CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER
IT WAS ONE OF THE BEST WORKS IN THE SOUTH, THOUGH NOT WELL
LOCATED--BUTLER’S POWDER-BOAT SCHEME, AND WHAT HE EXPECTED TO
ACCOMPLISH BY IT--THROWING 15,000 SHELLS AT THE FORT DISABLED
EIGHT GREAT GUNS OUT OF A TOTAL OF THIRTY-EIGHT--BUTLER THOUGHT
THE FORT STILL TOO STRONG AND WOULD NOT TRY--HE DID NOT EVEN MAKE
INTRENCHMENTS ACCORDING TO ORDERS--GEN. A. H. TERRY, WITH 6,000
SOLDIERS AND 2,000 FROM THE SHIPS, EASILY TOOK THE FORT THREE WEEKS
LATER--THE NAVY’S LAST FIGHT IN THE CIVIL WAR.
The last of the expeditions of the navy in the Civil War, and the
greatest in the number and force of the ships and men, was that sent
to capture Fort Fisher, guarding the entrance to Cape Fear River, on
which Wilmington, North Carolina, stands. The preparations for this
expedition began in the fall of 1864, and one cannot help wondering
that no determined effort was made to capture the port early in the
war, for, because of its situation and the peculiar nature of the
entrances to the mouth of the river, it was the favorite resort of
the blockade-runners, and therefore the chief source from which the
Confederates drew their foreign supplies. “From it Lee’s army in front
of Richmond was kept supplied, and the great Confederate commander had
plainly informed Colonel Lamb, the officer in charge of Fort Fisher,
that the Confederates must fall back from before Richmond, through
inability to procure food, if the port was lost.”
[Illustration: The Entrance to Cape Fear River, Showing Fort Fisher.
_From “The Navy in the Civil War.”_]
Fort Fisher was planned early in the war, and no fort built by the
Confederates received greater care. A look at the chart will show that
a long arm of land comes down from the north between the river and the
sea--an arm that at last is split like the claw of a lobster into two
fingers. One, very fat, and extending in toward the channel of the
river, is called Federal Point, and the other, very slender, continues
the coast line to what is called New Inlet. A shoal body of water
called the basin lies between the two fingers. Fort Fisher was erected
right where the two fingers split apart--right on the wrist.
Beginning a few yards back from the beach and north of the split of the
fingers, the Confederates erected a mound of sand eighty feet high.
On this they mounted an eight-inch (150-pounder) rifle and a ten-inch
medium-length (columbiad) shell gun. From this mound a series of
connected batteries or earthworks, of the most approved form, extended
away to the north for about 1,400 yards. In this stretch were mounted
seventeen great guns, including rifles from four and a half inches up
to seven inches, with a number of ten-inch smooth-bore shell guns. In
height and thickness these batteries were all that could be wished
in that day, and there were immense traverses (big mounds of sand)
between the guns to protect the gun crews from an enfilading fire and
from shells bursting on either side of them. At the north end of the
north-and-south line so far described, the wall of the fort turned at
a right angle toward the west. This part of the wall extending to the
west was about 500 yards long, and it crossed the arm of dry land to
the swamps of the river. Looking from the north, the whole fort was a
very good L. The east-and-west arm mounted twenty-one great guns, and
these were, for the most part, placed to defend the garrison from a
land attack.
[Illustration:
PLAN AND SECTIONS
OF
FORT FISHER
CARRIED BY ASSAULT
BY THE
U.S. FORCES
MAJ. GEN. A. H. TERRY
Commanding.
January 15th, 1865.
After three days’ bombardment by
U. S. Fleet
REAR ADMIRAL D. D. PORTER,
Commanding.
_From “The Navy in the Civil War.”_]
It was plain that the Confederates erected this huge structure to keep
the Federal forces from entering Cape Fear River by the way of New
Inlet. As a matter of fact, it was, in the judgment of engineers, built
too near to the sea. The inlet was shoal at best. Only the lightest of
vessels could enter it. Had Fort Fisher been erected back from the sea,
where it would have been out of range of the deep-draft Union ships, a
different story would have been told of it in history. As it was, Col.
William Lamb, commanding it, gave a right good account of himself.
When an attack was at last planned by the Union forces, a very grave
error was made in placing Benjamin F. Butler at the head of the army
forces after Admiral David D. Porter had been assigned to command the
naval part of the expedition. This is not to disparage the talents of
either man. It is said because the two leaders heartily disliked each
other. It was therefore utterly impossible for them to coöperate.
Ships and transports were assembled at Hampton Roads in September,
but the publicity given to the destination of the expedition caused a
postponement until December. In the meantime Butler had conceived an
idea, and in order not to be unfair his exact words, from page 775 of
“Butler’s Book,” are given. He says:
“In that time, after hearing of the great destruction for many miles
around made by an explosion of gunpowder at Erith, England, I made an
examination into the various instances of the explosive effect of large
quantities of powder; and I believed that possibly, by bringing within
four or five hundred yards of Fort Fisher a large mass of explosives,
and firing the whole in every part at the same moment--for it was the
essence of the experiment to have the powder all exploded at the same
instant--the garrison would at least be so far paralyzed as to enable,
by a prompt landing of men, a seizure of the fort.”
The reader is requested to note that he says “within _four or five
hundred yards_ of Fort Fisher.” His idea was submitted to the
Administration and approved, although Mr. Lincoln accepted it “with
more caution” than the others. Admiral Porter accepted it because “it
was considered advisable to try almost any expedient.” When it came to
details, Butler says on page 800 of his book: “My proposition to the
Navy Department contemplated using but one hundred tons of powder ...
that this one hundred tons of powder should be put into a light-draught
steamer, and arranged and packed in such a way that either by
electrical or other apparatus fire could be communicated all through
the vessel into every part of the mass of powder at one and nearly the
same instant; that that vessel should be run ashore; that time fuses or
other means of calculating the time necessary for the explosion should
be put in operation, and that with the vessel hard and fast on shore
so that none of the powder substantially could go down into the water
until it had time to take fire, the whole mass should explode. The
effect that I expected from that was that the gases from the burning
powder would so disturb the air as to render it impossible for men to
breathe within two hundred yards; that the magazines of the fort would
be burst in and possibly the magazines themselves be exploded; that by
the enormous missiles that would be set in motion and by the concussion
many men would be killed, and if the explosion were to be followed
immediately by an attack of even a small number of effective men, the
fort could be captured.”
Accordingly, an old and worthless steamer, the _Louisiana_, was fitted
for the purpose. Instead of 100 tons, 215 tons of powder were put
on board. Part of it was not of full power, but nearly 200 tons of
the best was stowed in the ship. The work of preparing her delayed
the expedition some days, and it was valuable time. However, the
expedition finally arrived on the coast, Butler, with his transports,
at Masonboro’ Inlet, twenty-five miles up the beach from Fort Fisher,
and Porter out at sea, twenty-five miles from the fort. The transports
had water and coal for but ten days, but there were delays due partly
to weather and partly to the ill feeling between the commanders, and
eventually Butler, with most of his transports, went away to Beaufort
to take on water for the troops.
Favorable (smooth-water) weather was had on the night of December 23,
1864, and the powder-boat _Louisiana_ was sent in. She was in charge
of Commander A. C. Rhind, who had with him Lieut. S. W. Preston,
Engineer A. T. E. Mullen, Master’s Mate Boyden, and seven men. The
tug _Wilderness_ towed the _Louisiana_ in toward the fort near the
north end of the sea-front until the water was fifteen feet deep, when
the _Louisiana_ cast off the line and proceeded under her own steam
until she was in nine feet of water, when she was anchored. She was
then 300 yards or less from the fort. Butler says she should have been
beached, although he also says (see ante) 400 or 500 yards was near
enough. Captain Rhind says he did not beach her because she would have
been strained on the sand, and was likely to open a seam and let in
the water and spoil the experiment. Clocks had been arranged to drop
weights on explosive mixtures, and these were now set. Then a fire was
built in the shaft tunnel in the stern to make sure that she exploded
if the clocks failed, after which Rhind and his men returned to the
tug. It was then exactly midnight. The tug ran twelve miles out to sea
and stopped to watch the explosion. It took place at 1.40 o’clock, and
amounted to absolutely nothing.
An army engineer found the wreck of a blockade-runner, called the
_Condor_, 800 or 900 yards from the fort, assumed that it was the wreck
of the _Louisiana_, and so reported. This report was used to discredit
Commander Rhind. It seems, on the face of it, to have been a fraud,
for the army officer should have known that nothing would remain of the
_Louisiana_ after such an explosion. But if so much had remained, what
became of Butler’s theory?
The idea that exploding any possible mass of gunpowder in the open
air outside of such a fort could hurt any one or anything inside was
simply childish. But Butler never ceased to argue that it ought to
have been a tremendous success. And it is a most sorrowful fact that,
because of Butler’s political influence, the magnificent bravery of the
powder-boat’s crew was never in any public manner recognized.
The next day, December 24, 1864, the warships steamed in and anchored
at fair range, with the ironclads in one line and the wooden ships some
distance outside. They bombarded the fort from 11.30 A.M. until sunset.
At night Butler, with a part of his transports, came from Beaufort, and
next morning the others arrived. It was arranged to land the troops,
undercover of the gunboats, at a point two miles up the beach from the
fort. Butler’s orders were to make an assault, if that were deemed
feasible, but if not, he was to throw up intrenchments and lay siege to
the fort in the usual fashion. Soundings were made in the morning, a
more effective line of fire was planned, and, late in the forenoon, the
fleet steamed in and once more opened fire. This was on December 25,
1864.
Nearly 3,000 troops were landed, with General Weitzel in command. They
captured a couple of little outworks three miles north of the landing
place, and then advanced with skirmishers. One of the skirmishers
captured a flag from one point on the parapet, and another passed
through the sally-port, bayoneted a man on a horse inside, and captured
the horse. Weitzel says (see “Butler’s Book”) that he was within 600
yards of the fort, and from a sand-dune examined the work carefully.
Butler ran down the beach in a shoal-draft transport, and at a range of
500 yards, as he says, looked at the fort for himself. He continues: “I
there met General Weitzel returning from a reconnoissance. He stated to
me that he had been out to the front line, and had seen Fort Fisher.
As a defensive work the fort was uninjured.” He continues: “I said
to Colonel Comstock, who was on board with me [Butler did not land],
‘jump into a boat with General Weitzel, pull ashore and examine with
him and report to me if an assault is feasible; _to me it does not look
so_, but I am unwilling to give it up.’” This is from “Butler’s Book,”
page 794. Being so primed by Butler, Comstock reported an assault not
feasible, and Butler wrote to Admiral Porter that night as follows:
“Upon landing the troops and making a thorough reconnoissance of Fort
Fisher, both General Weitzel and myself are fully of the opinion that
the place could not be carried by assault, as it was left substantially
uninjured as a defensive work by the navy fire. We found seventeen guns
protected by traverses, two only of which were dismounted, bearing up
the beach, and covering a strip of land, the only practicable route,
not more than wide enough for a thousand men in line of battle.... I
shall therefore sail for Hampton Roads as soon as the transport fleet
can be got in order.”
By Confederate reports it appears that the fort was garrisoned by “900
veterans, sixty C. S. N. sailors and marines and 450 junior reserves
between sixteen and eighteen years of age.” On December 24th three
guns had been disabled in the fort, and on the 25th five others were
disabled. Two more had exploded. Including howitzers, the fort had
left thirty-four guns, of which twenty pointed up the beach toward
an assaulting column. There were also some torpedoes planted in the
sand, and a very good line of palisades “made of heavy timber pointed
on top.” But for the delay due to the wild powder-boat scheme, the
Confederates would have been caught with only 667 men in the fort,
according to General Whiting, who commanded the Confederate forces of
the Wilmington district. Whiting wrote that he believed an assault on
Christmas day would have failed. In his official report he said of the
fort: “The delay due to the heavy weather of Wednesday and Thursday
after the arrival of the fleet was its salvation.”
With these facts in mind, a student of history may find the following
words in Admiral Porter’s report of December 27, 1864 (see Report Sec.
Navy, 1865, p. 51): “My despatch of yesterday will scarcely give you an
idea of my disappointment at the conduct of the army authorities in not
attempting to take possession of the forts which had been so completely
silenced by our guns; they were so blown up, burst up and torn up that
the people inside had no intention of fighting any longer.”
Certainly this is not true. Porter guessed at the facts. The
Confederate officers (see Scharf) had to use the flat of their swords
to get some of the reserves out to man the parapet, but they had a
force of nearly 1,000 that would have made a fight. But if Butler
had been as anxious to carry the fort by assault as he was to report
a failure on the part of Admiral Porter, he would have carried the
fort inside of an hour with even the partial force he had landed.
Moreover, when he said the beach was “the only practicable route”
for an assaulting party, he was mistaken, for General Terry, three
weeks later, found a much safer route “under the river bank.” It is
an interesting fact that Butler in his book does not attempt any
explanation of his lack of knowledge, when before the fort, of the
river-bank route.
Thomas E. Taylor, a noted blockade-runner, who has printed a book on
his experiences, was in Richmond in consultation with the Confederate
chiefs at the time of this assault, and wrote the following in a letter
to his employers regarding the matter: “They nearly had Fort Fisher;
they were within sixty yards of it--and had they pushed on as they
ought to have done, could have taken it. It was a terrific bombardment.”
Anyway, Butler did not even throw up intrenchments. He abandoned the
enterprise altogether.
However, the operations against the fort were only suspended. Admiral
Porter filled up his ships with ammunition. On January 13, 1865,
Gen. Alfred H. Terry landed with 6,000 men. The ships anchored with
the monitors at a range of half a mile, and the others outside at
three-quarters of a mile (in some cases further), and a storm of
bursting shells poured over the fort. It lasted all that day, was
continued at intervals during the night and all the next day. The
fort replied slowly, partly because ammunition was scarce and partly
because of the effect of the Union fire.
[Illustration: The Bombardment of Fort Fisher.
_From a lithograph._]
That night an assault was planned, and 1,600 sailors and 400 marines
were landed to help the soldiers. At 9 o’clock on the morning of
January 15, 1865, the fleet once more opened fire. The soldiers,
who had been lying at the river side of the arm of land, charged
up to attack the extreme west end of the fort. The sea force, in
three divisions, led by Cushing (he who destroyed the _Albemarle_),
Lieut.-commander James Parker, and Lieut.-commander T. O. Selfredge,
Jr., charged up the barren beach, where Butler did not dare to go, to
attack the sea front. They had the post of greatest danger, for they
were wholly uncovered.
[Illustration: T. O. Selfredge.
_From a photograph owned by Mr. C. B. Hall._]
“The attacking column of the army was hid and protected by the river
bank as it approached the left flank of the work, but the naval column
came up the open beach upon our center. As its success would have been
disastrous, I concentrated all available guns upon this column, and
met its assault with the larger portion of my men, posting them upon
the ramparts so as to fire down upon the sailors and marines.” The
quotation is from a letter by Colonel Lamb, commanding the fort.
Some of the sea force reached the row of palisades, and there found
shelter, but when eighty-two had been killed and 269 wounded, the
others broke and fled out of range. They were armed (except the
marines) with cutlasses and revolvers only. It was not a good place for
boarders. Nevertheless, this assault was not in vain, as W. R. Mayo,
one of the Confederate officers in the fort, testifies in Scharf’s
work. He says:
“Though proving a great failure in itself, this assault occupied the
nearly worn-out and depleted garrison, and had the direct result of
admitting the army to the ramparts of the disabled land face of the
fort before attention could be given to the assaulting column in that
direction.”
There were forty-two ships in the line bombarding Fort Fisher on
January 15, 1865, of which six were ironclads--five monitors and the
_New Ironsides_. The total number killed afloat during the three days
of fighting was seventy-four, and 289 were wounded. Ammen estimates
from the reports in the department that 21,716 shells were thrown at
the fort. In the first attack 15,000 were thrown.
[Illustration:
Second Attack upon Fort Fisher by the U. S. Navy, under
Rear-admiral D. D. Porter, January 13, 14, 15, 1865.
]
Scharf has this to say of the capture of Fort Fisher:
“The fall of Wilmington was the severest blow to the Confederate
cause which it could receive from the loss of any port. It was far
more injurious than the capture of Charleston, and, but for the moral
effect, even more hurtful than the evacuation of Richmond. With
Wilmington and the Cape Fear River open, the supplies that reached
the Confederate armies would have enabled them to have maintained
an unequal contest for years, but with the fall of Fort Fisher the
constant stream of supplies was effectually cut off and the blockade
made truly effective--not by the navy fleet, but by its captures on
land.”
The other forts about the river soon fell into government hands. The
Civil War was already drawing to a close before the assault was made.
It was a question only of how many days the able and determined men of
the South would struggle against overwhelming numbers. The fall of Fort
Fisher was therefore fortunate for both sides. It the sooner brought a
hopeless fight to an end.