CORRECTING SOME STATEMENTS
IN
GENERAL GREEN B. RAUM'S
DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA
PUBLISHED
IN THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE, WASHINGTON, D. C.
SEPTEMBER 25, 1902
_My Dear General_:
Referring to my conversation with you in Washington, I will endeavor to
aid you in getting at the actual facts connected with the Battle of
Atlanta, as it has never yet been properly written up.
I delivered an address on September 25th, 1889, to the Army of the
Tennessee on that battle, copy of which I am sending to you, and from
which I think you can get a good deal of information.
I first want to call your attention to the fact that the battle commenced
about fifteen minutes after 12 o'clock, and that the Sixteenth Army Corps
fought a long time before the Seventeenth Corps was attacked. You can
verify this statement by reading General Strong's account of the battle,
which is given in our Army of the Tennessee records, volume 11 to 13, page
242.
It was just 12 o'clock exactly when I reached Fuller's headquarters.
Having gone to the front to select my position, Fuller asked me to stop
and take luncheon, and I got down from my horse and went into his tent. I
had sat down at the table when I heard skirmish firing in the rear. Fuller
said it was a lot of the boys out there killing hogs. The stillness had
been oppressive as we went clear to the left and front of Blair's line to
select my new position. We inquired from the pickets and found that nobody
had seen anything of the enemy. It made an impression on us all; so the
moment I heard this firing I jumped up, as if by instinct, and told
Fuller to get into line, and sent a staff officer towards Sweeney; but
before he hardly got out of the tent Sweeney was in line and fighting, so
you can see how sudden the attack was.
In volume 11 to 13 of the Army of the Tennessee records, page 243, Strong,
in his address on the Battle of Atlanta, has this to say fixing the time
of the commencement of the battle, speaking of the time when an officer
was sent with an order to me from McPherson:
The officer had hardly disappeared from sight, when a shot was heard
to the left and rear of us, then another, followed quickly by a
rattling volley of small arms, and at almost the same instant a shell
came crashing through the tree-tops near us, followed by a rapid and
incessant firing from Dodge's Corps. At the first shots every officer
sprang to his feet and called for his horse. The time, I should think,
was ten or fifteen minutes past 12 o'clock.
Then after speaking of the fighting of this Division, comes this, on page
243:
After the _two_ attempts to break the Sixteenth Corps had failed,
General McPherson sent me to General Blair to ascertain the condition
of affairs along his line, and instructed me to say to General Giles
A. Smith to hold his position; that he would order up troops to occupy
the gap between the Seventeenth and Sixteenth Corps; and also saying
as I left him that he would remain with his orderly where he then was
(a commanding position on Dodge's right) until I returned. I rode
rapidly through the woods towards the Seventeenth Corps and found
General Blair with General Giles A. Smith near the extreme left of the
Fourth Division (Hall's Brigade).
This conclusively shows that Blair was not attacked until after two
attacks had been made upon me, although Hall's report gives the attack
upon Blair as at 12 o'clock, that time being before the Sixteenth Corps
was attacked. Fuller gives the time of attack upon him as 12:30. By
reading all of page 243 you will get a full and clear idea of time and
everything. The time was also taken by my staff and record made of it, and
that agrees with Strong. This only shows how far apart officers can get as
to time in a great battle, and on many things, unless correct data is made
of record on the spot.
On page 484, of volume 14 to 16 of Society of the Army of the Tennessee
records, General Leggett says:
Both divisions of the Sixteenth Army Corps immediately became hotly
engaged.... Just at this time I espied General McPherson upon the high
ground in the immediate rear of General Fuller's command, and sent
Captain John B. Raymond of my staff to inquire of General McPherson
the expediency of having General Giles A. Smith and myself change our
line so as to face south, and at the same time I sent Captain George
W. Porter to ascertain whether or not the left of General Smith and
the right of General Fuller were sufficiently near together to
antagonize any force seeking entrance there.... The enemy in front of
the Sixteenth Corps rallied in the woods (this is after the first
attack) and renewed their attack with increased vigor and
bitterness.... The conflict continued for some time, with no
appearance on either side of any disposition to yield the ground, when
the enemy gave way, and fell back in confusion, followed by the
Sixteenth Corps.... The second assault (upon the Sixteenth Corps) was
simultaneous with the attack upon General Giles A. Smith's Division,
which was the left of the Seventeenth Corps.
You will note from my address that the moment I was attacked I sent an
aide, and afterwards a signal officer named Sheffly (I think), who was
detailed with me that day, or happened to be with me. These officers had
gone to General Giles A. Smith, who commanded Blair's left, Fourth
Division, Seventeenth Corps, to get him to refuse his left and join my
right. I think the first officer I sent was Captain Jonas of my staff, who
returned immediately to me, and General Giles A. Smith sent me word that
he would refuse. That was a long time before Cleburn's Division got
between us; but, as my paper and your article show, McPherson had sent
word to Giles A. Smith without knowing the condition in his front, to hold
his position, stating that he would send reinforcements to fill the gap
between Fuller and himself. Of course, had McPherson been there earlier
and seen what I saw, he would have had Smith's left join my right
immediately, which would have put Cleburn in front of us instead of
between us. That is one of the things that occur in battle that the person
on the ground knows better than the one distant. It was on the third
attack on my line that the enemy struck Blair, as Strong did not go to
Blair until after the repulse of the second attack. Cleburn's force got
right in behind Blair's left and picked up that portion of his line that
was refused, and swept back his force so that Blair's left, even before
Waglin of the Fifteenth Corps got there, was pretty nearly an extension of
but a quarter of a mile away from Fuller's right, and after I got through
fighting I had to withdraw my entire right quite a distance to connect
with Waglin and Blair, as Cleburn's force had pressed clear beyond me and
before he was halted was way in the rear of my right.
After the second attack, Cleburn, as he pressed through the gap between
Fuller and Smith, forced Fuller to change front and use part of his force
to protect his flank, and the Sixty-fourth Illinois in this movement
captured the skirmish-line that killed McPherson, taking from them his
field-glass, orders, and other papers that they had taken from McPherson's
body; and later in the day I sent these to General Sherman. See report
Sixty-fourth Illinois, volume 38, part 3, War Records, page 494. Fuller's
maps, page 480, volume 38, part 3, War Records, show where Fuller fought,
and where we had to intrench.
Where I stood in my line I could see the entire Confederate force, and all
of my own, something that very seldom occurs, and, of course, the scene,
as Blair states, was a magnificent one. I saw Fuller do a most gallant
act. I sent an aide to him with instructions to charge, but before he got
there Walker's division broke the center of Fuller's Brigade, his own
regiment, the Twenty-seventh Ohio, falling back. I saw Fuller get down off
his horse, grab the colors of the Twenty-seventh, rush to the front with
them in his hands, and call upon his regiment to come to the colors; and
they rallied and saved his front. It was but a moment later that I saw
Walker, who commanded the division that was attacking Fuller, fall from
his horse, and the division broke and went into the woods. The action of
Fuller was very gallant, and has been painted, and I have a copy of the
painting in my room.
Blair in his report has this to say of the fighting, which shows that he
watched us a long time before he was attacked; and if you will read his
report carefully, you will see that it bears out my statements in full:
I started to go back to my command and witnessed the fearful assault
made on the Sixteenth Army Corps, and its prompt and gallant repulse
by that command. It was a most fortunate circumstance for the whole
army that the Sixteenth Army Corps occupied the position I have
attempted to describe at the moment of attack, and although it does
not belong to me to report upon the bearing and conduct of the
officers and men of that Corps, still I cannot withhold my expression
of admiration for the manner in which this command met and repulsed
the repeated and persistent attacks of the enemy. The attack upon our
flank was made by the whole of Hardee's Corps.
I speak in my address of Mercer's Brigade fighting on three parts of the
field. Mercer, after helping to retake the Decatur-road line, camped right
in the rear of the Fifteenth Corps, and did not come back to me. When
Logan, Blair and myself met that evening, Blair asked Logan for some help
to go up to relieve troops at Bald Hill. Logan, seeing Mercer's Brigade
there, ordered me to send it up. They went up there and crawled in and
relieved the men on Bald Hill. This was very late in the night, and even
then fresh men coming in drove out or captured what men there were still
lying on the enemy's side of the intrenchments. Mercer never made a report
of this battle. You will see by my paper that he was virtually out of the
service, awaiting transportation home; but he went in with his regiment
the same as though they were still in the service. He was a German, and I
do not suppose he knew the importance of reporting; and as it was only a
short time later that I had to leave that army, I therefore did not follow
it up, and I find no report of Mercer or of the Ninth Illinois; but I
think the regimental reports of the Eighty-first Ohio give all these
facts. See War Records, volume 38, part 3, page 463, and report Second
Brigade, Second Division Sixteenth Army Corps, volume 38, part 3, page
450.
In my address I did not go much into detail, but I have all the data of
this battle compiled, and intend some day to put it in shape; but I give
you enough so you can, after examining the reports of Blair and the
others, make your article historically correct. Most of it is correct and
well-stated, but I know you want to get the dates and movements at the
left on such an occasion so full that they will stand criticism, as the
Battle of Atlanta was the great battle of that campaign.
Your article and many others that I have seen assumes that it was a part
of Hardee's Corps that struck Blair's front--that is, his front that was
towards Atlanta; but that is not so. Cleburn's Division was the left
Division of Hardee's Corps. There were three other Divisions. Maney's
(Cheatham's old Division), Bate's, and Walker's. Walker was the next to
Cleburn and attacked Fuller. Bate and Maney struck Sweeney. Cleburn's
Division was in front of Blair after Cleburn had driven back his left and
he had refused it from Leggett's Hill towards my right. What saved Blair
was that Cheatham, who commanded Hood's old Corps, whose orders were to
attack Blair's front at the same time Hardee struck his rear, in
accordance with the plans of both Hood and Hardee, did not attack because
Hardee struck me, which was a surprise to them as well as to me, and when
Cheatham got ready to attack Blair's front, hitting Leggett's Division,
and on down the Fifteenth Corps, two Divisions, Bate's and Walker's, had
been whipped, and were virtually out of the fight, because after the third
attack upon me, and my breaking up of one of their columns so badly, they
did not come again in any force. They went back to the road on the ridge,
just south of and parallel to my line. I forget the name of the road, but
it was the one that led off to Decatur, and there they intrenched, and
when I pushed forward my skirmishers I found them in force. Between 3 and
4 o'clock Maney's Division left my front and went around to help Cleburn.
There have also been many statements that in the first attack two
Divisions of Hardee's Corps struck the Sixteenth Corps and two the
Seventeenth, Blair's. This is not correct. Three Divisions struck my
Corps, and one Division, Cleburn's, struck Blair's Corps, and caught his
left and rear; but after the third attack on my front Maney's Division was
sent around to join Cleburn, and joined in the fiercest attack of the day,
about 4 p. m., upon Leggett's and Smith's Divisions after their line had
been refused and formed almost at right angles at Leggett's Hill, and
reaching out towards me, with Waglin's Brigade on their left. From all
accounts this attack was a fearful one, Maney's men reaching and holding
the outside of the intrenchments that were occupied by Blair's men. This
line faced almost due south, and both forces fought there off and on until
about 7 p. m., some of the enemy remaining in the outside intrenchments
until Mercer's Brigade of the Sixteenth Corps went in at near midnight to
support that line.
Again, many records have it that Blair was forced back early in the
battle. This is a mistake, as his Fourth Division, commanded by General
Giles A. Smith, which was on the extreme left, held most of his original
intrenched line until between 3 and 4 o'clock, when the attack of Cheatham
from the Atlanta side forced them to take a new position to keep them from
being crushed by Cleburn in the rear and Cheatham's attack from the
Atlanta front.
There is another thing that does not seem to be fully understood, and that
is that when Blair got his left refused so as to face Maney and Cleburn in
his front they were unable to gain any headway on him in their attacks. In
fact, they suffered great loss, and they only damaged Blair when they got
in behind his left. Blair had three Regiments there refused at right
angles to his front, and it was a portion of two of these Regiments that
Cleburn picked up. Blair lost nearly all his prisoners from Giles A.
Smith's Division, when Cleburn swept down through the gap and got right in
behind them before they knew anybody was on them. In fact, Blair's men had
to turn around and fight towards their rear, and, as I have stated,
Cleburn got past Fuller's right and commenced shooting into his flank.
Just after Walker was killed there was a lull, and Fuller turned two
regiments right into Cleburn's main line, and, as Captain Allen of the
Signal Corps, says, and my records show, captured that skirmish-line that
killed McPherson, and brought it in.
To show McPherson's feeling about Blair's left flank, I sent Fuller's
command to that flank the night before on a request from McPherson, who
felt anxious about Blair's position, that flank being in the air; but
Blair camped Fuller near where he opened the battle in the rear of the
Seventeenth Corps instead of connecting his left with it. They camped
about a quarter of a mile to his rear and a little back from his extreme
left. Blair, no doubt, thought that would protect him, as well as put them
in line, but he took one of my batteries (Murray's) and put it in his
front line. Now this battery was on the way from Blair to report to me,
coming down just as McPherson was going up the road, and the same
skirmish-line that killed McPherson killed the horses of that battery and
captured a portion of the men, and McPherson really almost fell upon the
limber of one of the guns. This was Murray's United States Battery of four
pieces. I do not know as I have seen this mentioned in any of the reports,
unless it is in mine; but these are the facts of the matter. That is the
way a battery of my Corps was reported lost or captured by the enemy. It
was passing from Blair to myself, and not captured in line of battle or
fighting, as a great many have stated and supposed to be the case.
In your article you speak of Logan taking a part of the Sixteenth Corps
and leading it, as though it was right on my front, and then speak of him
as leading a portion of the Fifteenth Corps that had been broken through
on the Decatur road back into position. The facts are that it was about 4
o'clock in the afternoon when Logan came to me and asked me to send any
force I had free to help retake the line that General John C. Brown's
Division had broken through the Fifteenth Corps. I sent Mercer's Brigade
of the Second Division, and with it sent Captain Jonas of my staff. (See
his statement copied in my address.) Logan followed with the command, and
it double-quicked the whole distance without stopping. As soon as it got
there it found Lightburn's Division drifted back, but holding their line
behind the trees, and the enemy in possession of DeGresse's Battery; and
as Mercer's Brigade went in on the front, Williamson's Brigade of Wood's
Division, which Sherman had directed to make a flank charge, was moving,
and they both reached the works together. The men of Mercer's Brigade got
hold of DeGresse's guns (see report of Eighty-first Illinois) and turned
them on the enemy. There has always been a contest between these two
Brigades as to which got there first, but that does not matter, for they
got in together and retook the line. General J. C. Brown, who commanded
the Confederate Division, was with me afterwards for many years on the
Texas and Pacific Railway, and has given me a full account of his attack,
and the fury with which he was forced out by this movement from the flank
by Wood and the direct assault by Mercer. Mercer in going in had his horse
killed under him.
Fighting along the Fifteenth Corps came late, and was all pretty much
after the fighting on my front was over, because when General Logan came
to me for aid I was intrenching the new line made by the refusal of
Blair's left, and took Mercer's Brigade right out of my front to go with
him. The fact is I did not happen to have a single man in reserve. Every
man I had on the field was in line from the commencement of the fighting.
Sweeney's Division stood right up in the road it was marching on, and the
two batteries were in the center of his division; the position was a very
strong one. If I had had plenty of time to select a position I could not
have found a stronger one. It was the first time I ever saw such execution
done by artillery. They used canister against those columns with terrible
effect.
To show you how small a thing will sometimes change the prospects in a
battle, one of Hardee's Divisions coming towards me got entangled in
something--at that time I could not tell what, but on going to the ground
afterwards I found that it was a mill-pond--that exposed the flank of
Maney's Division that was next to Walker's. Seeing this, I rode down to
Mercer and told him to take his Brigade and charge right into it, which he
did. It was quite a time before I could tell what the result was, but I
soon saw prisoners coming back and knew then that Mercer had them. He had
that Division at a great disadvantage, and captured a great many prisoners
out of it and several battle-flags. See report Second Brigade, Second
Division Sixteenth Army Corps, volume 38, part 3, page 450, Army Records.
That charge, no doubt, saved my line, because I had a very thin line, and
with the most of Hardee's Corps coming at me in double column, as it was,
I have no doubt that if it had reached me it would have given me trouble;
but they never got to me on any of their attacks. We were fortunate
enough to break them before they could reach the line, though on Fuller's
front they were right up to it when Walker fell.
There was a great dispute between Hood and Hardee about this movement to
the rear, Hood claiming that Hardee should have reached there early in the
morning, while Hardee claimed he did not receive the order in time to get
there before he did--a very fortunate fact for us, for if he had reached
the rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and Cheatham and Stewart
had attacked in the front, it would have been rough times for the old Army
of the Tennessee; but no doubt they would have come out of it with honor
in some way.
I think there is no doubt about the time McPherson was killed--it was just
about two hours after the battle had opened. Of course there are all kinds
of time given, but the fact of the stopping of the watch of the signal
officer, Sheffly, when he fell against the tree at two minutes past two,
is almost conclusive evidence. See his statement, volume 11-13, page 242,
records Society Army of the Tennessee. You can judge of that yourself,
because even before McPherson got up to my right, where he stood, as
Strong says, watching me, I had been fighting some time, for he had to
ride from near Sherman's headquarters up there, a distance of two to three
miles. If you will read carefully the address I am sending you, and the
report Blair made--also the address of Strong--I think you will come to
the same conclusions I give you. An article on the death of General
McPherson, by W. W. Allen, of San Diego, California, Signal Officer of the
Army of the Tennessee, appeared in an issue of the National Tribune some
time this year, but of what date I do not know. It goes to prove the time
and the hour McPherson was killed, and the capture of the skirmish-line
that killed him. Of course a great many of the official reports are
misleading as to time, and it is only by these circumstances that we can
judge definitely. I notice it was 12:20 o'clock, according to Allen, when
they first heard the rattle of musketry and artillery.
When you have read Allen's article please return it to me. I will be very
glad to give you any further information you may need if it is possible
for me to do so.
Truly and cordially yours,