_Companions_:
On the 17th day of July, 1864, General John B. Hood relieved General
Joseph E. Johnston in command of the Confederate Army in front of Atlanta,
and on the 20th Hood opened an attack upon Sherman's right, commanded by
General Thomas. The attack was a failure, and resulted in a great defeat
to Hood's Army and the disarrangement of all his plans.
On the evening of the 21st of July, General Sherman's Army had closed up
to within two miles of Atlanta, and on that day Force's Brigade of
Leggett's Division of Blair's Seventeenth Army Corps carried a prominent
hill, known as Bald or Leggett's Hill, that gave us a clear view of
Atlanta, and placed that city within range of our guns. It was a strategic
point, and unless the swing of our left was stopped it would dangerously
interfere with Hood's communications towards the south. Hood fully
appreciated this, and determined upon his celebrated attack in the rear of
General Sherman's Army.
On the 22d of July, the Army of the Tennessee was occupying the rebel
intrenchments, its right resting very near the Howard House, north of the
Augusta Railroad, thence to Leggett's Hill, which had been carried by
Force's assault on the evening of the 21st. From this hill Giles A.
Smith's Division of the Seventeenth Army Corps stretched out southward on
a road that occupied this ridge, with a weak flank in air. To strengthen
this flank, by order of General McPherson I sent on the evening of the
21st one Brigade of Fuller's Division, the other being left at Decatur to
protect our parked trains. Fuller camped his Brigade about half a mile in
the rear of the extreme left and at right angles to Blair's lines and
commanding the open ground and valley of the forks of Sugar Creek, a
position that proved very strong in the battle. Fuller did not go into
line; simply bivouacked ready to respond to any call.
On the morning of the 22d of July, General McPherson called at my
headquarters and gave me verbal orders in relation to the movement of the
Second (Sweeney's) Division of my command, the Sixteenth Corps, which had
been crowded out of the line by the contraction of our lines as we neared
Atlanta, and told me that I was to take position on the left of the line
that Blair had been instructed to occupy and intrench that morning, and
cautioned me about protecting my flank very strongly. McPherson evidently
thought that there would be trouble on that flank, for he rode out to
examine it himself.
I moved Sweeney in the rear of our Army, on the road leading from the
Augusta Railway down the east branch of Sugar Creek to near where it
forks; then, turning west, the road crosses the west branch of Sugar Creek
just back of where Fuller was camped, and passed up through a strip of
woods and through Blair's lines near where his left was refused. Up this
road Sweeney marched until he reached Fuller, when he halted, waiting
until the line I had selected on Blair's proposed new left could be
intrenched, so that at mid-day, July 22d, the position of the Army of the
Tennessee was as follows: One Division of the Fifteenth across and north
of the Augusta Railway facing Atlanta; the balance of the Fifteenth and
all of the Seventeenth Corps behind intrenchments running south of the
railway along a gentle ridge with a gentle slope and clear valley facing
Atlanta in front, and another clear valley in the rear. The Sixteenth
Corps was resting on the road described, entirely in the rear of the
Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and facing from Atlanta. To the left and
left-rear the country was heavily wooded. The enemy, therefore, was
enabled, under cover of the forest, to approach close to the rear of our
lines.
On the night of July 21st Hood had transferred Hardee's Corps and two
Divisions of Wheeler's Cavalry to our rear, going around our left flank,
Wheeler attacking Sprague's Brigade of the Sixteenth Army Corps at
Decatur, where our trains were parked. At daylight, Stewart's and
Cheatham's Corps and the Georgia Militia were withdrawn closer to Atlanta,
and placed in a position to attack simultaneously with Hardee, the plan
thus involving the destroying of the Army of the Tennessee by attacking it
in rear and front and the capturing of all its trains corraled at Decatur.
Hardee's was the largest Corps in Hood's Army, and according to Hood there
were thus to move upon the Army of the Tennessee about 40,000 troops.
Hood's order of attack was for Hardee to form entirely in the rear of the
Army of the Tennessee, but Hardee claims that he met Hood on the night of
the 21st; that he was so late in moving his Corps that they changed the
plan of attack so that his left was to strike the Seventeenth Corps. He
was to swing his right until he enveloped and attacked the rear of the
Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps.
Hood stood in one of the batteries of Atlanta, where he could see Blair's
left and the front line of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps. He says he
was astonished to see the attack come on Blair's left instead of his rear,
and charges his defeat to that fact; but Hardee, when he swung his right
and came out in the open, found the Sixteenth Corps in line in the rear of
our Army, and he was as much surprised to find us there as our Army was at
the sudden attack in our rear. The driving back by the Sixteenth Corps of
Hardee's Corps made the latter drift to the left and against Blair,--not
only to Blair's left, but into his rear,--so that what Hood declares was
the cause of his failure was not Hardee's fault, as his attacks on the
Sixteenth Corps were evidently determined and fierce enough to relieve him
from all blame in that matter.
Historians and others who have written of the Battle of Atlanta have been
misled by being governed in their data by the first dispatches of General
Sherman, who was evidently misinformed, as he afterwards corrected his
dispatches. He stated in the first dispatch that the attack was at 11
a. m., and on Blair's Corps, and also that General McPherson was killed
about 11 a. m. The fact is, Blair was not attacked until half an hour
after the attack upon the Sixteenth Corps, and McPherson fell at about 2
p. m. General Sherman was at the Howard House, which was miles away from
the scene of Hardee's attack in the rear, and evidently did not at first
comprehend the terrific fighting that was in progress, and the serious
results that would have been effected had the attack succeeded.
The battle began within fifteen or twenty minutes of 12 o'clock (noon) and
lasted until midnight, and covered the ground from the Howard House along
the entire front of the Fifteenth (Logan's) Corps, the Seventeenth
(Blair's) on the front of the Sixteenth (which was formed in the rear of
the Army), and on to Decatur, where Sprague's Brigade of the Sixteenth
Army Corps met and defeated Wheeler's Cavalry--a distance of about seven
miles.
The Army of the Tennessee had present on that day at Atlanta and Decatur
about 26,000 men; there were 10,000 in the Fifteenth Army Corps, 9,000 in
the Sixteenth Corps, and 7,000 in the Seventeenth. About 21,000 of these
were in line of battle. Three Brigades of the Sixteenth Corps were absent,
the Sixteenth Corps having 5,000 men in a single line which received the
attack of the four Divisions of Hardee's Corps, Hardee's left, Cleburn's
Division lapping the extreme left of Blair and joining Cheatham's Corps
which attacked Blair from the Atlanta front; and, according to Hood, they
were joined by the Georgia Militia under General Smith. Extending down the
line in front of the Armies of the Ohio and the Cumberland, Stewart's
Corps occupied the works and held the lines in front of the Army of the
Cumberland. The Sixteenth Army Corps fought in the open ground; the
Fifteenth and Seventeenth behind intrenchments.
Where I stood just at the rear of the Sixteenth Army Corps, I could see
the entire line of that corps, and could look up and see the enemy's
entire front as they emerged from the woods, and I quickly saw that both
of my flanks were overlapped by the enemy. Knowing General McPherson was
some two miles away, I sent a staff officer to General Giles A. Smith,
requesting him to refuse his left and protect the gap between the
Seventeenth Corps and my right, which he sent word he would do. Later, as
the battle progressed, and I saw no movement on the part of General Smith,
I sent another officer to inform him that the enemy were passing my right
flank, which was nearly opposite his center, and requested him to refuse
his left immediately, or he would be cut off. This officer (Lieutenant D.
Sheffly, who belonged to the Signal Corps, and acted as my aide only for
the time being) found, on reaching Smith, that he was just becoming
engaged; that he had received orders to hold his line, with a promise that
other troops would be thrown into the gap.
My second messenger, Lieutenant Sheffly, returning over the road upon
which McPherson was a few minutes later shot dead, met the General on the
road with a very few attendants, and turned to warn him of his dangerous
position, assuring him that the enemy held the woods and were advancing.
The General paying no heed to the warning and moving on, my aide turned
and followed him. They had proceeded but a short distance into the woods
when a sharp command, "Halt," was heard from the skirmish-line of the
rebels. Without heeding the command, General McPherson and his party
wheeled their horses, and at that moment a heavy volley was poured in,
killing McPherson and so frightening the horses that they became
unmanageable and plunged into the underbrush in different directions. My
aide became separated from the General and the rest of the party, and was
knocked from his horse by coming in contact with a tree, and lay for some
time in an unconscious condition on the ground. As soon as he was
sufficiently recovered he returned on foot to me, having lost his horse
and equipments. Of General McPherson he saw nothing after his fall. His
watch, crushed by contact with the tree, was stopped at two minutes past 2
o'clock, which fixed the time of General McPherson's death.
General McPherson could not have left his point of observation more than a
few minutes when I detected the enemy's advance in the woods some distance
to my right, and between that flank and General Blair's rear. Fuller
quickly changed front with a portion of his brigade to confront them, and
pushing promptly to the attack captured their skirmish-line and drove back
their main force. Upon the persons of some of these prisoners we found
McPherson's papers, field-glass, etc., which conveyed to me the first
knowledge I had of his death; or, rather, as I then supposed, of his
capture by the enemy; and seeing that the papers were important I sent
them by my Chief of Staff with all haste to General Sherman.
General McPherson, it seems, had just witnessed the decisive grapple of
the Sixteenth Corps with the charging columns of the enemy, and, as
probably conveying his own reflections at that moment, I quote the
language of General Strong, the only staff officer present with him at
that critical time:
The General and myself, accompanied only by our orderlies, rode on and
took positions on the right of Dodge's line, and witnessed the
desperate assaults of Hood's army.
The Divisions of Generals Fuller and Sweeney were formed in a single
line of battle in the open fields, without cover of any kind (Fuller's
Division on the right,) and were warmly engaged. The enemy, massed in
columns three or four lines deep, moved out of the dense timber
several hundred yards from General Dodge's position, and after gaining
fairly the open fields, halted and opened a rapid fire upon the
Sixteenth Corps. They, however, seemed surprised to find our infantry
in line of battle, prepared for attack, and after facing for a few
minutes the destructive fire from the Divisions of Generals Fuller and
Sweeney, fell back in disorder to the cover of the woods. Here,
however, their lines were quickly reformed, and they again advanced,
evidently determined to carry the position.
The scene at this time was grand and impressive. It seemed to us that
every mounted officer of the attacking column was riding at the front
of, or on the right or left of, the first line of battle. The
regimental colors waved and fluttered in advance of the lines, and not
a shot was fired by the rebel infantry, although the movement was
covered by a heavy and well-directed fire from artillery, which was
posted in the woods and on higher ground, and which enabled the guns
to bear upon our troops with solid shot and shell, firing over the
attacking column.
It seemed impossible, however, for the enemy to face the sweeping,
deadly fire from Fuller's and Sweeney's Divisions, and the guns of the
Fourteenth Ohio and Welker's Batteries of the Sixteenth Corps fairly
mowed great swaths in the advancing columns. They showed great
steadiness, and closed up the gaps and preserved their alignments; but
the iron and leaden hail which was poured upon them was too much for
flesh and blood to stand, and, before reaching the center of the open
field, the columns were broken up and thrown into great confusion.
Taking advantage of this, General Dodge, with portions of General
Fuller's and General Sweeney's Divisions, with bayonets fixed, charged
the enemy and drove them back to the woods, taking many prisoners.
General McPherson's admiration for the steadiness and determined
bravery of the Sixteenth Corps was unbounded. General Dodge held the
key to the position.
Had the Sixteenth Corps given way the rebel army would have been in
the rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and would have swept
like an avalanche over our supply trains, and the position of the Army
of the Tennessee would have been very critical, although, without
doubt, the result of the battle would have been in our favor, because
the Armies of the Cumberland and the Ohio were close at hand, and the
enemy would have been checked and routed further on.
General Blair, in his official report of the battle, says:
I witnessed the first furious assault upon the Sixteenth Army Corps,
and its prompt and gallant repulse. It was a fortunate circumstance
for that whole army that the Sixteenth Army Corps occupied the
position I have attempted to describe, at the moment of the attack;
and although it does not become me to comment upon the brave conduct
of the officers and men of that Corps, still I can not refrain from
expressing my admiration for the manner in which the Sixteenth Corps
met and repulsed the repeated and persistent attacks of the enemy.
The Sixteenth Corps has a record in that battle which we seldom see in the
annals of war. It met the shock of battle and fired the last shot late
that night, as the enemy stubbornly yielded its grasp on Bald Hill. It
fought on four parts of the field, and everywhere with equal success. It
lost no gun that it took into the engagement, and its losses were almost
entirely in killed and wounded--the missing having been captured at
Decatur through getting mired in a swamp.
At no time during the Atlanta campaign was there present in the Sixteenth
Corps more than two small Divisions of three Brigades each, and at this
time these two Divisions were widely scattered; on the Atlanta field only
ten Regiments and two Batteries were present, three entire Brigades being
absent from the Corps. It was called upon to meet the assault of at least
three Divisions or nine Brigades, or at the least forty-nine Regiments,
all full to the utmost that a desperate emergency could swell them,
impelled by the motive of the preconcerted surprise, and orders from their
commander at all hazards to sweep over any and all obstructions; while, on
the other hand, the force attacked and surprised was fighting without
orders, guided only by the exigency of the moment. Their captures
represented forty-nine different Regiments of the enemy. How many more
Regiments were included in those nine Brigades I have never been able to
learn. The fact that this small force, technically, if not actually, in
march, in a perfectly open field, with this enormously superior force
leaping upon them from the cover of dense woods, was able to hold its
ground and drive its assailants, pell-mell, back to the cover of the woods
again, proves that when a great battle is in progress, or a great
emergency occurs, no officer can tell what the result may be when he
throws in his forces, be they 5,000 or 20,000 men; and it seems to me to
be impossible to draw the line that gives the right to a subordinate
officer to use his own judgment in engaging an enemy when a great battle
is within his hearing.
Suppose the Sixteenth Corps, with less than 5,000 men, seeing at least
three times their number in their front, should have retreated, instead of
standing and fighting as it did: What would have been the result? I say
that in all my experience in life, until the two forces struck and the
Sixteenth Corps stood firm, I never passed more anxious moments.
Sprague's Brigade, of the same corps, was engaged at the same time within
hearing, but on a different field,--at Decatur,--fighting and stubbornly
holding that place, knowing that if he failed the trains massed there and
_en route_ from Roswell would be captured. His fight was a gallant and
sometimes seemingly almost hopeless one--giving ground inch by inch,
until, finally, he obtained a position that he could not be driven from,
and one that protected the entire trains of the Army.
As Hardee's attack fell upon the Sixteenth Army Corps, his left Division
(Cleburn's) lapped over and beyond Blair's left, and swung around his left
front; they poured down through the gap between the left of the
Seventeenth and the right of the Sixteenth Corps, taking Blair in front,
flank, and rear. Cheatham's Corps moved out of Atlanta and attacked in
Blair's front. General Giles A. Smith commanded Blair's left Division, his
right connecting with Leggett at Bald Hill, where Leggett's Division held
the line until they connected with the Fifteenth Corps, and along this
front the battle raged with great fury.
As Cleburn advanced along the open space between the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Corps they cut off from Blair's left and captured a portion of
two Regiments of his command, and forced the Seventeenth Corps to form new
lines, utilizing the old intrenchments thrown up by the enemy, fighting
first on one side and then on the other, as the attack would come from
Hardee in the rear or Cheatham in the front, until about 3:30 p. m., when,
evidently after a lull, an extraordinary effort was made by the rebels to
wipe out Giles A. Smith's Division and capture Leggett's Hill, the enemy
approaching under cover of the woods until they were within fifty yards of
Smith's temporary position, when they pressed forward until the fight
became a hand-to-hand conflict across the trenches occupied by Smith, the
troops using bayonet freely and the officers their swords. This attack
failed; it was no doubt timed to occur at the same time that Cheatham's
Corps attacked from the Atlanta front, which Leggett met. The brunt of
Cheatham's attack was against Leggett's Hill, the key to the position of
that portion of the Army of the Tennessee. General Giles A. Smith's
Division had to give up the works they occupied and fall into line at
right angles with Leggett's Division, Leggett's Hill being the apex of the
formation; and around this position for three-quarters of an hour more
desperate fighting was done that I can describe. Up to midnight the enemy
occupied one side of the works while we occupied the other, neither side
giving way until Hood saw that the whole attack was a failure, when those
who were on the outside of the works finally surrendered to us. Their
attack at this angle was a determined and resolute one, advancing up to
our breastworks on the crest of the hill, planting their flag side by side
with ours, and fighting hand to hand until it grew so dark that nothing
could be seen but the flash of guns from the opposite sides of the works.
The ground covered by these attacks was literally strewn with the dead of
both sides. The loss of Blair's Corps was 1,801 killed, wounded, and
missing. Blair's left struck in the rear flank, and the front gave way
slowly, gradually, fighting for every inch of ground, until their left was
opposite the right flank of the Sixteenth Corps; then they halted, and
held the enemy, refusing to give another inch.
It would be difficult in all the annals of war to find a parallel to the
fighting of the Seventeenth Corps; first from one side of its works and
then from the other, one incident of which was that of Colonel Belknap, of
the Union side, who, reaching over the works, seized the Colonel of the
Forty-fifth Alabama, and, drawing him over the breastworks, made him a
prisoner of war.
About 4 p. m. Cheatham's Corps was ordered by Hood to again attack; they
directed their assault this time to the front of the Fifteenth Corps,
using the Decatur wagon-road and railway as a guide, and came forward in
solid masses, meeting no success until they slipped through to the rear of
the Fifteenth Corps by a deep cut used by the railway passing through our
intrenchments.
As soon as they reached our rear, Lightburn's Division of the Fifteenth
Corps became partially panic-stricken, and fell back, giving up the
intrenchments for the whole front of this Division, the enemy capturing
the celebrated Degress Battery of 20-pounders and two guns in advance of
our lines. The officers of Lightburn's Division rallied it in the line of
intrenchments, just in the rear of the position they had in the morning.
General Logan was then in command of the Army of the Tennessee. He rode
over to my position, and I sent Mersey's Brigade of the Second Division,
under the guidance of Major Edward Jonas, my Aide-de-camp, to the aid of
the Fifteenth Corps. Of the performance of that Brigade on that occasion,
I quote the words of that staff officer, Major Jonas:
I conducted Mersey's Brigade to the point where needed; arrived at the
railroad, he at once deployed and charged, all men of the Fifteenth
Corps at hand joining with him. Mersey's Brigade recaptured the works
and the guns. Old Colonel Mersey was slightly wounded, and his
celebrated horse, "Billy," killed. By your direction I said to General
Morgan L. Smith (temporarily in command of the Fifteenth Corps):
"General Dodge requests that you return this Brigade at the earliest
practicable moment, as there is every indication of renewed assault on
our own line," and, after saying that your request would be respected,
General Smith added: "Tell General Dodge that his Brigade (Mersey's)
has done magnificently, and that it shall have full credit in my
report."
Afterwards one of Mersey's officers--Captain Boyd, I think--in trying his
skill as an artillerist, cracked one of the recaptured guns. At the same
moment of Mersey's attack in front, General Wood's Division of the
Fifteenth Army Corps, under the eye of General Sherman, attacked the
Confederates occupying our intrenchments in flank, and Williamson's
Brigade joined Mersey's in recapturing our line and the batteries--the
Fourth Iowa Infantry taking a conspicuous part.
Colonel Mersey and many of his men whom he so gallantly led had served
their time before this battle occurred, and were awaiting transportation
home. Eloquent words have been written and spoken all over the land in
behalf of the honor and the bravery of the soldier; but where is the word
spoken or written that can say more for the soldier than the action of
these men on that field? They were out of service; they had written that
they were coming home, and their eyes and hearts were toward the North.
Many an anxious eye was looking for the boy who voluntarily laid down his
life that day, and many a devoted father, mother or sister has had untold
trouble to obtain recognition in the War Department because the soldier's
time had expired. He was mustered out; waiting to go home; and was not
known on the records; but on that day he fought on three different parts
of the field, without a thought except for his cause and his country.
The continuous attacks of Cheatham made no other impression on the line.
Our men were behind the intrenchments and the slaughter of the enemy was
something fearful. General J. C. Brown, who commanded the Confederate
Division that broke through our line, told me that after breaking through
it was impossible to force his men forward; the fire on their flanks and
front was so terrific that when driven out of the works one-half of his
command was killed, wounded, or missing. The Confederate records sustain
this, and it is a wonder that they could force their line so often up to
within 100 to 300 feet of us, where our fire would drive them back in
spite of the efforts of their officers, a great many of whom fell in these
attacks.
I could see the terrific fighting at Leggett's Hill, but of that along the
line of the Fifteenth Corps I can only speak from the records and as told
me by General John C. Brown, of the Confederate Army. The stubbornness and
coolness with which they contested every inch of the ground won his
admiration, and the manner and method with which the line was retaken must
have been seen to be appreciated.
When darkness fell upon us the enemy had retired, except around the angle
in the Seventeenth Corps, known as Leggett's or Bald Hill. Here there was
a continuous fire, desultory and at close quarters, the enemy in places
occupying ground close up to our intrenchments. To relieve these men of
the Seventeenth Army Corps holding this angle, who were worn out, at the
request of General Blair I sent two Regiments of Mersey's Brigade. They
crawled in on their hands and knees, and swept the enemy from that front.
The whole of Hood's Army, except Stewart's Corps, was thrown into our
rear, upon the flank and the front of the Army of the Tennessee, and after
fighting from mid-day until dark were repulsed and driven back. That Army
held or commanded the entire battle-field, demonstrating the fact that the
Army of the Tennessee alone was able and competent to meet and defeat
Hood's entire Army. The battle fell almost entirely upon the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Corps and two Divisions of the Fifteenth Corps, three Brigades
of the Sixteenth being absent. The attack of the enemy was made along this
line some seven times, and they were seven times repulsed.
We captured eighteen stands of colors, 5,000 stands of arms, and 2,017
prisoners. We lost in killed and wounded 3,521 men and ten pieces of
artillery, and over 1,800 men, mostly from Blair's Corps, were taken
prisoners. The enemy's dead reported as buried in front of the different
Corps was over 2,000, and the enemy's total loss in killed, wounded and
prisoners was 8,000.
The criticism has often been made of this battle that with two Armies idle
that day, one the Army of the Ohio (two-thirds as large as the Army of the
Tennessee) and the other the Army of the Cumberland (the largest of all
Sherman's Armies), why we did not enter Atlanta. General Sherman urged
Thomas to make the attack; Thomas's answer was that the enemy were in full
force behind his intrenchments. The fact was that Stewart's Corps was
guarding that front, but General Schofield urged Sherman to allow him to
throw his Army upon Cheatham's flank, in an endeavor to roll up the
Confederate line and so interpose between Atlanta and Cheatham's Corps,
which was so persistently attacking the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps
from the Atlanta front. Sherman, whose anxiety had been very great, seeing
how successfully we were meeting the attack, his face relaxing into a
pleasant smile, said to Schofield, "Let the Army of the Tennessee fight
it out this time." This flank attack of Schofield on Cheatham would have
no doubt cleared our front facing the Atlanta intrenchments, but Stewart
was ready with his three Divisions and the Militia to hold them.
General Sherman, in speaking of this battle, always regretted that he did
not allow Schofield to attack as he suggested, and also force the fighting
on Thomas's front; but no doubt the loss of McPherson really took his
attention from everything except the Army of the Tennessee.
At about 10 o'clock on the night of the 22d, the three Corps commanders of
the Army of the Tennessee (one of them in command of the Army) met in the
rear of the Fifteenth Corps, on the line of the Decatur road, under an oak
tree, and there discussed the results of the day. Blair's men were at the
time in the trenches; in some places the enemy held one side and they the
other. The men of the Fifteenth Corps were still in their own line, but
tired and hungry, and those of the Sixteenth were, after their hard day's
fight, busy throwing up intrenchments on the field they had held and won.
It was thought that the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Ohio,
which had not been engaged that day, should send a force to relieve Blair,
and Dodge, being the junior Corps commander, was dispatched by General
Logan, at the requests of Generals Logan and Blair, to see General
Sherman. My impression is that I met him in a tent; I have heard it said
that he had his headquarters in a house. When I met him he seemed rather
surprised to see me, but greeted me cordially, and spoke of the loss of
McPherson. I stated to him my errand. He turned upon me and said, "Dodge,
you whipped them today, didn't you?" I said, "Yes, sir." Then he said:
"Can't you do it again tomorrow?" and I said, "Yes, sir"; bade him
good-night, and went back to my command, determined never to go upon
another such errand. As he explained it afterward, he wanted it said that
the little Army of the Tennessee had fought the great battle that day,
needing no help, no aid, and that it could be said that all alone it had
whipped the whole of Hood's Army. Therefore, he let us hold our position
and our line, knowing that Hood would not dare attack us after the
"thrashing" he had already received. When we consider that in this, the
greatest battle of the campaign, the little Army of the Tennessee met the
entire rebel Army, secretly thrust to its rear, on its flank, and upon its
advance center, with its idolized commander killed in the first shock of
battle, and at nightfall found the enemy's dead and wounded on its front,
we see that no disaster--no temporary rebuff--could discourage this Army.
Every man was at his post; every man doing a hero's duty. They proved they
might be wiped out but never made to run. They were invincible.
Companions, regarding so great a battle, against such odds, with such
loss, the question has often been asked me--and I know it has come to the
mind of all of us--why it was that this battle was never put forth ahead
of many others inferior to it, but better known to the world and causing
much greater comment?
The answer comes to all of us. It is apparent to us today, as it was that
night. We had lost our best friend,--that superb soldier, our commander,
General McPherson; his death counted so much more to us than victory that
we spoke of our battle, our great success, with our loss uppermost in our
minds.
[Illustration: MONUMENT ERECTED ON THE BATTLE-FIELD OF ATLANTA
This monument was erected by the Society of the Army of the Tennessee on
the spot where Major-General James B. McPherson was killed, July 22,
1864.]