In a few days I received a letter from General Hunter, who had relieved
General Fremont, instructing me that thereafter everything in the
department must be carried on in accordance with the orders of the War
Department and the Army Regulations, and I immediately saw a change for
the better. I was soldier enough, although I had not had much experience
then, to know that the methods being pursued under Fremont could bring
nothing but disaster to the service. Every order was signed by somebody
acting as a General, a Colonel, or something else, while in fact many of
them had no rank whatever, and in looking over my own orders I do not know
why I did not sign myself as an Acting General, as those who succeeded me
did. Even after General Halleck took command I noticed in the orders of
General Hunter that he assigned persons to the command of a Brigade as
Acting Brigadier-Generals instead of their rank as Colonel Commanding,
etc.
I remained at Rolla until the return of the troops under General Hunter;
and finally those commanded by Siegel, Asboth and Osterhaus were encamped
at Rolla outside of the post and were reporting directly to the commanding
officer of the department, while I as post commander reported directly to
the same authority.
General Hunter as soon as he took command wired the War Department that
there was no force of the enemy in his neighborhood, although orders had
been given by Fremont a day or two before to march out and fight Price's
Army. Hunter, therefore, in accordance with his orders from Washington,
abandoned the pursuit, although with the force he had he could have driven
Price and McCullough south of the Arkansas River, and probably have
avoided the later campaign that ended in the Battle of Pea Ridge. Hunter
moved his forces back to Rolla and Sedalia and sent 18,000 of his men to
join General Grant in the campaigns up the Tennessee River.
This force at Rolla was mostly Germans, and the change of commanders from
Fremont to Hunter, and later to Halleck, was unsatisfactory to them,
though one of the officers, General Osterhaus, took no part in the feeling
and sentiment that seemed to exist that for success it was necessary to
have Fremont or Siegel in command, and my understanding was that the force
at Rolla during the winter of 1861-62 was the nucleus of the force that
was again to march to the Southwest under the orders of General Halleck
and to be commanded by General Siegel. General Halleck, when he assumed
command of the department, in his letters to the War Department and his
orders to the troops showed plainly his disgust at the condition of
matters in that department. He wrote to the War Department:
One week's experience here is sufficient to prove that everything is
in complete chaos. The most astounding orders and contracts for
supplies of all kinds have been made, and large amounts purported to
have been received, but there is nothing to show that they have ever
been properly issued and they cannot now be found.
Of the condition of the troops he found in his department, he wrote:
Some of these corps are not only organized in a way entirely contrary
to law, but are by no means reliable, being mostly foreigners, and
officered in many cases by foreign adventurers, or perhaps refugees
from justice; and, having been tampered with by political partizans
for political purposes, they constitute a very dangerous element to
society as well as to the Army itself. Wherever they go they convert
all Union men into bitter enemies. The men, if properly officered,
would make good soldiers, but with their present officers they are
little better than an armed mob.
They were not paid, had not been mustered into our service, and the
commissions emanated from General Fremont, not from the State or
Government.
General Halleck's plans evidently were to make a campaign against Price as
soon as he could organize the forces concentrated at Rolla. Price's
headquarters were at Springfield, and his northerly line was along the
Osage Valley. His force was estimated anywhere from 10,000 to 30,000. As
outposts General Halleck had Rolla, Jefferson City, and Sedalia. There was
located at Rolla five or six thousand troops; at Sedalia and along that
line about ten or twelve thousand, under General Pope, including Jeff C.
Davis's Division; but these troops Halleck intended to send down the
Mississippi and up the Tennessee.
General Pope in his letters to General Halleck urged that he be allowed to
move on Price and destroy his Army, which he said he could do with his
force. Rumors of Price's force and their movements were a constant terror
and excitement throughout Missouri. The whole of northern Missouri was
aroused by Price's proximity, and all the counties had recruiting officers
from his Army enrolling and sending it recruits. The numbers of these
recruiting officers and their small squads of recruits were magnified into
thousands, and Price, when he sent a thousand men to Lexington for the
purpose of holding that place and recruiting, brought orders from Halleck
for a movement of all the troops to cut him off. The prompt movement of
Halleck kept him from remaining there very long, but he was enabled to
take about three thousand recruits from there without molestation from us.
Price's campaign as planned for the winter was to have General
McCullough's Arkansas force, which was lying at Cross Timbers, near
Elkhorn Tavern, and Van Buren in Arkansas, join him. Price complained
bitterly of his inability to obtain any aid from McCullough, stating that
if he could obtain it he could march into northern Missouri and hold the
State, and recruit there an Army of Missourians; which, from my experience
in the State, I have no doubt he would have done if he could have moved
there and held his position.
General Halleck's plan evidently was to move a body from Rolla directly on
Springfield, with the intention of striking and defeating Price before
Price could receive reinforcements, but Halleck had a great disinclination
to move until he had organized the forces in the State of Missouri into
Brigades and Divisions, had them properly mustered and officered, and had
his staff departments so arranged that they could be depended upon to take
care of any moving column. This disinclination of Halleck to move carried
us on to the first of January.
In December General Siegel was given command of the troops at Rolla, and
Captain Phil Sheridan was sent there as Quartermaster for that Army. His
ability and foresight in organizing the transportation of an Army, feeding
it, and fitting it for a campaign, was shown every day.
On December 26th General Halleck assigned General S. R. Curtis to the
command of the District of Southwest Missouri. This included the forces
under Siegel at Rolla, and caused very severe comments from them. From the
letters of Halleck, written at the time and afterwards, this placing of
Siegel under Curtis was caused by the letters and opinions--in fact, the
denunciations--of Siegel made by Captains Schofield, Totten, and Sturgis,
when with Lyon in the Wilson's Creek campaign. Evidently Halleck lost all
faith in Siegel as commander of the Southwestern Army, and therefore
assigned Brigadier-General Samuel R. Curtis, who had been stationed at St.
Louis, to the command. But General Siegel was still left in command of two
Divisions of the troops near Rolla, which was a great mistake.
As soon as General Curtis assumed command General Halleck commenced urging
him to move to the south on Springfield, agreeing to send to him Colonel
Jeff C. Davis's Division to join him before reaching Springfield, which
Division was about 5,000 strong, and was with Pope on the Lamine River
line. Curtis hesitated, and did not feel secure with the forces he had,
although Halleck did not believe Price would stand for a fight, or that
Curtis would need Jeff C. Davis's Division.
The Army of the Southwest, about seven thousand strong, was organized at
Rolla, and moved from there January 14th, towards Springfield, halting at
Lebanon. From Lebanon it moved on to Marshfield, where Colonel Jeff C.
Davis, with his Division, joined it. Great preparations were made there
for the attack upon Price, and we moved out of Marshfield prepared for
battle, General Siegel commanding the First and Second Divisions, one
under General Osterhaus and the other under General Asboth. General Jeff
C. Davis, from General Pope's Army, commanded the Third Division, and
Colonel Eugene A. Carr the Fourth Division, a Brigade of which I
commanded.
When within about three miles of Springfield we received orders to attack
that town the next morning, and moved at midnight. All the reports we
received were that Price was in Springfield ready for battle. I had the
extreme left, and put out my skirmishers soon after midnight, supposing,
of course, that I was in front of the enemy, although I had seen nothing
of them. In the darkness I lost track of the company of the Fourth Iowa,
who were the skirmishers of my Brigade, and was greatly worried at the
fact, but at daylight I met them on the road mounted upon horses and
dressed in all kinds of costumes. The officer in command, who was an
enterprising one, had started his skirmish-line, and, not meeting any
enemy, had pushed right into Springfield, which he found evacuated except
for a rear guard and a number of horses. They mounted the horses and rode
back to us. All this time our extreme right, under Siegel, was using its
artillery upon the town, not knowing that the enemy had gone.
General Curtis, in his order of battle, instructed Captain Sheridan to
line up his transportation in the rear of the line of battle, so that it
could be used as a defensive obstruction for the troops to fall back to,
provided they met any check or were driven back. Captain Sheridan looked
on this order as a very singular one, and says that he could, in his
imagination, if anything happened our army, see his transportation flying
over that rough country, knowing that his mule-drivers would be the first
to run, most likely from a false report, not even waiting for an attack.
While this order at the time caused no comment, it now, after our long
experience, looks very ridiculous, though not more so than many others, we
received at the beginning of the war.
It was not long before we were all on the march through and beyond
Springfield, Price and his Army being in full retreat, with a force, so
far as we could learn, of about ten thousand men. We followed him as
rapidly as possible, he leaving a strong rear guard under Colonel Little
to stop us at every stream. General Siegel had urged upon General Curtis a
detour by his two Divisions to head off Price or stop him, so that he
could attack him in front while we attacked his rear. Curtis had acceded
to this. I had the advance following up Price, and endeavored to hold him,
while Siegel moved by another road, expecting to catch him in flank or get
ahead of him.
I remember that about noon of each day at some good defensive point,
generally across a creek with a wide, open valley, Price would open out
with his artillery and cavalry and act as though he intended to give
battle. Our cavalry would fall back to give way to our infantry, and we
would go into line, put out our skirmishers, and lose half a day, and as
night came on Price would get out without our accomplishing anything. I
remember distinctly that my Regiment would go into line, strip themselves,
and throw down the chickens, potatoes, apples, and other eatables they had
foraged and taken during the day, and as they would go forward the troops
in our rear would come up and gobble what they had dropped. About the
third time the Regiment went into line I noticed the boys had left nothing
but their knapsacks, and were holding on to their chickens and provisions.
One of the boys saw me looking at them, and thinking I was going to order
them to drop what they had in their hands or on their backs, he appealed
to me, saying, "Colonel, we have fed that damned Thirty-sixth Illinois
Infantry every day and left ourselves without any supper. They put up this
game that is going on to get our chickens. There ain't any Price on that
side of the river, and they can't fool us any longer if they do you."
At Cane Creek, Flat Creek, Sugar Creek, etc., we had pretty sharp
skirmishes. I soon discovered the plan of Price. It was to leave a strong
rear-guard and make a great show while his trains and the rest of his Army
were pushing to the South as fast as possible; so as soon as I saw him
stop I went at him head-on with the cavalry and infantry, not even waiting
to deploy more than a Regiment. Price's men would line the road and get
one or two volleys at us and then slip off into the woods before we could
deploy or return their fire. They did not get hurt much, but we did; but
at the same time it broke up his game of holding us back, and we kept
close on to his rear. For two or three days we were looking for Siegel to
get in ahead and check Price, when to our astonishment a report came from
our rear that he had turned his column in on our road some eight miles
behind us, and there was a general howl from the force that had been
pounding away at Price's rear.
Finally we pushed Price back to Fayetteville, Ark., where we landed during
the month of February, and where we were halted by General Halleck's
orders, who stated that he would relieve our front of the enemy by his
movements with the rest of his forces through Southeast Missouri, down the
Mississippi, and up the Tennessee.
While Price was laying at Springfield, in December, he communicated with
the Confederate Government, and changed all his Missouri State force as
far as practicable into Confederate troops. He also complained to the
Government, and to General Polk, who commanded at Columbus, Ky., of the
impossibility of obtaining the co-operation of the Confederate forces west
of the Mississippi River. From the representations of Polk and Price, the
Confederate Government organized all the country west of the Mississippi
River into a department known as the Trans-Mississippi District, and
placed it under the command of General Earl Van Dorn, who assumed command
early in February, 1862. As soon as he assumed command General Van Dorn
prepared to make an aggressive campaign, using all his forces in Arkansas
and those under Price, estimating that they would reach 30,000 troops. His
plan was to move his forces directly from Arkansas northward, west of Iron
Mountain, by way of Salem, while Price moved from Springfield directly
east and joined his column by way of Salem and Rolla, thence the combined
column to move directly on St. Louis, Van Dorn calculating that he could
strike and capture St. Louis before Halleck could concentrate his troops
or obtain any knowledge of his movements that would enable him to defeat
him before reaching St. Louis. Van Dorn expected to make this move in
February, and his plans and the energy with which he executed them and
concentrated his troops shows him to have been an officer of ability and
great energy. General Halleck's prompt movement of General Curtis's army
from Rolla southwest in January, thus driving Price out of Springfield,
compelled Van Dorn to change his plans, and instead of moving towards St.
Louis he moved his troops by Van Buren and the Boston Mountains, making a
junction with Price's force in the Boston Mountains below Fayetteville,
and while General Curtis's Army was laying at Cross Hollows, evidently in
full security, thinking his campaign was over and expecting Price and Van
Dorn to be drawn away from his front by the movement down the Mississippi.
General Curtis was obliged to scatter his forces in that destitute country
over a wide expanse so as to obtain food and forage. Van Dorn, without our
having any knowledge of the fact, marched over the Boston Mountains, and
it was March 3d before General Curtis was aware that Van Dorn was almost
in his front and on his flank. The Union refugees flying before Van Dorn's
movement gave us the first reliable notice of the new combination and the
new movement. General Curtis immediately sent out orders, and, by marching
all night, during heavy snows and severe cold weather, was able to
concentrate most of his force on Sugar Creek, near Bentonville. General
Siegel and his force did not move promptly, as ordered by Curtis, and was
almost cut off before reaching Bentonville. He had to cut his way through
a portion of Van Dorn's Cavalry, which he was able to do without much
loss, and our line was formed on the north side of Sugar Creek, facing to
the south,--a strong position,--expecting to receive Van Dorn's attack on
the main telegraph road from Fayetteville to Springfield. We were on a
plateau with a broad open valley in our front. In the rear of us was what
was known as the Cross Timbers, a deep gorge. To the west of us was much
open ground, over which was a road parallel to the main road, passing down
what was known as Little Cross Timbers, and entering the Springfield and
Fayetteville road about midway between Elkhorn Tavern and Cassville, some
four miles in our rear.
While I was in command at Rolla I had organized by details from the
Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Missouri Regiments a Corps of scouts who
lived in Northern Arkansas and Southern Missouri and were thoroughly
acquainted with that country. During the day of the 6th of March, while
Siegel was joining us and we were preparing for the battle, some of these
scouts came to me and told me that Van Dorn proposed to move to our rear
by this Little Cross Timber road. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon I went
to General Curtis and reported these facts to him, and also told him of
this road and of the feasibility of blockading it, supposing, of course,
he would send some of the troops on his extreme right to do it; but he
turned to me and said: "You take a portion of your command and go there
and blockade the road."
It was after dark before I could reach the Little Cross Timbers, as I had
to march infantry to the place, which was quite a distance away from where
we were. I took six companies of the Fourth Iowa Infantry and one company
of the Third Illinois Cavalry and marched to carry out this order. In the
dark two of my companies crossed the road and got lost, while with the
other five I got into Cross Timbers Hollows and spent about three hours
felling trees all through the gorge, and only left when my cavalry
reported the movement of Van Dorn's Army coming down the road. I returned
to my camp supposing my two companies had been cut off, but upon
discovering that the enemy were coming down the road they managed to get
back across it and reached the camp.
I reported immediately to General Curtis's headquarters, and informed him
that Van Dorn's Army was moving down that road to his rear. He did not
believe it, and thought that I had mistaken some of his cavalry for Van
Dorn's Army. There were no pickets out on our right flank, and I so
reported to General Curtis, but evidently my report made no impression
upon him, and I returned to camp.
Early on the morning of the 7th of March I received a request from General
Curtis to report at a schoolhouse that was on the main Fayetteville road a
half mile north of Sugar Creek, where I met all the commanders of
Divisions, and, I think, some of the Brigade commanders, and where a
council of war was being held as to the policy that was to be pursued. I
was so confident that Van Dorn was in our rear that when I went to this
council I took my Brigade and halted it on the road near where the council
was to be held. Generals Siegel, Asboth, and a majority of the officers
present, advised that we should fall back to Cassville towards
Springfield, and not give battle there, but Colonel Jeff C. Davis and
myself protested, and I stated that I believed a portion of Van Dorn's
force was then in our rear. The rear of Curtis's Army was in a great deal
of confusion; its trains were stretched out on the Fayetteville road and
the ground that we were upon was wooded and not very defensible for a
battle, unless they attacked us on the Sugar Creek front.
While we were in this council, about 8:30 a. m., scattered firing
commenced in our rear near the Elkhorn Tavern, and General Curtis inquired
what it was, and asked what troops those were that were out upon the
road. I answered that they were mine, and he ordered Colonel Carr to
immediately send me to the Elkhorn Tavern and ascertain what the firing
meant.
Colonel Carr evidently was of the same opinion as myself, and accompanied
me as I moved as rapidly as possible to the Elkhorn Tavern, where we went
without being deployed right into battle; in fact, right into the enemy's
skirmishers. The fact is, the first notice I had that the battle was on
was when a shell fell among my drummers and fifers, who were at the head
of my Regiment, and killed and demoralized them, so that we heard no more
of drumming and fifing that day. I immediately deployed a company of the
Fourth Iowa, which had been thoroughly drilled as skirmishers, and pushed
forward toward the White River road, seeing some teams of the enemy
passing that way with forage, and I pushed down the slopes of the Cross
Timber Hollows nearly a mile before I developed the enemy in force.
The firing of the artillery and the sharp skirmish firing of my movement
satisfied Colonel Carr that the enemy was in force in my front, and he
immediately sent back word for his other Brigade, Commanded by Colonel
Vandever, of the Ninth Iowa Infantry, to come to the rear, now our front.
They had hardly reached the Elkhorn Tavern and deployed into line before
Price's whole Army moved in on us in line of battle and disabled two of
our batteries. The fighting on this front, with only Carr's two Brigades
in line, the strength of both not exceeding three thousand men, was kept
up continuously all day, until dark, with varying success.
As soon as I saw, near the middle of the day, the formation of the enemy,
I knew that I could not hold the extended line we were covering, and I
commenced drawing in my right and closing on Vandever until I backed down
through an open field that had been cleared, and where the logs had been
hauled to the lower edge of the slope to make a fence. Behind these logs I
placed my Brigade and fought all the afternoon, with the enemy sometimes
around both flanks and sometimes in my rear.
Colonel Vandever held his line at the Elkhorn Tavern in the edge of thick
timber on the main Fayetteville road until late in the afternoon, fighting
desperately, when the enemy, taking advantage of the timber as a blind, by
largely superior numbers, drove him back across an open field to a line of
woods in his rear and in my rear, which he successfully held. I was not
aware of his movement until the fire in that direction slackened, and I
sent out my adjutant, Lieutenant James A. Williamson (afterwards a Brevet
Major-General), who returned and reported that the enemy were in
possession of that field; in fact, he ran right into them and received
their fire, but got back to me safely. It was then nearly dark. The fire
on my front had slackened, and my Brigade was almost entirely out of
ammunition. I immediately ordered them to form in column and led them
right out from the right, moving in the direction where Vandever's Brigade
had formed in its new position. As I moved out I passed right in sight of
a column of the Confederate forces, who evidently had come out of the
hollow and were forming to again attack Vandever. They probably thought I
was a portion of their force, for they made no demonstration towards me,
and I passed right by them. As I passed out into the open I could see that
General Asboth, who had been brought there by General Curtis, was forming
to attack at the Elkhorn Tavern again; and I met General Curtis, who
seemed astonished to find me with my force intact. He asked me where I was
going. I told him that I was out of ammunition, and that I was bringing
out my force to form it on the new line. Paying the command a high
compliment, he immediately ordered me to fix bayonets and to charge on the
enemy at the same time that Asboth with his reinforcement moved down the
Fayetteville road towards the Elkhorn Tavern. I immediately did this, and
passed right back over the field where I had been fighting, but found no
enemy. They had evidently left my front at the same time I retired, and I
returned and went into line on the right of Vandever's Brigade, probably
500 feet in the rear of the original line, and there we laid all night
under arms.
Van Dorn's plan of attack was to throw the Arkansas forces under
McCullough and McIntosh on Curtis's right, facing the Little Cross Hollow
road, while at the same time General Price with his force moved around us
by the Little Cross Timber road to our rear and attacked from the Cross
Timbers.
When passing through Little Cross Timber Hollow Price struck the timber
blockade, and, as he shows in his report, was held there for a long time
before he could clear out the roads and get his forces and artillery
through. This delayed his attack in the rear until nearly 10 o'clock in
the morning. The two forces of McCullough and Price were separated by a
high ridge by the name of Pea Ridge, over which it was impracticable for
them to connect, and, therefore, the two attacks were separate and not in
concert.
General McCullough, in attacking from the west, struck General Jeff C.
Davis's Division. Davis had a Division of troops that had been thoroughly
drilled. He was a very competent officer and handled them with great
skill, and the attack of McCullough and McIntosh, though desperate, was
without avail, both rebel commanders being killed in the attack, which
took all the fight out of the Arkansas troops and made their attacks
towards evening of very little effect. Davis pursued them so energetically
that after the death of their commanders they straggled off towards
Arkansas and no more fighting occurred on that flank.
General Siegel's two Divisions had remained facing Sugar Creek. General
Curtis had endeavored to bring them forward, but without avail. A Brigade
of General Osterhaus's Division aided General Davis during the latter part
of the day, but the Brigade from Asboth's Division did not get into line
to help Carr until nearly dark, although General Curtis went in person for
them. Colonel Carr's troops had been marching two nights before the
battle, and on the night of the 7th he asked General Curtis to relieve
them, so they could get some sleep. General Curtis promised they should be
relieved by one of General Siegel's Divisions, but they held the line all
that night right where they were formed, and when we looked for our relief
the next morning we learned that General Siegel and his troops were nearly
a mile in our rear, taking their breakfast.
The general plan of General Curtis's attack on the morning of the 8th was
for a combined movement on Price's Army by both of General Siegel's
Divisions, and General Davis, who had been brought over to our front,
holding Carr's Division in reserve. We waited a long time for General
Siegel to get into position; and in fact before he got into position
Colonel Carr had been brought out from the reserve and placed on the right
of Davis. The enemy opened out upon us, and my Brigade holding the right I
commenced swinging my line in over the ground I had fought over the day
before, and discovered that the enemy were withdrawing from us; were not
standing and giving battle; and the fighting on the morning of the 8th was
merely a fight of Price's rear-guard to enable him to withdraw by the
Huntsville road, he having received orders that morning from Van Dorn to
do so, Van Dorn notifying Price that this was necessary, as the Arkansas
troops, after the death of McCullough and McIntosh, had most of them
retreated to the south, leaving Price's Army the only force intact in our
rear, so that he now had the difficult problem of getting away from us.
The fighting lasted but a short time, mostly with artillery, and
occasioned very little loss for that day. We soon discovered the rebels
fleeing over the hills and down the White River Road, and being nearest to
that road I immediately started my Brigade after them. I had not proceeded
far when I received an order from General Curtis to return and hold the
battle-field. I was a good deal astonished at this, as I could see the
enemy demoralized in my front, with their baggage-trains and their
artillery, and I had no doubt, (as I knew the country, having had a
detachment stationed at Blackburn's Mills, at the crossing of White River,
supplying our Army with forage and grain before the battle,) that I could
capture this portion of the army before it could make a crossing of White
River.
When I arrived on the battle-field General Curtis told me that General
Siegel and his Divisions had gone to the rear towards Cassville; in fact,
I myself heard him give one of the Brigades that was passing an order to
halt there, which they did not obey, but kept on. General Siegel wrote
back advising Curtis to form his new line in the rear of Cross Timbers, as
Van Dorn might return to the fight, but Curtis instructed Colonel Carr's
Division to remain on the field and hold it, which it did. General Curtis
afterwards made very severe complaints to General Halleck of the actions
of General Siegel, and in answer General Halleck wrote as follows:
I was by no means surprised at General Siegel's conduct before the
battle of Pea Ridge. It was plainly in keeping with what he did at
Carthage and Wilson's Creek. After your expedition started I received
documentary proof from Captains Sturgis, Schofield, and Totten, and a
number of other officers, in regard to his conduct on those occasions,
which destroyed all confidence in him. It was for that reason that I
telegraphed to you so often not to let Siegel separate from you. I
anticipated that he would try to play you a trick by being absent at
the critical moment. I wished to forewarn you of the snare, but I
could not then give you my reasons. I am glad you prevented his
project and saved your army. I cannot describe to you how much
uneasiness I felt for you. You saved your army and won a glorious
victory by refusing to take his advice.
Captain Kinsman, of Company B, Fourth Iowa, who was holding Pea Ridge, and
witnessed the battle from that point, and could look down upon Carr's
Division, described the battle in the rear as follows:
At 8:30 o'clock Colonel Dodge opened the ball, and the battle was soon
raging all along the line with a fierceness and obstinacy which omened
a terrific struggle. The weather was splendid, and the smoke instead
of hanging murkily among the trees, rose rapidly and rolled away over
the hills in dense sulphurous masses. The thunder of the artillery was
terrific, and the shot and shell hissed and screamed through the air
like flying devils, while the infantry of both armies, with their
rifles, shot-guns, and muskets, kept a perfect hurricane of death
howling through the woods. The rebels fought well, but generally fired
too high, and their batteries, although getting our range accurately,
missed the elevation much of the time. Their poor shooting was our
salvation. Had they done as well as our men, with the tremendous odds
against us, they must have annihilated us. The enemy were clear around
our right flank, enveloping us, and it looked as though they would
capture Dodge's Brigade, when Colonel Dodge took a battalion of
Colonel Carr's regiment, the Third Illinois cavalry, and charged the
forces that were turning our right flank like a whirlwind. Everything
gave way before them. Every man in that battalion seemed to ride for
his life, and they swept way around our front, routing and
demoralizing that flank of the enemy, and effectually freeing our rear
and flank. Price told some of our boys of the Fourth Iowa who were
captured on the day of the fight and have since escaped, that we
fought more like devils than human beings. The rebel colonels (several
of them) inquired of our boys who those black-coated fellows were, and
who led them. They said there must have been at least 3,000 of them.
When the boys told them there were less than 600 of them, the Colonels
said they needn't tell them any such stuff as that; that they knew it
was a damned lie. But they sent their compliments to Colonel Dodge for
the bravery of himself and his command, and well they might, for
opposed to Colonel Dodge's Brigade of 1,050 men, and two guns of the
First Iowa Battery, were six regiments of Confederate troops, a large
force of Confederate Missouri State troops, and eighteen guns, and
many of these Confederate troops were the men who did the hard
fighting at the Wilson Creek battle. All day, from 8:30 in the morning
till 5:30 at night, Dodge's Brigade held its ground, dealing death
into the rebel ranks, and, when dark came, with ammunition expended,
the Fourth Iowa walked away from the field in good order, with the
sullen savage tread of men who might be driven by main strength, but
could not be conquered. Although this was one of the first battles of
the war, the Northern men showed their desperate fighting qualities;
and on the second day the South met and faced great slaughter.
Fayel, the correspondent of the Missouri Democrat, gives this account of
the part Colonel Eugene A. Carr's Fourth Iowa Division took in the battle
at Elk Horn Tavern:
Having given an account of the battle fought by Brigadier-General Jeff
C. Davis's Division, which occurred the same day, on our left, I will
now attempt to give some details of the Elk Horn Battle--the latter
having commenced early in the morning. First in order comes a
description of the locality near Elk Horn Tavern.
The house is on the Fayetteville and Springfield road, about four
miles north of Sugar Creek, between which two points our camp was
pitched, on the elevated ridge constituting the northern bank of the
creek. Leading north from the tavern, the road drops into the head of
the long gorge running towards Keetsville seven miles, known as the
"Cross Timbers."
Into the strong fastness north of the Tavern the enemy had obtained a
lodgment from 10,000 to 15,000 strong in the rear of our wing, on the
morning of the 7th. His strength consisted in part of the following
rebel Divisions, as was subsequently ascertained: Frost's, Slack's,
Parson's, and Rains's; and the batteries of Ghebor, Clark (six
pieces), E. McDonald (three pieces), and Wade (four pieces). There was
present also one Regiment of Indians, the whole commanded by General
Van Dorn in person, and General Price, who directs the Missouri
forces.
Early in the morning, while General Curtis was in consultation with
his officers regarding a change of front, consequent on the approach
of the enemy on the west of us, news came that the enemy were in close
vicinity to the Elk Horn Tavern. The General then immediately ordered
Colonel Carr to proceed to effect a dislodgment of the enemy. The
formidable numbers present at the time not being known, Colonel Carr
directed Colonel Dodge, with the First Brigade of the Fourth Division,
to take a position near the Elkhorn Tavern, Colonel Carr accompanying
the expedition himself. The point indicated was about a mile and a
half distant from our camp, the ground being level and gradually
ascending, with open fields on either side of the road, interspersed
with an occasional belt of timber.
Colonel Dodge having discovered the enemy in the timber to the right,
opened the First Iowa Battery on them, causing considerable execution;
two rebels on horseback were seen to fall, and the rest fled. The
enemy having fled to the hollow, Colonel Dodge deployed his line,
covering as much ground as possible, the Thirty-fifth Illinois being
on his left. He sent forward a company of skirmishers from the Fourth
Iowa, who soon became sharply engaged with the enemy and the latter
opened on us a perfect tornado of round shot, shell, and grape. The
Thirty-fifth Illinois became engaged, fighting with determined
bravery, and about, this time Colonel Smith was wounded in the head by
a shell, which took off a part of his scalp. He also received a bullet
in his shoulder, and his horse was shot under him, all about the same
time. Just before he was wounded, several ammunition-chests exploded,
one after the other, wounding Captain Jones and Lieutenant Gamble, who
were standing near Colonel Carr, the latter making a fortunate escape.
The explosion of a caisson was terrific.
There was a short lull in the storm of leaden hail, during which time
the enemy advanced up the hollow through the brush, along the main
road, when Colonel Vandever, who had arrived, ordered forward the
infantry. A desperate conflict with small arms ensued. Back rolled the
tide of battle, the enemy being driven to the foot of the hill, when
he reopened the batteries. Our men fought like heroes; many fell
covered with wounds. The latter, when brought to the rear by their
comrades, encouraged those who were still breasting the fierce
cannonade, by hurrahing for the Union.
Colonel Vandever, in leading forward his brigade, had his horse hit
twice, and Colonel Phelps, in the van of his own Regiment, had three
horses shot under him. Major Geiger, of the same Regiment, and Captain
Hayden, of the Dubuque Battery, had two horses shot under them. Major
Coyle, of the Ninth Iowa, was wounded in the leg.
Colonel Dodge having discovered that the enemy were preparing for a
general attack, changed his front to the right, covering his men with
a log fence, thus compelling the enemy to cross an open field to reach
him. Our line was formed and we opened fire with one section of a
battery, the other pieces having left the field for want of
ammunition. The enemy advanced on our right, left, and center, under
cover of a destructive fire, poured in on our works under twelve
pieces of artillery. The fighting now lasted over two hours, during
which time we held our position; only one Brigade contending against
at least six thousand rebel infantry and a heavy bombardment from
their artillery, the latter playing upon us at short range. Our men
fought like heroes without wincing under the galling fire belching
forth from behind trees and rocks, and much of the time from a
concealed foe. At one time we were reinforced by three rifled pieces
from a German battery, which fired four rounds, and then was compelled
to withdraw from the field, being flanked by a Regiment of the enemy.
Colonel Dodge, in order to discover the position of the enemy on his
right, directed his firing to cease, when a thousand rebel plush caps
and black broad brims popped up into view from the bushes, and,
forming, they advanced with great confidence to within one hundred
feet of our line. Our men were then ordered to pour in a fire on the
dastardly enemy, taking good aim. They were thrown into confusion by
our murderous volley and fled.
Their places were filled by a fresh Regiment, and Colonel Dodge,
finding that the enemy were outflanking him on the right and that his
force was too weak to permit an extension of his line, sent for and
soon received a reinforcement of five companies of the Eighth Indiana,
which were posted on the right. The firing now became terrific. The
enemy annoyed us severely by placing a battery on our left, which
completely enfiladed our line. The Fourth Iowa now getting short of
ammunition, and the Thirty-fifth Illinois having been forced to give
way on the left, it was at this critical time that Lieutenant-Colonel
Challenor was ordered to rally his men, who were hurled on the enemy,
driving his left back a short distance. Having advanced too far, the
Lieutenant-Colonel was surrounded and captured with forty of his men.
Our ammunition, as before stated, having given out, we fell back to
the open field, maintaining our line of battle in splendid order. The
enemy rushed forward with their batteries and entire force. The Fourth
Iowa halted, turned on them, and checked for a time their advance
until the last round of ammunition was exhausted. General Curtis
coming up about this stage of the action, was received with a round of
cheers from our boys. The General learning that the ammunition had
given out, ordered the Fourth Iowa to fix bayonets and charge on the
enemy. The men did so briskly, across the field, but found no enemy.
On Colonel Vandever's front the enemy now commenced swarming up the
road and along the gorge, and out of the brush in front of us. Our
troops fought them bravely, the officers exposing their persons in
leading in front of their men; but we were overwhelmed at this time by
superior numbers. We retreated across the field, but rallied again
along the fence behind our original position. Upon retiring as above
mentioned, reinforcements were seen coming up under General Asboth. In
a gallant attempt to resist the advancing column of the enemy, General
Asboth received a severe wound in the arm. After the terrible conflict
of the day our gallant troops bivouacked in front of the enemy,
awaiting the reopening of the conflict in the morning.
Colonel Vandever fought Little's Division. Colonel Dodge's Brigade
contended in the morning directly with Rain's and Clark's Divisions,
both immediately under the direction of Sterling Price. The latter had
his position for some time behind young Clarke's battery.
The enemy fired wagon-nuts, pieces of chain, marble, gravel, and all
sorts of projectiles. The overcoat worn by Colonel Dodge was perfectly
riddled by the jagged holes made by these unusual missiles.
Colonel Dodge, the day after the battle, received a letter from a
widow lady in Illinois, stating that she had three sons in the field
fighting for the Union; that her youngest son, who was in feeble
health, was in his Brigade, and she asked it as a special favor to her
in her loneliness to have him discharged. The young man whose mother
had such solicitude in his behalf was named Preston Green, and was
killed in the action of the 7th, near Elkhorn, while bravely
performing his duty.
During the battle, Colonel Dodge's horse was shot under him. An
enlisted man, detailed as clerk in the Adjutant's office, was acting
as orderly for Colonel Dodge. When his horse fell, he ordered the
orderly to dismount and give him his horse. The orderly said, "You
will be killed if you get on another horse; this is the third you have
lost." But the orderly dismounted and stood where the Colonel had
stood when he asked for the horse, and at that moment was instantly
killed by a shot from the enemy. After the battle, the Adjutant,
Lieutenant Williamson, found in the orderly's desk a note in which he
said he was sure he would be killed in the battle, and in which, also,
he left directions as to the disposal of his effects and whom to write
to.
In General Price's command there was a Regiment or more of Indians
commanded by Colonel Albert B. Pike. They crawled up through the thick
timber and attacked my extreme left. I saw them and turned one of the guns
of my battery on them, and they left. We saw no more of them, but they
scalped and mutilated some of our dead. General Curtis entered a complaint
to General Price, who answered that they were not of his command, and that
they had scalped some of his dead, and he said he did not approve of their
being upon the field. They evidently scalped many of the dead, no matter
what side they belonged to.
The battle of Pea Ridge being one of the first of the war and one of
unquestioned victory, had a great deal of attention called to it, and for
months--in fact for years, and, I think even now--was considered to have
been won by General Siegel. The proper credit was not given to General
Curtis, while the history and records of the battle show that he was
entitled to all of the credit, and fought the battle in opposition to
Siegel's views. A statement of the losses shows what commands fought the
battle. The total force engaged on our side, according to General Curtis's
report, was 10,500 men, formed in four Divisions, Siegel's two Divisions
being the largest, the Third and Fourth Divisions having less than 2,000
men each. The losses were:
First Division,* commanded by Osterhaus 144
Second Division,* commanded by Asboth 119
Third Division, commanded by Colonel Jeff C. Davis 329
Fourth Division, commanded by Colonel Carr 701
*Divisions were commanded by General Siegel.
Van Dorn's and Price's reports of the battle show how great their defeat
was, and why it was, and while for some time General Curtis called
anxiously on Halleck for more reinforcements, demanding that the column
which was marching South in Kansas be sent to him, Van Dorn and Price,
from the time they left the field, never stopped until they landed at
Memphis, Tenn., their first movement being towards Pocahontas, with a view
of attacking Pope in the rear, who was at New Madrid. Finding New Madrid
captured, they turned their forces to Desarc, and were then transported by
boats to Memphis. This relieved Missouri of any Confederate force in or
near its border, and General Halleck immediately gave General Curtis
orders to move on the flank of Van Dorn and keep up with him, but through
that swampy, hilly country it was impossible for him to meet Van Dorn, and
Curtis with his Army finally landed at Helena, Ark., and most of it joined
the Vicksburg siege.
Captain Phil Sheridan was the Quartermaster and Commissary of General
Curtis's Army. He kept us in flour, meat, and meal, and sometimes had my
whole regiment detailed in running and protecting mills, driving cattle,
etc. He had great difficulty in obtaining details, as at that early day a
good many commanders, and especially General Siegel and his officers, did
not think it the duty of a soldier to be detailed on anything but a
soldier's duty; so Sheridan naturally came to me, as he was my
Quartermaster while I commanded the post at Rolla, and when with the
marching column he camped and tented with me. Sheridan and Curtis had
considerable difficulty, and Curtis relieved him and ordered him to report
to General Halleck, at St. Louis. We who knew Sheridan's ability, and the
necessities of our Army, did all we could to hold him with us. He left us
just before the Battle of Pea Ridge, and our Army saw a great difference
after he was gone. He used to say to me, "Dodge, if I could get into the
line I believe I could do something;" and his ambition was to get as high
a rank as I then had and as large a command--a Colonel commanding a
Brigade. In his memoirs he pays the Fourth Iowa a great compliment, and
says they will have a warm place in his heart during his life.
During the Battle of Pea Ridge Sheridan was at Springfield, Mo., preparing
to turn over his property to the officer who was to relieve him, and he
there showed his soldierly qualities. The dispatches from Curtis's army
had to be relayed at Springfield. The first dispatches after the battle
were sent all in praise of General Siegel, and by portions of his command,
claiming he had won the battle. Sheridan, knowing this to be untrue,
withheld the Siegel dispatches until the telegrams from General Curtis to
General Halleck were received, and sent them forward first,
notwithstanding the fact that he felt he had been unjustly treated by
General Curtis.
This Army had no water or rail communication. It was 300 miles from its
nearest supply-depot, and therefore it had to live off of a country that
was sparsely settled by poor people; but Sheridan showed that dominant
combination of enterprise and energy, by running every mill and using
every means of supply within fifty miles of us, that he developed so fully
later in the war. He kept us and our stock fairly well supplied; as I
remember, there were no complaints. When General Curtis concluded to
relieve him, I went with others and endeavored to induce him to change his
mind. I had had experience and knew what it was to have an Army well fed a
long ways from its base, and I felt that if we lost Sheridan we would
suffer, which later proved to be the case; but General Curtis did not
listen to us. In fact, he was angry at our appeal, and his Adjutant,
General McKinney, came to see us afterwards and urged us not to press the
matter; if we did, he said, we might go to the rear with Sheridan.
At the Battle of Pea Ridge and during the campaign we were very destitute
of all hospital appliances for the care of the wounded, and the ability
and ingenuity of our medical staff in supplying our wants was inestimable.
The day after the battle, when we had all our own wounded and so many of
the enemy's with us, Mrs. Governor Phelps, the wife of Governor Phelps, of
Missouri, who commanded the Twenty-fifth Missouri Infantry, arrived on the
field with a general supply of sanitary goods, a part of which had been
sent to my Regiment from Philadelphia by the father and mother of Captain
Ford, who was then a Lieutenant in Company B, Fourth Iowa Infantry. These
were a great relief, as fully one-third of my command were killed and
wounded, and were suffering for want of this class of goods. Mrs. Phelps
spent her time day and night on the field aiding the surgeons and
succoring the wounded.
General Curtis endeavored to send all the wounded to the rear who could
stand the trip. I was hauled 250 miles over a rough road in an ambulance,
and if any of you have had the same experience you can judge what I
suffered. Captain Burton, of my Regiment, who was severely wounded in the
arm, sat on the front seat of that ambulance the whole distance, and never
murmured, although he came near losing his arm from the exposure. It was
during this ambulance trip, while lying on my back, that I received a
telegraphic dispatch from General Halleck notifying me of my promotion for
services in this battle. It was thought, and was also stated in the
papers, that I could not live, and I told General Halleck afterwards that
they expected to have the credit of making a Brigadier-General and at the
same time to have a vacancy, too, but that on the vacancy I fooled them,
for the promotion insured my getting well.
This campaign demonstrated early in the war what could be accomplished by
a small Army 300 miles away from any rail or water communication, in a
rugged, mountainous, sparsely settled county, marching in winter, and
virtually subsisting upon the country. Nothing escaped that Army that was
eatable.
The Battle of Pea Ridge was fought by the two Divisions commanded by Carr
and Davis, not exceeding 6,000 men, and it is a lesson in war that is very
seldom appreciated: that no one can tell what the result of a battle may
be, and that even where forces are very wide apart in numbers it is not
always the larger force that wins. In this battle Van Dorn had put twice
as many men into the fight as Curtis did, and still was defeated. His
dividing his force and attacking our Army at two different points was
fatal to his success, as General Curtis had the inside line and could move
from one part of his command to another within an hour, while for Van Dorn
to move from one portion of his Army to the other would have taken at
least half a day, and therefore he was whipped in detail. If he had thrown
his whole force upon Curtis's right flank at the point where McCullough
fought and was overwhelmed by Davis's Division, there would have been
great danger of our Army being defeated, or at least forced to the rear.
There was no strategy nor tactics in this battle; it was simply men
standing up and giving and taking, and the one that stood the longest won
the battle. The only strategy or tactics was the movement of Van Dorn
attacking on the right flank and in the rear, and these moves were fatal
to his success. Curtis's Army fought each man for himself. Every commander
fought his own part of the battle to the best of his ability, and I think
the feeling of all was that unless they won they would have to go to
Richmond, as the enemy was in the rear, which fact made us desperate in
meeting and defeating the continued attacks of the enemy. I sent for
reinforcements once when the enemy was clear around my right flank and in
my rear, and they sent me a part of the Eighth Indiana, two companies of
the Third Illinois Cavalry, and a section of a battery. The battery fought
ten minutes under a heavy fire. The four companies of the Eighth Indiana
lined up alongside the Fourth Iowa, and stayed there fighting bravely
until the end. The Third Illinois held my right flank. The officer who
brought this force to me was Lieutenant Shields, of my own Regiment, who
was acting as aid on Colonel Carr's staff. As he rode up to me to report
the Eighth Indiana he halted alongside of me, and at the same instant both
of our horses fell dead without a struggle--something very unusual. I was
quick, and jumped clear of my horse, but Shields's horse fell upon him. I
walked away, not thinking of Shields; but he called back to me and said,
"Colonel, you are not going to leave me this way are you?" and I returned
and helped him from under his horse. An examination of the two horses made
the next day, showed that they must have been killed by the same bullet,
which passed through their necks at the same place, killing them
instantly.
A log house was used by us early in the morning as a temporary hospital.
When my skirmishers fell back this log house was left in the lines of the
enemy, and Hospital Steward Baker, of the Fourth Iowa, was left in charge
of the wounded there. When General Price came up he asked him who those
black-coated devils were, and when Baker told him there were only six
hundred he did not believe him. He said no six hundred men could stand
such attacks, and paid the Brigade a very high compliment for their
fighting, and told Baker to give them his compliments.
I never returned to this Army, but many of the troops who fought so
gallantly fought afterwards in Corps and Armies that I was connected with.
My own Regiment went into battle with 548 rank and file present. Company B
was on detailed service holding Pea Ridge, and had no casualties in line
of battle. My Regiment was greatly reduced from sickness and men on
furlough, but the bravery and steadiness with which those with me fought
was a surprise and a great satisfaction to me. One-third of them fell, and
not a straggler left the field. I had drilled the Regiment to most all
kinds of conditions--in the open, in the woods--and many complained, and
thought I was too severe, as many Regiments at the posts where they were
stationed only had the usual exercises; but after this, their first
battle, they saw what drilling, maneuvers, and discipline meant, and they
had nothing but praise for the severe drilling I had given them. They
never fell under my command again, but on every field that they fought
they won the praise of their commanders, and General Grant ordered that
they should place on their banners, "First at Chickasaw Bayou."
I have never thought that General Curtis has received the credit he was
entitled to for this campaign and battle. With 12,000 men he traversed
Missouri into Arkansas, living off the country, and showing good judgment
in concentrating to meet Van Dorn and refusing to retreat when urged to do
so at the conference at the log schoolhouse on the morning of the 7th. The
night of the 7th I know some officers thought we ought to try to cut
ourselves out to the East, Price being in our rear; but Curtis said he
would fight where we were. He then had no knowledge of the condition of
the enemy. On the morning of the 8th he brought General Siegel's two
Divisions into the fight and concentrated on Price, whose fighting was
simply to cover his retreat. General Curtis failed to reap the full
benefit of the battle because Siegel went to Cassville, leaving only
Davis's and Carr's Divisions on the field. We who took part in this
campaign appreciate the difficulties and obstacles Curtis had to overcome,
and how bravely and efficiently he commanded, and we honor him for it. So
did General Halleck; but the Government, for some reason, failed to give
him another command in the field, though they retained him in command of
departments to the end of the war.
[Illustration: SYLVANUS DODGE