on the side of the South; but whatever might be their personal or

political sympathies, it was clear to all who had not lost their

reason that Maryland, which lay open from the North by both land and

sea, would be kept in the Union for the sake of the national capital,

even if it required the united power of the nation to accomplish the

object. The telegraph wires on the lines leading to the North had been

cut, and for some days the city was without regular telegraphic

connection. For a longer time the mails were interrupted and travel

was stopped. The buoys in the harbor were temporarily removed. The

business interests of the city of course suffered under these

interruptions, and would be paralyzed if such isolation were to

continue, and the merchants soon began to demand that the channels of

trade should be reopened to the north and east.

The immediate duty of the city authorities was to keep the peace and

protect the city, and, without going into details or discussing the

conduct of individuals, I shall leave others to speak of the manner in

which it was performed.

Colonel Scharf, in his "History of Maryland," Volume III, p. 415, sums

up the matter as follows: "In such a period of intense excitement,

many foolish and unnecessary acts were undoubtedly done by persons in

the employment of the city, as well as by private individuals, but it

is undoubtedly true that the Mayor and board of police commissioners

were inflexibly determined to resist all attempts to force the city

into secession or into acts of hostility to the Federal Government,

and that they successfully accomplished their purpose. If they had

been otherwise disposed, they could easily have effected their

object."

Baltimore and the Nineteenth of April, 1861: A Study of the War · 第 5 / 10 章