was sagacious enough to perceive that nothing
could be gained by open declaration of hostility to the
reigning prince: the choice had been a deliberate act on
the part of Russia, and Elizabeth Petrowna was not the 15
person to recall her own favors with levity or upon slight
grounds. Openly, therefore, to have declared his enmity
toward his relative on the throne, could have had no effect
but that of arming suspicions against his own ulterior
purposes in a quarter where it was most essential to his 20
interest that, for the present, all suspicions should be
hoodwinked. Accordingly, after much meditation, the
course he took for opening his snares was this:--He
raised a rumor that his own life was in danger from the
plots of several Saissang (that is, Kalmuck nobles), who 25
were leagued together under an oath to assassinate him;
and immediately after, assuming a well-counterfeited alarm,
he fled to Tcherkask, followed by sixty-five tents.
From this place he kept up a correspondence with the
Imperial Court, and, by way of soliciting his cause more 30
effectually, he soon repaired in person to St. Petersburg.
Once admitted to personal conferences with the cabinet,
he found no difficulty in winning over the Russian councils
to a concurrence with some of his political views,
and thus covertly introducing the point of that wedge
which was finally to accomplish his purposes. In particular,
he persuaded the Russian Government to make a
very important alteration in the constitution of the Kalmuck
State Council which in effect reorganized the whole 5
political condition of the state and disturbed the balance
of power as previously adjusted. Of this council--in
the Kalmuck language called Sarga--there were eight
members, called Sargatchi; and hitherto it had been the
custom that these eight members should be entirely subordinate 10
to the Khan; holding, in fact, the ministerial
character of secretaries and assistants, but in no respect
ranking as co-ordinate authorities. That had produced
some inconveniences in former reigns; and it was easy
for Zebek-Dorchi to point the jealousy of the Russian 15
Court to others more serious which might arise in future
circumstances of war or other contingencies. It was
resolved, therefore, to place the Sargatchi henceforward
on a footing of perfect independence, and, therefore (as
regarded responsibility), on a footing of equality with the 20
Khan. Their independence, however, had respect only
to their own sovereign; for toward Russia they were
placed in a new attitude of direct duty and accountability
by the creation in their favor of small pensions (300
roubles a year), which, however, to a Kalmuck of that 25
day were more considerable than might be supposed,
and had a further value as marks of honorary distinction
emanating from a great empress. Thus far the purposes
of Zebek-Dorchi were served effectually for the moment:
but, apparently, it was only for the moment; since, in 30
the further development of his plots, this very dependency
upon Russian influence would be the most serious
obstacle in his way. There was, however, another point
carried, which outweighed all inferior considerations, as
it gave him a power of setting aside discretionally whatsoever
should arise to disturb his plots: he was himself
appointed President and Controller of the Sargatchi.
The Russian Court had been aware of his high pretensions 5
by birth, and hoped by this promotion to satisfy
the ambition which, in some degree, was acknowledged
to be a reasonable passion for any man occupying his
situation.
Having thus completely blindfolded the Cabinet of
Russia, Zebek-Dorchi proceeded in his new character to 10
fulfil his political mission with the Khan of the Kalmucks.
So artfully did he prepare the road for his favorable
reception at the court of this prince that he was at once
and universally welcomed as a public benefactor. The
pensions of the councillors were so much additional wealth 15
poured into the Tartar exchequer; as to the ties of dependency
thus created, experience had not yet enlightened
these simple tribes as to that result. And that he himself
should be the chief of these mercenary councillors was so
far from being charged upon Zebek as any offence or any 20
ground of suspicion, that his relative the Khan returned
him hearty thanks for his services, under the belief that
he could have accepted this appointment only with a view
to keep out other and more unwelcome pretenders, who
would not have had the same motives of consanguinity or 25
friendship for executing its duties in a spirit of kindness
to the Kalmucks. The first use which he made of his
new functions about the Khan's person was to attack the
Court of Russia, by a romantic villainy not easily to be
credited, for those very acts of interference with the 30
council which he himself had prompted. This was a
dangerous step: but it was indispensable to his farther
advance upon the gloomy path which he had traced out
for himself. A triple vengeance was what he meditated:
1, upon the Russian Cabinet, for having undervalued his
own pretensions to the throne; 2, upon his amiable rival,
for having supplanted him; and 3, upon all those of the
nobility who had manifested their sense of his weakness
by their neglect or their sense of his perfidious character 5
by their suspicions. Here was a colossal outline of wickedness;
and by one in his situation, feeble (as it might
seem) for the accomplishment of its humblest parts, how
was the total edifice to be reared in its comprehensive
grandeur? He, a worm as he was, could he venture to 10
assail the mighty behemoth of Muscovy, the potentate
who counted three hundred languages around the footsteps
of his throne, and from whose "lion ramp" recoiled
alike "baptized and infidel"--Christendom on the one
side, strong by her intellect and her organization, and the 15
"barbaric East" on the other, with her unnumbered
numbers? The match was a monstrous one; but in its
very monstrosity there lay this germ of encouragement--that
it could not be suspected. The very hopelessness
of the scheme grounded his hope; and he resolved to 20
execute a vengeance which should involve as it were, in
the unity of a well-laid tragic fable, all whom he judged
to be his enemies. That vengeance lay in detaching from
the Russian empire the whole Kalmuck nation and breaking
up that system of intercourse which had thus far been 25
beneficial to both. This last was a consideration which
moved him but little. True it was that Russia to the
Kalmucks had secured lands and extensive pasturage;
true it was that the Kalmucks reciprocally to Russia had
furnished a powerful cavalry; but the latter loss would be 30
part of his triumph, and the former might be more than
compensated in other climates, under other sovereigns.
Here was a scheme which, in its final accomplishment,
would avenge him bitterly on the Czarina, and in the
course of its accomplishment might furnish him with
ample occasions for removing his other enemies. It may
be readily supposed, indeed, that he who could deliberately
raise his eyes to the Russian autocrat as an antagonist 5
in single duel with himself was not likely to feel much
anxiety about Kalmuck enemies of whatever rank. He
took his resolution, therefore, sternly and irrevocably, to
effect this astonishing translation of an ancient people
across the pathless deserts of Central Asia, intersected
continually by rapid rivers rarely furnished with bridges, 10
and of which the fords were known only to those who
might think it for their interest to conceal them, through
many nations inhospitable or hostile: frost and snow
around them (from the necessity of commencing their
flight in winter), famine in their front, and the sabre, or 15
even the artillery of an offended and mighty empress
hanging upon their rear for thousands of miles. But what
was to be their final mark--the port of shelter after so
fearful a course of wandering? Two things were evident:
it must be some power at a great distance from Russia, 20
so as to make return even in that view hopeless, and it
must be a power of sufficient rank to insure them protection
from any hostile efforts on the part of the Czarina
for reclaiming them or for chastising their revolt. Both
conditions were united obviously in the person of Kien 25
Long, the reigning Emperor of China, who was further
recommended to them by his respect for the head of
their religion. To China, therefore, and, as their first
rendezvous, to the shadow of the Great Chinese Wall, it
was settled by Zebek that they should direct their flight. 30
Next came the question of time--_when_ should the
flight commence? and, finally, the more delicate question
as to the choice of accomplices. To extend the knowledge
of the conspiracy too far was to insure its betrayal
to the Russian Government. Yet, at some stage of the
preparations, it was evident that a very extensive confidence
must be made, because in no other way could the
mass of the Kalmuck population be persuaded to furnish
their families with the requisite equipments for so long a 5
migration. This critical step, however, it was resolved
to defer up to the latest possible moment, and, at all
events, to make no general communication on the subject
until the time of departure should be definitely
settled. In the meantime, Zebek admitted only three 10
persons to his confidence; of whom Oubacha, the reigning
prince, was almost necessarily one; but him, for his
yielding and somewhat feeble character, he viewed rather
in the light of a tool than as one of his active accomplices.
Those whom (if anybody) he admitted to an unreserved 15
participation in his counsels were two only: the
great Lama among the Kalmucks, and his own father-in-law,
Erempel, a ruling prince of some tribe in the neighborhood
of the Caspian Sea, recommended to his favor
not so much by any strength of talent corresponding to 20
the occasion as by his blind devotion to himself and
his passionate anxiety to promote the elevation of his
daughter and his son-in-law to the throne of a sovereign
prince. A titular prince Zebek already was: but this
dignity, without the substantial accompaniment of a sceptre, 25
seemed but an empty sound to both of these ambitious
rebels. The other accomplice, whose name was
Loosang-Dchaltzan, and whose rank was that of Lama,
or Kalmuck pontiff, was a person of far more distinguished
pretensions; he had something of the same 30
gloomy and terrific pride which marked the character of
Zebek himself, manifesting also the same energy, accompanied
by the same unfaltering cruelty, and a natural
facility of dissimulation even more profound. It was by
this man that the other question was settled as to the
time for giving effect to their designs. His own pontifical
character had suggested to him that, in order to
strengthen their influence with the vast mob of simple-minded 5
men whom they were to lead into a howling
wilderness, after persuading them to lay desolate their
own ancient hearths, it was indispensable that they should
be able, in cases of extremity, to plead the express sanction
of God for their entire enterprise. This could only
be done by addressing themselves to the great head of 10
their religion, the Dalai-Lama of Tibet. Him they easily
persuaded to countenance their schemes: and an oracle
was delivered solemnly at Tibet, to the effect that no
ultimate prosperity would attend this great Exodus unless
it were pursued through the years of the _tiger_ and the 15
_hare_. Now the Kalmuck custom is to distinguish their
years by attaching to each a denomination taken from one
of twelve animals, the exact order of succession being
absolutely fixed, so that the cycle revolves of course
through a period of a dozen years. Consequently, if the 20
approaching year of the _tiger_ were suffered to escape
them, in that case the expedition must be delayed for
twelve years more; within which period, even were no
other unfavorable changes to arise, it was pretty well
foreseen that the Russian Government would take most 25
effectual means for bridling their vagrant propensities by
a ring-fence of forts or military posts; to say nothing of
the still readier plan for securing their fidelity (a plan
already talked of in all quarters) by exacting a large body
of hostages selected from the families of the most influential 30
nobles. On these cogent considerations, it was solemnly
determined that this terrific experiment should be
made in the next year of the _tiger_, which happened to fall
upon the Christian year 1771. With respect to the
month, there was, unhappily for the Kalmucks, even less
latitude allowed to their choice than with respect to the
year. It was absolutely necessary, or it was thought so,
that the different divisions of the nation, which pastured
their flocks on both banks of the Wolga, should have the 5
means of effecting an instantaneous junction, because
the danger of being intercepted by flying columns of the
imperial armies was precisely the greatest at the outset.
Now, from the want of bridges or sufficient river craft
for transporting so vast a body of men, the sole means 10
which could be depended upon (especially where so many
women, children, and camels were concerned) was _ice_;
and this, in a state of sufficient firmness, could not be
absolutely counted upon before the month of January.
Hence it happened that this astonishing Exodus of a 15
whole nation, before so much as a whisper of the design
had begun to circulate amongst those whom it most interested,
before it was even suspected that any man's wishes
pointed in that direction, had been definitely appointed
for January of the year 1771. And almost up to the 20
Christmas of 1770 the poor simple Kalmuck herdsmen
and their families were going nightly to their peaceful
beds without even dreaming that the _fiat_ had already
gone forth from their rulers which consigned those quiet
abodes, together with the peace and comfort which reigned 25
within them, to a withering desolation, now close at
hand.
Meantime war raged on a great scale between Russia
and the Sultan; and, until the time arrived for throwing
off their vassalage, it was necessary that Oubacha should 30
contribute his usual contingent of martial aid. Nay, it
had unfortunately become prudent that he should contribute
much more than his usual aid. Human experience
gives ample evidence that in some mysterious and
unaccountable way no great design is ever agitated, no
matter how few or how faithful may be the participators,
but that some presentiment--some dim misgiving--is
kindled amongst those whom it is chiefly important to
blind. And, however it might have happened, certain it 5
is that already, when as yet no syllable of the conspiracy
had been breathed to any man whose very existence was
not staked upon its concealment, nevertheless some vague
and uneasy jealousy had arisen in the Russian Cabinet
as to the future schemes of the Kalmuck Khan: and 10
very probable it is that, but for the war then raging, and
the consequent prudence of conciliating a very important
vassal, or, at least, of abstaining from what would powerfully
alienate him, even at that moment such measures
would have been adopted as must forever have intercepted 15
the Kalmuck schemes. Slight as were the jealousies
of the Imperial Court, they had not escaped the
Machiavelian eyes of Zebek and the Lama. And under
their guidance, Oubacha, bending to the circumstances of
the moment, and meeting the jealousy of the Russian 20
Court with a policy corresponding to their own, strove by
unusual zeal to efface the Czarina's unfavorable impressions.
He enlarged the scale of his contributions, and
_that_ so prodigiously that he absolutely carried to headquarters
a force of 35,000 cavalry, fully equipped: some 25
go further, and rate the amount beyond 40,000; but the
smaller estimate is, at all events, _within_ the truth.
With this magnificent array of cavalry, heavy as well as
light, the Khan went into the field under great expectations;
and these he more than realized. Having the 30
good fortune to be concerned with so ill-organized and
disorderly a description of force as that which at all times
composed the bulk of a Turkish army, he carried victory
along with his banners; gained many partial successes;
and at last, in a pitched battle, overthrew the Turkish
force opposed to him, with a loss of 5000 men left upon
the field.
These splendid achievements seemed likely to operate
in various ways against the impending revolt. Oubacha 5
had now a strong motive, in the martial glory acquired,
for continuing his connection with the empire in whose
service he had won it, and by whom only it could be fully
appreciated. He was now a great marshal of a great
empire, one of the Paladins around the imperial throne; 10
in China he would be nobody, or (worse than that) a mendicant
alien, prostrate at the feet, and soliciting the precarious
alms, of a prince with whom he had no connection.
Besides, it might reasonably be expected that the Czarina,
grateful for the really efficient aid given by the Tartar 15
prince, would confer upon him such eminent rewards as
might be sufficient to anchor his hopes upon Russia, and
to wean him from every possible seduction. These were
the obvious suggestions of prudence and good sense to
every man who stood neutral in the case. But they were 20
disappointed. The Czarina knew her obligations to the
Khan, but she did not acknowledge them. Wherefore?
That is a mystery perhaps never to be explained. So it
was, however. The Khan went unhonored; no _ukase_
ever proclaimed his merits; and, perhaps, had he even 25
been abundantly recompensed by Russia, there were
others who would have defeated these tendencies to
reconciliation. Erempel, Zebek, and Loosang the Lama
were pledged life-deep to prevent any accommodation;
and their efforts were unfortunately seconded by those of 30
their deadliest enemies. In the Russian Court there were
at that time some great nobles preoccupied with feelings
of hatred and blind malice toward the Kalmucks quite as
strong as any which the Kalmucks could harbor toward
Russia, and not, perhaps, so well founded. Just as much
as the Kalmucks hated the Russian yoke, their galling
assumption of authority, the marked air of disdain, as
toward a nation of ugly, stupid, and filthy barbarians,
which too generally marked the Russian bearing and 5
language, but, above all, the insolent contempt, or even
outrages, which the Russian governors or great military
commandants tolerated in their followers toward the barbarous
religion and superstitious mummeries of the Kalmuck
priesthood--precisely in that extent did the ferocity 10
of the Russian resentment, and their wrath at seeing the
trampled worm turn or attempt a feeble retaliation, react
upon the unfortunate Kalmucks. At this crisis, it is probable
that envy and wounded pride, upon witnessing the
splendid victories of Oubacha and Momotbacha over the 15
Turks and Bashkirs, contributed strength to the Russian
irritation. And it must have been through the intrigues
of those nobles about her person who chiefly smarted
under these feelings that the Czarina could ever have
lent herself to the unwise and ungrateful policy pursued 20
at this critical period toward the Kalmuck Khan. That
Czarina was no longer Elizabeth Petrowna; it was Catharine II.--a
princess who did not often err so injuriously
(injuriously for herself as much as for others) in the measures
of her government. She had soon ample reason for 25
repenting of her false policy. Meantime, how much it
must have co-operated with the other motives previously
acting upon Oubacha in sustaining his determination to
revolt, and how powerfully it must have assisted the efforts
of all the Tartar chieftains in preparing the minds of their 30
people to feel the necessity of this difficult enterprise, by
arming their pride and their suspicions against the Russian
Government, through the keenness of their sympathy
with the wrongs of their insulted prince, may be readily
imagined. It is a fact, and it has been confessed by
candid Russians themselves when treating of this great
dismemberment, that the conduct of the Russian Cabinet
throughout the period of suspense, and during the crisis
of hesitation in the Kalmuck Council, was exactly such 5
as was most desirable for the purposes of the conspirators;
it was such, in fact, as to set the seal to all their
machinations, by supplying distinct evidences and official
vouchers for what could otherwise have been at the most
matters of doubtful suspicion and indirect presumption. 10
Nevertheless, in the face of all these arguments, and
even allowing their weight so far as not at all to deny the
injustice or the impolicy of the imperial ministers, it is
contended by many persons who have reviewed the affair
with a command of all the documents bearing on the case, 15
more especially the letters or minutes of council subsequently
discovered in the handwriting of Zebek-Dorchi,
and the important evidence of the Russian captive, Weseloff,
who was carried off by the Kalmucks in their flight,
that beyond all doubt Oubacha was powerless for any 20
purpose of impeding or even of delaying the revolt. He
himself, indeed, was under religious obligations of the
most terrific solemnity never to flinch from the enterprise
or even to slacken in his zeal; for Zebek-Dorchi, distrusting
the firmness of his resolution under any unusual 25
pressure of alarm or difficulty, had, in the very earliest
stage of the conspiracy, availed himself of the Khan's
well-known superstition, to engage him, by means of previous
concert with the priests and their head, the Lama,
in some dark and mysterious rites of consecration, terminating 30
in oaths under such terrific sanctions as no Kalmuck
would have courage to violate. As far, therefore,
as regarded the personal share of the Khan in what was
to come, Zebek was entirely at his ease; he knew him to
be so deeply pledged by religious terrors to the prosecution
of the conspiracy that no honors within the Czarina's
gift could have possibly shaken his adhesion; and then,
as to threats from the same quarter, he knew him to be
sealed against those fears by others of a gloomier character, 5
and better adapted to his peculiar temperament. For
Oubacha was a brave man, as respected all bodily enemies
or the dangers of human warfare, but was as sensitive and
timid as the most superstitious of old women in
facing the frowns of a priest or under the vague anticipations 10
of ghostly retributions. But had it been otherwise,
and had there been any reason to apprehend an unsteady
demeanor on the part of this prince at the approach
of the critical moment, such were the changes already
effected in the state of their domestic politics amongst 15
the Tartars by the undermining arts of Zebek-Dorchi, and
his ally the Lama, that very little importance would have
attached to that doubt. All power was now effectually
lodged in the hands of Zebek-Dorchi. He was the true
and absolute wielder of the Kalmuck sceptre; all measures 20
of importance were submitted to his discretion, and
nothing was finally resolved but under his dictation.
This result he had brought about, in a year or two, by
means sufficiently simple: first of all, by availing himself
of the prejudice in his favor, so largely diffused amongst 25
the lowest of the Kalmucks, that his own title to the
throne in quality of great-grandson in a direct line from
Ajouka, the most illustrious of all the Kalmuck Khans,
stood upon a better basis than that of Oubacha, who
derived from a collateral branch; secondly, with respect 30
to the sole advantage which Oubacha possessed above
himself in the ratification of his title, by improving this
difference between their situations to the disadvantage
of his competitor, as one who had not scrupled to accept
that triumph from an alien power at the price of his independence,
which he himself (as he would have it understood)
disdained to court; thirdly, by his own talents
and address, coupled with the ferocious energy of his
moral character; fourthly--and perhaps in an equal 5
degree--by the criminal facility and good nature of
Oubacha; finally (which is remarkable enough, as illustrating
the character of the man), by that very new modelling
of the Sarga, or Privy Council, which he had used
as a principal topic of abuse and malicious insinuation 10
against the Russian Government, whilst, in reality, he
first had suggested the alteration to the Empress, and
he chiefly appropriated the political advantages which it
was fitted to yield. For, as he was himself appointed the
chief of the Sargatchi, and as the pensions of the inferior 15
Sargatchi passed through his hands, whilst in effect they
owed their appointments to his nomination, it may be
easily supposed that, whatever power existed in the state
capable of controlling the Khan, being held by the Sarga
under its new organization, and this body being completely 20
under his influence, the final result was to throw
all the functions of the state, whether nominally in the
prince or in the council, substantially into the hands of
this one man; whilst, at the same time, from the strict
league which he maintained with the Lama, all the thunders 25
of the spiritual power were always ready to come in
aid of the magistrate, or to supply his incapacity in cases
which he could not reach.