The Southwest became prominent before the nation early in the war from the
doubt existing as to the position of Missouri, which was saved by the
energy and determination of Frank P. Blair and Colonel Nathaniel Lyon; the
latter first capturing Camp Jackson, on May 10th, 1861. He then, picking
up what force he could without waiting for them to be disciplined or
drilled, marched rapidly against the Missouri State troops under Price,
who were driven to the southwest through Springfield, where, being joined
by the troops from Arkansas, under Colonel McCullough, they stood and
fought the battle of Wilson's Creek. This would have been a great victory
for the Union forces if Lyon had not divided his forces at the request of
General Siegel and trusted the latter to carry out his plan of attack in
the rear while Lyon attacked in the front. This General Siegel failed to
do, leaving the field when the battle was half over, and allowing Lyon to
fight it out alone. Even then, if Lyon had not been killed at the head of
his Army while fighting the whole force of the enemy, it would have turned
out to be a great victory for the Union forces, and would have held that
country. The death of Lyon caused a return of his troops to Rolla and
Sedalia, and opened up again the whole of Missouri to the Missouri State
troops under General Price.
One of the notable facts of this battle of Wilson's Creek was that it was
fought by young officers who ranked only as Captains and Lieutenants, all
of whom afterwards became distinguished officers in the war--Schofield,
Sturgis, Totten, DuBois, and Sweeny--and from the fact that in the first
great battle of the Southwest one of the two commanders of Armies falling
at the head of their forces in battle was killed here--General Lyon. The
other was General McPherson, who fell at Atlanta.
Lyon pursued the tactics of Grant by attacking the enemy wherever to be
found, and not taking into consideration the disparity of forces. The
excitement caused by Lyon's campaigns induced the Government to create
the Western Department, and assign to it on July 25th, 1861, General John
C. Fremont as its commander.
In August, 1861, I landed in St. Louis with my Regiment, the Fourth Iowa
Infantry, and soon after was sent to Rolla, Mo., which was then the most
important outpost, being the nearest to the enemy's Army. Soon after I
reached there General Fremont commenced formulating his plans for the
campaign in the South, and being the commander of that outpost I was in
daily communication with him. There was a constant stream of reports
coming from the enemy's lines that seemed to give great importance to
their strength and their position, and I was continually ordered to send
out scouts and troops to test the information. I invariably found it wrong
and my telegrams will show my opinion of those reports.
Soon after arriving at Rolla I was placed in command of the post, and had
quite a force under me, and was ordered to prepare to winter there.
The battle of Wilson's Creek was fought on August 10th, and soon
thereafter General Price formed his plan of campaign to move north into
north Missouri and endeavor to hold it by the recruits that he could
obtain there. With from five to ten thousand men of the Missouri State
Guards, General Price moved, and as he marched north in September his Army
increased heavily in numbers and enthusiasm. The Federal forces were
scattered all over Missouri--some eighty thousand in all. At least half of
these could have been concentrated to operate against any force of the
enemy, but they were all protecting towns, cities and railways and
endeavoring to make Missouri loyal, while Price concentrated and moved
where he pleased, until, on September 21, 1861, he captured Lexington,
with some 3,000 or more prisoners. The movement of Price on Lexington and
the defeat and capture of our forces there, forced Fremont to concentrate,
and he moved with four Divisions, making an Army of 38,000, on
Springfield, which he reached October 27th. Price was then far south of
that place. Had our forces been concentrated to meet Price's Army we had
enough to defeat him; but the moment Fremont commenced concentrating his
four Divisions to act against him, Price moved back as fast as he had
advanced, and did not stop until he was south of Springfield and near
supports in Arkansas.
General McCullough, in his letters from Springfield, Mo., August 24th,
says that there were only 3,000 troops in Springfield and all the Arkansas
troops had left the service. Price's total force was about 12,000 men, and
on November 7th he reached and joined McCullough and suggested to General
A. S. Johnston a campaign against St. Louis, offering to raise in Missouri
and Arkansas a force of 25,000 men in such a campaign, and stated he
should wait for Fremont at Pineville, Ark., believing in that rugged
country he could defeat him.
While at Rolla I was ordered to send a force to take Salem, to the south
of me, and I entrusted the command of the force to Colonel Greusel, of the
Thirteenth Illinois Infantry. I issued to him the following instructions:
If the men who are away from home are in the rebel Army, or if their
families cannot give a good account of them or their whereabouts, take
their property or that portion of it worth taking; also their slaves.
Be sure that they are aiding the enemy, then take all they have got.
When I wrote these instructions I had not considered for a moment what a
row the order to take the slaves would cause. I simply treated them as
other property. It was written innocently, but made a sensation I never
dreamed of, and I have often since been quoted as one of the first to
liberate and utilize the negro.
On the return of Lyon's Army to Rolla I was ordered by General Fremont to
report at his headquarters in St. Louis. On my arrival in St. Louis I
reported myself to his Adjutant, who was in the basement of the old home
of Thomas A. Benton, on Choutau Avenue, but was unable to obtain an
interview with the General. I showed my dispatch to his Adjutant-General,
and waited there two days. I met any number of staff officers, and was
handed about from one to another, never reaching or hearing from General
Fremont. After remaining in St. Louis two days I considered it was my duty
to return to my command, and left a note to the Adjutant stating that I
had waited there two days for an interview with General Fremont, and had
left for my command, and that if wanted would return to St. Louis again.
Evidently no communication was made to Fremont of my presence in the city
or of my note, for soon after I arrived at Rolla I received a sharp note
from him asking why I had not reported as ordered. I answered by wire that
I had reported, had been unable to see him, and would report immediately
again in St. Louis. I was determined to see him this time, and I,
therefore, went directly to Colonel Benton's house, and, taking a sealed
envelope in my hand, marched right up the front steps, passed all the
guards as though I belonged there, and went into his room and reported
myself present. I there learned from him as much of his plans as he
thought best to give me in regard to his movements, and obtained from him
the information that Price's Army was not far from Rolla, and instructions
to be on the alert. I supposed that my command at Rolla was to accompany
his march to Springfield, and on my return to Rolla made every preparation
to do so, but never received the order. Everything in the department was
absolutely chaos. It was impossible to obtain provisions, accouterments,
equipment, or anything else upon a proper requisition. Everything seemed
to require an order from one of General Fremont's staff, and my own
Regiment suffered a long time before I could get for it the necessary
arms, clothing, equipment, etc.
While I was at Rolla the dispatch sent by the Government to General
Curtis, to be forwarded to Fremont at Springfield, relieving him of the
command, was brought by a staff officer to me with the request that I
should see that the staff officer had an escort and went through promptly
to Springfield. General Curtis, who was from my own state, wrote me a
private note stating the importance of pushing this staff officer through.
President Lincoln sent the order to General Curtis with this peculiar
note:
WASHINGTON, October 24, 1861.
_Brigadier-General S. R. Curtis_:
MY DEAR SIR:--Herewith is a document, half letter, half order, which,
wishing you to see but not to make public, I send unsealed. Please
read it and then inclose it to the officer who may be in command of
the Department of the West at the time it reaches you. I cannot know
now whether Fremont or Hunter will then be in command. Yours truly,