CHAPTER XXII

SILVER AND BIMETALLISM

I was compelled, by the state of my health, to be absent

from the country in the campaign which preceded the Presidential

election of 1896, except for the last week or two. But, of

course, I took a very deep interest indeed in the campaign.

Mr. Bryan's theories, and those of his followers in many parts

of the country, had thoroughly alarmed the business men of

the Northern and Eastern States. But in the new States of

the Northwest, especially in those that contained silver mines,

a large majority of the people, without distinction of party,

had become converts to the doctrine that the United States

should coin silver at a ratio compared to gold of sixteen

to one, and make the silver so coined legal tender in the

payment of all debts, public and private. The price of silver

as compared with that of gold had been constantly falling

for several years past. This was attributed to the effect

of the legislation which demonetized silver except to a limited

amount. Several eminent Republicans, both in the Senate and

in the House, as well as many others in private station, left

the Republican Party on that issue. Several States that had

been constantly and reliably Republican became Democratic

or Populist, under the same influence.

The Democratic Platform of 1896 demanded the immediate restoration

of the free coinage of gold and silver at the present ratio

of 16 to 1, without waiting for the consent of any other nation.

That doctrine was reaffirmed and endorsed in the Democratic

National Platform for 1900.

There were two theories among the persons who desired to maintain

the gold standard. One was entertained by the persons known

as Gold Monometallists. They insisted that no value could

be given to any commodity by legislation. They said that

nothing could restore silver to its old value as compared

with gold; that its fall was owing to natural causes, chiefly

to the increased production. They insisted that every attempt

to restore silver to its old place would be futile, and that

the promise to make the attempt, under any circumstances,

was juggling with the people, from which nothing but disaster

and shame would follow. They justly maintained that, if we

undertook the unlimited coinage of silver, and to make it

legal tender, under the inevitable law long ago announced

by Gresham, the cheaper metal, silver, would flow into the

country where it would have a larger value for the purpose

of paying debts, and that gold, the more precious metal, would

desert the country where there would be no use found for it

as long as the cheaper metal would perform its function according

to law. From this, it was claimed, would follow the making

of silver the exclusive basis of all commercial transactions;

the disturbance of our commercial relations with other countries,

and the establishment of a standard of value which would fluctuate

and shrink as the value of silver fluctuated and shrunk. So

that no man who contracted a debt on time could tell what

would be the value of the coin he would be compelled to pay

when his debt became due, and all business on earth would

become gambling. They, therefore, demanded that the Republican

Party should plant itself squarely on the gold standard; should

announce its purpose to make gold the exclusive legal tender

for the country, and appeal to the people for support in the

Presidential election, standing on that ground.

To them their antagonists answered, that the true law was

stated by Alexander Hamilton in his famous Report, accepted

by all his contemporaries, and by all our statesmen of all

parties down to 1873 or thereabouts, and recognised in the

Constitution of the United States. That doctrine was, that

the standard of value must necessarily be fixed by the agreement

of all commercial nations. No nation could, without infinite

suffering and mischief, undertake to set itself against the

rule adopted by the rest of mankind. It was best, if the

nations would consent to it, to have two metals instead of

one made legal tender, at a ratio to be agreed upon by all

mankind, establishing what was called Bimetallism. If this

were done, the Gresham law could not operate, because there

would be no occasion for the cheaper metal to flow into any

one country by reason of its having a preference there in

the payment of debts; and nothing which would cause the more

precious metal to depart from any country by reason of its

being at a disadvantage. If such a rule were adopted, and

a proper ratio once established, it would be pretty likely

to continue, unless there were a very large increase in the

production of one metal or the other. If the supply of gold

in proportion to silver were diminished a little, the corresponding

demand for silver by all mankind would bring up its price

and cure the inequality. So, if the supply of gold were to

increase in proportion to silver, a like effect would take

place.

If, however, the nations of the world were to agree on one

metal alone, it was best that the most precious metal should

be taken for that purpose.

The above, in substance, was the doctrine of Alexander Hamilton,

the ablest practical financier and economist that ever lived,

certainly without a rival in this country.

The duties specially assigned to me in the Senate and in

the House related to other matters. But I made as thorough

and faithful a study as I could of this great question, and

accepted Hamilton's conclusions. I believed they were right

in themselves, and thought the reasons by which they were

supported, although the subject is complex and difficult,

likely to find favor with the American people. Silver has

always been a favorite metal with mankind from the beginning.

While gold may be the standard of value, it is too precious

to be a convenient medium of payment for small sums, such

as enter into the daily transactions of ordinary life. It

is said that you can no more have a double standard, or two

measures of value, than you can have a double standard, or

two measures of distance. But the compensating effect may

be well illustrated by what is done by the makers of clocks

for the most delicate measurements of time, such as are used

for astronomical calculations. The accuracy of the clock

depends upon the length of the pendulum and the weight which

the pendulum supports. If the disk at the end of the pendulum

be humg by a wire of a single metal, that metal expands and

shrinks in length under changing atmospheric influences, and

affects the clock's record of time. So the makers of these

clocks resort to two or three wires of different metals, differently

affected by the atmosphere. One of these compensates for

and supplements the other, so that the atmospheric changes

have much less effect than upon a single metal.

Beside the fact that I thoroughly believed in the soundness

of bimetallism, as I now believe in it, I thought we ought

not to give our antagonists who were pressing us so hard,

and appealing so zealously to every debtor and every man in

pecuniary difficulties, the advantage, in debate before the

people, of arraying on their side all our great authorities

of the past. We had enough on our hands to encounter Mr.

Bryan and the solid South and the powerful Democratic Party

of New York and the other great cities, and every man in the

country who was uneasy and discontented, without giving them

the right to claim as their allies Alexander Hamilton, and

George Washington, and Oliver Ellsworth, and John C. Calhoun,

and Daniel Webster, and Henry Clay, and Thomas H. Benton.

I was, therefore, eager that the Republican Party should state

frankly in its platform what I, myself, deemed the sound doctrine.

It should denounce and condemn the attempt to establish the

free coinage of silver by the power of the United States

alone, and declare that to be practical repudiation and national

ruin. But I thought we ought also to declare our willingness,

if the great commercial nations of the earth would agree,

to establish a bimetallic system on a ratio to be agreed upon.

Some of the enemies of the Republican Party, who could not

adopt the Democratic plan for the free coinage of silver,

without contradicting all their utterances in the past, denounced

this proposal as a subterfuge, a straddle, an attempt to deceive

the people and get votes by pledges not meant to be carried

out.

I believed then, and I believe now, that we were right in

demanding that the Republican Party should go into the campaign

with the declaration I have stated.

It is true that you cannot give value to any commodity by

law. It is as idle to attempt to make an ounce of silver

worth as much as an ounce of gold by legislation, as it is to

try to make one pound weigh two pounds, or one yard measure

two yards. You cannot increase the price of a hat, or a coat,

or a farm, by act of Congress. The value of every article,

whether gold or silver, whether used as money or as merchandise,

must depend upon the inexorable law of demand and supply.

But you can, by legislation, compel the use of an article,

which use will create a demand for it, and the demand will

then increase its price. If Congress shall require that every

soldier in the United States Army shall wear a hat or coat

of a particular material or pattern, or shall enact that every

man who votes shall come to the polls dressed in broadcloth,

if there be a limited supply of these commodities, the price

of the hat or the coat or the broadcloth will go up. So,

when the nations of the world joined in depriving silver of

one of its chief uses--that of serving the function of a tender

for the payment of debts, the value of silver diminished because

one large use which it had served before was gone. Whether

this doctrine be sound or no, it was the result of as careful

study as I ever gave in my life, to any subject, public or

private. It was not only the doctrine of the Fathers, but

of recent generations. It was the doctrine on which the Republicans

of Massachusetts, a community noted for its conservatism and

business sagacity, had planted the Commonwealth, and it was

the doctrine on which the American people planted itself and

which triumphed in the election of 1896.

I have been accused, sometimes, of want of sincerity, and,

by one leading New England paper, with having an imperfect

and confused understanding of the subject. Perhaps I may

be pardoned, therefore, for quoting two testimonials to the

value of my personal contribution to this debate. One came

from Senator Clay of Georgia, one of the ablest of the Democratic

leaders. After I had stated my doctrine in a brief speech

in the Senate one day, he crossed the chamber and said to

me that, while he did not accept it, he thought I had made

the ablest and most powerful statement of it he had ever heard

or read. The other came from Charles Emory Smith, afterward

a member of President McKinley's Cabinet and editor of the

_Press,_ a leading paper in Philadelphia. I have his letter

in which he says that he think an edition of at least a million

copies of my speech on gold and silver should be published

and circulated through the country. He also said, in an article

in the _Saturday Evening Post,_ June 14, 1902:

"In the great contest over the repeal of the Silver Purchase

Act he made the most luminous exposition, both of what had

been done, and the reasons for it; and what ought to be done,

and the grounds for it, that was heard in the Senate."

It occurred to me that I could render a very great service

to my country, during my absence, if I could be instrumental

in getting a declaration from England and France that those

countries would join with the United States in an attempt

to reestablish silver as a legal tender.

It was well known that Mr. Balfour, Leader of the Administration

in the House of Commons, was an earnest bimetallist. He had

so declared himself in public, both in the House and elsewhere,

more than once.

There had been a resolution, not long before, signed by more

than two thirds of the French Chamber of Deputies, declaring

that France was ready to take a similar action whenever England

would move. I, accordingly, with the intervention of Mr.

Frewen, the English friend I have just mentioned, arranged

an interview with Mr. Balfour in Downing Street. We had a

very pleasant conversation indeed. I told him that if he

were willing, in case the United States, with France and Germany

and some of the smaller nations, would establish a common

standard for gold and silver, to declare that the step would

have the approval of England, and that, although she would

maintain the gold standard alone for domestic purposes, she

would make a substantial and most important contribution to

the success of the joint undertaking, that it would insure

the defeat of the project for silver monometallism, from which

England, who was so largely our creditor, would suffer, in

the beginning almost as much as we would, and perhaps much

more, and would avert the panic and confusion in the business

of the world, which would be brought about by the success

of the project.

I did not state to Mr. Balfour exactly what I thought the

contribution of England to this result ought to be. He, on

the other hand, did not tell me what he thought she would

do. I did not, of course, expect that England would establish

the free coinage of silver for her own domestic purposes.

But I thought it quite likely that she would declare her cordial

approval of the proposed arrangement between the other countries,

and would reopen her India mints to the free coinage of the

rupee, and maintain the silver standard for the Queen's three

hundred million subjects in Asia. This contribution, I thought,

if Great Britain went no farther, would give great support

to silver, and would ensure the success of the concerted attempt

of the other commercial nations to restore silver to its old

place.

Mr. Balfour expressed his assent to my proposal, and entered

heartily into the scheme. He said he would be very happy

indeed to make such a declaration. I suggested to him that

I had been authorized to say, by one or two gentlemen with

whom I had talked, that, if he were willing, a deputation

of the friends of Bimetallism would wait upon him, to whom

he could express his opinion and purpose. He said he thought

it would be better that he should write a letter to me, and

that if I would write to him stating what I had said orally,

he would answer it with such a statement as I desired. I

told him I was going to Paris in a few days, and that I would

write to him from Paris when I got there. The matter was

left in that way. The next day, or the next day but one,

a luncheon was given me at White's, the club famous for its

memories of Pitt and Canning and the old statesmen of that

time, and still the resort of many of the Conservative leaders

of to-day. There were present some fifteen or twenty gentlemen,

including several members of the Government. A gentleman

who had known of my interview with Mr. Balfour, and sat at

the table some distance from me, made some allusion to it

which was heard by most of the guests. I said that I did

not like to repeat what Mr. Balfour had said; that gentlemen

in his position preferred, if their opinions were to be made

public, to do it for themselves, rather than to have anybody

else do it for them. To this, one member of the Government--

I think it was Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, but I will not undertake

to be sure--said: "It is no secret that Mr. Balfour's opinions

are those of a majority of Her Majesty's Government."

I went to Paris, and wrote at once the letter that had been

agreed upon, of which I have in my possession a copy. I

at once secured an introduction to M. Fougirot, the Member

of the French Assembly who had drawn and procured the signatures

to the resolution to which I just referred. That is, I am

told, a not uncommon way in France of declaring the sense

of the House in anticipation of a more formal vote. He entered

heartily into the plan. He thought Germany would at once

agree, at any rate, he was sure that Belgium, Spain, Italy

and all the European commercial powers would come into the

arrangement, and that the whole thing would be absolutely

sure if Great Britain were to agree. I waited a week or two

for the letter from Mr. Balfour. In the meantime I got a

letter from Mr. Frewen, who told me that Mr. Balfour had

shown him the letter he had written to me; that it was admirable,

and eminently satisfactory. But no letter came. I waited

another week or two, and then got another letter from Mr.

Frewen, in which he said that he had taken no copy of Mr.

Balfour's letter, and had returned the original, and asked

me, if I had no objection, if I would give him a copy of it.

I answered that I had heard nothing, whereupon Mr. Frewen

wrote a note to Mr. Balfour, telling him that I had not heard.

Mr. Balfour said that he had, after writing the letter, submitted

it to a meeting of his colleagues; that one of them had expressed

his most emphatic disapproval of the plan, and that he did

not feel warranted in taking such a step against the objection

of one of his colleagues. I gathered, from what I heard afterward,

that Mr. Balfour wished he had sent he letter without communicating

its contents. But of this I have no right to be sure. Mr.

Balfour sent Mr. Frewen the following letter, which is now

in my possession. It was, I suppose with his approval, sent

to me.

10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, S. W.

August 6, 1896.

DEAR MORETON FREWEN.

I think Senator Hoar has just reason to complain of my long

silence. But, the truth is that I was unwilling to tell

him that my hopes of sending him a letter for publication

had come to an end, until I was really certain that this was

the case. I am afraid however that even if I am able now

to overcome the objections of my colleagues, the letter itself

would be too late to do much good. Please let me know what

you think on this subject.

Yours sincerely,

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR.

I never blamed him. He was in the midst of a good deal of

difficulty with his Education Bill. Certainly there can

be no obligation on the Leader of the English House of Commons

to do anything that he is not sure is for the interests of

his own country, or his own party, for the sake of benefitting

a foreign country, still less for the sake of affecting its

politics. Indeed, I suppose Mr. Balfour would have utterly

and very rightfully disclaimed any idea of writing such a

letter, unless he thought what was proposed would benefit

England. When I went back to London, an offer was made me

later to arrange another interview with Mr. Balfour, and

see if something else could not be devised. This I declined.

I thought I had gone as far as I properly could, with a due

sense of my own dignity. The exigency at home had pretty

much passed by.

A day or two after I got to Paris, after I had seen M. Fougirot,

I cabled my colleague, Mr. Lodge, at St. Louis, where the

delegates to the convention to nominate a President were then

gathering, stating my hope that our convention would insert

in its platform a declaration of the purpose of the Republican

Party to obtain, in concert with other nations, the restoration

of silver as a legal tender in company with gold, and that

I had reason to feel sure that such a plan could be accomplished.

This cable reached St. Louis on the morning the convention

assembled. I do not know how much influence it had, or whether

it had any, in causing the insertion of that plank in the

platform. Such a plank was inserted. In my opinion it saved

the Presidential election, and, in my opinion, in saving the

Presidential election, it saved the country from the incalculable

evil of the free coinage of silver.

After I came home, at the next winter's session, I told the

story of what I had done, to a caucus of the Republican Senators.

A Committee was thereupon appointed by John Sherman, President

of the Caucus, to devise proper means for keeping the pledge

of the National platform and establishing international bimetallism

in concurrence with other nations. The Committee consisted

of Messrs. Wolcott, Hoar, Chandler, Carter and Gear. They

reported the Act of March 3, 1897, authorizing a commission

to visit Europe for that purpose, of which Senator Wolcott

was chairman.

A Commission was sent abroad by President McKinley, in pursuance

of the pledge of the Republican National platform, to endeavor

to effect an arrangement with the leading European nations

for an international bimetallic standard. Senator Wolcott

of Colorado, who was the head of this Commission, told me

he was emboldened to undertake it by the account I had given.

The Commission met with little success. I conjecture that

the English Administration, although a majority of the Government,

and probably a majority of the Conservative Party, were Bimetallists

and favored an international arrangement on principle, did

not like to disturb existing conditions at the risk of offending

the banking interests at London, especially those which had

charge of the enormous foreign investments, the value of

which would be constantly increasing so long as their debts

were payable, principal and interest, in gold, the value of

which, also, was steadily appreciating.

It has been the fashion of some quite zealous--I will not

say presumptuous, still less ignorant or shallow writers on

this subject--to charge bimetallists with catering to a mischievous,

popular delusion, for political purposes, or with shallowness

in thinking or investigating. I have had my share of such

criticism. All I have to say in reply to it is that I have

done my best to get at the truth, without, so far as I am

concerned, any desire except to get at and utter the truth.

In addition to the authority of our own early statesmen,

and to that of the eminent Englishmen to whom I have referred,

I wish to cite that of my pupil and dear friend, General Francis

A. Walker, who is declared by abundant European, as well as

American authority, to be the foremost writer on money of

modern times. He was a thorough believer in the doctrine

I have stated.

He pointed out the danger, indeed the ruin, of undertaking

to reestablish silver without the consent of foreign nations.

But he declared that the happiness and, perhaps, the safety

of the country rested on Bimetallism. He said:

"Indeed, every monometallist ought also to be a monoculist.

Polyphemus, the old Cyclops, would be his ideal. Unfortunately

our philosophers were not in the Garden of Eden at the time

when the Creator made the mistake of endowing men with eyes

in pairs. Perhaps it would not be too much to say that there

are probably few men whose eyes do not differ from each other

as to every element affecting vision by more than the degree

from which gold and silver varied from the French standard

of fifteen and a half to one for whole decades."

The German Imperial Parliament passed a resolution, in June,

1895, in favor of Bimetallism, and the Prussian Parliament

passed a resolution favoring an international bimetallic convention,

provided England joined it, May 22, 1895.

The great increase in the gold product of the world, and

the constant diminution in the value of silver, have put an

end to the danger of the movement for the free coinage of

silver, and made the question purely academic or theoretic,

at any rate for a good while to come. The same causes have

diminished the desire for a bimetallic standard, and make

the difficulty of establishing a parity between silver and

gold, for the present, almost insuperable. So the question

which excited so much public feeling throughout the world

for nearly a quarter of a century, and endangered not only

the ascendancy of the Republican Party, but the financial

strength of the United States, has become almost wholly one

of theory and ancient history.

After leaving Paris I spent a few delightful weeks at Innsbruck

in Austria, and Reichenhall in Germany, both near the frontier

between those two countries. The wonderful scenery and the

curious architecture and antiquity of those towns transport

one back to the Middle Ages. But I suppose they are too well

known now, to our many travellers, to make it worth while

to describe them. I went to those places for the health of

a lady nearly allied to my household. She was under the care

of Baron Liebig, one of the most famous physicians in Germany,

the son of the great chemist. I got quite well acquainted

with him. He was a very interesting man. He had a peculiar

method of dealing with the diseases of the throat and lungs

like those under which my sister-in-law suffered. He had

several large oval apartments, air-tight, with an inner wall

made of porcelain, like that used for an ordinary vase or

pitcher. From these he excluded all the air of the atmosphere,

and supplied its place with an artificial air made for the

purpose. The patients were put in there, remaining an hour

and three quarters or two hours each day--I do not know but

some of them for a longer time. Then they were directed to

take long walks, increasing them in length day by day, a considerable

part of the walk being up a steep hill or mountain. I believe

his method was of very great value to the patient who was

in my company. The Baron thought he could effect a complete

cure if she could stay with him several months. But that

was impossible.

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