THE SIXTH MASSACHUSETTS REGIMENT IN BALTIMORE. -- THE FIGHT. --
THE DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON. -- CORRESPONDENCE IN REGARD TO THE
KILLED AND WOUNDED. -- PUBLIC MEETING. -- TELEGRAM TO THE
PRESIDENT. -- NO REPLY. -- BURNING OF BRIDGES.
The Sixth Massachusetts Regiment had the honor of being the first to
march in obedience to the call of the President, completely equipped
and organized. It had a full band and regimental staff. Mustered at
Lowell on the morning of the 16th, the day after the proclamation was
issued, four companies from Lowell presented themselves, and to these
were added two from Lawrence, one from Groton, one from Acton, and one
from Worcester; and when the regiment reached Boston, at one o'clock,
an additional company was added from that city and another from
Stoneham, making eleven in all--about seven hundred men.[7] It was
addressed by the Governor of the State in front of the State House. In
the city and along the line of the railroad, on the 17th, everywhere,
ovations attended them. In the march down Broadway, in New York, on
the 18th, the wildest enthusiasm inspired all classes. Similar scenes
occurred in the progress through New Jersey and through the city of
Philadelphia. At midnight on the 18th, reports reached Philadelphia
that the passage of the regiment through Baltimore would be disputed.
[Footnote 7: Hanson's Sixth Massachusetts Regiment, p. 14.]
An unarmed and un-uniformed Pennsylvania regiment, under Colonel
Small, was added to the train, either in Philadelphia or when the
train reached the Susquehanna--it has been stated both ways, and I am
not sure which account is correct--and the two regiments made the
force about seventeen hundred men.
The proper course for the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore
Railroad Company was to have given immediate notice to the mayor or
board of police of the number of the troops, and the time when they
were expected to arrive in the city, so that preparation might have
been made to receive them, but no such notice was given. On the
contrary, it was purposely withheld, and no information could be
obtained from the office of the company, although the marshal of
police repeatedly telegraphed to Philadelphia to learn when the troops
were to be expected. No news was received until from a half hour to an
hour of the time at which they were to arrive. Whatever was the reason
that no notice of the approach of the troops was given, it was not
because they had no apprehensions of trouble. Mr. Felton, the
president of the railroad company, says that _before_ the troops left
Philadelphia he called the colonel and principal officers into his
office, and told them of the dangers they would probably encounter,
and advised that each soldier should load his musket before leaving
and be ready for any emergency. Colonel Jones's official report, which
is dated, "Capitol, Washington, April 22, 1861," says, "_After_
leaving Philadelphia, I received intimation that the passage through
the city of Baltimore would be resisted. I caused ammunition to be
distributed and arms loaded, and went personally through the cars, and
issued the following order--viz.:
"'The regiment will march through Baltimore in columns of sections,
arms at will. You will undoubtedly be insulted, abused, and perhaps
assaulted, to which you must pay no attention whatever, but march
with your faces square to the front, and pay no attention to the mob,
even if they throw stones, bricks, or other missiles; but if you are
fired upon, and any of you are hit, your officers will order you to
fire. Do not fire into any promiscuous crowds, but select any man whom
you may see aiming at you, and be sure you drop him.'"
If due notice had been given, and if this order had been carried out,
the danger of a serious disturbance would have been greatly
diminished. The plainest dictates of prudence required the
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania regiments to march through the city in
a body. The Massachusetts regiment was armed with muskets, and could
have defended itself, and would also have had aid from the police; and
although the Pennsylvania troops were unarmed, they would have been
protected by the police just as troops from the same State had been
protected on the day before. The mayor and police commissioners would
have been present, adding the sanction and authority of their official
positions. But the plan adopted laid the troops open to be attacked in
detail when they were least able to defend themselves and were out of
the reach of assistance from the police. This plan was that when the
train reached the President-street or Philadelphia station, in the
southeastern part of Baltimore, each car should, according to custom,
be detached from the engine and be drawn through the city by four
horses for the distance of more than a mile to the Camden-street or
Washington station, in the southwestern part of the city. Some one had
blundered.
The train of thirty-five cars arrived at President-street Station at
about eleven o'clock. The course which the troops had to take was
first northerly on President street, four squares to Pratt street, a
crowded thoroughfare leading along the heads of the docks, then along
Pratt street west for nearly a mile to Howard street, and then south,
on Howard street, one square to the Camden-street station.
Drawn by horses across the city at a rapid pace, about nine[8] cars,
containing seven companies of the Massachusetts Sixth, reached the
Camden-street station, the first carloads being assailed only with
jeers and hisses; but the last car, containing Company "K" and Major
Watson, was delayed on its passage--according to one account was
thrown off the track by obstructions, and had to be replaced with the
help of a passing team; paving-stones and other missiles were thrown,
the windows were broken, and some of the soldiers were struck. Colonel
Jones was in one of the cars which passed through. Near Gay street, it
happened that a number of laborers were at work repaving Pratt street,
and had taken up the cobble-stones for the purpose of relaying them.
As the troops kept passing, the crowd of bystanders grew larger, the
excitement and--among many--the feeling of indignation grew more
intense; each new aggressive act was the signal and example for
further aggression. A cart coming by with a load of sand, the track
was blocked by dumping the cartload upon it--I have been told that
this was the act of some merchants and clerks of the neighborhood--and
then, as a more effectual means of obstruction, some anchors lying
near the head of the Gay-street dock were dragged up to and placed
across the track.[9]
[Footnote 8: According to some of the published accounts _seven_ cars
got through, which would have been one to each company, but I believe
that the number of the cars and of the companies did not correspond.
Probably the larger companies were divided.]
[Footnote 9: For participation in placing this obstruction, a wealthy
merchant of long experience, usually a very peaceful man, was
afterward indicted for treason by the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court
of the United States in Baltimore, but his trial was not pressed.]
The next car being stopped by these obstructions, the driver attached
the horses to the rear end of the car and drove it back, with the
soldiers, to the President-street station, the rest of the cars also,
of course, having to turn back, or--if any of them had not yet
started--to remain where they were at the depot. In the cars thus
stopped and turned back there were four companies, "C," "D," "I" and
"L," under Captains Follansbee, Hart, Pickering and Dike; also the
band, which, I believe, did not leave the depot, and which remained
there with the unarmed Pennsylvania regiment. These four companies, in
all about 220 men, formed on President street, in the midst of a dense
and angry crowd, which threatened and pressed upon the troops,
uttering cheers for Jefferson Davis and the Southern Confederacy, and
groans for Lincoln and the North, with much abusive language. As the
soldiers advanced along President street, the commotion increased; one
of the band of rioters appeared bearing a Confederate flag, and it was
carried a considerable distance before it was torn from its staff by
citizens. Stones were thrown in great numbers, and at the corner of
Fawn street two of the soldiers were knocked down by stones and
seriously injured. In crossing Pratt-street bridge, the troops had to
pick their way over joists and scantling, which by this time had been
placed on the bridge to obstruct their passage.
Colonel Jones's official report, from which I have already quoted,
thus describes what happened after the four companies left the cars.
As Colonel Jones was not present during the march, but obtained the
particulars from others, it is not surprising that his account
contains errors. These will be pointed out and corrected later:
"They proceeded to march in accordance with orders, and had proceeded
but a short distance before they were furiously attacked by a shower
of missiles, which came faster as they advanced. They increased their
step to double-quick, which seemed to infuriate the mob, as it
evidently impressed the mob with the idea that the soldiers dared not
fire or had no ammunition, and pistol-shots were numerously fired into
the ranks, and one soldier fell dead. The order "Fire!" was given, and
it was executed; in consequence several of the mob fell, and the
soldiers again advanced hastily. The mayor of Baltimore placed himself
at the head of the column beside Captain Follansbee, and proceeded
with them a short distance, assuring him that he would protect them,
and begging him not to let the men fire. But the mayor's patience was
soon exhausted, and he seized a musket from the hands of one of the
men, and killed a man therewith; and a policeman, who was in advance
of the column, also shot a man with a revolver. They at last reached
the cars, and they started immediately for Washington. On going
through the train I found there were about one hundred and thirty
missing, including the band and field music. Our baggage was seized,
and we have not as yet been able to recover any of it. I have found it
very difficult to get reliable information in regard to the killed and
wounded, but believe there were only three killed.
"As the men went into the cars" [meaning the men who had marched
through the city to Camden Station], "I caused the blinds to the cars
to be closed, and took every precaution to prevent any shadow of
offense to the people of Baltimore, but still the stones flew thick
and fast into the train, and it was with the utmost difficulty that I
could prevent the troops from leaving the cars and revenging the death
of their comrades. After a volley of stones, some one of the soldiers
fired and killed a Mr. Davis, who, I ascertained by reliable
witnesses, threw a stone into the car." This is incorrectly stated, as
will hereafter appear.
It is proper that I should now go back and take up the narration from
my own point of view.
On the morning of the 19th of April I was at my law office in Saint
Paul street after ten o'clock, when three members of the city council
came to me with a message from Marshal Kane, informing me that he had
just received intelligence that troops were about to arrive--I did not
learn how many--and that he apprehended a disturbance, and requesting
me to go to the Camden-street station. I immediately hastened to the
office of the board of police, and found that they had received a
similar notice. The Counsellor of the City, Mr. George M. Gill, and
myself then drove rapidly in a carriage to the Camden-street station.
The police commissioners followed, and, on reaching the station, we
found Marshal Kane on the ground and the police coming in in squads. A
large and angry crowd had assembled, but were restrained by the police
from committing any serious breach of the peace.
After considerable delay seven of the eleven companies of the
Massachusetts regiment arrived at the station, as already mentioned,
and I saw that the windows of the last car were badly broken. No one
to whom I applied could inform me whether more troops were expected or
not. At this time an alarm was given that the mob was about to tear up
the rails in advance of the train on the Washington road, and Marshal
Kane ordered some of his men to go out the road as far as necessary to
protect the track. Soon afterward, and when I was about to leave the
Camden-street station, supposing all danger to be over, news was
brought to Police Commissioner Davis and myself, who were standing
together, that some troops had been left behind, and that the mob was
tearing up the track on Pratt street, so as to obstruct the progress
of the cars, which were coming to the Camden-street station. Mr. Davis
immediately ran to summon the marshal, who was at the station with a
body of police, to be sent to the point of danger, while I hastened
alone in the same direction. On arriving at about Smith's Wharf, foot
of Gay street, I found that anchors had been placed on the track, and
that Sergeant McComas and four policemen who were with him were not
allowed by a group of rioters to remove the obstruction. I at once
ordered the anchors to be removed, and my authority was not resisted.
I hurried on, and, approaching Pratt-street bridge, I saw a battalion,
which proved to be four companies of the Massachusetts regiment which
had crossed the bridge, coming towards me in double-quick time.
They were firing wildly, sometimes backward, over their shoulders. So
rapid was the march that they could not stop to take aim. The mob,
which was not very large, as it seemed to me, was pursuing with shouts
and stones, and, I think, an occasional pistol-shot. The uproar was
furious. I ran at once to the head of the column, some persons in the
crowd shouting, "Here comes the mayor." I shook hands with the officer
in command, Captain Follansbee, saying as I did so, "I am the mayor of
Baltimore." The captain greeted me cordially. I at once objected to
the double-quick, which was immediately stopped. I placed myself by
his side, and marched with him. He said, "We have been attacked
without provocation," or words to that effect. I replied, "You must
defend yourselves." I expected that he would face his men to the rear,
and, after giving warning, would fire if necessary. But I said no
more, for I immediately felt that, as mayor of the city, it was not my
province to volunteer such advice. Once before in my life I had taken
part in opposing a formidable riot, and had learned by experience
that the safest and most humane manner of quelling a mob is to meet it
at the beginning with armed resistance.
The column continued its march. There was neither concert of action
nor organization among the rioters. They were armed only with such
stones or missiles as they could pick up, and a few pistols. My
presence for a short time had some effect, but very soon the attack
was renewed with greater violence. The mob grew bolder. Stones flew
thick and fast. Rioters rushed at the soldiers and attempted to snatch
their muskets, and at least on two occasions succeeded. With one of
these muskets a soldier was killed. Men fell on both sides. A young
lawyer, then and now known as a quiet citizen, seized a flag of one of
the companies and nearly tore it from its staff. He was shot through
the thigh, and was carried home apparently a dying man, but he
survived to enter the army of the Confederacy, where he rose to the
rank of captain, and he afterward returned to Baltimore, where he
still lives. The soldiers fired at will. There was no firing by
platoons, and I heard no order given to fire. I remember that at the
corner of South street several citizens standing in a group fell,
either killed or wounded. It was impossible for the troops to
discriminate between the rioters and the by-standers, but the latter
seemed to suffer most, because, as the main attack was from the mob
pursuing the soldiers from the rear, they, in their march, could not
easily face backward to fire, but could shoot at those whom they
passed on the street. Near the corner of Light street a soldier was
severely wounded, who afterward died, and a boy on a vessel lying in
the dock was killed, and about the same place three soldiers at the
head of the column leveled their muskets and fired into a group
standing on the sidewalk, who, as far as I could see, were taking no
active part. The shots took effect, but I cannot say how many fell. I
cried out, waving my umbrella to emphasize my words, "For God's sake
don't shoot!" but it was too late. The statement that I begged Captain
Follansbee not to let the men fire is incorrect, although on this
occasion I did say, "Don't shoot." It then seemed to me that I was in
the wrong place, for my presence did not avail to protect either the
soldiers or the citizens, and I stepped out from the column. Just at
this moment a boy ran forward and handed to me a discharged musket
which had fallen from one of the soldiers. I took it from him and
hastened into the nearest shop, asking the person in charge to keep it
safely, and returned immediately to the street. This boy was far from
being alone in his sympathy for the troops, but their friends were
powerless, except to care for the wounded and remove the dead. The
statement in Colonel Jones's report that I seized a musket and killed
one of the rioters is entirely incorrect. The smoking musket seen in
my hands was no doubt the foundation for it. There is no foundation
for the other statement that one of the police shot a man with a
revolver. At the moment when I returned to the street, Marshal Kane,
with about fifty policemen (as I then supposed, but I have since
ascertained that in fact there were not so many), came at a run from
the direction of the Camden-street station, and throwing themselves in
the rear of the troops, they formed a line in front of the mob, and
with drawn revolvers kept it back. This was between Light and Charles
streets. Marshal Kane's voice shouted, "Keep back, men, or I shoot!"
This movement, which I saw myself, was gallantly executed, and was
perfectly successful. The mob recoiled like water from a rock. One of
the leading rioters, then a young man, now a peaceful merchant, tried,
as he has himself told me, to pass the line, but the marshal seized
him and vowed he would shoot if the attempt was made. This nearly
ended the fight, and the column passed on under the protection of the
police, without serious molestation, to Camden Station.[10] I had
accompanied the troops for more than a third of a mile, and regarded
the danger as now over. At Camden-street Station there was rioting and
confusion. Commissioner Davis assisted in placing the soldiers in the
cars for Washington. Some muskets were pointed out of the windows by
the soldiers. To this he earnestly objected, as likely to bring on a
renewal of the fight, and he advised the blinds to be closed. The
muskets were then withdrawn and the blinds closed, by military order,
as stated by Colonel Jones.
[Footnote 10: The accounts in some of our newspapers describe serious
fighting at a point beyond this, but I am satisfied they are
incorrect.]
At last, about a quarter before one o'clock, the train, consisting of
thirteen cars filled with troops, moved out of Camden Station amid the
hisses and groans of the multitude, and passed safely on to
Washington. At the outskirts of the city, half a mile or more beyond
the station, occurred the unfortunate incident of the killing of
Robert W. Davis. This gentleman, a well-known dry-goods merchant, was
standing on a vacant lot near the track with two friends, and as the
train went by they raised a cheer for Jefferson Davis and the South,
when he was immediately shot dead by one of the soldiers from a
car-window, several firing at once. There were no rioters near them,
and they did not know that the troops had been attacked on their march
through the city. There was no "volley of stones" thrown just before
Mr. Davis was killed, nor did he or his friends throw any.[11] This
was the last of the casualties of the day, and was by far the most
serious and unfortunate in its consequences, for it was not
unnaturally made the most of to inflame the minds of the people
against the Northern troops. Had it not been for this incident, there
would perhaps have been among many of our people a keener sense of
blame attaching to themselves as the aggressors. Four of the
Massachusetts regiment were killed and thirty-six wounded. Twelve
citizens were killed, including Mr. Davis. The number of wounded among
the latter has never been ascertained. As the fighting was at close
quarters, the small number of casualties shows that it was not so
severe as has generally been supposed.
[Footnote 11: Testimony of witnesses at the coroner's inquest.]
But peace even for the day had not come. The unarmed Pennsylvanians
and the band of the Massachusetts regiment were still at the
President-street station, where a mob had assembled, and the police at
that point were not sufficient to protect them. Stones were thrown,
and some few of the Pennsylvania troops were hurt, not seriously, I
believe. A good many of them were, not unnaturally, seized with a
panic, and scattered through the city in different directions. Marshal
Kane again appeared on the scene with an adequate force, and an
arrangement was made with the railroad company by which the troops
were sent back in the direction of Philadelphia. During the afternoon
and night a number of stragglers sought the aid of the police and were
cared for at one of the station-houses.
The following card of Captain Dike, who commanded Company "C" of the
Sixth Massachusetts Regiment, appeared in the Boston _Courier_:
"BALTIMORE, _April 25, 1861_.
"It is but an act of justice that induces me to say to my friends
who may feel any interest, and to the community generally, that
in the affair which occurred in this city on Friday, the 19th
instant, the mayor and city authorities should be exonerated from
blame or censure, as they did all in their power, as far as my
knowledge extends, to quell the riot, and Mayor Brown attested
the sincerity of his desire to preserve the peace, and pass our
regiment safely through the city, by marching at the head of its
column, and remaining there at the risk of his life. Candor could
not permit me to say less, and a desire to place the conduct of
the authorities here on the occasion in a right position, as well
as to allay feelings, urges me to this sheer act of justice.
JOHN H. DIKE,
"_Captain Company 'C,' Seventh Regiment,
attached to Sixth Regiment Massachusetts V. M._"
In a letter to Marshal Kane, Colonel Jones wrote as follows:
"HEADQUARTERS SIXTH REGIMENT M. V. M.
"WASHINGTON, D. C., _April 28, 1861_.
"_Marshal Kane, Baltimore, Maryland._
"Please deliver the bodies of the deceased soldiers belonging to
my regiment to Murrill S. Wright, Esq., who is authorized to
receive them, and take charge of them through to Boston, and
thereby add one more to the many favors for which, in connection
with this matter, I am, with my command, much indebted to you.
Many, many thanks for the Christian conduct of the authorities of
Baltimore in this truly unfortunate affair.
"I am, with much respect, your obedient servant,
"EDWARD F. JONES,
"_Colonel Sixth Regiment M. V. M._"
The following correspondence with the Governor of Massachusetts seems
to be entitled to a place in this paper. Gov. Andrew's first telegram
cannot be found. The second, which was sent by me in reply, is as
follows:
"BALTIMORE, _April 20, 1861_.
"_To the Honorable John A. Andrew, Governor of Massachusetts._
"_Sir_:--No one deplores the sad events of yesterday in this city
more deeply than myself, but they were inevitable. Our people
viewed the passage of armed troops to another State through the
streets as an invasion of our soil, and could not be restrained.
The authorities exerted themselves to the best of their ability,
but with only partial success. Governor Hicks was present, and
concurs in all my views as to the proceedings now necessary for
our protection. When are these scenes to cease? Are we to have a
war of sections? God forbid! The bodies of the Massachusetts
soldiers could not be sent out to Boston, as you requested, all
communication between this city and Philadelphia by railroad and
with Boston by steamer having ceased, but they have been placed
in cemented coffins, and will be placed with proper funeral
ceremonies in the mausoleum of Greenmount Cemetery, where they
shall be retained until further directions are received from you.
The wounded are tenderly cared for. I appreciate your offer, but
Baltimore will claim it as her right to pay all expenses
incurred."
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"GEO. WM. BROWN,
"_Mayor of Baltimore._"
To this the following reply was returned by the Governor:
"_To His Honor George W. Brown, Mayor of Baltimore._
"_Dear Sir_:--I appreciate your kind attention to our wounded and
our dead, and trust that at the earliest moment the remains of
our fallen will return to us. I am overwhelmed with surprise that
a peaceful march of American citizens over the highway to the
defense of our common capital should be deemed aggressive to
Baltimoreans. Through New York the march was triumphal.
JOHN A. ANDREW,
"_Governor of Massachusetts._"
This correspondence carries the narrative beyond the nineteenth of
April, and I now return to the remaining events of that day.
After the news spread through the city of the fight in the streets,
and especially of the killing of Mr. Davis, the excitement became
intense. It was manifest that no more troops, while the excitement
lasted, could pass through without a bloody conflict. All citizens, no
matter what were their political opinions, appeared to agree in
this--the strongest friends of the Union as well as its foes. However
such a conflict might terminate, the result would be disastrous. In
each case it might bring down the vengeance of the North upon the
city. If the mob succeeded, it would probably precipitate the city,
and perhaps the State, into a temporary secession. Such an event all
who had not lost their reason deprecated. The immediate and pressing
necessity was that no more troops should arrive.
Governor Hicks called out the military for the preservation of the
peace and the protection of the city.
An immense public meeting assembled in Monument Square. Governor
Hicks, the mayor, Mr. S. Teackle Wallis, and others, addressed it.
In my speech I insisted on the maintenance of peace and order in the
city. I denied that the right of a State to secede from the Union was
granted by the Constitution. This was received with groans and shouts
of disapproval by a part of the crowd, but I maintained my ground. I
deprecated war on the seceding States, and strongly expressed the
opinion that the South could not be conquered. I approved of Governor
Hicks's determination to send no troops from Maryland to invade the
South. I further endeavored to calm the people by informing them of
the efforts made by Governor Hicks and myself to prevent the passage
of more troops through the city.
Governor Hicks said: "I coincide in the sentiment of your worthy
mayor. After three conferences we have agreed, and I bow in submission
to the people. I am a Marylander; I love my State and I love the
Union, but I will suffer my right arm to be torn from my body before I
will raise it to strike a sister State."
A dispatch had previously been sent by Governor Hicks and myself to
the President of the United States as follows: "A collision between
the citizens and the Northern troops has taken place in Baltimore, and
the excitement is fearful. Send no troops here. We will endeavor to
prevent all bloodshed. A public meeting of citizens has been called,
and the troops of the State have been called out to preserve the
peace. They will be enough."
Immediately afterward, Messrs. H. Lennox Bond, a Republican, then
Judge of the Criminal Court of Baltimore, and now Judge of the Circuit
Court of the United States; George W. Dobbin, an eminent lawyer, and
John C. Brune, President of the Board of Trade, went to Washington at
my request, bearing the following letter to the President:
"MAYOR'S OFFICE, BALTIMORE, _April 19, 1861_.
"_Sir_:--This will be presented to you by the Hon. H. Lennox
Bond, and George W. Dobbin, and John C. Brune, Esqs., who will
proceed to Washington by an express train at my request, in order
to explain fully the fearful condition of affairs in this city.
The people are exasperated to the highest degree by the passage
of troops, and the citizens are universally decided in the
opinion that no more should be ordered to come. The authorities
of the city did their best to-day to protect both strangers and
citizens and to prevent a collision, but in vain, and, but for
their great efforts, a fearful slaughter would have occurred.
Under these circumstances it is my solemn duty to inform you that
it is not possible for more soldiers to pass through Baltimore
unless they fight their way at every step. I therefore hope and
trust and most earnestly request that no more troops be permitted
or ordered by the Government to pass through the city. If they
should attempt it, the responsibility for the blood shed will not
rest upon me.
"With great respect, your obedient servant,
"GEO. WM. BROWN, _Mayor_.
"_To His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, President United States._"
To this Governor Hicks added: "I have been in Baltimore City since
Tuesday evening last, and cooeperated with Mayor G. W. Brown in his
untiring efforts to allay and prevent the excitement and suppress the
fearful outbreak as indicated above, and I fully concur in all that is
said by him in the above communication."
No reply came from Washington. The city authorities were left to act
on their own responsibility. Late at night reports came of troops
being on their way both from Harrisburg and Philadelphia. It was
impossible that they could pass through the city without fighting and
bloodshed. In this emergency, the board of police, including the
mayor, immediately assembled for consultation, and came to the
conclusion that it was necessary to burn or disable the bridges on
both railroads so far as was required to prevent the ingress of
troops. This was accordingly done at once, some of the police and a
detachment of the Maryland Guard being sent out to do the work.
Governor Hicks was first consulted and urged to give his consent, for
we desired that he should share with us the responsibility of taking
this grave step. This consent he distinctly gave in my presence and in
the presence of several others, and although there was an attempt
afterward to deny the fact that he so consented, there can be no doubt
whatever about the matter. He was in my house at the time, where, on
my invitation, he had taken refuge, thinking that he was in some
personal danger at the hotel where he was staying. Early the next
morning the Governor returned to Annapolis, and after this the city
authorities had to bear alone the responsibilities which the anomalous
state of things in Baltimore had brought upon them.
On the Philadelphia Railroad the detachment sent out by special train
for the purpose of burning the bridges went as far as the Bush River,
and the long bridge there, and the still longer one over the wide
estuary of the Gunpowder, a few miles nearer Baltimore, were
partially burned. It is an interesting fact that just as this party
arrived at the Bush River bridge, a volunteer party of five gentlemen
from Baltimore reached the same place on the same errand. They had
ridden on horseback by night to the river, and had then gone by boat
to the bridge for the purpose of burning it, and in fact they stayed
at the bridge and continued the work of burning until the afternoon.